R. K. AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these Special Appeals have been filed by U. P. State Bridge corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) against the judgment and order dated 18. 5. 1999 passed by the learned Single Judge, in civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4043 of 1996 and Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 36071 of 1995, whereby the learned Single judge has allowed these writ petitions filed by the respondents writ petitioners and declared the order dated 9. 1. 1996 contained in annexure 9, order dated 30. 10. 1995 and 4. 11. 1995, contained in annexures no. 6 and 6-A to the writ petition, as void ab-initio, non-est, and quashed the same. The learned Single judge also held that the respondents-writ petitioners shall be deemed to be in service and be treated as on continuous service with all notional benefits except however, that they would not be entitled to any payment of arrears for the period during which they did not work actually. Except that each of them would be entitled to a compensation for the whole period assessed at Rs. 5,000/- each. Briefly stated facts giving rise to the present Special Appeal are that in writ petition no. 36071 of 1996, service of 168 workmen were terminated by an order dated 30. 10. 1995, while in writ petition no. 4043 of 1996 services of 66 workmen were terminated by an order dated 9. 1. 1996 published in Hindi daily Dainik jagran on 12. 1. 1996. In both the cases, the termination was effected by striking off the names of the respective workmen from the rolls in terms of clause L-2-12 of the standing orders for workmen employed in the Corporation. According to the respondents-writ petitioners, they were on strike for a considerable period through sitting dharna and various other modes in support of their demands for bonus and other claims whereas as per the appellants, no notice of such dharna or strike was ever given to the appellants by the Union, on the other hand, the Union had been adopting illegal means impermissible in law despite the corporations requests to the workers to return to work. In these background, the names of two groups of workmen involved in the two writ petitions were struck off from the rolls. In these background, the names of two groups of workmen involved in the two writ petitions were struck off from the rolls. Before the learned Single Judge, the following preliminary objections were raised: the writ petition is not maintainable since the writ petitioners are seeking to enforce their alleged legal right arising out of standing orders which has no statutory force as has been held in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport corporation Vs. Krishna Kant ( 1995 (5)SCC 75 ) and as such the action of the respondents cannot be amenable to writ jurisdiction; ( 2 ) THE dispute as to whether the names can be struck off on account of continuous absence of the workers is a question of fact viz. whether they were on strike of unauthorized absence could be adequately dealt with before the Labour court or Industrial Tribunal when this court is not capable of determining such question of fact, the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy; ( 3 ) THE petitioners had sought for leave to amend the writ petition seeking to incorporate the prayer challenging the vires of clause L-2-12 of the standing order which was since granted on 18. 9. 1996, in writ petition no. 36071 of 1996 from which Special Appeal No. 212 of 1996 preferred by the respondents is pending before the Division Bench while this court had allowed the amendment on 17. 7. 1998 in writ petition no. 4043 of 1996 and had listed both the matters on 6. 8. 1998 and as such this writ petition cannot be maintained to challenge the vires of the said clause of the standing order; ( 4 ) SINCE certified standing order has no statuory force as has been held in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport corporation (Supra), the vires cannot be challenged under Article 226 of the constitution and as such the writ petition in relation thereto cannot be maintained; ( 5 ) THE individual workmen had not come and the Union which is an unregistered one could not maintain the writ petition on behalf of the individual workmen; ( 6 ) THE same very order dated 30. 10. 1995 was challenged by means of writ petition no. 10. 1995 was challenged by means of writ petition no. 2317 of 1996 by one Shri anand Prakash one of the worker whose case is also sponsored in this proceeding and the said writ petition having been dismissed on 9. 5. 1996, the writ petition challenging the same order is barred by the principles of res-judicata. ( 7 ) IN reply to the preliminary objections, the contentions of the respondents-writ petitioners were that even though the action taken under the standing order cannot be challenged through writ proceedings in the present case, U. P. State Bridge Corporation being the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution, it is amenable to writ jurisdiction. It was further stated that its action can very well be challenged in writ jurisdiction as it is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. According to the respondents-writ petitioners, the bar of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar and where there is no disputed question of fact and the question raised is a question of law apparent on the basis of facts disclosed, the court should not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition simply on the ground of existing of alternative remedy. More so, here the question of law raised is as to whether the clause L-2-12 of the standing order can be resorted to when the workmen are on strike may be illegal. It was further contended that even though the amendment in writ petition no. 36071 of 1995 was under challenge in Special appeal but no interim order has since been granted nor further proceedings of the said writ petition has been stayed by the appellate court, therefore, it is open to the Court to proceed with the writ petition. ( 8 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, though the standing orders have no statutory force, if it affects the right of the workmen and operate as an unfair labour policy in that event vires of such provision can very well be challenged in writ proceedings. The decision of the lucknow Bench of this Court in writ petition no. 2317 of 1996 could have operated only against the individual workmen Anand Prakash and not against the rest. Neither against his union. The decision of the lucknow Bench of this Court in writ petition no. 2317 of 1996 could have operated only against the individual workmen Anand Prakash and not against the rest. Neither against his union. As the said decision having not been on the merit of the case, the question raised in present writ petitions, having not been decided, the holding of the writ petitions as not maintainable simply on the ground of alternative remedy would not attract the principles of res-judicata. According to the writ petitions, the union has been registered under the Trade union Act, is competent to file writ petition before this court espousing the cause of its members. On merit, the case of the writ petitioners before the learned Single judge, was that the Corporation had admitted the workmen to be on strike though allegedly on illegal strike and, therefore, the strike having emanated from the means and process for collective bargain accepted in he industrial jurisprudence the workmen cannot be said to be absent within the meaning of the said standing order (L-2-12 ). It is not abandonment of service but rather a step to enforce their demand, which can never be treated to be an absence within the meaning of the standing order. If such an interpretation is arrived at, it would be counter productive to the accepted principle and demolish one of the best hammer in the hands of the workmen to resort to collective bargaining for the fulfilment of their demand, which is otherwise week but becomes capable of confronting when the employees are collected together against the mighty employer. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the Corporation, it was contended that the respondents-writ petitioners continuously absented for more than 13 days and, therefore, it was open to the Corporation to strike off their names from the rolls under the aforesaid standing order. ( 9 ) ON behalf of the Corporation, it was contended that the respondents-writ petitioners continuously absented for more than 13 days and, therefore, it was open to the Corporation to strike off their names from the rolls under the aforesaid standing order. It was further contended that the strike being illegal in the absence of compliance of the required procedure prescribed by the Industrial Dispute Act, the same is to be treated as continuous absence within the meaning of the said clause L-2-12 of the standing order and as such their names could be very well struck off and the respondents-writ petitioners cannot take advantage of the illegal strike to challenge an order passed under the relevant standing order for striking the names of the workmen off the roll treating them to have abandoned their services. ( 10 ) THE learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment and order, has held that the Corporation being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of India, its action is to be judge on the touch stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable under article 226 of the Constitution of India. He further held that the alternative remedy is not an absolute bar because of the reason that a State even when discharging non-statutory duties by reason of its being a State is amenable to writ jurisdiction. He further held that where an order is void and the petition does not involve controversial questions of fact, the High Court may not refuse to exercise its jurisdiction and that too after the writ petition was kept pending for considerable period. ( 11 ) IT may be mentioned that the writ petitions giving rise to the present Special appeals, have been filed in the year 1995-96 and they were pending for about four years and, in these circumstances, the learned Single Judge, declined to relegate the writ petitioners for alternative remedy available to them under the provisions of u. P. Industrial Disputes Act, by raising an industrial dispute. So far as the effect of pendency of the special Appeal No. 212 of 1996 filed against the order allowing amendment in writ petition no. So far as the effect of pendency of the special Appeal No. 212 of 1996 filed against the order allowing amendment in writ petition no. 36071 of 1995 is concerned, the learned Single Judge has held that as no interim order, either staying the operation of the order or staying further proceedings in the writ petitions, was passed by the Division bench, there is no impediment in deciding the writ petitions, more so, when in one writ petition viz. writ petition no. 4043 of 1996 the order allowing amendment has not been challenged. The learned Single judge was further of the view that it is not necessary to go into the question of vires of clause L-2-12 of the standing orders and, therefore, the amendment would not come in the way in proceeding with the writ petitions. ( 12 ) SO far as the objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petitions by unregistered union is concerned, the learned Single Judge has held that even without being registered and without being recognized as a collective body of workmen, the Union is authorized, entitled and eligible to represent the cause of individual workman in the form of collective-bargain between the workmen and the employer and if it is so, in that event, there cannot be any justifiable reason to deny them the same right when it seeks to invoke writ jurisdiction for its individual members through the Union. Further, the plea of res-judicata canvassed by the Corporation, was negatived by the learned Single Judge on the ground that the Lucknow Bench of this Court had not determined and decided the issue and decision in these cases would have effect in the dispute before the Industrial Labour Court where Anand prakash would be pursuing his remedy. On the merit of the case, the learned single Judge, has held that the notice of strike is necessary only when the employees are employed in a public utility service and no material has been brought on record to show that the industrial establishment of the corporation comes within the purview of any of clauses of Section 2 (n) of the industrial Disputes Act and 2-q of the u. P. Industrial Dispute Act which define the public utility services. He further held that even if notice is required for going on strike, still the provision of Industrial disputes Act, provides punishment of illegal strike i. e. (i) making a person on illegal strike liable to punishment of imprisonment for a term extending to one month or with fine extending to Rs. 50/- or with both and it had not mentioned in the provision to the extent that the period of illegal strike would be a period of unauthorized absence inviting consequence therefore. It has not provided that because of such illegal strike the relationship of employer and employee would cease or the contract of service would cease. In that event the provision relating to clause L-2-12, of the standing orders will not be applicable and the workmen shall be deemed to be in service and the contract of employment shall be deemed to be subsisting. He also held that calling the strike as legal or illegal, but it would not be treated as absence. The learned Single Judge, thus, has found that the impugned orders of termination have been passed in violation of the principle of natural justice, equity undertaken by an instrumentality or agency of the State affecting the legal as well as fundamental right with regard to the right to livelihood which is recognized as a right to live within the meaning of Article 21 and as such amenable to writ jurisdiction. Therefore, the writ petitions have been allowed by the learned Single Judge and the orders, which were under challenge in the writ petitions, have been quashed. We have heard Shri A. K. Gupta learned counsel as well as Shri V. R. Agrawal learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri P. N. Rai learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Arun Prakash learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners. ( 13 ) SHRI A. K. Gupta reiterated before us the same preliminary objections, which were raised on behalf of the Corporation before the learned Single Judge. Shri V. R. Agrawal, however, submitted that the Corporation is engage in construction business and the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act both central and U. P. are not applicable in case of closure of a construction undertaking, while also raising the preliminary objections. Shri V. R. Agrawal, however, submitted that the Corporation is engage in construction business and the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act both central and U. P. are not applicable in case of closure of a construction undertaking, while also raising the preliminary objections. He referred to the proviso to Section 25-O of the Industrial disputes Act, as also the proviso to section 6-W of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act, which excludes the procedure prescribed for closing down an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work. According to him, no permission is required for closing down the construction project and each construction project is treated to be the independent work. Thus, the Corporation was entitled to terminate the services of its workmen engaged for particular project on its completion without following procedure laid down in Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act or section 6-W of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act. He also submitted that as the respondents- writ petitioners had absented for more than 10 days and they did not respond to the notice issued to them calling upon them to resume their duties, the provisions of clause L-2-12 of the standing order stood attracted and, therefore, the Corporation was fully justified in terminating their services. According to him, the provisions of section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act or Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes act were not attracted, as workmen had not put in continuous service of not less than one year. Thus, the question, as to whether their termination is in violation of the aforesaid provisions, can only be adjudicated by the Labour Court in an industrial Dispute, where the corporation would be at liberty to produce the material and evidence to show that the provisions of Section 6-N or Section 25-F have not been violated. He relied upon the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Employers in relation to m/s Anand Cinema of M/s Maheshwari and Bernard Vs. Mohan Tiwari and another reported in 1993 L. I. C. 651. He further submitted that Hon. Supreme court in the case of Hindustan Steel works Construction Ltd. Etc. Vs. He relied upon the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Employers in relation to m/s Anand Cinema of M/s Maheshwari and Bernard Vs. Mohan Tiwari and another reported in 1993 L. I. C. 651. He further submitted that Hon. Supreme court in the case of Hindustan Steel works Construction Ltd. Etc. Vs. Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. Employees Union Hyderabad and another reported in AIR 1995 S. C. 1163 has held that "in the case of a construction company which undertakes construction works wherever awarded does not work and winds up its establishment there and particularly where a number of local persons have to be and are appointed for the purpose of a particular work, mere unity of ownership, management and control are not of much significance. The conclusion is inevitable that the units at one place were district establishments. Once this is so, workmen of the said unit had no right to demand absorption in other units on the particular units completing their job. In such a case the fact that the management reserved to itself the liberty of transferring the employees from one place to another, did not mean that all the units of the appellant constituted one single establishment. " ( 14 ) THUS, he submitted that the respondents-writ petitioners are not entitled for any relief. The project, in which they worked, has already come to end. He referred to para 10 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the corporation affirmed by Shri K. B. Srivastava on 7. 1. 1996 wherein it has been averred that the workmen are generally employed at the project site and after completion of the project, the services of such employees authomatically come to end on that particular project. ( 15 ) FURTHER, there cannot be any dispute under the provision of Industrial Dispute act, as construction is treated to be independent project and when it comes to end the employees who are employed specifically for that project cannot seek adjustment as a matter of right in another construction project undertaken by the industrial undertaking. Shri Arun Prakash, however, submitted that the Corporation is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable, hi fact, he adopted the reasoning given by the learned single Judge in support of his submissions. Shri Arun Prakash, however, submitted that the Corporation is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of India and, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable, hi fact, he adopted the reasoning given by the learned single Judge in support of his submissions. He also submitted that this court in the case of Pradeep Kumar Vs. U. P. State Sugar Corporation and another passed in Special Appeal No. 596 of 1998, on 6. 10. 2001, reported in 2002 (1)E. S. C. (All.) 165 has considered in great detail the question as to whether a writ petition is maintainable by the workmen/employees where the employer is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and has held it to be maintainable. ( 16 ) HE further submitted that the corporation being the State by acting arbitrarily in terminating the services of the respondents-writ petitioners, in gross violation of principle of natural justice, equity, and fair play and, thus, the learned single Judge, was justified in interfering with the impugned orders. Having heard the rival submissions, we find that almost all the preliminary objections, raised on behalf of the corporation, have been considered in great detail by this court, in the case of pradeep Kumar Singh (supra) and, we are in full agreement with the principles laid down in the case of Pradeep Kumar Singh (supra) and, we do not propose to deal with the same separately again in this case. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the Corporation that the writ petitions were not maintainable, cannot be accepted. So far as the merit of the case, it is not the case of the Corporation that the orders terminating the services of the respondents-writ petitioners were by way of retrenchment. They had invoked the provisions of clause L-2-12 of the certified Standing Orders on the ground that the respondents-writ petitioners had abandoned their services and despite notice they had not turned up for work. ( 17 ) IT is not disputed that the Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is supposed to act reasonably and not arbitrarily. The services of the respondents-writ petitioners have been terminated without even giving show cause notice or opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders of termination. ( 17 ) IT is not disputed that the Corporation is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is supposed to act reasonably and not arbitrarily. The services of the respondents-writ petitioners have been terminated without even giving show cause notice or opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned orders of termination. Thus, the impugned orders have been passed in gross violation of principle of natural justice, fair play and equity and have rightly been quashed by the learned single Judge. ( 18 ) THERE cannot be any dispute that every construction project is treated to be a separate work and the employees engaged for and working in a particular project cannot seek adjustment or absorption as a matter of right in another project on completion of that project in which they were working. So far as the question that the respondents-writ petitioners had been engaged for a particular project is concerned, there is no specific pleading by the corporation. General statement has been made that the workmen are generally employed at the project site and after completion of the project; the services of such employees automatically come to end on that particular project. But neither any details of project and employees engaged therein with reference to the respondents-writ petitioners have been given nor their appointment letters have been placed before the Court. Hence, such contention cannot be accepted. ( 19 ) IN view of the foregoing discussions, we do not find any merit in these Special appeals and they are dismissed.