Research › Search › Judgment

Andhra High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 1354 (AP)

J. SUMANA v. ENDLURI ASEERWADAMMA

2002-11-21

S.R.K.PRASAD

body2002
S. R. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is accused in PRC No. 40/2001 on the File of ii Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, nellore, seeks for quashing of the proceedings by invoking the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) A brief resume of background of facts is necessary to appreciate the contentions. The petitioner is working as assistant Director, Sericulture, Buja, Nellore. The de facto-complainant Endluri aseerwadamma, was an employee in Silk realing Unit, Sericulture, Buja, Nellore. It is alleged that the salaries for the de facto- complainant were not paid for three months for want of budget. Thereupon, the 1 st respondent herein went to the petitioner and questioned about the non-payment of salaries. It is alleged that the petitioner abused stating that things will be like that, if jobs are given to "malas and Madigas". These words were utterd in the presence of lalithabai, Meharunnisa, Seenaiah and gopal, who are also working under the accused. Thereupon, a report is presented to the Sub-Inspector, V Town Police Station, nellore. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, nellore, investigated the case and submitted a Report stating that the complaint is a false one. Aggrieved by the same, a private complaint was presented. The same has been taken cognizance by the learned magistrate and numbered it as PRC no. 40/2001. As against the taking of cognizance by the II Addl. Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Nellore, the petitioner presented a Criminal Revision Petition no. 52/2001 before the Sessions Judge, nellore, who in turn, dismissed the revision petition. As the matters stood thus, the petitioner has invoked the inherent powers of this Court to quash the proceedings in prc No. 40/2001. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly urged two contentions. Firstly, he contends that the offence did not take place in public view1 as contemplated under Section 3 (1) (x) of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of atrocities) Act, and hence it does not constitute an offence. He has placed reliance on a decision reported in Bharat petroleum Corporation Limited v. Union of India, 2000 (5) ALD 566, wherein interpretation was put on by this Court to public view . He has placed reliance on a decision reported in Bharat petroleum Corporation Limited v. Union of India, 2000 (5) ALD 566, wherein interpretation was put on by this Court to public view . The 2nd contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the Magistrate has not taken into consideration the final report of police official and taking cognizance by the learned magistrate without considering the final report is bad. He has also placed reliance on another decision reported in M/s. Pepsi foods Limited v. Special Judicial Magistrate, air 1998 SC 128. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent has placed reliance on a decision reported in State of Kerala v. Cherian Secariah and others, AIR 1967 kerala 106; and Saraswathi and another v. State, III (2002) CCR 446, and contends that the offence took place at public view namely in the office. It is also contended that the learned Magistrate has found prima facie case and issued process and there is no need to quash the proceedings at this stage, as no elaborate order need be passed at the time of taking cognizance. He has placed reliance on a catena of decisions namely, S. W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, 2002 (I) ALT (Crl.) 219 (SC); Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa konjalgi and others, (1976) 3 SCC 736 ; p. V. Krishna Prasad v. K. V. N. Koteswara rao and another, 1990 (3) ALT 202 and india Carat Private Limited v. State of karnataka, AIR 1989 SC 885 . The learned public Prosecutor contends that it is not a fit case to exercise the inherent powers as there is sufficient material in taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate. Hence, the proceedings need not be quashed in this case. ( 4 ) ADVERTING to the said contentions, it is necessary to have a glance at section 3 (l) (x) of SC and ST (PA) Act, before proceeding to consider the contentions canvassed by both parties. Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act reads as follows : 3 (l) (x): Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act reads as follows : 3 (l) (x): Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. It is clear from the language used in section 3 (l) (x) of the Act, intentional insult or intimidation has to be made in any place within the public view with intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or a scheduled Tribe. The learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly lays stress on the words public view and contends that the offence will not fall under public view . The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent contends that public view includes public places which is inclusive of office. It is also contended by him that the facts in the decision reported in Bharat Petroleum corporation Limited v. Union of India (supra) differ from the facts of this case as the alleged incident is said to have been taken place in the chambers and not in the public place. This Court has considered the difference between public place and public view in the decision (supra) and categorically stated at paras 8, 10 and 13 as follows:8. The learned Counsel referring to this provision submits that any offence committed in any place within the public view is an offence under the said provision. But, if the offence is committed not within the public view would not fall within the parameters of this provision. He relies on the decision of the learned Single Judge of madhya Pradesh High Court reported in karan Singh s case (supra), wherein the distinction was drawn between public place and public view in Para 5 which is extracted below: "from the material on record in the case diary, further it cannot be said that the incident took place at place within public view. The words used in the provision are in place within "public view" and not in a "public place". There is clearly a distinction between an incident taking place within public view and incident taking place in a public place. The incident took place at about 11. 00 p. m. , and the accused party only was present on the spot and what transpired between them has not been alleged to have taken place within public view. There is clearly a distinction between an incident taking place within public view and incident taking place in a public place. The incident took place at about 11. 00 p. m. , and the accused party only was present on the spot and what transpired between them has not been alleged to have taken place within public view. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that all the ingredients of offence under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Atrocities Act have been made out. There is absolutely no material to proceed against the accused persons for a charge on that count. The charge is groundless and deserves to be quashed at the investigation stage itself. "10. In the counter filed by the 2nd respondent, it is only elicited that since a complaint was filed, action was initiated in accordance with law and that it is nothing to do with the service matter of the 4th respondent. As alread} stated earlier, investigation was commenced after receiving the complaint registered as FIR No. 3 of 1997 under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act read with Section 506 IPC and that it is not open for the petitioners to interdict the criminal proceedings at this stage. In the counter filed by the 4th respondent he tried to expose the matter relating to the service conditions. He only stated that he was being harassed by the petitioners and therefore, he had made a complaint to the authorities and the same was registered as crime No. 3 of 1997. He also states that there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the prosecution. But, however, after withdrawing the complaint and after the 4th respondent was reinstated into service, no counter has been filed. Having given serious consideration to the issue, I am of the view that the contention of the learned Government Pleader cannot be countenanced for the simple reason the very Section itself is specific that the insult or intimidation should have taken place in public view. It need not be a public place, it could also be a private place. The intention of the Parliament was very clear that this insult or intimidation should have been caused in a place within the public view. If it is committed in any place which is not within the public view, it would not be treated as an offence. It need not be a public place, it could also be a private place. The intention of the Parliament was very clear that this insult or intimidation should have been caused in a place within the public view. If it is committed in any place which is not within the public view, it would not be treated as an offence. Otherwise, the Parliament could have omitted the words within the public view, and it would be redundant if the contention of the learned government Pleader is accepted. Admittedly, in the instant case, the alleged offence has taken place in the chambers of the officers where there was no public, and which was not within the public view. It is not even the contention of the 4th respondent that the events were viewed by the public on the days mentioned by him in the complaint. In such a situation, it would be very difficult for this Court to conclude that even though public did not view the event, yet, it has to be treated as a offence under section 3 (1) (x) of the Act. The decision of madhya Pradesh High Court fully covers the case on hand. My learned Brother Justice G. Bhikshapathy, has considered public view with reference to a decision rendered by madhya Pradesh High Court reported in karan Singh v. State of M. P. , 1992 Cri. LJ 3054, and also meaning given in Stout s dictionary, Edn. 5, page 2080 wherein the word "public" was interpreted. Ultimately his Lordship has considered that the intention of the Parliament was very clear that this insult or intimidation should have been caused in a place within the public view, and it would not be treated as an offence. In a decision reported in State of Kerala v. Cherian Secaraiah (supra), Kerala High court has considered the interpretation put on to "public Place" in the case of Common gaming house as can be seen from the principles laid down at para 4. In a decision reported in Saraswathi and another v. State, (supra) the Madras High Court has considered the interpretation put on to "public place" while dealing with Section 294 (b) Obscenity etc. In both these decisions, "public view" has not been interpreted. The question is whether "office" can be stated to be a "public view". In a decision reported in Saraswathi and another v. State, (supra) the Madras High Court has considered the interpretation put on to "public place" while dealing with Section 294 (b) Obscenity etc. In both these decisions, "public view" has not been interpreted. The question is whether "office" can be stated to be a "public view". If an incident were to happen in the office, can it be construed that the incident happened in the public view. It is now well settled that the public cannot have automatic access to the office. Only the employees will have access to the office. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the office is always at public view. It may be a public place. 1 have already stated that these aspects have been considered by this Court in the decision of Bharat Petroleum case (supra) and came to the conclusion that interpretation has to be put on to "public Place". Public place and Public view are quiet different and the same interpretation which is given to "public Place" cannot be given to "public view". I do not see any reason to differ from the reasoning given and the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision. I agree with the same. There may be lacuna in drafting the legislation. The accused is certainly entitled to take advantage even though, it causes great injustice to victim. The utterances, if any, said to have been made may give raise to civil action or any personal action against the concerned official. In view of the interpretation put on to the provisions of SC and ST (PA) Act, by my learned Brother in the aforesaid decision (supra) and in view of my concurrence with the reasoning given by him, I am of the considered view that no offence is made out against the petitioner insofar as SC and ST (PA) Act is concerned. ( 5 ) COMING to the second contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Magistrate has not considered the material gathered by the police during investigation, guidelines are mentioned in several Supreme Court decisions. It is stated in S. W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (supra) at para - 14 as follows:14. In case of a complaint under Section 200 cr. It is stated in S. W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (supra) at para - 14 as follows:14. In case of a complaint under Section 200 cr. PC, or IPC a Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence made out and then has to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any, to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused to issue process so that the issue of process is prevented on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass. Such examination is provided in order to find out whether there is or not sufficient grounds for proceeding. The words sufficient ground used under Section 203 have to be construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the accused and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction. It is stated in Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna shivalingappa Konjalgi and others (supra) at paras 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 as follows:2. In support of the appeal Mr. H. B. Datar submitted that the Magistrate had given cogent reasons for holding that there was sufficient grounds for proceeding against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the Magistrate by examining the merits of the case after taking into consideration the documents filed by the respondents which could not be looked into by the Magistrate as they did not form part of the complaint or the evidence recorded in support thereof. In our opinion the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. Mr. M. C, bhandare sought to repel the argument of the appellant on the ground that the order of the Magistrate was perverse and as the case was full of patent absurdities and was politically motivated the prosecution of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 would amount to unnecessary harassment resulting in abuse of the process of the Court. In the view we take in the instant case it is not necessary for us to enter into the merits of the case at this stage. 1 and 2 would amount to unnecessary harassment resulting in abuse of the process of the Court. In the view we take in the instant case it is not necessary for us to enter into the merits of the case at this stage. It is well settled by a long catena of decisions of this Court that at the stage of issuing process the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is not the province of the magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the case nor can the High Court go into this matter in its revisional jurisdiction which is a very limited one. 4. It would thus be clear from the two decisions of this Court that the scope of the inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of criminal Procedure is extremely limited - limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint - (I) on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court; (II) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (III) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not. 5. Mr. Bhandare laid great stress on the words "the truth or falsehood of the complaint" and contended that in determining whether the complaint is false the Court can go into the question of the broad probabilities of the case or intrinsic appearing in the evidence. 5. Mr. Bhandare laid great stress on the words "the truth or falsehood of the complaint" and contended that in determining whether the complaint is false the Court can go into the question of the broad probabilities of the case or intrinsic appearing in the evidence. It is true that in coming to a decision as to whether a process should be issued the Magistrate can take into consideration inherent improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations but there appears to be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability of conviction of the accused and establishment of a prima facie case against him. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. These cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High court can quash proceedings. ( 6 ) APPLYING these principles to the facts of the present case it seems to us that the present case is not one in which the High court should have quashed the proceedings. To begin with, the order of the Magistrate dated February 11, 1975 issuing process against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is a very well reasoned one which takes into consideration the allegations in the complaint as also the evidence adduced in support of it. The Magistrate clearly applied his mind and has analysed the evidence into there categories - (1) those witnesses who have deposed as eye witnesses regarding the actual occurrence and the part attributed to respondents Nos. l and 2. The Magistrate then refers to other witnesses who corroborated the evidence of the complainant; and thirdly the Magistrate relied on the evidence of witnesses who were admittedly signatories to the dying declaration and had clearly stated on oath that the names of respondent Nos. l and 2. The Magistrate then refers to other witnesses who corroborated the evidence of the complainant; and thirdly the Magistrate relied on the evidence of witnesses who were admittedly signatories to the dying declaration and had clearly stated on oath that the names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were mentioned in their presence by the deceased but were not recorded by the Police Patel in the dying declaration and in spite of the protest by the witnesses they were made to sign the dying declaration as attesting witnesses under threat and duress. On a consideration of this evidence the Magistrate was satisfied that a prima facie case against respondent nos. 1 and 2 was made out and he accordingly issued process against them. It was not a case where the Magistrate had passed an order issuing process in a mechanical manner or just by way of routine. The High court appears to have gone into the whole history of the case, examined the merits of the evidence, the contradictions and what it called the improbabilities and after a detailed discussion not only of the materials produced before the Magistrate but also of the documents which had been filed by the defence and which should not have been looked into at the stage when the matter was pending under Section 202, has held that the order of the Magistrate was illegal and was fit to be quashed. In the first place the High Court ought not to have considered the documents filed by respondent Nos. l and 2 in the previous revision without obtaining the permission of the Court and particularly when the High Court itself gave no directions whatsoever to the Magistrate to consider those documents. In fact the magistrate considering the question as to whether process should be issued against the accused or not cannot go into the materials placed by the accused and therefore the High Court could not have given any such directions while disposing of the previous revision. The impugned order of the High Court proceeds on the basis that it was incumbent on the Magistrate to have considered the documents and their effect on the truth or falsehood of the allegations made by the complainant. This was an entirely wrong approach. The impugned order of the High Court proceeds on the basis that it was incumbent on the Magistrate to have considered the documents and their effect on the truth or falsehood of the allegations made by the complainant. This was an entirely wrong approach. As we are clearly of the opinion that the Magistrate was fully justified in completely excluding the documents from consideration, we refrain from making any observation regarding the effect of those documents. In fact the documents filed by the respondents were mere copies and they were, therefore, not admissible. At any rate, at the stage of section 202 or Section 204 of the Code of criminal Procedure as the accused had no locus standi the Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to go into any materials or evidence which may be produced by the accused who could be present only to watch the proceedings and not to participate in them. Indeed if the documents or the evidence produced by the accused is allowed to be taken by the Magistrate then an inquiry under Section 202 would have to be converted into a full-dress trial defeating the very object for which this Section has been engrafted. The High Court in quashing the order of the Magistrate completely failed to consider the limited scope of an inquiry under Section 202. Having gone through the order of the Magistrate we do not find any error of law committed by him. The magistrate has exercised his discretion and has given cogent reasons for his conclusion. Whether the reasons were good or bad, sufficient or insufficient, is not a matter which could have been examined by the High Court in revision. We are constrained to observe that the High Court went out of its way to write a laboured judgment highlighting certain aspects of the case of the accused as appearing from the documents filed by them which they were not entitled to file and which were not entitled in law to be considered. ( 7 ) FOR these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the order of the High Court suffers from a serious legal infirmity and the high Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering in revision by quashing the order of the Magistrate. ( 7 ) FOR these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the order of the High Court suffers from a serious legal infirmity and the high Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering in revision by quashing the order of the Magistrate. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated December 16, 1975 and restore the order of the Magistrate issuing process against respondent Nos. 1 and 2. it is stated in P. V. Krishna Prasad v. KVN koteswara Rao (supra) at paras 10, 13 and 15 as follows: i 0. Mr. Bali Reddy drawing my attention to the observations of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in bains s case (supra) namely at page 1312 crl. LJ 1980 :"the mere fact that he (Magistrate) had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156 (3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint. . . . . . . . . . . . "sought to contend that in spite of acceptance of the report under Section 173 and issuance of the proceedings closing the case, the complaint made under Section 200 Cr. PC, survives and does not get effected thereby warranting some orders for disposal of the complaint. The contention is obviously misconceived since the proceedings issued closing the case patently refer to the complaint. Apart from this, the very preceding sentence to the observation quoted supra runs:"the Magistrate after receiving the police report, may without issuing process or dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him when once the proceedings are closed or dropped while accepting the report filed under Section 173 Cr. PC, it cannot be said that the complaint will not have the effect of total effacement and survives for being disposed of. 13. Looking the matter even from a different angle, taking cognizance of an offence or refusing to take cognizance is an action to be done under the provisions of Section 190 cr. PC. The Magistrate will begin applying judicial mind from the stage a charge sheet if filed, or a report under Section 173 cr. PC, is submitted pursuant to a reference made under Section 156 (3) on the basis of a private complaint. PC. The Magistrate will begin applying judicial mind from the stage a charge sheet if filed, or a report under Section 173 cr. PC, is submitted pursuant to a reference made under Section 156 (3) on the basis of a private complaint. While exercising the judicial function as to or not to take cognizance of the offence in either case basing on the charge sheet or on the report under Section 173 Cr. PC, he goes through the material submitted along thereto. While so applying the mind in discharge of the judicial function, the Magistrate may or may not take cognizance and the moment he records his order, he is ceased of that matter and the remedy open to the aggrieved party is only by way of a revision or appeal. Neither acceptance nor non- acceptance of the police report can be termed as an administrative function since it is after application of judicial mind and examination of the material submitted along with the report under Section 173 Cr. PC. , the Magistrate makes the order under section 190 Cr. PC. After exercising the jurisdiction under Section 190 Cr. PC, the magistrate has no power to review the order in view of the provisions covered by section 362 Cr. PC. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the magistrate has no power or jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence on the basis of a private complaint that resulted in submission of the report under Section 173 consequent upon reference under Section 156 (3) when once he has accepted the negative police report and issued proceedings closing the case. However, the aggrieved party is at liberty to take recourse to a revision or appeal as the case may be according to law. The criminal petition is accordingly allowed. The procedure that has to be followed regarding taking cognizance of the offence have been mentioned in M/s. India Carat private Limited v. State of Karnataka (supra) at para 16 as follows:16. The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under section 173 (2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under section 190 (1) (b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The position is, therefore, now well settled that upon receipt of a police report under section 173 (2) a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of an offence under section 190 (1) (b) of the Code even if the police report is to the effect that no case is made out against the accused. The magistrate can take into account the statements of the witnesses examined by the police during the investigation and take cognizance of the offence complained of and order the issue of process to the accused. Section 190 (1) (b) does not lay down that a Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the Investigating Officer gives an opinion that the investigation has made out a case against the accused. The magistrate can ignore the conclusions arrived at by the Investigating Officer and independently apply his mind to the facts emerging from the investigation and take cognizance of the case, if he thinks fit, in exercise of his power under Section 190 (1) (b) and direct the issue of process to the accused. The Magistrate is not bound in such a situation to follow the procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202 of the Code for taking cognizance of a case under Section 190 (1) (a) though it is open to him to act under Section 200 or Section 202 also. The high Court was, therefore, wrong in taking the view that the Second Additional Chief metropolitan Magistrate was not entitled to direct the registration of a case against the second respondent and order the issue of summons to him. It is observed by Supreme Court in M/s. Pepsi Foods Limited v. Special Judicial magistrate (supra) at para 28 as follows:28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused. 6. From the aforesaid decisions, the following principles can be culled out. (1) In cases where private complaints are filed regarding the incident referred to be false after investigation made by the Investigating Officer, the Court has to record sworn statement of the complainant and also his witnesses and consider the material gathered by the police and see whether there is any prima face material to take cognizance of the offence. (2) If the Magistrate finds that there is some prima facie material which constitute an offence, he shall take cognizance of the offence and he need not be carried away with the finding given by the Investigating officer. (3) The Magistrate shall take into consideration of the material gathered by the police along with the swom statement recorded in the private complaint. (4) Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The Magistrate has to keep in mind all these aspects and the law laid down in the decisions, and pass an order. (4) Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The Magistrate has to keep in mind all these aspects and the law laid down in the decisions, and pass an order. Normally magistrate need not pass an elaborate order giving lengthy reasons, but when he takes into consideration of the material gathered by the police along with the sworn statements of the witnesses, he is bound to record some reasons, since it is a judicial act and it is always subject to judicial review by higher Courts. The revisional Court has confirmed the order of the learned Magistrate in this case. Normally, this Court will not interfere with the orders of the lower Court which have been confirmed by the Revisional Court. But when the Revisional Court and the lower Court failed to look at the correct provisions of law in a proper perspective, it is the duty of this Court to interpret the provisions and give a correct finding and thereafter, leave the matter to the lower Court to decide about its merits. In view of the interpretation put on by this Court to Section 3 (l) (x) of sc and ST (PA) Act, I cannot, but, state that the averments do not constitute an offence, within the meaning of the said Act as the incident did not happen before public view. No doubt, much hardship is being caused to the aggrieved persons, but the only remedy open is the Legislature consideration to fill up the lacunae found there as early as possible. 7. To sum up, I find that the interpretation that has to be put on to "public place and public view" are different. I also find that the incident took place in the office, and hence, it cannot be said to be a "public view" within the meaning of Section 3 (l) (x) of the Act. The truth or otherwise of the allegations mentioned in the complaint, can only be decided during the time of trial and not in the summary inquiry. I also state that the Magistrate has failed to take into consideration of the material gathered by the police during the investigation, and considered it along with the sworn statement, in that view of the matter, the proceedings are bad and they are liable to be quashed. I also state that the Magistrate has failed to take into consideration of the material gathered by the police during the investigation, and considered it along with the sworn statement, in that view of the matter, the proceedings are bad and they are liable to be quashed. I accordingly quash the proceedings after finding that the alleged acts do not constitute an offence under Section 3 (l) (x) of the Act. In the result, this Petition allowed.