Daya Engineering Works Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.
2002-03-22
RANJAN GOGOI
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
R. GOGOI, J— The essence of the grievances raised by the writ petitioner in the present writ application is in respect of certain deductions made by the Indian Railways from the running bills of the writ petitioner and also in quantifying the amounts due for such deductions. 2. The essential facts to enable the Court to ascertain the controversy that has arisen between the parties in the present proceeding may be recapitulated. By a contract agreement executed by and between the writ petitioner and the authority of the railways dated 17.11.94, the petitioner was awarded a contract for manufacture and supply of 1,50,000 number of E.G. Concrete Sleepers and 4,500 number of P.S.C. sleepers at a rate of Rs.527/- per sleeper. The contract executed by the parties visualise the costs of inputs like H.T.S., special cement, wages etc. at a rate stipulated in the agreement. The terms of the agreement also visualise variation of prices of the sleepers in the event of increase in cost of inputs. According to the petitioner, he had manufactured and supplied 1,16,000 numbers out of the contracted quantity of sleepers and had received 90% payment against the aforesaid supplies. According to the petitioner, all was well between the parties and sanction was also accorded for payment to the petitioner at the revised rate of Rs.629.77 per sleeper against the agreed rate of Rs.527/- as contemplated under the agreement. The petitioner alleges that by a letter dated 11.8.95 issued by the authority of the railways, the petitioner was intimated the decision of the authority that henceforth the H.T.S. wires, one of the major inputs used in the manufacture of concrete sleepers, was to be supplied by the approved contractors of the railways at a price agreed to between the railways' and such contractors. In the aforesaid communication, it was also mentioned that the new rates stipulated would be effective from 8.11.94. Along with the said letter, an office memorandum dt. 2.1.95, to the same effect was enclosed. As it had become necessary to refix the prices of concrete sleepers in terms of the revision of rates as aforesaid, the petitioner was invited to a negotiation to be held on 18.8.95 in the office of the Chief Engineer (Construction)-!!, NF Railways.
Along with the said letter, an office memorandum dt. 2.1.95, to the same effect was enclosed. As it had become necessary to refix the prices of concrete sleepers in terms of the revision of rates as aforesaid, the petitioner was invited to a negotiation to be held on 18.8.95 in the office of the Chief Engineer (Construction)-!!, NF Railways. The petitioner participated in the aforesaid negotiation in the course of which a dispute arose between the parties regarding the date of operation of the revision of rates in respect of HTS wires, in the said negotiation, the petitioner agreed to resolve the matter by the process of arbitration in the terms of the arbitration clause in the agreement. Pending final decision of the matter, a communication dated 12.9.95 was issued by the railway authorities \ stating that until the dispute is resolved between the parties, the contracted rate of Rs.527/- was to continue to remain in force. Subsequently, an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was adjusted from 3 (three) running bills of the contractor i.e. the petitioner and the total amount recoverable having been computed at Rs.28,04,678/-for the period from 8.11.94 to 24.4.95 and such computation having been communicated to the petitioner by a letter dated 25.6.96, the instant approach has been made to this Court seeking invocation of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-railways and the precise stand taken in the said affidavit is that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the parties. According to the railways, by virtue of Clause No. 26.4.2 (III) the revision of rates of HTS wires and the altered mode of procurement of the said inputs was binding on the petitioner. The aforesaid clause may be conveniently extracted hereunder: "Railway Board is considering to fix up the source of supply of HTS wire and the manner and method of fixation of rates. As and when such system is adopted the same shall become binding on the contractor." Furthermore, it has been stated in the affidavit that under Clause No. 26.6.2, the Railways had reserved its right to recover the amount paid in excess in the event of a fall in price of the materials.
As and when such system is adopted the same shall become binding on the contractor." Furthermore, it has been stated in the affidavit that under Clause No. 26.6.2, the Railways had reserved its right to recover the amount paid in excess in the event of a fall in price of the materials. Such a fall in price of HTS wires had taken place consequent to the reduction of customs duty on the said item with effect from 1.4.94. The benefit of the aforesaid deduction in the cost of a major input should have been passed on to the Railways by the contractor but the same was not done. It has also been averred in the affidavit that prices of concrete sleepers was enhanced from Rs.527/- to Rs.629.77 on the basis of the vouchers produced by the contractors without disclosing the fall in price of HTS wires. The Railways contend, in the affidavit filed, that such vouchers are false and fabricated and price of HTS wires having decreased from I.4.94, it is really the said date which should have been taken into account by the Railways for deciding the liability of the contractor to refund the excess amount collected. However, the Railways had adopted the date 8.11.94 as the relevant date keeping in mind that the said date i.e. 8.11.94 was the date on which the quotation of prices of HTS wires were received by the Railways. It is further averred in the affidavit that the market price of HTS wires could not have been higher than the rates at which the supply of the said item was offered to the Railways on 8.11.94. 4. Three principal contentions have been advanced by Mr S.P. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in support of the challenge made in the present writ application. Mr Roy contends that in any event, the revised rate of HTS wires could not have been given retrospective effect from 8.11.94. Therefore, the communication dated 11.8.95 and the office memorandum dated 2.1.95 enclosed thereto area ex-facie illegal to that extent. Learned counsel has also contended that the change in policy as been reflected in the communication dated 11.8.95 and memorandum dated 2.1.95 amounts to novation of the contract and the petitioner not being a consequenting party, the aforesaid change in the terms of the contract would not be binding on him.
Learned counsel has also contended that the change in policy as been reflected in the communication dated 11.8.95 and memorandum dated 2.1.95 amounts to novation of the contract and the petitioner not being a consequenting party, the aforesaid change in the terms of the contract would not be binding on him. Learned counsel has argued that the arbitration clause embodied in the contract agreement would have no application to the instant dispute as the same has arisen not out of the terms of the contract between the parties but has so arisen out of the subsequent actions of the Railways authorities in seeking to change the terms of the original contract. 5. Mr B.K. Sharma, learned sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent--Railways has, at the outset, submitted that the instant writ proceeding ought not to be entertained inasmuch as the dispute besides raising highly disputed questions of fact are covered by the terms of arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the parties. Mr Sharma contends that in terms of Clause No. 26.4.2 (III), the Railways had reserved its right to alter the manner and method of fixation of rates and by the said clause, such alteration is binding on the petitioner. The dispute that has arisen between the parties is, therefore, really one relating to interpretation on to the scope and ambit of the aforesaid Clause No. 26.4.1(111). The aforesaid contract and the dispute would therefore be governed by the arbitration clause. Mr Sharma has drawn attention of the Court to the averments made by the writ petitioner in a connected misc. case filed in the present proceeding namely, Misc. Case No. 434/98 wherein the writ petitioner had consented to seek a resolution of the aforesaid dispute by a reference to arbitration. On the contentions advanced by Mr Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner on the merits of the case, Mr Sharma has contended that the affidavit filed by the respondents having been disclosed that there had occurred a fall in the price of HTS wires with effect from 1.4.94, under the contract, the petitioner was duty bound to pass on the benefit of such fall in price to the Railways which was not so done. Instead, on grounds and reasons which subsequently turned down to be incorrect, the price of concrete sleepers was increased in favour of the petitioner.
Instead, on grounds and reasons which subsequently turned down to be incorrect, the price of concrete sleepers was increased in favour of the petitioner. As soon as the aforesaid position became known to the respondent authority, prompt steps were taken to issue the office memorandum dated 2.1.95 and the letter dated 11.8.95 to the writ petitioner fixing the rate of HTS wires procured by the writ petitioner with effect from 8.11.94. Mr Sharma submitted that the aforesaid date fixed i.e. 8.11.94 is rational and reasonable inasmuch on the said date, separate tenders floated by the Railways for supply of HTS wires were received. The market rate on the said rate could not have been higher than the rates fixed by the Railways by the aforesaid office memorandum dated 2.1.95 and 11.8.95 respectively. Mr Sharma has also argued that in view of Clause No. 26.4.2(111) of the agreement between the parties, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the novation of the contract is untenable. 6. I have considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. In my considered view, the dispute that has arisen in the present petition is squarely governed by the arbitration clause contained in the contract agreement executed by and between the parties. The rate at which the concrete sleepers were to be supplied, is fixed under the contract agreement which contained a clause for price variation. The aforesaid price of the concrete sleepers was fixed under the agreement on the basis of the price of different inputs which under the contract was to be procured independently by the contractor. Depending upon the proof of the increase of the price of the inputs, the price variation clause was to become operative. The parties by inserting Clause No. 26.4.2(111) had agreed that the source of supply of HTS wires and the manner and method of fixation of rates could be varied/altered in the future by the Railways and that such altered system as and when adopted, will bind the contractor. The dispute in the instant case has really arisen on account of the alteration in the source of supply of HTS wires and the question of fixation of rates. The dispute, therefore, that has arisen in the facts of the present cannot be said to be beyond the scope of the contract agreement between the parties.
The dispute in the instant case has really arisen on account of the alteration in the source of supply of HTS wires and the question of fixation of rates. The dispute, therefore, that has arisen in the facts of the present cannot be said to be beyond the scope of the contract agreement between the parties. In that event, the present dispute would be governed by the arbitration clause. 7. Having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, the next question that has to be determined by the Court is as to what should be the fate of the present writ application. The present writ application has remained pending in the file of this Court for nearly 6 (six) years now. For the said reasons, the Court is inclined to examine whether the dispute between the parties as raised in the writ application can be finally decided by the Court without requiring the parties to go to arbitration. While examining the matter from the aforesaid standpoint, this Court has noticed that the dispute between the parties in the present proceeding cannot be effectively determined without answering certain questions of fact which have become highly disputed on the basis of the rival pleadings. The entitlement of either party to the reliefs as prayed for would depend on an answer to several questions relating to the actual cost of HTS wires procured on and from 8.11.94; the genuineness of the various vouchers submitted by the writ petitioner in support of its claim that HTS wires even subsequent to 8.11.94 had been procured at the higher rates than the rates stipulated in the memorandum dated 2.1.95; whether the Railways had succeeded in supplying HTS wires to the writ petitioner through the agency of other contractors even after coming into force the office memorandum dated 2.1.95 and if so, at what rates. The aforesaid questions and such other incidental questions that have arisen can hardly be resolved in the present proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The resolution of such disputed questions of fact can only be arrived at upon consideration of the evidence and materials to be placed by the parties.
The aforesaid questions and such other incidental questions that have arisen can hardly be resolved in the present proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The resolution of such disputed questions of fact can only be arrived at upon consideration of the evidence and materials to be placed by the parties. Considering the above, this Court is not inclined to exercise is extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in the facts of the present case and instead, considers it more appropriate to leave the parties to seek a resolution of the present dispute by having. recourse to the arbitration clause contained in the agreement between the parties. 8. This Court has noticed that in the course of the present proceeding, interim orders have been passed by this Court halting the process of recovery as proposed by the respondent-Railways. The aforesaid interim orders shall remain in force for a period of 3 months by which time both parties will take all necessary steps to ensure that the arbitration proceedings commence. It will be open for the petitioner to seek fresh interim orders before the arbitrator/arbitrators on the expiry on the period mentioned above and as and when any such prayer is made the same will be considered by the learned arbitrator/arbitrators in the light of the entitlement of the parties to any such interim order. Writ petition shall stand dismissed in terms of the above order.