S. K. SEN, C. J. In the instant writ petition, stated to be a public Interest Litigation, the petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from raising construction/installing a Petrol Pump on plot No. 5-A Government Industrial Estate, Kalpi Road, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to as the plot in dispute) (in pursuance of direction of Mr. Lalji Tandon, the then Urban Planning and Development Minister, State of U. P. and the consequential Government order dated 28-4-2002 ). The petitioners have claimed to have filed this petition as public Interest Litigation. 2. The case of the petitioners, in brief, is that the plot in dispute, was initially leased out to one Girish Chandra Poddar. After the death of Sri Poddar, his heirs could not develop the land for the purpose for which it had been leased out. Therefore, the proposal of the respondent No. 7 for sub-letting the plot in dispute to Sri B. D. Agarwal was considered by the District Industries Centre. It is mandatory under the terms and conditions of the lease-deed that the plot, in dispute, can be utilized only for the purpose of setting up of an industry and the same cannot be used for commercial purposes. It is alleged that the respondent No. 7 made a proposal for setting up an industry to manufacture certain petroleum products. District Industries Administration permitted negotiation of the sub-letting of the plot in dispute and accordingly, a lease-deed was executed on 20- 7-1999, contained in Annexure-3 to the writ petition. It stipulates that no change-either by way of transfer or any conveyance thereafter shall be done without the previous consent, in writing of the Industrial Estate Administration. The petitioners allege that the respondent No. 7 is bound by the aforesaid terms of the lease-deed. That apart, it is alleged that a hire purchase agreement was entered into by the respondent No. 7 with the Director of Industries, U. P. , contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition, which contains a clause that the land shall not be utilized for carrying on any business of dangerous, noisy or offensive nature and that the property shall neither be sold, mortgaged, assigned nor otherwise conveyed nor transferred except with the previous permission, in writing of the Industrial Estate Administration. The petitioners allege that the parties are bound by the agreement. The petitioners allege that the parties are bound by the agreement. In utter violation of the aforesaid agreement, the Respondent No. 7, it is alleged, in collusion with respondent No. 8, agreed for getting the Petrol Pump installed despite the fact that there was no such proposal before the District Industries Department respondent No. 7 has been able to procure the impugned letter dated 27-8-2000, contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition, from the concerned Minister directing the Director, Industries Department to give permission and consent for the conversion of the plot, in dispute for commercial use. The petitioners claim that the proposed Petrol Pump is against public interest, inasmuch as, trading in highly inflammable petrol product is an obnoxious trade and is seriously hazardous to the people, residing in the locality. 3. Respondent No. 7 is main respondent in the present case. It is the case of respondent No. 7 that the petitioners have been able to unnecessarily stall the project of establishment of a world class Automobile Workshop-Petrol Pump within the industrial estate at Kanpur Nagar by obtaining a stay order from this Court. The petitioners are mere busy bodies and it is sheer misnomer to label the present petition as public Interest Litigation. It is alleged that the petitioners have been set up by the trade rival of respondent No. 7, namely, M/s. Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal. Annexure C. A.-7 to the counter- affidavit filed by respondent No. 7 is the objection filed by the aforesaid rival firm. Moreover, petitioner No. 1 resides at a place which is more than 5-6 kilometers away from the plot in dispute. Same holds true for petitioner No. 2 as well. He resides in House No. 118/241 Kaushalpuri, Kanpur Nagar which too is about 6 kms. away from the plot in dispute. The petitioner No. 2 has wrongly described residential address as 123/1-A, which actually is the address of the rival firm, namely, M/s. Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal. This clearly shows the nexus of the petitioners with the rival firm. At least seven or eight petrol pumps already exist in the concerned area. If these petrol pumps do not cause any danger to the ecology, there is no reason for denying the respondent No. 7 to install petrol pump. 4. This clearly shows the nexus of the petitioners with the rival firm. At least seven or eight petrol pumps already exist in the concerned area. If these petrol pumps do not cause any danger to the ecology, there is no reason for denying the respondent No. 7 to install petrol pump. 4. Heard Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri A. P. Sahi on behalf of the petitioners and Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate assisting by Sri L. M. Singh on behalf of the respondent No. 7. 5. Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate strenuously urged that if the respondent No. 7 is allowed to install petrol pump in the concerned locality, the entire ecological balance will be disturbed and the residents of the locality will be the worst sufferers. He, therefore, claimed that the instant is public Interest Litigation. In support of his contention, he cited two decisions of the apex Court in Chairman Railway Board v. Chandhima Das, (2002) 2 SCC 465 and M. S. Jayaraj v. Commissioner of Excise, (2002) 7 SCC 552. Sri Singh further contended that in order to uphold the cleanliness in public life and rule of law, the bar of locus standi is not as rigorous as in other petitions of adversial nature. In support of this contention he relied upon paragraphs 50 and 51 of the Report in Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi, AIR 1987 SC 294 . Sri Singh vehemently urged that the present is a case of malice in law and, therefore, he urged that the impugned action on the part of the State Government deserves to be deprecated by this Court. In support of this contention, he drew our attention to the law laid down by apex Court in Smt. S. R. Venkataraman v. Union of India and another, AIR 1979 SC 49 and The Regional Manager and another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, AIR 1976 SC 1766 . 6. In reply to the allegation of the respondent No. 7, in the counter-affidavit, that 7 or 8 petrol pumps are already existing in the locality, Sri Singh pointed out that the other existing petrol pumps are outside the vicinity of the Industrial Estate and not within the Industrial Estate. Thus, the plea of the respondent No. 7 to the contrary is misconceived. Thus, the plea of the respondent No. 7 to the contrary is misconceived. Moreover, according to Sri Singh, installation of petrol pump is contrary to the policy and Guidelines framed by the State Government as per Government orders dated 18-2-2001 and September, 2001, contained in Annexures R. A. 1 and R. A. 4 respectively to the Re- joinder-Affidavit. A bare perusal of these Government orders will reveal that they clearly prohibit the change of user of the land from industrial to commercial purpose. Precisely, because of this reason. Sri Singh asserted that till date, there does not exist any permission of the Director of Industries, or for that matter, any other officer of the Industries Department. Sri Singh alleged that the respondent No. 7, therefore, contacted Sri Lalji Tandon, Minister who used his good offices to pass an order in favour of the respondent No. 7 in utter breach of the provisions of law. Sri Singh vehemently urged that the action of the State Government in proceeding to accord permission to the respondent No. 7 to install a petrol pump is patently without jurisdiction. It is glaring example of abuse of power having been exercised arbitrarily and maliciously at the behest of the concerned Minister. Sri Singh drew our attention to the contents of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the counter-affidavit of Sri O. P. Srivastava of Industries Department wherein it has been averred that permission and consent, in writing, are sine qua non for change of user of the land. So far as the case in hand is concerned, Sri Singh asserted that a bare perusal of the counter- affidavit on behalf of the Director of Industries reveals that no such permission was ever granted by the Director of Industries or the Industries Department. The impugned order has been passed straightway without at all following the procedures prescribed by law. Sri Singh, therefore, strenuously urged that the impugned orders deserve to be quashed and the petition deserves to be allowed with costs. 7. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 7 on the other hand, submitted that by means of the present petition, an insidious attempt has been made to frustrate the ambitious project of establishment of an automobile workshop-petrol pump of repute within the industrial estate at Kanpur Nagar. 7. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 7 on the other hand, submitted that by means of the present petition, an insidious attempt has been made to frustrate the ambitious project of establishment of an automobile workshop-petrol pump of repute within the industrial estate at Kanpur Nagar. He vehemently urged that the petitioners are mere busy bodies and the instant is not, at all, a public Interest Litigation. According to Sri Ravi Kant, the petitioners are mere proxies, having been set up by M/s. Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal - a rival firm of the respondent No. 7. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the gravamen of averments made in the writ petition is breach of provisions of the lease deed rather than disturbance of ecological equilibrium. The main plank of attack of the petitioners is that the respondent No. 7 proposes to use the land in dispute for commercial purposes rather than industrial purposes. However, on the own showing of the petitioners, there are seven or eight petrol pumps in the vicinity. Sri Ravi Kant stressed on the word vicinity and pointed out that the word vicinity means surrounding or nearness. Thus, if seven or eight petrol pumps in the vicinity do not cause any harm to the ecology of the area, it passes ones comprehension as to how the proposed petrol pump would ruffle the ecological equilibrium. Thus, the petitioners have made sweeping and bald allegations. 8. Sri Ravi Kant, in the forefront, contended that by no stretch of imagination can the instant petition be said to espouse any public cause. On the other hand, in real sense, it is a private interest litigation. To support his view, Sri Ravi Kant placed reliance on paragraphs 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 88, 97 and 99 of the latest decision of the Apex Court in Balco Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India and others, (2002) 2 SCC 333 and he dubbed the present litigation as private interest litigation. Sri Ravi Kant drew our attention to the address of petitioner No. 2, mentioned in the writ petition, which is that of M/s Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal, the person who had filed the objection. He, therefore, contended that this itself is sufficient to establish the nexus between the petitioners and M/s. Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal, which is too close and patent. He, therefore, contended that this itself is sufficient to establish the nexus between the petitioners and M/s. Kishori Lal Jogendra Lal, which is too close and patent. It was also contended by Sri Ravi Kant that it has not been averred by the petitioners, anywhere, that they suffer any injury or that any of their interests is being pre-judiced. In this behalf, Sri Ravi Kant placed reliance on the decisions in T. N. Civil Supplies Corporation Workers Union v. T. N. Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. and others, (2001) 4 SCC 469 ; Vinay Kumar v. State of U. P. , 2001 (2) JCLR 51 (SC) : (2001) 4 SCC 734 ; Union of India v. Alok Kumar Dass, (2001) 9 SCC 297 . According to Sri Ravi Kant, the decisions cited by Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioner are of no assistance to the petitioner and, they, in fact, on the other hand support the case of the respondent No. 7. 9. Sri Ravi Kant, next contended that the substantive/parent document governing the relations between the parties is the lease deed executed between Kanpur Nagar Maha Palika and the State Government through the Director of Industries, contained in Annexure C. A.-7 to the counter-affidavit of respondent No. 7. Its prefatory part recites that it is the Governor of Uttar Pradesh who is the lessee. Thus, the land vests in the State Government. Clauses (d), (g) and (k) of the aforesaid document authorize the user of the demised plot for workshop. The term industrial estate in Clauses (d) and (k) has been defined inclusively and not exclusively. Thus, it expands the meaning of the term industrial estate. industrial estate, therefore, includes any ancillary or any other industry which has connection with the industries in the State. 10. Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners seriously refuted the aforesaid assertion and contended that it is not the aforesaid lease deed, but the lease deed executed between the respondent No. 7 and the Director of Industries which is material. 11. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 7 replied that even if the aforesaid version of Sri Singh is accepted, the same would not alter the complexion or the rules of the game. According to Sri Ravi Kant, reliance has been placed by Mr. 11. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 7 replied that even if the aforesaid version of Sri Singh is accepted, the same would not alter the complexion or the rules of the game. According to Sri Ravi Kant, reliance has been placed by Mr. R. N. Singh on the counter-affidavit of Sri O. P. Srivastava on behalf of the Director of Industries. Sri Ravi Kant pointed out that in his counter- affidavit, Sri O. P. Srivastava placed reliance on Clauses (h) and (i) of the lease deed executed between the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent No. 7 and the Director of Industries. There is absolutely no material difference between the two. Neither Clause (k) nor Clause (g) nor Clause (h) nor Clause (i) imposes any restriction on change of user. The restriction is only in regard to transfer, mortgage, subletting, assignment or relinquishment of the demised property. The only embargo regarding user of the plot in Clause (g) of the present lease deed is on carrying on any obnoxious trade or business or its user for any religious purpose. As regards the opinion of the Director of Industries that the change in the land user cannot be permitted since the site in question is meant for industry, Sri Ravi Kant submitted that it is only the individual opinion of an officer and it cannot trench upon, abrogate or supersede the terms of the lease. Sri Ravi Kant lastly contended that the project, in question, is an ambitious project and the State Government would be gaining and is anxious to have it located in this State. Mr. Tandon, the concerned Minister acted accordingly and no exception can be taken, much less any mala fide attributed to such an action. Mr. Tandon has not showered any patronage on an individual rather it goes to a public body/corporation. Sri Ravi Kant vigourously urged that it is easy to allege mala fide but too difficult to prove it. The standards of proving mala fide are, indeed, very rigorous. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decisions of the summit Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 872 ; E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555 and S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 . In support of this contention, he relied upon the decisions of the summit Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 872 ; E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555 and S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 . Sri Ravi Kant, therefore, vehemently urged that the writ petition being devoid of any merit and substance, deserves to be dismissed and the petitioners are liable to be saddled with heavy and exemplary costs. 12. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the entire materials placed before us, we are of the view that it cannot be said that the submissions of Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate is without substance. The submission of Mr. Ravi Kant that neither Clause (k) nor Clauses (g), (h) and (i) imposes any restriction on change of user appears to us to be correct. The restriction is only in regard to transfer, mortgage, sub- letting, assignment or relinquishment of the demised property and also the embargo is created only with regard to user of the plot in Clause (g) of the present lease deed- on carrying on any obnoxious trade or business or its user for any religious purpose. Sri Ravi Kant is also justified in his submission that the opinion of Director of Industries that the change in the land user cannot be permitted since the site in question is meant for industry, is only an individual opinion of the officer and cannot override or abrogate or supersede the terms of the lease. It appears to us that the project, in question, shall be of a very global and international standard and shall be in the interest of the State and it would be fit and proper for the State Government to accept such proposal and as such, Mr. Tandon, the concerned Minister, on the representation of a delegation of Indian Industries Association led by Sri Anil Pandey, its General Secretary, forwarded the matter. In such circumstances, no mala fide action can be attributed on the basis of facts on record. Tandon, the concerned Minister, on the representation of a delegation of Indian Industries Association led by Sri Anil Pandey, its General Secretary, forwarded the matter. In such circumstances, no mala fide action can be attributed on the basis of facts on record. We may take note of the decisions of the Apex Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 872 ; E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 SC 555 ; S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 , in which in fact, rigorous standard has been laid down by the Supreme Court. Since the site, in question, is meant for industry, decision of the apex Court in Balco Employees Union (Regd.) (supra) is relevant. The Apex Court has clearly emphasised the necessity of distinguishing between the public Interest Litigation and private Interest Litigation as well as the publicity Interest Litigation. It also stressed that mere interlopers, by-standers or busy bodies have no locus standi to maintain the petition. The case, on hand, does not fall within any of the parameters enumerated in Balco Employees Union (Regd.) (supra ). Thus, the reliance on the decisions in Chairman Railway Board (supra) and M. S. Jayaraj (supra) placed by Sri R. N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the petitioners, is utterly misplaced. Chairman Railway Board (supra) is clearly distinguishable as in that case, the modesty of a Bangladesh national was outraged by many, including the employees of Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah station. The apex Court distinguished between public law and private law and recorded a finding that the inaction of the authorities to bring to book such criminals fall within rainbow of public law. The offence committed was at a public place. It amounted to most flagrant breach of the most cherished right to life which includes the right to live with human dignity contained in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was in this context that the Apex Court permitted the petition by a public spirited person, a practicing Advocate of Calcutta High Court. Thus, no parallel can be drawn between Chairman Railway Board (supra) and the present case. So far as M. S. Jayaraj (supra) is concerned, this too was not a public interest litigation. It was instituted by rival trader. Thus, no parallel can be drawn between Chairman Railway Board (supra) and the present case. So far as M. S. Jayaraj (supra) is concerned, this too was not a public interest litigation. It was instituted by rival trader. The Supreme Court held that even a rival trader can impugn the locale of another liquor shop near his shop. The Apex Court specified three categories of persons, vis-a-vis, locus standi (i) a person aggrieved (ii) a stranger and (iii) a busy body or a meddlesome interloper. It was held that any one belonging to third category is easily distinguishable and such person interferes in the things which do not concern him as he masquerades to be a crusader of justice. Petition by such person has to be rejected at the very threshold. The instant case squarely falls in the third category. Not a single entrepreneur from the industrial estate has come forward to complain about the project, in question. Supreme Court, has very clearly held in T. N. Civil Supplies Corporation Workers Union v. T. N. Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. and others, (2001) 4 SCC 469 ; Vinoy Kumar v. State of U. P. , (2001) 4 SCC 734 ; Union of India v. Alok Kumar Dass, (2001) 9 SCC 297 , that a person shall have no locus standi to file writ petition if he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his Fundamental Rights have neither been directly or substantially invaded nor is there any imminent danger of such rights being invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring the applicable rules. The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is based on the existence of a right in favour of the person invoking the jurisdiction. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the writ applied for is a writ of Habeas Corpus or Quo Warranto or instituted in the public interest. In Nilangekar Patil (supra), the Apex Court stressed the necessity to cleanse public life. It equated the pollution in values and standards as equally grave as pollution in the environment. Thus, Nilangekar Patil (supra) too is of no assistance to the petitioners. 13. We also find ourselves unable to accept the argument of Sri Singh, learned Senior Advocate that the present is a case of malice of law. It equated the pollution in values and standards as equally grave as pollution in the environment. Thus, Nilangekar Patil (supra) too is of no assistance to the petitioners. 13. We also find ourselves unable to accept the argument of Sri Singh, learned Senior Advocate that the present is a case of malice of law. Sri Sigh has sought to distinguish between malice of fact and malice of law. In this behalf, paragraph 28 of the writ petition is relevant wherein it has been alleged by the petitioners that the Minister was won over and, therefore, the Minister, with a mala fide intention and for extraneous consideration, favoured the respondent No. 7 with the impugned letter dated 27-8-2000. Use of words won over mala fide intention and extraneous consideration can only mean malice in fact and not malice in law. It is precisely because of this reason that Mr. Lalji Tandon has been impleaded as a respondent in the writ petition. Had it been a case of malice in law, there was absolutely no need to implead Mr. Tandon in the instant case. 14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, noted as aforesaid, we are of the view that there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .