JUDGMENT P. K. TRIPATHY, J. — The Second Appeal has been admitted on the substantial question of law and, the relevant question as per Ground No. 3 reads as hereunder : “Whether the appellate Judge is justified in law in decree¬ing the suit of the plaintiff by accepting additional evidence against the appellant without giving them an opportunity of adducing rebuttal evidence ?" 2. Plaintiff is Respondent No. 1. He filed Title Suit No. 124 of 1979 in the Court of Munsif, First Court, Cuttack, inter alia, praying for confirmation of possession, alternatively for recovery of possession and for permanent injunction restraining defendant Nos.1 to 4 from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 5 and 6. Plaintiff claimed the said land for himself as well as for the defendant Nos. 5 and 6. The disputed land is described in the Schedule ‘A’ of the plaint, which reads as hereunder: Schedule ‘A’ District - Cuttack Mouza - Samapurpoda, Samil-Rajabagicha, Khata No. 64, C.S. Plot No. 128, out of this an area Ac. 0.021 decimals corresponding to Hal Plot No. 344 as shown in the sketch maps attached to the schedule ‘B’ and ‘C’. Defendant No .1 is the sole contesting defendant and, inter alia,he advanced the plea that the disputed land appertains to C.S. Plot No. 121 and not C.S. Plot No. 128. 3. In the trial Court plaintiff’s suit was dismissed, inter alia, on the grounds that the predecessors in interest had no good title to convey it to the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 5 and 6, and the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 5 and 6 are not in possession of the suit land. While considering Issue No. 9, i.e., as to whether the suit property appertains to C.S. Plot No. 121 or 128, the trial Court recorded the finding that it appertains to C.S. Plot No. 121. 4. It appears from the trial Court’s record that both the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. Plaintiff examined two witnesses and tendered Exts. 1 to 10/a as documen¬tary evidence. Defendant examined seven witnesses and tendered Exts. A to M/1 as oral and documentary evidence. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned Munsif, First Court, Cuttack, plaintiff preferred an appeal and that was decided by the learned First Addl. Plaintiff examined two witnesses and tendered Exts. 1 to 10/a as documen¬tary evidence. Defendant examined seven witnesses and tendered Exts. A to M/1 as oral and documentary evidence. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the learned Munsif, First Court, Cuttack, plaintiff preferred an appeal and that was decided by the learned First Addl. District Judge, Cuttack, vide the impugned judgment dated 14.8.1985 in Title Appeal No. 11 of 1982. It appears from order No. 16, dated 7.2.1983 of the appellate Court record that an application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. was filed by the appellant. The re¬spondents in that appeal i.e., the present appellants (in the Second Appeal) filed a counter. On 26.4.1983 the lower appellate Court deferred consideration of that application till the time of hearing of the appeal. On 1.8.1985 the lower appellate Court heard and allowed that application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. and marked the documents (additional evidence) as Exts. 11, 12 and 13, and simultaneously heard argument on merit in the appeal and thereafter on 14.8.1985 delivered the impugned judg¬ment. 6. Narration of the aforesaid circumstances from the lower Court’s records indicate that though the additional evidence from the side of the plaintiff was accepted but the appellate Court did not even think of affording to the contesting defendants/respondents a chance of submitting rebuttal evidence. Undoubtedly, that attitude and the manner of acceptance of addi¬tional evidence without affording an opportunity to the contest¬ing opponent is in gross violation of the principle of natural justice besides the procedural law. While reiterating on the aforesaid ground which has been taken by the appellant as Ground No. 3, Mr. Aswini Mishra, learned Standing Counsel states that he is under instruction to make a statement that in fact the defend¬ant/appellant is not only required to adduce rebuttal evidence but also prepared to adduce rebuttal evidence subject to grant of opportunity. In that context, while the contention of the learned Standing Counsel is to remand the matter to the lower appellate Court for acceptance of the rebuttal evidence from the defend¬ants/appellants, Mr. N. C. Pati, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents vehemently opposes to the submission of remand and argues that a litigation which was initiated about two decades back, should reach to a finality by deciding the issue in this Court and not by an order of remand. N. C. Pati, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents vehemently opposes to the submission of remand and argues that a litigation which was initiated about two decades back, should reach to a finality by deciding the issue in this Court and not by an order of remand. He further argues that the provision of law in Order 41, Rule 25, C.P.C. which is constructively applicable to the second appeal even is sufficient to guide the Court to adopt the correct course for partial remand and not for total remand. In reply, Mr. Mishra disputes to the correctness of the interpretation of provision of law by Mr. Pati. 7. An order of remand in an old pending litigation may amount to harassment to one or both the parties, as the case may be, and therefore, whenever it is possible within the legal bounds an order of remand should be avoided. But when an order of remand is necessary for proper adjudication of the dispute, then Court shall not avoid that in the name of delay. Therefore, it is to be considered on the given facts and circumstances as to whether an order of remand, be it total or partial, can be avoid¬ed in this appeal. 8. On a reference to the conflicting findings on fact by the Courts below, it appears that, referring to the documents on record while the trial Court found no possession with the plain¬tiff as well as decided the relevant but vital issues in the manner indicated above, the lower appellate Court, on apprecia¬tion of such evidence with the aid and assistance of Exts. 11 to 13, has taken a different view on the aforesaid two aspects, that is to say, two vital aspects (issues) involved in the litigation. The rebuttal evidence, which the defendants propose of adduce, if rebuts or explains Exts. 11 to 13 for a decision in their favour, then the decision taken by the lower appellate Court on the issue of possession and identity of the suit land shall change and that may ultimately affect the result of the impugned decree of the lower appellate Court. 11 to 13 for a decision in their favour, then the decision taken by the lower appellate Court on the issue of possession and identity of the suit land shall change and that may ultimately affect the result of the impugned decree of the lower appellate Court. Under such circumstance, the partial remand of the appeal to the lower appellate Court will not serve any purpose in as much as if there shall be a decision in favour of defendants on the basis of the rebuttal evidence, then the appeal in the Court below shall stand dismissed and, in view of the above noted substantial question of law nothing more remains or required to be decided in the Second Appeal. 9. While in seisin of the dispute in exercise of jurisdic¬tion under Section 100, C.P.C. it is neither required nor desirable for this Court to accept and/or record additional evidence and to decide the factual aspects on all relevant issues, if required afresh. Thus, for that reason argument for no remand is not acceptable. For the reasons indicated above, the provision in Order 41, Rule 25, C.P.C. is found not attracted in this case. In other words, the decision on the aforesaid two vital issues shall be required to be taken afresh in the event of availabili¬ty of rebuttal evidence from the side of the defendants. Of course, it is open to the appellate Court to take any view in the matter after acceptance of the rebuttal evidence, if any. For the sake of clarity, it is indicated here that after this order of remand if the defendants/appellants shall not adduce any rebuttal evidence, then it will be appropriate for the learned First Addl. District Judge, Cuttack to re-affirm the judgment and decree passed by his predecessor without granting any further opportuni¬ty of hearing to both the parties because, this Court sets aside the impugned decree only on the ground of non-affording opportu¬nity of adducing rebuttal evidence though the defendants want to exercise such right after acceptance of additional evidence from the side of the plaintiffs/appellants (in the Courts below) and not on any other ground or reason. 10. For the reasons indicated above, this Court sets aside the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and remands that appeal for fresh adjudication in the manner indicat¬ed above. 11. 10. For the reasons indicated above, this Court sets aside the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and remands that appeal for fresh adjudication in the manner indicat¬ed above. 11. Keeping in view the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and also being conscious of the oldness of the litigation besides the contention advanced by both the parties, it is directed that both the parties shall appear before learned 1st Additional District Judge, Cuttack on 30.3.2002. Default in appearance on that date shall be treated as such, and neither of the parties shall be entitled to fresh notice from that Court. Learned Standing Counsel states that a period of three months may be granted to the defendants to produce the rebuttal evidence and to advance argument. It is left for consideration of the lower appellate Court to grant time to the defendants for producing/adducing rebuttal evidence. In any event, the lower appellate Court is directed to dispose of the appeal in accord¬ance with law and the aforesaid direction and to report compli¬ance by end of August, 2002. Appeal allowed.