JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed by the three appellants Smt. Harkori, Smt. Pari and their brother Pema Ram, against an order dated 22.3.2000 by the District Judge, Hanumangarh, whereby an application under Order 9, Rule 13 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, moved by the appellants in the said Court, was dismissed. 2. The respondent-plaintiff Tehal Singh filed a Civil Suit No. 64/89 against Lekhuram Meghwal for specific performance on the basis of an agreement. The appellants are the legal heirs of the said Lekhuram. 3. After service of the suit on Lekhuram, he did not turn up and on 19.7.90, ex parte proceedings were ordered against Lekhuram. However, Shri Jitendra Saraswat, Advocate, appeared on behalf of Lekhuram and filed memo of appearance and on his request, the order for proceeding ex parte was set aside by the learned trial Court, the case was listed for filing of the written- statement. On 31.10.90, 4.1.91, 22.2.91 and 15.5.91, the case was listed for filing of the written-statement, but the learned counsel for the defendant Lekhuram sought adjournments. On the next date, i.e., 28.5.91, the learned counsel pleaded to instructions and, consequently the suit was ordered to proceed ex parte. The evidence of the plaintiff was recorded and ultimately on 23.4.1992, an ex parte decree was passed. 4. For setting aside of the ex parte decree dated 23.4.92, the appellants moved the application under Order 9, Rule 13 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code on 12.9.96 and to condone the delay, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was moved with the assertion that after the institution of the execution proceedings, the appellants received the notice for appearing in the Court on 20.1.96 and hence, the application for setting aside the decree was moved on 12.9.96. 5. The application was contested by the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that the counsel for Lekhuram appeared in the court on 19.7.90 and sought adjournment for filing of the written statement and since no written-statement was filed and ultimately, the counsel pleaded no instructions, the case was proceeded ex parte and hence, there was no good ground to allow the application. The application was contested by the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that the counsel for Lekhuram appeared in the court on 19.7.90 and sought adjournment for filing of the written statement and since no written-statement was filed and ultimately, the counsel pleaded no instructions, the case was proceeded ex parte and hence, there was no good ground to allow the application. Further, it was contended that even the appellants were in the knowledge of the decree because after filing of the execution, the notices for all the three appellants were served on Pema Ram on 29.11.95 and hence, filing of the application for setting aside the decree on 12.9.96 was barred by time and no good ground has been given for the delay in filing the application. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to say that Lekhuram had no knowledge of the suit and the learned counsel Mr. Saraswat appeared without authority and actually, no 'Vakalatnama' was filed by the learned counsel in the court. During the course of the arguments, the following three citations were pressed into service by the learned counsel for the appellants : (1) Smt. Bhani v. Mahaveer Prasad, 1997(2) WLC (Raj.) P.67. (2) Kailash Chand v. Smt. Hemlata, R.R.C. 1998 P. 667. (3) G.P. Sirvastava v. Shri R.K. Raijada, 2000 (2) Supreme P. 104. The learned counsel for the respondent has supported the conclusions drawn by the learned trial Court. 7. After hearing the two sides and going through the matter, I find no merit in this appeal. 8. As pointed out earlier, there is no reason to believe that there was no service on Lekhuram in respect of filing of the suit. There is no reason to believe that the learned counsel Mr. Saraswat on 19.7.90 appeared as a counsel for Lekhuram, without any instructions from Lekhuram and got the ex parte proceedings set aside. Notices were sent through Registered Post and the A.D. receipt was duly received in the Court. Summons, which were sent through the Process Server, at Lekhuram's address were affixed at his house and Pooran Ram and Pal Singh acted as witnesses. There was no denial on the part of Lekhuram that he was not served in the suit, nor Pooran Ram and Pal Singh have denied that the notices were not affixed in their presence. Summons, which were sent through the Process Server, at Lekhuram's address were affixed at his house and Pooran Ram and Pal Singh acted as witnesses. There was no denial on the part of Lekhuram that he was not served in the suit, nor Pooran Ram and Pal Singh have denied that the notices were not affixed in their presence. There is, thus, no reason to believe that Lekhuram had no notice of the suit. So far as the appellants are concerned, the impugned order makes a mention that in the execution proceedings, notices were sent to the appellants for the date of 18.12.95 and the appellant Pemaram received the notices on 29.11.95 on behalf of all the three appellants. In this way, at least by 29.11.95, the appellants were in the knowledge of the ex parte decree and they remained negligent in not filing any application for setting it aside within limitation and the application was ultimately filed on 12.2.96. In the application, there was a mention to the effect that when the appellants appeared in the execution proceedings on 20.1.96, on that date, for the first time, they came to know about the decree dated 23.4.92. However, they came to know about the decree dated 23.4.92. However, they have not disclosed as to on what information, they proceeded to attend the Court on 20.1.96. It was nowhere mentioned in the application as to when and on what date, they were served with a notice to appear on 20.1.96. So far as Lekhuram is concerned, the appellants claim to be his legal representatives, but the application does not contain a mention about the date of death of Lekhuram and the same has not been disclosed by them as yet. As pointed out earlier, there is no material to suggest that Lekhuram had no knowledge of the decree passed by the Court.The three citations relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants are not of much consequence, in the facts and circumstances of this case. In the case of Smt. Bhani (supra), there was definite evidence to conclude that there was no service on the defendant. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier, there is no reason to believe that Lekhuram was not served. In the case of Smt. Bhani (supra), there was definite evidence to conclude that there was no service on the defendant. In the instant case, as pointed out earlier, there is no reason to believe that Lekhuram was not served. On the other hand, there is evidence to believe that for the date 19.7.90, Lekhuram was served through Registered Post as well as by the bailiff of the Court who, after refusal to receive the summons by Lekhuram, affixed the same at his house in the presence of two witnesses, whose names have been recorded. In the case of Kailash Chand (supra), the summons were received with an endorsement of 'refused', but, admittedly, the address on the envelope was wrong and in this way, no correct address was given. That is not the case, in this matter. In the case of G.P. Srivastava (supra), the defendant was unable to attend the Court on account of his employment and illness. His counsel could not appear on account of the death of a close relation on the date of hearing. In support, certificate of a Medical Practitioner was duly filed, but the trial Court refused to believe the same and ultimately, it was found that there was reasonable cause for the absence of the party as well as his counsel. 9. The learned counsel for the appellants has argued that in the matter of condonation of delay, the Courts are required to apply liberal construction of the provisions in the interest of justice and has relied on the case of Ramnath v. Gobardhan, 2002(2) Supreme P. 143. I find that the facts in the case are quite different and the appellants cannot get any benefit on account of the said case. In the case of 'Ramnath', it has been held that the Court should be liberal in the interest of justice in the cases, in which the party is not guilty of negligence, inaction or want of bona fides. As pointed out earlier, in the instant case, these things are not available to the appellants and neither there is good ground to allow the application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code, nor there is good reason to condone the inordinate delay. 10. In the result, the appeal is found to be without any merit and the same is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******