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2002 DIGILAW 135 (ALL)

LAKSHMI NARAYAN SHUKLA v. JOINT DIRECTOR OF EDUCATION, BASTI

2002-01-22

S.K.SINGH

body2002
S. K. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) BY means of this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 8. 3. 1999 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) by which the appeal filed by the opposite party No. 3 regarding infer se seniority dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 came to be decided in favour of the opposite party No. 3. ( 2 ) PETITIONER and the respondent No. 3 both were given appointment as Lecturer on 2. 9. 1974. Petitioner claims that he was initially appointed as Assistant Teacher in L. T. Grade on 1. 3. 1973 and was approved on that post. It is claimed that in the year. 1979 a seniority list was published by the Manager of the Institution where the petitioner was placed at S. No. 3 and the opposite party No. 3 was placed at S. No. 4, which was not objected by the opposite party No. 3. It has been further stated that in the year 1994 another seniority list was published in which also the same sequence was shown. It is in the year 1994 an objection was filed by the opposite party No. 3 on 12. 11. 1994 against the seniority list. The said objection was filed by the opposite party No. 3 before the Manager and not before the Committee of Management, which was rejected by the letter as was written by the Manager on 21. 1. 1995. It is against the letter of the Manager dated 21. 1. 1995 by which the claim of the opposite party No. 3 was rejected, respondent No. 3 filed appeal which subsequently came to be placed before the Joint Director of Education, Bastl region, who has allowed the same by his order dated 8th March, 1999 (Annexure-1 to the writ petitioner) which made the petitioner aggrieved to come up to this Court. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Shri Arvind Srlvastava. advocate assailed the order of the respondent No. 1 dated 8. 3. 1999 mainly on the following grounds : (i) The order of the respondent No. 1 besides being illegal, is in clear violation of Principles of natural Justice as petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity of hearing on the merits of the matter. In this connection it has been pointed out that on 11. 2. 3. 1999 mainly on the following grounds : (i) The order of the respondent No. 1 besides being illegal, is in clear violation of Principles of natural Justice as petitioner has not been afforded any opportunity of hearing on the merits of the matter. In this connection it has been pointed out that on 11. 2. 1999 the date fixed before the respondent No. 1 parties were asked to file their written submission and 17. 2. 1999 was fixed. On 17. 2. 1999 petitioner moved application/objection (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) In which it was specifically stated that appeal filed by the respondent No. 3 is not maintainable for various reasons stated in this objection and, therefore, first the question of maintainability of the appeal may be decided and it is only then, on the merits of the controversy the written submission and documents can be filed. On 17. 2. 1999 it is the Manager who also filed an objection (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) in which also it has been stated that the appeal filed before the respondent no. 3 is not maintainable as there Is no decision by the Committee of Management in respect to the grievance of the respondent No. 3. Learned counsel submits that thereafter the matter was never heard and no date was fixed and it is by the order dated 8. 3. 1999 the appeal has been allowed on the merits which clearly shows that petitioner has never been given opportunity of being heard on merits and he was never apprised that appeal will be decided on merits irrespective of petitioners objection about maintainability and his plea of deciding the appeal firstly on the question of maintainability. It has been further submitted that on 11. 2. 1999 Sri G. P. Dinkar. Joint Director of Education heard the matter and he asked to file written submission by 17. 2. 1999. Thereafter he was transferred and one Sri Dwarika Prasad became the officiating joint Director who never heard the matter and thus decision given by him is absolutely in violation of Principles of Natural Justice. The specific averment in this respect has been made in para 22a and 22b of the writ petition. (ii) The appeal as filed by the respondent No. 3 against the order/letter of the Manager dated 21. 1. The specific averment in this respect has been made in para 22a and 22b of the writ petition. (ii) The appeal as filed by the respondent No. 3 against the order/letter of the Manager dated 21. 1. 1995 was legally not maintainable as Regulation 3 (e) of Chapter II under the Intermediate education Act stipulates that every dispute about the seniority shall be referred to the Committee of Management who shall decide the same after giving reasons. In the present case the objection as has been filed by the respondent No. 3 clearly shows that it was addressed to the Manager who passed the order dated 21. 1. 1995 and thus passing of the order by the Manager cannot be said to be an exercise by the Committee of Management and thus as the Committee of management has not taken any decision determining the seniority between the parties the remedy of appeal cannot be invoked. (iii) It has been submitted that the material as exists on the record demonstrate that respondent no. 3 has been accepting the seniority of the petitioner since last about 20 years and therefore, after lapse of considerable long time even though it may be an incorrect arrangement, respondent no. 3 cannot be permitted to raise up the issue for unsettling the position which was continuing for the last more than 20 years. Learned counsel submits that in the attendance register from very beginning. that is, 1975 throughout the name of the petitioner finds place at S. No. 3 and the name of the respondent No. 3 at S. No. 4 and thereafter, petitioner at S. No. 2 and respondent no. 3 at S. No. 3. Learned counsel submits that respondent No. 3 never objected for any change of his position and therefore, by his conduct he has accepted the petitioner to be senior and therefore, by his act of acquisition he is estopped from challenging the petitioners seniority. Learned counsel in support of his submission placed reliance on the decision in Keshau Ram agnihotri v. District Inspector of Schools, 1998 (3) AWC 1917 (SCI: 1998 (4) SCC 72 ; Kamla sharma v. Director of Education, Agra and Ors. , 2000 (4) AWC 2. 40 (NOC) : 2000 (4) ESC 2489 and Surendra Pratap Singh v. District Inspector of Schools. Varanasi and Ors. , 1990 (1)AWC 538 : 1991 ID UPLBEC474. , 2000 (4) AWC 2. 40 (NOC) : 2000 (4) ESC 2489 and Surendra Pratap Singh v. District Inspector of Schools. Varanasi and Ors. , 1990 (1)AWC 538 : 1991 ID UPLBEC474. (iv) Lastly it has been submitted that at the time of determination of seniority between the parties the criteria of age was not in existence as at the time of appointment of the petitioner and the opposite party No. 3 as Lecturer the Rules/ Regulations were silent on this point. Learned counsel points out that on the date of appointment and approval of the petitioner and respondent no. 3 Regulation 3 (b) was not in existence and the criteria of determination of seniority was governed by the Regulation 4 of the Old Chapter I under the Intermediate Education Act which only stipulates that seniority was to be maintained between the teachers by the Manager of the institution. As the petitioner was trained lecturer he was put above to respondent No. 3 who was untrained lecturer. Learned counsel emphasise that seniority is to be determined as per Rule prevalent at the time of appointment and it cannot be effected by amendment in regulations with retrospective effect. In this connection, learned counsel refers the decision as has been given by the Apex Court in P. Mohan Reddy v. P. A. A. Charles. 2001 (2) ST 10 and Kamla Sharma v. Deputy Director of Education, 2000 (4) AWC 2. 40 (NOC) : 2000 (4) ESC 2489. ( 4 ) ON the aforesaid premises learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the decision of the respondent being contrary to law, fact and being in violation of Principles of Natural Justice, is liable to be quashed. ( 5 ) IN response to the aforesaid submission as advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, sri V. K. Shukla learned counsel who appears for respondent No. 3 has defended the action/order of the respondent No. 1 mainly on the following submissions : (i) So far the arguments of the petitioner In respect to want of opportunity is concerned learned counsel submits that petitioner was afforded full opportunity and matter was given full hearing as the arguments were heard on 11. 2. 1999. 17. 2. 1999. 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999. This averment is contained in para 34 of the counter-affidavit. 2. 1999. 17. 2. 1999. 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999. This averment is contained in para 34 of the counter-affidavit. (ii) So far the maintainability of the appeal as filed by the respondent No. 3 is concerned, learned counsel submits that Committee of Management is headed by the Manager and therefore, filing of the objection even addressed to the Manager and its decision by the Manager will be taken for and on behalf of Management and therefore, the appeal as filed by the opposite party No. 3 as decided by the respondent No. 1 was fully competent. (iii) In respect to the submission about the acceptance by the respondent No. 3 about seniority of the petitioner is concerned it has been submitted that seniority list was never published in 1979 and it did not bear signature of the respondent No. 3 or any teacher and it is only when in 1994 seniority list was published the respondent No. 3 filed objection. Learned counsel submits that although in the attendance register the name of the petitioner finds place above the respondent no. 3 but as it was internal arrangement and it has nothing to do with the seniority and therefore, respondent No. 3 did not raise any plea in this respect. This cannot be accepted and treated to be acquisition on the part of respondent No. 3 in respect to his rights and claim. (iv) It has been lastly argued that on the admitted fact that the petitioner and respondent No. 3 both were appointed and approved on the same date and admittedly respondent No. 3 is older is age. in view of Chapter 2 Regulation 3 (1) of the Intermediate Education Act, respondent No. 3 has been rightly held to be senior and no exception can be taken to the view as has been taken by the respondent No. 1. Learned counsel places reliance on the decision as has been given in sudama Singh v. Nath Saran Singh and Ors. 1988 (1) AWC 257 : 1988 UPLBEC 31 and decision as has been given in Dal Chand Sfiarma v. Joint Director of Education, Meerut and Ors, writ Petition No. 3236 of 1996. ( 6 ) IN the light of the aforesaid submission as has come across the Bar and pleading as has been set forth from rival sides, the material as exists on the record, has been examined. ( 6 ) IN the light of the aforesaid submission as has come across the Bar and pleading as has been set forth from rival sides, the material as exists on the record, has been examined. ( 7 ) THE rival submission as has come in respect to seniority of the petitioner on account of silence of respondent No. 3 will rest its decision on examination of certain facts and circumstances running into a span of about 20 years. Although the submission has been made on behalf of the respondent No. 3 that seniority list was published for the first time in the year 1994 but the pleadings and the evidence in respect to conduct of the parties will have to be taken into consideration that in the attendance register name of the petitioner finds place, above the name of respondent No. 3 although mentioning of the name of the petitioner in the attendance register over and above respondent No. 3 may not be conclusive but at the same time this question will have to be adjudicated and the finding of fact will have to be arrived at after going through the materials and in the light of the pleadings of petitioners, the management and respondent No. 3 which this Court may not be justified to go into as this aspect has not been dealt by the respondent No. 1 in the light of the submissions as made by the petitioner, keeping in view the decision on this aspect. So far the contention as has come from rival side in respect to the relevant regulations for determining the seniority in view of the date of appointment and approval of the petitioner and respondent ,no. 3 on the same date, admittedly at the relevant time these regulations were not in existence and thus it is also be examined that what should have been the criteria for determining the seniority. This aspect bas also not been dealt with by the respondent No. 1. 3 on the same date, admittedly at the relevant time these regulations were not in existence and thus it is also be examined that what should have been the criteria for determining the seniority. This aspect bas also not been dealt with by the respondent No. 1. ( 8 ) IN respect to the aforesaid two aspect i. e. , the effect of the mentioning of the name of the petitioner above the respondent No. 3 in the attendance register for about 20 years and non-availability of Regulation 3-b of Chapter 2 at the relevant time and the claim of the petitioner to be governed by Regulation 4 ol" the old Chapter 1 of the Intermediate Education act, this Court is not examining the matter for the simple reason that on the remaining two grounds as has been canvassed from the side of the petitioner, this Court feels that the matter is liable to be re-examined by the respondent No. 1. ( 9 ) THE claim of the petitioner of disposal of the matter without affording the proper opportunity to him appears to be substantiated in the light of the pleadings as has come on the record as well as on closer screening of the original record which was summoned by the order of this Court dated 30. 7. 2001. The petitioner has pleaded in paras 22a and 22b of the writ petition that matter was heard by G. P. Dinker, Joint Director on 11. 2. 1999 who asked the parties to file written submissions on 17. 2. 1999. It has been stated that on 13. 2. 1999 Sri G. P. Dinker proceeded on leave and Sri Dwarlka Prasad, District Inspector of Schools took charge of the officiating Joint director of Education. It has been pleaded that no further hearing took place. On 17. 2. 1999 when the petitioner filed written submission/objection before the respondent No. 1 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) sole protest was made that as the appeal is not maintainable this should be decided as preliminary issue and if this issue is decided, it is only then the written submission and evidence on the merits can be filed. On 17. 2. 1999 when the petitioner filed written submission/objection before the respondent No. 1 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) sole protest was made that as the appeal is not maintainable this should be decided as preliminary issue and if this issue is decided, it is only then the written submission and evidence on the merits can be filed. The reply to the aforesaid averment as has been made in paras 22a and 22b of the writ petition is contained in para 33 of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent No. 3 in which without there being any specific denial to the aforesaid fact it has been just averred that Joint Director of Education has rightly decided the matter. In para 34 of the said counter-affidavit it has been stated that authorities have heard the matter on 11. 2. 1999, 17. 2. 1999, 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999 and petitioner has also filed arguments and written submission. This averment of the respondent appears to be not sustalnable in view of the original record which has been placed before me as has been summoned by this Court vide its order dated 30. 7. 2001. The record has been produced before me have been perused. On page 8 there is "order of the Joint Director of Education fixing 11. 2. 1999 on the report submitted by the staff. On page 9 there is report dated 22. 2. 1999 that matter has been heard on 11. 2. 1999 and 17. 2. 1999 and written statement and material exists on record and the matter may be decided. This note submitted by the staff dated 22. 2. 1999 bears the signature of the Joint Director as on 22. 2. 1999. In the record there is no further noting of proceedings or any note from which it can be ascertained that what transpired on 11. 2. 1999 and 17. 2. 1999 on which date hearing is said to have been completed. There is also notings on the record to show that hearing took place on 11. 2. 1999, 17. 2. 1999, 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999 as has been stated in para 34 of the counter-affidavit. In this respect it can be mentioned that at page 57 of the record there is application of the petitioner dated 11. 2. There is also notings on the record to show that hearing took place on 11. 2. 1999, 17. 2. 1999, 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999 as has been stated in para 34 of the counter-affidavit. In this respect it can be mentioned that at page 57 of the record there is application of the petitioner dated 11. 2. 1999 in which a prayer was made for giving time to file written submission and it is on that application, 17. 2. 1999 was fixed. As has been observed, on 17. 2. 1999 petitioner has moved application (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) by which prayer was made for deciding the appeal on preliminary ground of its non-maintainability and only then written submission was prayed to be filed. There is nothing on record by which it can be ascertained that the application/objection of the petitioner dated 17. 2. 1999 (Annexure-9) was ever disposed of and petitioner was apprised that he has to submit his written submission and evidence on the merits of the controversy. Now comes page 72 of the record which is the original order as has been passed by the Joint Director of Education. This order runs into four pages. As stated, on page 72, whereas in the operative portion of the order there is signature of joint Director of Education and in the left hand side no date have been mentioned but only month and year have been mentioned which runs like this. . . . . . . . . . 2. 1999 then comes the type copy of the order of the Joint Director of Education referred above which is impugned in this petition. At pages 77 and 76 of the record the date is mentioned as 4th March, 1999 above the designation of the Joint Director of Education and at one place date 8. 3. 1999. ( 10 ) IN view of this fact it appears that no proper hearing could take place, giving opportunity to the petitioner as neither his application/ objection dated 17. 2. 1999 (Annexure-9) appears to have been decided nor hearing appears to have taken place either on 17. 2. 1999 or on 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999 as stated by respondent No. 3 in para 34 of the counter-affidavit. 2. 1999 (Annexure-9) appears to have been decided nor hearing appears to have taken place either on 17. 2. 1999 or on 4. 3. 1999 and 8. 3. 1999 as stated by respondent No. 3 in para 34 of the counter-affidavit. So far the contention that whether Sri G. P. Dinker, Joint Director of Education or Sri Dwarika Prasad, Officiating joint Director of Education has decided the matter, in view of the aforesaid finding this aspect need not be examined in detail. As adjudication of the rival claim of the parties is to rest after giving the finding on certain factual aspects as has been observed above, and therefore, It appears to be more just that the competent authority may be asked to first deal the matter after affording opportunity to the petitioner. Similarly, in respect to the question of maintainability of the appeal against the order of the Manager, the approach of the respondent No. 1 that as the manager heads the Committee and, therefore, even the decision by the Manager will be taken to be a decision by the Committee of Management, this Court finds difficulty in accepting the same. On own finding of the respondent No. 1, Committee of Management consists of elected office bearers and the members and it is the whole body which constitute the Committee of management. So far the Manager is concerned under the Scheme of Administration he has been entrusted some additional powers which he has to discharge. The Committee of Management by no stretch of imaginations can be accepted to be synonymous to the Manager alone. Respondent no. 1 appears to have not properly attended this aspect and in casual manner he has treated the order of the Manager to be the order of the Committee of Management. Otherwise also the fair play requires that the authority who decides the claim must deal all the points and aspects and analysis must come on the record which may justify his conclusion. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid this writ petition deserves to be allowed without going into the merits of the either of the contention as has come from rival sides, on the short ground that decision in the appeal by the respondent No. 1 lacks proper opportunity to the petitioner. ( 11 ) IN view of the aforesaid this writ petition deserves to be allowed without going into the merits of the either of the contention as has come from rival sides, on the short ground that decision in the appeal by the respondent No. 1 lacks proper opportunity to the petitioner. It has to be made clear that respondent No. 1 while dealing the matter will not take any observation made in this Judgment in favour or against either of the parties and he will independently deal with all the submissions as has been noted in this judgment from the rival sides. Respondent No. 1 will afford full opportunity to the petitioner, to the management and to the respondent No. 3 and thereafter will take appropriate decision in accordance with law. The exercise should be completed by the respondent No. I/competent authority within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order by either of the parties. ( 12 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussions, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of respondent No. 1 dated 8. 3. 1999 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted to the respondent No. 1 to take fresh decision in the light of the observation as made in this judgment. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.