ORDER : 1. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed by one Sowar Ram Singh, the respondent-herein, against the Union of India as also against the Commander, 16(I) Armoured Brigade C/o 56 A.P.O and Commanding Officer, 72, Armoured Regiment, C/o 56 A.P.O. wherein the petitioner prayed for quashing of the trial of the petitioner by Court Martial and the resultant finding and sentence of death as pronounced by General Court Martial together with a prayer for declaration that the provisions authorising the trial of the offence by Court Martial which is punishable with penalty of death, being violative of Articles 21, 19 and 14 of the Constitution. 2. The High Court, however, upon consideration of the evidence on record, allowed the writ petition and modified the sentence of death to that of imprisonment for life. Be it placed on record that the respondent-herein accepted such a finding of the High Court but the Union of India feeling aggrieved thereby came to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India upon the grant of leave. 3. The contextual facts depict that the respondent herein was the assailant and the victims were Captain Sanjib Kumar Nayak and Captain Kuldip Thakur. The assailant killed the victims through bullet injuries from his service rifle. Thus, according to the prosecution, the assailant killed the two superior officers. The assailant thereafter was arrested and subsequently tried for charges framed on 8th September, 1987 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the General Court Martial recorded a finding that the respondent herein was guilty of the charges aforesaid and announced the sentence of death. 4. This order of death penalty in terms of the Rules was, however, subject to the confirmation by the Central Government and apparently the same stands confirmed as communicated vide an order dated 30th January, 1990. 5. The factum of acceptance of the verdict as pronounced by the High Court, of course, makes task of this Court much easier. This Court, thus, in the contextual facts need not go and scrutinise the evidence on record or go into the matter further excepting the conversion of the sentence from life imprisonment to death penalty. 6. 5. The factum of acceptance of the verdict as pronounced by the High Court, of course, makes task of this Court much easier. This Court, thus, in the contextual facts need not go and scrutinise the evidence on record or go into the matter further excepting the conversion of the sentence from life imprisonment to death penalty. 6. Rule 64 of the Army Rules, 1954 provides that in the event of there being a finding of guilt on any charge, the sentence thereon ought to be passed in a manner and in consonance with the provisions as contained in Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As a matter of fact, the provisions are more or less pari materia in nature and as such, the safeguards available under the general law of the land also stand statutorily recognised under the Army Rules 7. Incidentally, under Section 354 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has been categorically recorded that the Court passing an order of sentence of death ought to record special reasons for such a punishment and it is on this score this Court in Jai Kumar v. State of M.P. (1999) 5 SCC 1 where one of us was a party, (Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.C. Banerjee) relying upon an earlier decision of this Court in Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 has summed up the law and the penology effect in the manner below :- "12. Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code authorises the court to punish the offender of murder with death or imprisonment for life - the statute therefore has provided a discretion to the court to sentence the offender either with death or with imprisonment for life: obviously, a serious decision and a heavy burden imposed on the court. This discretion conferred however, shall have to be thus exercised in a manner and in consonance with the concept of law so as to subserve the ends of justice and it is on this aspect of the matter that in a long catena of cases this Court in no uncertain terms laid down that the award of death sentence though within the ambit of jurisdiction of the courts, but that does not clothe the courts to exercise the same in a manner indiscriminate. This Court has been candid enough to record on more occasions than one that it is only in the rarest of the rare cases that this discretion as regards capital punishment ought to be exercised. Ours is a civilised society - a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye ought not to be the criterion; civilisation and the due process of law coupled with social order ought not to permit us to be hasty in regard to the award of capital punishment and as a matter of fact the courts ought to be rather slow in that direction. Justice is supreme and justice ought to be beneficial for the society so that the society is placed in a better-off situation. Law courts exist for the society and ought to rise up to the occasion to do the needful in the matter, and as such ought to act in a manner so as to subserve the basic requirement of the society. It is a requirement of the society and the law must respond to its need. The greatest virtue of law is its flexibility and its adaptability, it must change from time to time so that it answers the cry of the people, the need of the hour and the order of the day. In the present- day society, crime is now considered a social problem and by reason therefore a tremendous change even conceptually is being seen in the legal horizon so far as the punishment is concerned. One school of thought on this score propagates that the function of the law court is that of a social reformer and as such in its endeavour to act as such, the question of a deterring punishment would not arise since the society would otherwise be further prone to such violent acts or activities by reason of the fact that with the advancement of the age the mental frame of boys of tender age also go on changing and in the event of any arrogance being developed or a sense of revenge creeping into the society, the society would perish to the detriment of its people. The other school, however, expressly recorded and rather emphatically that unless the severest of the severe punishments are inflicted on an offender (obviously depending upon the nature of the crime) the society would perish. The other school, however, expressly recorded and rather emphatically that unless the severest of the severe punishments are inflicted on an offender (obviously depending upon the nature of the crime) the society would perish. The other school professes that since one has taken the life of another that does not mean that his life shall have to be taken but during the trial if it transpires the method and manner or the nature of the activities which have resulted in the elimination of a human being from this world, there should not be any laxity on the part of the law courts, otherwise people will and in turn the society will be engulfed in a false sense of security of life in the event of there being the most heinous crime of the earth." 8. In paragraph 16 of the judgment (in Jai Kumar supra) this Court further recorded the Following :- "16. The law courts as a matter of fact have been rather consistent in the approach that a reasonable proportion has to be maintained between the seriousness of crime and the punishment. While it is true that a sentence disproportionately severe ought not to be passed but that does not even clothe the law courts with an option to award the sentence which would be manifestly inadequate having due regard to the nature of the offence since an inadequate sentence would fail to produce a deterrent effect on the society at large. Punishments are awarded not because of the fact that it has to be an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth, rather having its due impact on the society: while undue harshness is not required but inadequate punishment may lead to sufferance of the community at large." 9. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent, however, contended that while it is true that there is no corresponding provision as is available under Section 354 (3) Criminal Procedure Code but having regard to the Rule 64, as noticed hereinbefore, and the factum of the issuance of a memorandum as early as on 2.2.1992 by the concerned authority wherein certain guidelines have been set down following the decision of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 . The proceeding initiated under the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder cannot thus be stated to be de hors the general law of land. The guidelines spoken of earlier are as below :- "(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability; (ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the 'offender' also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the 'crime'; (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances; (iv) A balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances has to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised." 10. It is in this regard that the authority concerned thought it fit to direct the following questions to be asked therein. "(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence.? (b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender ? If upon taking an overall global view of all the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid proposition and taking into account the answers to the questions posed hereinabove, the circumstances of the case are such that death sentence is warranted, the Court should proceed to do so." 11. Be that as it may, the applicability of the general law of the land as regards the award of punishment by reason of the aforesaid cannot be decried and Mr. Altaf Ahmad, Learned Additional Solicitor General in his usual fairness has submitted that the penal jurisprudence of the country ought to have a similar role to play as regards the award of punishments in the Court Martial Proceedings as well. We appreciate the gesture of Mr. Altaf Ahmad, Learned Additional Solicitor General in his usual fairness has submitted that the penal jurisprudence of the country ought to have a similar role to play as regards the award of punishments in the Court Martial Proceedings as well. We appreciate the gesture of Mr. Altaf Ahmad and record our appreciation therefor. 12. Incidentally, the High Court while modifying the sentence from that of the death penalty to life imprisonment was pleased to record the following :- "If the basic principles of penology in the matter of determining sentence are to be taken into consideration not only that the nature of the crime but the antecedents of the criminal are also to be taken into consideration apart from other facts and circumstances such as motive for the crime. Taking into consideration overall assessment of the case we are of the opinion that imposition of death sentence was not called for in the facts and circumstances of the present case." 13. We do not find any infraction in such a recording of the law neither any perversity in modification of the order by the High Court from death penalty to life imprisonment. On the wake of the aforesaid, this appeal fails and is dismissed.