JUDGMENT S. K. Sen, C.J.—We have heard Sri B. P. Singh holding brief of Sri Amit Bose, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri S. M. K. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1/writ petitioner, (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner). 2. This special appeal is directed against an order passed by the learned single Judge directing the appellant to appear in person and to explain why the orders passed in the writ petition by the learned single Judge have not been carried out. 3. Short facts are that the petitioner filed a writ petition claiming appointment on compassionate ground under the Dying-in-Harness Rules and he was granted relief in the writ petition. 4. The contention of the respondents-State Government in the application, which has been filed by the petitioner, is two fold, firstly the writ petitioner’s father was only a work charge employee and secondly there was a ban imposed by the State Government in making appointment on daily wages or in work charge establishment. 5. The question that arises for consideration in this special appeal is whether after the writ petition is finally disposed of, further orders can be passed on a miscellaneous application. 6. It is well-settled that after the disposal of the writ petition, only an application for review or clarification can be made but no further relief can be prayed for. In this connection, we take note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahma Datt Sharma and another, 1987 (1) AWC 760 (SC) : 1987 (2) SCC 179 , wherein, inter alia, it was held in paragraph 10 of the judgment as follows : “The High Court’s order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondents’ writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on August 10, 1984, thereafter nothing remained pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondent is aggrieved by the notice dated January 29, 1986, he could have filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided as separate cause of action to him. If the respondent is aggrieved by the notice dated January 29, 1986, he could have filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided as separate cause of action to him. The respondent was not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court by means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which had already been decided. The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High Court committed error in entertaining the respondent’s application which was founded on a separate cause of action. When proceedings stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the Court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous application in respect of a matter which provided a fresh cause of action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any meaning.” 7. Mr. S. M. K. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1-writ petitioner placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Jitendra Pal v. Committee of Management and others, 1992 (3) AWC 1685 : 1993 (1) UPLBEC 218, wherein it was held that power of the High Court under writ jurisdiction is not confined till disposal of the writ petition but High Court can pass appropriate orders even after its disposal. While making said finding, the Division Bench relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, Dwarka Nath v. I.T.O., AIR 1966 SC 81 and M. V. Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., 1992 (2) JT 65 . 8. The Division Bench also quoted the relevant portion of the judgment given in M. V. Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. (supra) which is as follows : “The High Courts in India are superior courts of record. They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers, (See Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, 1966 (3) SCR 744 ). As stated in Halsbury’s laws of England, 4th Edition Vol. 10 para 713. Unless expressly or impliedly barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their own powers, (See Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, 1966 (3) SCR 744 ). As stated in Halsbury’s laws of England, 4th Edition Vol. 10 para 713. Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular court.” 9. In paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment Division Bench considering said observations of the Supreme Court held that the High Court has all power to do justice unless there is some express curtailment of the power in the Constitution. It is quite true that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not only limited to enforcement of fundamental rights but also it can be exercised for other purposes but that does not mean and in fact the Division Bench has considered the Supreme Court decision which has only held that High Court can under Article 226 of the Constitution of India pass orders to secure ends of justice. The Supreme Court in the said decisions did not take the view that after the writ petition is disposed of, it is open to the High Courts in miscellaneous application to pass any order granting further reliefs. 10. We are accordingly constrained to observe that the later part of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court has not been taken into consideration in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahma Datt Sharma and another (supra). 11. In that view of the matter, the judgment and decision of the aforesaid Division Bench appears to us to be per incuriam and not binding being contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court. 12. 11. In that view of the matter, the judgment and decision of the aforesaid Division Bench appears to us to be per incuriam and not binding being contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court. 12. We accordingly, following the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahma Datt Sharma and another (supra), set aside the judgment and order dated 15.1.2002 of the learned single Judge and opine that the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to pass such order in a miscellaneous application filed in the same proceeding in the writ petition when the writ petition itself has already been disposed of. 13. It is of course true that an order can be passed on an application for review, modification or clarification of the final order, but in the garb of clarification, the Court has no power to pass such orders for enforcement of its order and to ask for explanation of and call upon the appellant to appear in person. Learned single Judge, it appears, has passed the impugned order as if he is sitting in a contempt jurisdiction. It is well-settled by several Supreme Court decisions as also by a recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Prof. Y. C. Simbadri and others v. Deen Bandhu Pathak, 2001 (3) HVD 140, independent jurisdiction of original nature whether emanating from the Contempt of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and that the Chief Justice being the Master of the roster, as such, the contempt jurisdiction having been given to another Judge exercising the jurisdiction in contempt matters, the learned single Judge has no jurisdiction to issue notice calling for an explanation sitting in the writ jurisdiction for violation of its orders. 14. In the aforesaid decision, we have taken note of several decisions which are as follows : (1) State v. Devi Dayal, AIR 1959 All 421 . (2) Sohan Lal Vaid v. State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1990 Cal 168 . (3) Raj Kishore Yadav v. Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya and others, 1997 (1) UPLBEC 26. (4) High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Raj Kishore Yadav and others, 1997 (3) SCC 11 . (5) State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and others, 1988 (1) SCC 1 . (6) Dr. (3) Raj Kishore Yadav v. Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya and others, 1997 (1) UPLBEC 26. (4) High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Raj Kishore Yadav and others, 1997 (3) SCC 11 . (5) State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and others, 1988 (1) SCC 1 . (6) Dr. L. P. Mishra v. State of U. P., 1998 (4) AWC 892 (SC) : 1998 (7) SCC 379 . 15. As early as in the year 1959, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of State v. Devi Dayal (supra) has clarified the position and in the case of Prof. Y. C. Simbadri and others v. Deen Bandhu Pathak, (supra), we have taken note of the same. In the aforesaid decision as also in the case of State v. Devi Dayal (supra), the Division Bench has considered the question in appropriate manner. The short facts and relevant finding of the same Division Bench are set out hereinbelow : “................ A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mr. Justice James and Mr. Justice Takru had directed a notice to be issued to the opposite party, Devi Dayal, to show cause, within three weeks why the sentences which had been passed on him by the Magistrate by his order dated 29th October, 1957, be not enhanced. This notice was directed to be issued by the aforementioned Bench ostensibly in the exercise of as they said, “the High Court’s power of revision.” When the matter came in revision before the Bench consisting of Mr. Justice B. Mukerji and Mr. Justice H. P. Asthana, it was held that on the facts of the case it was clear that the matter was not placed before the learned Judges, who directed notice to be issued, by either the Chief Justice or in accordance with any direction given by him and the case appears to have been taken by the Bench suo motu. The question that came for consideration was whether under the aforementioned circumstances of the case, the order of the Bench directing issue of notice to Devi Dayal to show cause why his sentence should not be enhanced, was within the jurisdiction of that Bench or not. While dealing with the said question, the Division Bench held that notice for enhancement can be issued by this Court under revisional jurisdiction. While dealing with the said question, the Division Bench held that notice for enhancement can be issued by this Court under revisional jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the order reads as under : “Revisional jurisdiction in criminal cases is conferred on the High Court by Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The jurisdiction that this section confers is on the ‘High Court’ and not on any individual Judge of the Court or on any Bench of the Court. The powers which the High Court can exercise while exercising its revisional jurisdiction are provided for in Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and here too it may be noticed, the powers that are described there are the powers of the ‘High Court’ and not of any individual Judge or any individual or particular Bench of the High Court. If there is nothing else in the law then whenever any revisional power had to be exercised by the High Court that power could only be exercised by the entire court and not by any single Judge or a Division Bench of the Court.” The jurisdiction of the High Court and the powers are provided for by Article 225 of the Constitution. The perusal of that article necessitates the consideration of the provisions contained in Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915. In pursuance of the power vested in the High Court by these provisions, Rule 1 of Chapter V of the Rules of the Allahabad High Court has been made. On a consideration of the aforementioned constitutional position and the rule, the Court came to the conclusion that it is only the Chief Justice who has the right and the power to decide which Judge is to sit alone and what cases such Judge can decide ; further, it is again for the Chief Justice to determine which Judge shall constitute Division Benches and what work those Benches shall do. Under the rules of the High Court, it is for the Chief Justice to allot work to Judges and Judges can do only such work as it allotted to them. Under the rules of the High Court, it is for the Chief Justice to allot work to Judges and Judges can do only such work as it allotted to them. It is not open to a Judge to make an order, which could be called an appropriate order, unless and until the case in which he makes the order has been placed before him for order either by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions. Any order which a Bench or a single Judge may choose to make in a case that is not placed before them or him by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his directions is an order which, if made, is without jurisdiction. (sic.) In the aforesaid case when the Bench of the High Court purported to make an order directing a notice to issue under Section 439, Criminal Procedure Code to an accused to show cause why his sentences should not be enhanced even though it was not a case that had been directed by the Chief Justice to be placed before that Bench for order, it was held that the Bench had no jurisdiction to issue notice to the accused to show cause for the enhancement of the sentences passed against him.” 16. Similar view has also been taken by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sohan Lal Vaid v. State of West Bengal and others, AIR 1990 Cal 168 , in which one of us (the then Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. K. Sen) was a party. The said decision has been exhaustively dealt with and considered by the Division Bench in the case of Prof. Y. V. Simbadri and others (supra) of this Court in which one of us (Hon’ble the Chief Justice) was a party. 17. The Apex Court had also the occasion to deal with the same question in the case of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (supra) whereby the appeal preferred was allowed and the decision therein was reversed. The finding of the Apex Court in this connection is summarized as follows : 13. 17. The Apex Court had also the occasion to deal with the same question in the case of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (supra) whereby the appeal preferred was allowed and the decision therein was reversed. The finding of the Apex Court in this connection is summarized as follows : 13. In the case of Raj Kishore Yadav v. Principal, Kendriya Vidyalaya, Bamrauli and others (supra) it was held that Rule 4 (a) is repugnant to the Constitution of India to the extent that it places a case of civil contempt before a Bench or a Division of a Court which may not have passed the order, direction or judgment. The relevant portion of the judgment is set out herein below : “The Rules of the Allahabad High Court dislocate the civil contempt jurisdiction, inconsis-tent with the understood concept of a court of record. This has resulted in adding arrears to the already pending cases. Of every contempt case, civil contempt, two proceedings are born. The main case and the contempt case. (sic) Each is registered separately. It is monitored separately right from notice to Judge. The records of the two cases are strangers to each other. This is not all. On record there are several instances of more than one contempt case and more than one case itself (out of which the contempt arises) pending on the same subject-matter, between the same parties. Statistics reveal that on the same controversy, counsel intimated the Court of there existing three, four, five or even six cases, between the case and contempt proceedings. In a Court of record this is not meant to happen. This had caused concern to Chief Justice Hon’ble B. P. Jeevan Reddy, as he then was. In the circumstances, it is found that Rule 4 (a) is repugnant to the Constitution of India to the extent and it places a case of civil contempt before a Bench or a Division of a Court which may not have passed the order, direction or judgment. A matter of civil contempt may be placed before a learned Judge, but this would be a jurisdiction so nominated by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, of cases referred by the subordinate courts to the High Court. A matter of civil contempt may be placed before a learned Judge, but this would be a jurisdiction so nominated by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, of cases referred by the subordinate courts to the High Court. But of contempt, that is, civil contempt alleged for the violation of an order, direction or judgment of the High Court, as a Court of record, the only Court would be the Court which passed such an order, direction or judgment and no other. Consequently and for the reasons given in this order sub-clause (a) of Rule 4 of Chapter XXXV-E of the rules framed under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and appended to the Allahabad High Court Rules, for the presentation and hearing of civil contempt case, in so far as they relate to the examination and allegation of a civil contempt on the breach or violation of an order, direction or judgment of a Bench of the High Court, but misplaces the case before the Court which may not have passed the order, direction or judgment, render this particular rule inconsistent in its contempt to a court of record and specifically ultra vires to Article 215 of the Constitution of India. This rule as is contained in sub-clause (a) of Clause 4, to Chapter XXXV-E is struck off accordingly. 14. The matter went up to the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Raj Kishore Yadav and others, 1997 (3) SCC 11 , allowed the appeal and reversed the decision of the Division Bench. The finding of the Apex Court in this connection may be summarized as follows : “Clause (a) of Rule 4 of Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is valid and legal and not inconsistent with Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The finding of the Apex Court in this connection may be summarized as follows : “Clause (a) of Rule 4 of Chapter XXXV-E of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is valid and legal and not inconsistent with Article 215 of the Constitution of India. A conjoint reading of Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 225 of the Constitution of India makes it clear that every High Court by its own rules can provide for exercise of its jurisdiction, original or appellate, by one or more Judges or by Division Courts consisting of two or more Judges of the High Courts and it is for the Chief Justice of each High Court to determine what Judge in each case is to sit alone or what Judges of the Court whether with or without the Chief Justice are to constitute several Division Courts. In exercise of the aforesaid rule-making power which inhered in all existing High Courts at the time of the advent of the Constitution of India and which was expressly saved by Article 225 of the Constitution of India, the Full Court of the High Court had framed these rules in 1952. The procedure for exercise of contempt jurisdiction can be laid down by the High Court concerned by framing suitable rules under Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Pursuant to Rule 4 (a) of the said rules of the Chief Justice was entitled to nominate a learned single Judge to decide civil contempt cases arising under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The aforesaid rule, therefore, clearly falls in line with the constitutional scheme in connection with the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court. Thus, enactment of the impugned rule squarely falls within the administrative power of the High Court well preserved by the aforesaid provisions. All the Article 215 states is that every High Court shall be a Court of record meaning thereby all the original record of the Court will be preserved by the said Court and it shall have all the powers of such a superior court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself. As a superior court of record the High Court is entitled to preserve its original record in perpetuity. As a superior court of record the High Court is entitled to preserve its original record in perpetuity. Even apart from the aforesaid attribute of a superior court of record the High Court as such has two fold powers. Being a court of record the High Court (i) has power to determine the question about its own jurisdiction and (ii) has inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily. As regards the contention that the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court by framing the impugned rule had enacted a provision which fell foul on the touchstone of Article 215 of the Constitution it may be stated that the High Court as an institution has the seisin of the relevant record pertaining to custody of the author of the order giving rise to contempt proceedings. The cases may be pending or might have been disposed of. Civil contempt might be alleged in connection with interim orders in pending matters and can also be alleged in connection with final orders in matters which are already disposed of. The record of such matters would be available in the High Court. All that the impugned rule has done is to entitle the Chief Justice to assign the work of hearing civil contempt matters to one of the Judges. Such an exercise is perfectly legal and valid in the light of the constitutional scheme. When civil contempt is alleged in connection with breach of any order of the High Court, whether final or interim, while deciding the said question the learned Judge to whom this work is assigned is entitled to look into the relevant record which obviously is available in the High Court and thereby the learned Judge is not depriving any other Judge of the said record. So far as matters which are finally disposed of are concerned, such an eventuality can never arise but even in pending matters where breach of interim orders is alleged, when contempt proceedings in connection with such orders are placed for examination and scrutiny before the learned Judge to whom the work is assigned by the Chief Justice under the rules it cannot be said that the record of the case in any way gets adversely affected or disturbed. It is the question of internal arrangement and transmission of record from Court to Court as per the exigencies and necessities of the case. It is the question of internal arrangement and transmission of record from Court to Court as per the exigencies and necessities of the case. The civil contempt alleged is the contempt of the High Court as such and not the contempt of the author of the order being the Judge concerned who might have passed the said order, whether interim or final. When civil contempt by way of breach of such an order is alleged it is the institution of the High Court as such which is said to have been contemptuously dealt with by contemnor concerned. For upholding the majesty of the institution as such, therefore, the High Court as a court of record can look into the grievance centering round the alleged breach of its order and it is this power to punish the contemnor that flows from Article 215 of the Constitution of India as well as from the relevant provisions of the Contempts of Courts Act. But how this grievance of the aggrieved party is to be processed and examined pertains to the realm of distribution of work and jurisdiction of the High Court amongst different Division Benches and that exercise is permissible to the Chief Justice of the High Court as per the rules framed by the High Court on its administrative side. That exercise has nothing to do with Article 215. Article 215 saves the inherent powers of the High Court as a Court of record to suitably punish the contemnor, who is alleged to have committed civil contempt of its order. Order might have been passed by any of the learned Judges exercising the jurisdiction of the High Court as per the work assigned to them under the rules by the orders of the Chief Justice, but once such an order is passed by a learned single Judge or a Division Bench of two or more Judges the order becomes the order of the High Court. Breach of such an order which gives rise to contempt proceedings also pertains to the contempt of the High Court as an institution. Breach of such an order which gives rise to contempt proceedings also pertains to the contempt of the High Court as an institution. At that stage Article 215 does not operate, but it is only Article 225 read with the rules framed by the High Court on administrative side and the power inhering in the Chief Justice, of assigning work to the appropriate Bench of Judge or Judges, under Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 read with Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which would have its full play. Consequently if under the impugned rules the task of considering the grievance of the aggrieved party in connection with civil contempts of High Court’s orders is assigned to one of the Judges of the High Court it cannot be said that thereby the impugned rule has in any manner affected the status of the High Court as a Court of record. The analogy of Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. cannot be pressed into service while judging the validity of the impugned rule on the touchstone of Article 215. Rule 2A is mainly pressed into service before subordinate Courts which at most of the centers consist of sole presiding Judges of the courts. In such cases where the subordinate courts working at these centers consist of only one presiding Judge the applications under Order XXXIX, Rule 2A, C.P.C. will have to be filed in the very same Court and would go to the same Judge or his successor-in-office. Such is not the case with the High Court functioning as a superior court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The High Court consists of the Chief Justice and such other Judges as the President may from time to time deem (sic.) it necessary to appoint as laid down by Article 216. Consequently plurality of Judges appointed to the High Court collectively constitute the High Court. Again, while exercising original jurisdiction under Contempts of Courts Act, 1971, in connection with civil contempt of its own orders the High Court is not exercising any review jurisdiction wherein statutorily the proceedings may have to be placed for decision of the same Judge or Judges if they are available. Contempt jurisdiction is an independent jurisdiction of original nature whether emanating from the Contempts of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Contempt jurisdiction is an independent jurisdiction of original nature whether emanating from the Contempts of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. How such original jurisdiction can be exercised is a matter which can legitimately be governed by the relevant rules framed by the High Court on its administrative side by exercising its rule-making power under Section 23 of the Act or under its general rule-making power flowing from the relevant provisions of the constitutional scheme. Consequently it cannot be said that the impugned rule is violative of Article 215.” In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and others, 1998 (1) SCC 1, the Supreme Court while allowing the appeal held as follows : “While on the judicial side the Chief Justice of the High Court is only the first amongst the equals, the administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice of the High Court alone and it is his prerogative to distribute business of the High Court both judicial and administrative. The Chief Justice is the master of the order. He alone has the right and power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be constituted ; which Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is required to hear as also as which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches shall do. The puisne Judge can only do that work which is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions. No Judge or a Bench of Judges can assume jurisdiction in a case pending (sic) in the High Court unless the case is allotted to him or them by the Chief Justice. Strict adherence of this procedure is essential for maintaining judicial discipline and proper functioning of the High Court. No departure from it can be permitted. Till any determination made by the Chief Justice lasts, no Judge who is to sit singly can sit in a Division Bench and no Division Bench can be split up by the Judges constituting such Bench cannot sit singly and take up any other kind of judicial business not otherwise assigned to them by or under the directions of the Chief Justice. In the event a single Judge or a Division Bench considers that a particular case requires to be listed before it for valid reasons, it should direct the Registry to obtain appropriate orders from the Chief Justice. The puisne Judges are not expected to entertain any request from the advocates of the parties for listing of case which does not strictly fall within the determined roster. In such case, it is appropriate to direct the Chief Justice and obtain appropriate orders. This is essential for smooth functioning of the High Court. The Chief Justice can take cognizance of an application laid before him under the High Court Rules (Rule 55 herein) and refer a case to the larger Bench for its disposal and he can exercise this jurisdiction even in relation to a part-heard case. The Chief Justice has the authority and the jurisdiction to refer even a part-heard case to a Division Bench for its disposal in accordance with law where the rules so demand. It is a complete fallacy to assume that a part-heard case can under no circumstances be withdrawn from the Bench and referred to a larger Bench, even where the rules make it essential for such a case to be heard by a larger Bench. The puisne Judges cannot “pick and choose” any case pending in the High Court and assign the same to himself or themselves for disposal without appropriate orders of the Chief Justice. No Judge or Judges can give directions to Registry for listing any case before him or them which runs counter to the directions given by the Chief Justice.” 18. The same question also came up in an appeal arising out of the judgment of this Court before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. L. P. Mishra’s case, 1998 (4) AWC 892 (SC) : 1998 (7) SCC 379 , wherein the Supreme Court after hearing the Solicitor General who was requested to appear and assist the Court held as follows : “12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials placed on record, we are of the opinion that the Court while passing the impugned order had not followed the procedure prescribed by law. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after going through the materials placed on record, we are of the opinion that the Court while passing the impugned order had not followed the procedure prescribed by law. It is true that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. It is in these, circumstances the impugned order cannot be sustained.” Considering all the aforesaid decisions, the Division Bench of this Court in Prof. Y. C. Simbadri and others v. Deen Bandhu Pathak (supra) inter alia held as follows : (1) The administrative control of the High Court vests in the Chief Justice alone and it is his prerogative to distribute business of the High Court both judicial and administrative. (2) The Chief Justice alone has the right and power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be constituted which Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is required to hear as also which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench and what work those Benches shall do. (3) The puisne Judges can only do such work which is allotted to them by the Chief Justice or under his directions. No Judge or a Bench of Judges can assume jurisdiction in a case pending in the High Court unless the case is allotted to him or them by the Chief Justice. (4) Any order which a Bench or a single Judge may choose to make in a case that is not placed before them or him by the Chief Justice or in accordance with his direction is an order without jurisdiction and void. (5) Contempt jurisdiction is an independent jurisdiction of original nature whether emanating from the Contempts of Courts Act or under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. (6) For exercising the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution of India the procedure prescribed by law has to be followed. 19. It, therefore, appears that the learned single Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the order in the manner it has been done. The order dated 15.1.2002, passed by the learned single Judge is accordingly set aside and the special appeal is allowed. 20. 19. It, therefore, appears that the learned single Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the order in the manner it has been done. The order dated 15.1.2002, passed by the learned single Judge is accordingly set aside and the special appeal is allowed. 20. We, however, make it clear that we have not adjudicated the matter on merits including the contentions raised and it will be open to the petitioner to proceed in accordance with law.