S. R. K. PRASAD, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners who are the accused in CC No. 154 of 2001 on the file of the learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge- cum-Judicial First Class Magistrate, Bapatla seek quashing of the proceedings by invoking the inherent powers of this Court under section 482 of Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) THE facts that require consideration can be succinctly stated: ( 3 ) THE 1 st respondent herein presented a complaint before the Judicial First Class magistrate, Bapatla under Section 190 (1) of cr. P. C against the petitioners alleging the they cheated him by taking a sum of rs. 1,50,000/- to provide a teacher job in taluq High School at Tenali and promised that they would provide one post by recommending to the higher officials. They also promised that in case the said job was not arranged, the said amount would be refunded to the persons who paid the same. The 1st respondent believing the said version stated to have paid an amount of rs. 1,50,000/- to the petitioners on 10. 11. 1999 at about 8. 00 p. m. , and thereafter, the petitioners herein did not provide any job nor refunded the amount. A legal notice dated 19. 7. 2000 was also got issued to the petitioners-accused and they returned the said Registered post letter and therefore, the 1st respondent requested the Judicial first Class Magistrate, Bapatla to take necessary action. The complaint has been forwarded by the learned Magistrate under section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C to the Station house Officer, Town Police Station, Bapatla who in turn registered a case in Crime no. 19 of 2001 under Sections 420, 406 and 409 of IPC on 12. 2. 2001. ( 4 ) ON 21. 6. 2001, an anticipatory protest petition has been presented before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Bapatla alleging that the Station House Officer, bapatla is not taking any action by investigating the matter which is referred to him and requested the Court to take cognizance of the same and to proceed with the case on the strength of the anticipatory protest petition. Thereafter, the Magistrate recorded the sworn statements of six other witnesses, ignored Crime No. 19 of 2001, directly took cognizance and registered it asc. C. No. 154 of 2001. Thereafter, the Magistrate recorded the sworn statements of six other witnesses, ignored Crime No. 19 of 2001, directly took cognizance and registered it asc. C. No. 154 of 2001. ( 5 ) TAKING cognizance of the case by the learned Magistrate has been assailed by the petitioners on the ground that it is against the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and abuse of process of law. It is also contended that it is not open to the magistrate after referring the complaint to the police under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C. to take cognizance without ascertaining the stage of investigation or the material collected by the investigating agency. Hence the petitioners sought for quashing of the proceedings. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent contends that as the police have not submitted any report after forwarding the case under Section 156 (3) of cr. PC, the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence. ( 7 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor contends that it is not a fit case where inherent powers of this Court can be exercised by this Court to quash the proceedings. ( 8 ) ADVERTING to the same it is necessary to have a look at several provisions of the code of Criminal Procedure that empower the Magistrate to entertain the complaint and take cognizance of the matters. I state at the very outset that there is no provision under the Cr. PC to entertain an anticipatory protest petition. ( 9 ) THE earlier case where under anticipatory protest petitions have been considered is in a decision of the Parna high Court in Saiku Khan v. Gaya Prasad, air 1941 Pat. 144. The Parna High Court in the said decision held as follows:"the only distinction between anticipatory protest petitions, that is to say, petitions made to the Magistrate before the receipt of the police report, and those filed after police report is that an anticipatory protest petition may possibly call for no action at all if the police report that is received afterwards actually places the accused persons on their trial. This position can of course never arise in connection with petitions of protest filed after the receipt of the police report. But apart from this, the two stand on much the same footing. This position can of course never arise in connection with petitions of protest filed after the receipt of the police report. But apart from this, the two stand on much the same footing. Anticipatory protest petitions amount to petitions of complaint on which the petitioners must be examined under Section 200". ( 10 ) IT is clear from the principles laid down in the said decision that anticipatory protest petitions can be treated as petitions of complaint. At the very outset i state that there is nothing wrong in dealing with it as a complaint. I state that it cannot be treated as an anticipatory protest petition since there is no police report. If there is a police report, one can entertain a protest petition. For a non-existing police report, the question of entertaining an anticipatory protest petition does not raise. Moreover, it is premature to protest that the police have not submitted any report. In that view of the matter, I am of the considered view that anticipatory protest petitions cannot be presented even before the filing of the police report and the Magistrate shall not entertain them. ( 11 ) IN case of cognizable offences, the police are entitled to investigate since it must be presented as per Section 154 of the cr. P. C which reads as follows:"information of cognizable cases. (1) every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and even such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an Officer-in-charge of a Police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any Police Officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such Officer shall have all the powers of an Officer-in-charge of the Police Station in relation to that offence. " ( 12 ) SECTION 155 of the Cr. P. C deals with information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases. If the police Officer wants to investigate a non- cognizable offence, he has to record the information and he shall not be entitled to investigate a non-cognizable offence without obtaining an order from the Magistrate as can be seen from Section 155 of Cr. P. C which is as follows:"information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases : (1) When information is given to an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such Officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf and refer the informant to the magistrate. (2) No Police Officer shall investigate a non- cognizable case without the order of a magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. (3) Any Police Officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect, of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an Officer-in- charge of a Police Station may exercise in a cognizable case. (4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable". (4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable". ( 13 ) WHENEVER a case relates to two or more offences of which one is cognizable offence, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence as can be seen from section 155 (4) of the Cr. P. C. It is clearly stated under Section 156 of the Cr. P. C that any Officer-in-charge of a Police Station may, without, the order of the Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. It is also mentioned in Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C that any Magistrate under Section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned. Hence, it is clear that under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C the Magistrate who is empowered under Section 190 may order investigation in the above cases. Section 157 of Cr. P. C prescribes the procedure for investigation. Section 158 of Cr. P. C directs the manner in which the report has to be submitted. According to this Section, even report sent to a Magistrate under Section 157, shall, if the State Government so directs, be submitted through such superior officer of police as the State Government, by general or special order, appoints in that behalf. Under Section 159 of the Cr. P. C, the magistrate on receiving the report may direct an investigation, or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry. ( 14 ) SECTION 190 of Cr. Under Section 159 of the Cr. P. C, the magistrate on receiving the report may direct an investigation, or, if he thinks fit, at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry. ( 14 ) SECTION 190 of Cr. P. C deals with the cognizance of offences by Magistrate and reads as follows:"cognizance of offences by Magistrate : (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2), may take cognizance of any offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the Second Class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try". ( 15 ) THE Magistrate has power to take cognizance of the offences on receiving a complaint and on receipt of the police report and upon information received from any person other than a Police Officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. The procedure that has to be followed after receipt of the complaint before taking cognizance has been stated in Section 200 of the Cr. P. C which reads as follows:"examination of complainant :a magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint: or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Section 192 : provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter magistrate need not re-examine them". ( 16 ) SECTION 202 empowers the magistrate to postpone the issue of process or enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Section 202 reads as follows:"postponement of issue of process : (1) any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorized to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under Section 192, may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under Section 200. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witness on oath: provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a Police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer-in-charge of a Police Station except the power to arrest without warrant". (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a Police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer-in-charge of a Police Station except the power to arrest without warrant". ( 17 ) IF there is no sufficient ground to proceed further on a perusal of the sworn statement of the complainant and the witness, the Magistrate has given power to dismiss the complaint as can be seen from Section 203 which is as follows:"dismissal of complaint :if, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing". ( 18 ) UNDER Section 204 of Cr. P. C, if there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the case, the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence and issue process. Under Section 210 of the Cr. P. C. , the procedure that has to be followed when there is a complaint case and police investigation in respect of the same offence has been mentioned. It reads as follows:"procedure to be followed when there is a complaint case and police investigation in respect of the same offence : (1) When in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report (hereinafter referred to as a complaint case), it is made to appear to the Magistrate, during the course of the inquiry or trial held by him, that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the Police Officer conducting the investigation. (2) If a report is made by the Investigating police Officer under Section 173 and on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if both the cases were instituted on a police report. (4) If the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of this Code". ( 19 ) KEEPING in view the said provisions, it is now necessary to deal with the catena of decisions placed by the petitioners Counsel as well the 1st respondent s counsel. ( 20 ) IN State of Bihar v. J. A. C. Saldanha, air 1980 SC 326 , the Supreme Court has dealt with the powers of the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C and also the duty of the Police Officers and the relevant portion reads as under:"the power of the Magistrate under section 156 (3} to direct further investigation is clearly an independent power and does not stand in conflict with the power of the state Government as spelt out hereinbefore. The power conferred upon the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even after submission of a report by the Investigating Officer which would mean that it would be open to the magistrate not to accept the conclusion of the Investigating Officer and direct further investigation. This provision does not in any way affect the power of the Investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of the report as provided in section 173 (8 ). Therefore, the High Court was in error in holding that the State government in exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 3 of the act lacked the power to direct further investigation into the case. In reaching this conclusion we have kept out of consideration the provision contained in Section 156 (2) that an investigation by an Officer-in-charge of a Police Station, which expression includes police Officer superior in rank to such officer, cannot be questioned on the ground that such Investigating Officer had no jurisdiction to carry on the investigation; otherwise that provisions would have been a short answer to the contention raised on behalf of respondent 1. (23) A grievance was made that there was serious impropriety in the Superintendent of railway Police, Mohammad Sulaiman, directly addressing a letter to the learned additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on 15-2-1979, informing him about the decision of the Government to continue the investigation and, therefore, not to accept the final report. It is true that the Police officers should refrain from addressing communications to the Court on pending matters required to be determined judicially and we express our disapproval of this conduct. However, it makes no difference in this case because the learned Additional chief Judicial Magistrate acted not on the letter dated 15-2-1979, but on an application made by the Assistant Public Prosecutor-in- charge of the case and that is the legally accepted mode of obtaining a judicial order. In Kanai Lal v. State, 1975 Crl. LJ 1143, the Calcutta High Court has categorically stated that the Magistrate cannot hamper with the investigation and record his order and discharge a case. The relevant portion is at para 5 and the same reads as under:"section 156 (3) empowers the Magistrate to direct the police to investigate a cognizable offence. Once the Magistrate gives such a direction, the police takes cognizance of the offence and starts investigation. The magistrate having directed such investigation cannot tinker with or hamper with the investigation started by the police by a subsequent order of re-call of his order under section 156 (3) and discharge the accused. If he does so, he exceeds his jurisdiction and acts in a manner which is not in accordance with the procedure established by law". ( 21 ) IT is clear from the observations made by the Supreme Court that the magistrate having directed investigation cannot tinker or hamper with the investigation started by the police by a subsequent order of recall of his order under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. If he does so, exceeds his jurisdiction and acts in a manner which not in accordance with the procedure established by law. P. C. If he does so, exceeds his jurisdiction and acts in a manner which not in accordance with the procedure established by law. ( 22 ) THE Supreme Court in a decision reported in State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak, AIR 1963 SC 447 , held as follows:" (3) At the time the respondent filed the petition in the High Court only a written report was made to the police by the Sub- inspector of Police Enforcement Branch and on the basis of that report a First Information report was recorded by the Officer-in-charge of the Police Station and investigation had started. There was no case pending at the time excepting that the respondent had appeared before the Court, had surrendered and had been admitted to bail. The powers of investigation into cognizable offences are contained in Chapter XIV of the Code of criminal Procedure. Section 154 which is in that Chapter deals with information in cognizable offences and Section 156 with investigation into such offences and under these Sections the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under Section 439 or under the inherent power of the Court under Section 561a of criminal Procedure Code. As to the powers of the judiciary in regard to statutory right of the police to investigate, the Privy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (1) observed as follows: The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, a course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561a has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that Section was enacted. In such a case as the present, however, the Court s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561a has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that Section was enacted. But this is not so, the Section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted as their lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the criminal Procedure Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of that Act. With this interpretation, which has been put on the statutory duties and powers of the police and of the powers of the Court, we are in accord. The High Court was in error therefore in interfering with the powers of the police in investigating into the offence which was alleged in the information sent to the Officer-in-charge of the Police station. ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court clearly stated in the above decision that the police have got statutory right to investigate the circumstances of any cognizable offence. ( 24 ) THE Supreme Court in the decision reported in S. N. Sharma v. Bipen kumar Tiwar, AIR 1970 SC 786 , held as follows:" (3) The High Court has held that, under section 159, the only power, which the magistrate can exercise on receiving a report from the Officer-in-charge of a Police station, is to make an order in those cases which are covered by the proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 157, viz. , cases in which the Officer-in-charge of the Police station does not proceed to investigate the case. The High Court has further held that this Section 159 does not empower a magistrate to stop investigation by the police in exercise of the power conferred on 20031ii AID (Crl.) Jan. it by Section 156. , cases in which the Officer-in-charge of the Police station does not proceed to investigate the case. The High Court has further held that this Section 159 does not empower a magistrate to stop investigation by the police in exercise of the power conferred on 20031ii AID (Crl.) Jan. it by Section 156. It is the correctness of this decision which has been challenged by the appellant, and the ground taken is that section 159 should be interpreted as being wide enough to permit the Magistrate to proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case in the manner provided in this Code, even if the report from the police, submitted under Section 157, states that the police is proceeding with the investigation of the offence. It was urged by Counsel for the appellant that the narrower interpretation of Section 159 accepted by the High Court will leave persons at the mercy of the police who can harass any one by having a false report lodged and starting investigation on the basis of such a report without any control by the judiciary. He has particularly emphasised the case of the appellant who was himself a Judicial Officer working as additional District Magistrate and who moved the Magistrate on the ground that the police had engineered the case against him. (4) We, however, feel constrained to hold that the language used in Section 159 does not permit the wider interpretation put forward by Counsel for the appellant. This s ection first mentions the power of the magistrate to direct an investigation on receiving the report under Section 157, and then states the alternative that, if he thinks fit, he may at once proceed, or depute any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed, to hold a preliminary enquiry into, or otherwise to dispose of, the case. (5) On the face of it, the first alternative of directing an investigation cannot arise in a case where the report itself shows that investigation by the police is going on in accordance with Section 156. It is to be noticed that the second alternative does not give the Magistrate an unqualified power to proceed himself or depute any Magistrate to hold the preliminary enquiry. That power is preceded by the condition that he may do so, "if he thinks fit". It is to be noticed that the second alternative does not give the Magistrate an unqualified power to proceed himself or depute any Magistrate to hold the preliminary enquiry. That power is preceded by the condition that he may do so, "if he thinks fit". The use of this expression makes it clear that Section 159 is primarily meant to give to the Magistrate the power of directing an investigation in cases where the police decide not to investigate the case under the proviso to Section 157 (1), and it is in those cases that, if he thinks fit, he can choose the second alternative. If the expression "if he thinks fit" had not been used, it might have been argued that this Section was intended to give in wide terms the power to the Magistrate to adopt any of the two courses of either directing an investigation, or of proceeding himself or deputing any Magistrate subordinate to him to proceed to hold a preliminary enquiry as the circumstances of the case may require. " ( 25 ) IT is observed by the Supreme Court that the fact that as the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be laid in Section 159 of the Code. It is clearly stated by the Supreme court that only a writ can be maintained by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of india in such a case. ( 26 ) IT is stated by the Supreme Court in H. N. Bains v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1883 , as follows: (6) It is seen from the provisions to which we have referred in the preceding paragraphs that on receipt of a complaint a Magistrate has several courses open to him. He may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding he may issue process under section 204. He may take cognizance of the offence and proceed to record the statements of the complainant and the witnesses present under Section 200. Thereafter, if in his opinion there is no sufficient ground for proceeding he may dismiss the complaint under Section 203. If in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding he may issue process under section 204. However, if he thinks fit, he may postpone the issue of process and either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a Police Officer or such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He may then issue process if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding or dismiss the complaint if there is no sufficient ground for proceeding. On the other hand, in the first instance, on receipt of a complaint, the Magistrate may, instead of taking cognizance of the offence, order an investigation under Section 156 (3 ). The police will then investigate and submit a report under Section 173 (1 ). On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (l) (b) and straight away issue process. This he may do irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report, whether an offence has been made out or not. The police report under Section 173 will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police and the conclusions drawn by the police therefrom. The magistrate is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the police and he may decide to issue process even if the police recommend that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. The Magistrate after receiving the police report, may, without issuing process or dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him and proceed to record the statements upon oath of the complainant and the witnesses present under section 200, Criminal Procedure Code and thereafter decide whether to dismiss the complaint or issue process. The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156 (3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Section 200, 203 and 204. The mere fact that he had earlier ordered an investigation under Section 156 (3) and received a report under Section 173 will not have the effect of total effacement of the complaint and therefore the Magistrate will not be barred from proceeding under Section 200, 203 and 204. Thus, a magistrate who on receipt of a complaint, orders an investigation under section 156 (3) and receives a police report under Section 173 (1), may, thereafter, do one of three things; (1) he may decide that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drop action; (2) he may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (b) on the basis of the police report and issue process; this he may do without being bound in any manner by the conclusion arrived at by the police in their report; (3) he may take cognizance of the offence under section 190 (1) (a) on the basis of the original complaint, and proceed to examine upon oath the complainant and his witnesses under section 200. If he adopts the third alternative, he may hold or direct an inquiry under section 202 if he thinks fit. Thereafter he may dismiss the complaint or issue process, as the case may be. In Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, the Magistrate, on receiving a complaint, ordered an investigation under Section 156 (3 ). The police submitted a report indicating that no case had been made out against the accused. The Court, however, recorded the statements of the complainant and the witnesses and issued process against the accused. It was contended that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case as if upon a complaint when the police had submitted a report that no case had been made out against the accused. This Court held that the Magistrate acted within his powers and observed that the complaint did not get exhausted as soon as the magistrate ordered an investigation under section 156 (3 ). We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submission of Shri Sibal that the Mgistrate acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process to the accused notwithstanding the fact that the police report was to the effect that no case had been made out". ( 27 ) THE Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Sections 156 (3), 191, 202 and 204 of Cr. ( 27 ) THE Supreme Court has considered the provisions of Sections 156 (3), 191, 202 and 204 of Cr. P. C and all the decisions arising under the same and laid down the following legal principles as can be seen from the decision in Tula Ram v. Kishore singh, AIR 1977 SC 2401 :"in these circumstances the inescapable conclusion is that in the present case the magistrate had not taken cognizance of the case and ordered investigation by the police under Section 156 (3) before applying his mind to the complaint. This being the position it was always open to the Magistrate to take cognizance of the complaint and dispose it of according to law, that is to say according to the provisions of Sections 190, 200 and 202. In view of the facts in the present case he was prohibited from directing any investigation but he could take other steps. Even in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh mishra (supra) this Court while holding that the Magistrate has supervisory power over the police and it was not open to him to direct the police to file a charge-sheet observes that the Court was not powerless to dispose of the complaint according to law. In this connection, this Court observed as follows; we are not inclined to agree with the further view that from these considerations alone it can be said that, when the police submit a report that no case has been made out for sending up an accused for trial, it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to file a charge sheet. But, we may make it clear that this is not to say that the Magistrate is absolutely powerless, because, as will be indicated later, it is open to him to take cognizance of an offence and proceed, according to law. (15) In these circumstances we are satisfied that the action taken by the Magistrate was fully supportable in law and he did not commit any error in recording the statement of the complainant and the witnesses and thereafter issuing process against the appellants. The High Court has discussed the points involved thread-bare and has also cited a number of decisions and we entirely agree with the view taken by the High Court. Thus on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case the following legal propositions emerge:1. The High Court has discussed the points involved thread-bare and has also cited a number of decisions and we entirely agree with the view taken by the High Court. Thus on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case the following legal propositions emerge:1. That a Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156 (3) only at the pre- cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Sections 190, 200 and 204 and where a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of chapter XIV he is not entitled in law to order any investigation under Section 156 (3) though in cases not falling within the proviso to Section 202 he can order an investigation by the police which would be in the nature of an enquiry as contemplated by section 202 of the Code. 2. Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the followingalternatives: (A) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (B) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (C) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 3. In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 4. Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under section 156 (3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 as described above. ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court in Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi, 2002 (1) ALD (Crl) 242, held as follows:"the complainant Sita Devi in FIR No. 135 is allowed to persist with her complaint despite the conclusion reached by the police that the said complaint was false. ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court in Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi, 2002 (1) ALD (Crl) 242, held as follows:"the complainant Sita Devi in FIR No. 135 is allowed to persist with her complaint despite the conclusion reached by the police that the said complaint was false. But that course adopted by the Court cannot disable the police to continue to investigate into the offence of murder of Sugnia Devi and to reach the final conclusion regarding the real culprit of her murder. The police completed their investigation only when the charge sheet was finally laid on 31-3-2000 against the first respondent Sita Devi and others. The said case has to be legally adjudicated for which a trial by the Sessions court is indispensable. Learned Counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceeding initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted by the Court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted by the Court regarding the new discovery made by the police during the investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceeding merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it. " ( 29 ) THE Supreme Court, in Suresh chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, air 2001 SC 571 , held as follows:"9. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. But a Magistrate need not order any such investigation if he proposes to take cognizance of the offence. Once he takes cognizance of the offence he has to follow the procedure envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code. A reading of Section 202 (1) of the code would convince that the investigation referred to therein is of a limited nature. The magistrate can direct such an investigation to be made either by a Police Officer or by any other person. Such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not there is sufficient ground for him to proceed further. This can be discerned from the culminating words in Section 292 (1) i. e. , "or direct an investigation to be made by a police Officer or by such other persons as he think fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". This is because he has already taken cognizance of the offence disclosed in the complaint, and the domain of the case would thereafter vest with him. 10. The position is thus clear. Any Judicial magistrate, before, taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under section 156 (3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the Officer-in-charge of the police Station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156 (3) of the code that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the Officer-in-charge of the police Station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in chapter XII of the Code only thereafter". ( 30 ) IN Jamuna Singli v. Bhadai Shah, air 1964 SC 1541 , the Supreme Court has dealt with the provisions of Sections 417 (3), 200, 202, 156 (3) of Cr. ( 30 ) IN Jamuna Singli v. Bhadai Shah, air 1964 SC 1541 , the Supreme Court has dealt with the provisions of Sections 417 (3), 200, 202, 156 (3) of Cr. PC and held as follows:" (5) The main contention urged in support of the appeal is that in this case no appeal lay to the High Court against an order of acquittal under Section 417 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This provision in section 417 was introduced in the Code by the Amending Act XXVI of 1955, giving a complainant a right of appeal against acquittal where a case is instituted upon a complaint. Before this new legislation, only the State government had the right to appeal against an order of acquittal. The result of the new provision in sub-section 3 is that if an order of acquittal is passed by any Court other than a High Court in a case instituted upon a complaint, the High Court on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf may grant special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal and on such leave being granted the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. It is to be noticed that this right is limited only to cases instituted upon a complaint. On behalf of the appellants it is argued that the case against them was not instituted on any complaint but was instituted on a police report. (6) The Code does not contain any definition of the words "institution of a case". It is clear however and indeed not disputed, that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. Section 190 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure contains the provision for cognizance of offences by magistrates. It provides for three ways in which such cognizance can be taken. The first is on receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; the second is on a report in writing of such factsthat is, facts constituting the offence-made by any police officer; the third is upon information received from any person other than a police Officer or upon the Magistrate s own knowledge or suspicion that such offence has been committed. Section 193 provides for cognizance of offences being taken by courts of sessions on commitment to it by a magistrate duly empowered in that behalf. Section 194 provides for cognizance being taken, by the High Court of offences upon a commitment made to it in the manner provided in the Code. (7) An examination of these provisions makes it clear that when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, a case is instituted in the Magistrate s court and such a case is one instituted on a complaint. Again, when a Magistrate takes cognizance of any offence upon a report in writing of such facts made by any Police officer it is a case instituted in the magistrate s Court on a police report. (8) To decide whether the case in which the appellants were first acquitted and thereafter convicted was instituted on a complaint or not, it is necessary to find out whether the sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gopalgunj, in whose Court the case was instituted, took cognizance of the offences in question on the complaint of Bhadai Sah filed in his court on 22-11-1956 or on the report of the sub-Inspector of Police dated the 13-12- 1956. It is well settled now that when on a petition of complaint being filed before him a Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under the various provisions of chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal procedure, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. When however he applies his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under Section 156 (3) or issues a search warrant for the purpose of investigation he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. It was so held by this Court in R. R. Chart v. State of u. P. (1) and again in Gopal Das v. State of assam (2) (9) In the case before us the Magistrate after receipt of Bhadai Sah s complaint proceeded to examine him under Section 200 of the code of Criminal Procedure. That Section itself states that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath. That Section itself states that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath. This examination by the Magistrate under section 200 of the Code of Criminal procedure puts it beyond doubt that the magistrate did take cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. After completing such examination and recording the substance of it to writing as required by section 200 the Magistrate could have issued process at once under Section 204 of the code of Criminal Procedure or could have dismissed the complaint under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was also open to him, before taking either of these courses, to take action under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of persons complained against, and either enquire into the case himself or if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the Third Class, direct an enquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a Police Officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint. If and when such investigation or inquiry is ordered the result of the investigation or inquiry has to be taken into consideration before the magistrate takes any action under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (10) We find that in the case before us the magistrate after completing the examination under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal procedure and receding the substance of it made the order in these words :- examined the complaint on a s. a. The offence is cognizable one. To S. I. , Bakunthpur for instituting a case and report by 12. 12. 1956. if the learned Magistrate had used the words for investigation instead of the words for instituting a case the order would clearly be under Section 202 (1) the Code of Criminal procedure. We do not think, that the fact that he used the words for instituting a case makes any difference. It has to be noticed that the Magistrate was not bound to take cognizance of the offences on receipt of the complaint. We do not think, that the fact that he used the words for instituting a case makes any difference. It has to be noticed that the Magistrate was not bound to take cognizance of the offences on receipt of the complaint. He could have, without taking cognizance, directed an investigation of the case by the police under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once however he took cognizance he could order investigation by the police only under section 202 of the Code of Criminal procedure and not under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As it is clear here from the very fact that he took action under Section 200 of the Code of criminal Procedure, that he had taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint, it was open to him to order investigation only under Section 202 of the code of Criminal Procedure and not under section 156 (3) of the Code. It would be proper in these circumstances to hold that though the Magistrate used the words for instituting a case in this order of 22-11- 1956 he was actually taking action under section 202 of the Code of Criminal procedure, that being the only section under which he was in law entitled to act. (11) The fact that the Sub-Inspector of police treated the copy of the petition of complaint as a first information report and submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons cannot make any difference. In the view we have taken of the order passed by the Magistrate on 22-11-1956, the report made by the Police Officer though purporting to be a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be treated in law to be a report only under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (12) Relying on the provisions in Section 190 of the Code that cognizance could be taken by the Magistrate on the report of the police Officer, the learned Counsel for the appellants argued that when the Magistrate made the order on 22-11-1956 his intention was that he would take cognizance only after receipt of the report of the Police officer and that cognizance should be held to have been taken only after that report was actually received in the shape of a charge- sheet under Section 173 of the Code, after 13. 12. 1956. 12. 1956. The insuperable difficulty in the way of this argument, however, is the fact that the Magistrate had already examined the complainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That examination proceeded on the basis that he had taken cognizance and in the face of this action it is not possible to say that cognizance had not already been taken when he made the -order "to Sub-Inspector, baikunthpur, for instituting a case and report by 12. 12. 1956. " (13) Cognizance having already been taken by the Magistrate before he made the order there was no scope of cognizance being taken afresh of the same offence after the police officer s report was received. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the case was instituted on Bhadai Shah s complaint on November 22, 1956 and not on the police report submitted later by the police Sub-Inspector, Baikunthpur. The contention that the appeal did not lie under Section 417 (3) of the Code of Criminal procedure must therefore be rejected. (14) The next contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the order of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant sessions Judge. The reasoning on which the learned Assistant Sessions Judge rejected the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the reasons for which the learned judges of the High Court were of opinion that there was no real effort by the learned sessions Judge to assess the credibility of the evidence have been placed before us. It is quite clear that the High Court examined the matter fully and carefully and on a detailed consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that assessment of the evidence had resulted in a serious failure of justice. The principles laid down by this court in a series of cases as regards interference with orders of a acquittal have been correctly followed by the High Court. There is nothing, therefore, that would justify us in reassessing the evidence for ourselves. As relevant parts of the evidence were however placed before us, we think it proper to state that on a consideration of such evidence we are satisfied that the decision of the High Court is correct. There is nothing, therefore, that would justify us in reassessing the evidence for ourselves. As relevant parts of the evidence were however placed before us, we think it proper to state that on a consideration of such evidence we are satisfied that the decision of the High Court is correct. (15) As a last resort the learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the Magistrate had acted without jurisdiction in asking 2003 (2) (Crl.)F-5 the police to institute a case and so the proceedings subsequent to that order were all void. As we have already pointed out, the order of the Magistrate asking the police to institute a case and to send a report should properly and reasonably be read as one made under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal procedure. So, the argument that the learned magistrate acted without jurisdiction cannot be accepted. At most it might be said that insofar as the learned Magistrate asked the police to institute a case he acted irregularly. There is absolutely no reason, however, to think that irregularity has resulted in any failure justice. The order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court cannot be reversed or altered on account of that irregularity. " ( 31 ) IT is now well settled that cognizance of an offence can be taken only by a Magistrate. He is entitled to take it either on a private complaint presented before him or on the strength of a police report submitted to him. ( 32 ) THE question that falls for consideration is whether the Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of the offence on the strength of a private complaint where police are seized of the matter by registering a crime and conducting investigation? ( 33 ) THE Legislature in its wisdom has introduced a new provision i. e. , Section 210 of the Cr. P. C (new Code) and categorically stated that when there is a complaint case and police investigation in respect of the same offence, the matter has to be stayed in respect of private complaint presented before the Magistrate and he has to call for a report as can be seen from Section 210 of the cr. P. C. Because of the provision of Section 210, the anticipatory protest petitions can be treated only as complaints. P. C. Because of the provision of Section 210, the anticipatory protest petitions can be treated only as complaints. But the magistrate is bound to follow the provisions of the Section 210 of the Cr. P. C before proceeding further and taking cognizance. If the offences are different, the Magistrate has got power to take cognizance of the offence. The exceptions are found under section 210 (3) of Cr P. C. It is clearly stated in Section 210 (3) of Cr. P. C that when police report, does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall proceed with the enquiry or trial, which has been stayed by him, in accordance with the provisions of the Code. These are the two exceptions given for proceeding with the enquiry in respect of the cases arising under a complaint case and police investigation in respect of the same offence. If the offences are different, there is no bar for the magistrate to take cognizance on the strength of the sworn statement. The statutory bar under Section 210 of Cr. P. C operates only in respect of the category of cases mentioned therein. Moreover, it is not a total bar for the Magistrate to take cognizance. What is mentioned in Section 210 of the Cr. P. C is that the Magistrate has to call for the report from the police who are investigating and thereupon proceed with the case. The stay of the proceedings contemplated under section 210 of Cr. P. C applies till the receiving of the police report and it is clear from Section 210 of Cr. PC that Magistrate has got exclusive power to take cognizance of the offence. Taking cognizance of the offence by the Magistrate without having the knowledge of pendency of a police report cannot be styled as invalid. Taking cognizance by the Magistrate on a complaint is still valid. It is stated in Section 210 of cr. P. C that whenever the Magistrate learns about the pendency of the police investigation in respect of the same offence, he has to stay the enquiry. It is clear that the Magistrate has got ample power to proceed further. But the exceptions are also have to be taken into consideration by the magistrate as mentioned in Section 210 (3) of Cr. It is clear that the Magistrate has got ample power to proceed further. But the exceptions are also have to be taken into consideration by the magistrate as mentioned in Section 210 (3) of Cr. P. C. The object of this provision is only to prevent the abuse of process of the court by the litigants by presenting police report and private complaint simultaneously in respect of the same accused and the incident. As already stated, the Magistrate has got exclusive right to take cognizance cl the offence and none else. ( 34 ) THIS Court had an occasion to deal with Sections 190, 200, 202, 204 and 210 of cr. P. C. in a decision reported in G. LB. Poornima v. State of A. P. , 1991 (1) APLJ 359 . This Court while dealing with the matter held as follows:"a combined reading of Sections 190, 200, 202, 204 and 210 Cr. P. C makes it clear that the Court is competent to take cognizance of an offence on a private complaint irrespective of the fact that a charge-sheet is filed by the police and the offence therein is taken cognizance of. The Court has to independently apply its judicial mind to the contents of the complaint, sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses, if any examined and then come to a conclusion whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed further. Non-application of the judicial mind independently to the said material is against the spirit of law". ( 35 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the proposition laid down in the said decision is not correct and requires reconsideration. Their Lordships have laid down the law visualising the lethargy of the Investigating Officers and also cases which arise on account of failure to submit a report in spite of the directions of the Magistrate. In so far as the presentation of the complaint is concerned, it can be presented to a Magistrate but the duty cast on the Magistrate is to call for a report whenever it is brought to his notice that police investigation is going on in respect of the same offence. If the complaint discloses different offence, he is entitled to proceed with the case and take cognizance of the offence after following the provisions of Section 210 of Cr. If the complaint discloses different offence, he is entitled to proceed with the case and take cognizance of the offence after following the provisions of Section 210 of Cr. P. C. There is no bar for entertaining the complaint when the accused are different and when the complaint presented before the Magistrate discloses different offences other than the one which is being investigated by the police. Viewed from this angle, it cannot be said that the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision is not correct. It is rightly stated in the said decision that the Magistrate can take congnizance of the offence. I am of the considered view that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence keeping in view the provisions of Section 210 of Cr. P. C and he cannot take cognizance beyond section 210 of Cr. P. C. If the police officials do not proceed with the investigation, it is rightly stated by the Supreme Court that the only remedy open to the litigant is to approach the High Court by invoking its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution of India. On a close scrutiny of the aforesaid decision, the following principles emerge: (1) The police have got exclusive right to investigate a cognizable offence. (2) The Magistrate has got power to take cognizance of a non-cognizable offence and he is entitled to direct the police also to investigate the non- cognizable offence. The police have no right to investigate non-cognizable offences directly. They have to obtain the order of the Magistrate seeking permission to investigate any non- cognizable offence. (3) If the case involves both non- cognizable and cognizable offence, it should be treated as a cognizable offence and the police have got right to investigate. The Magistrate has got the exclusive power to take cognizance either on the complaint or on the report of the police and on the information placed before him and also upon his knowledge. (4) Whenever a complaint is forwarded to the police under Section 156 (3) of cr. P. C, the police have exclusive right to investigate. It cannot be recalled by the Magistrate. He can only call for a report and await for the report. (4) Whenever a complaint is forwarded to the police under Section 156 (3) of cr. P. C, the police have exclusive right to investigate. It cannot be recalled by the Magistrate. He can only call for a report and await for the report. If the police are seized of the matter, no private complaint shall be entertained by the Magistrate in respect of the same offence and in respect of the same accused. Assuming that the magistrate entertains such a complaint, there will be no invalidity in the order since he can take cognizance of the offence and he has to follow the procedure mentioned in section 210 of the Cr. P. C. (5) If a private complaint were to be presented before the Magistrate and if it comes to his knowledge the pendency of the police report, he has to call for a report from the police after staying the proceedings before him. Soon after receipt of the police, report, he is entitled to proceed with the case subject to the provisions of section 210 of Cr. PC. (6) An anticipatory protest petition shall not be received by any Magistrate on the strength of a non-existing police report. (7) There is no bar for any complainant to present a complaint when there is lethargy on the part of a police officer and also failure to submit the report whenver called for by the Magistrate. Taking cognizance in such cases is not totally prohibited under the Code. The exceptions mentioned under section 210 of Cr. PC have to be kept in view. The Magistrate has also got exclusive power to take cognizance even in such cases by recording reasons. The anticipatory protest petitions shall be treated as complaints and cannot be treated as protest petition and cannot be rejected out right and the procedure under Section 210 of cr. PC has to be followed. ( 36 ) COMING to the facts of this case, the anicipatory protest petition has to be treated as a complaint. The orginal FIR that was registered was under Section 420, 406 and 409 of 1pc. The anticipatory protest petition was also presented under sections 420, 406 and 409 of IPC. It has been taken cognizance by the Magistrate. The procedure under Section 210 of Cr. The orginal FIR that was registered was under Section 420, 406 and 409 of 1pc. The anticipatory protest petition was also presented under sections 420, 406 and 409 of IPC. It has been taken cognizance by the Magistrate. The procedure under Section 210 of Cr. P. C has to be followed at this stage i. e. , staying the proceedings and calling for a report as the police are seized of the matter. The police have referred the case as false subsequently. No doubt, the Magistrate has to follow the express provisions of section 210 of Cr. P. C. But the only prohibition under Section 210 is for proceeding further and the matter has to be stayed. When once the police submitted the report, the magistrate is entitled to proceed with the case, in that view of the matter, I find that it is not a fit case where proceedings can be quashed. The Magistrate has got every right under Section 210 of Cr. P. C to proceed with the case when final report has been received. ( 37 ) IN view of the above discussion, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, I dismiss the Criminal Petition and direct the Magistrate to proceed with the complaint keeping in view the provisions of Section 210 of Cr. PC.