Judgment :- S.JAGADEESAN, J. The plaintiff in C.S.No.188/1972 filed O.S.A.No.261/1995 having aggrieved by the disallowed portion with reference to his claim in the judgment and decree passed in the said suit. 2. O.S.A.No.284/1996 is by the 1st defendant in the said suit, having aggrieved by the judgment and decree therein rejecting his claim that the plaint Schedule properties are his absolute properties and nobody can claim any title, interest or whatsoever in the same during his lifetime. 3. The 1st defendant filed another Appeal in O.S.A.No.237/1996 against the dismissal of his suit in C.S.No.442/1983 filed by him for a declaration that he is the owner of all the properties. For the convenience the parties are referred to herein as their description in C.S.No.188/1972. 4. The plaintiff in C.S.No.188/1972 filed the suit claiming partition on the basis that the suit properties are the joint family properties consisting of plaintiff, 1st defendant, defendants 2 to 4 and the 76th defendant. The 1st defendant is the father of the plaintiff. 76th defendant is his mother, and defendants 2 to 4 are the daughters of 1st defendant and 76th defendant. The plaintiff claims right in the suit property through his paternal great grandfather Diwan Bahadur P.Somasundram Chettiar who died on 25.12.1929 leaving his adopted son P.S.Sathappa Chettiar. Sathappa Chettiar had two wives, Visalakshi Achi, who died during the lifetime of her husband in 1934, and Seethai Achi. Sathappa Chettiar died on 7.3.1950 leaving his second wife as his heir and gave an authority to adopt a son. Exercising such authority, Seethai Achi, the second wife of Sathappa Chettiar adopted the 1st defendant, Somasundaram Chettiar on 25.5.1951. The 1st defendant after adoption married Meenakshi Achi, the 76th defendant and they have four children the plaintiff, and the defendants 2 to 4. Originally, the suit was filed by the appellant as the first plaintiff when he was a minor represented by his mother who was also impleaded as second plaintiff and after he attained majority, his mother, the second plaintiff, was transposed as 76th defendant as per the order dated 23.06.1987 made in A.No.1446 of 1987. 5. It is the case of the plaintiff that during 1966-1967, the first defendant alienated several joint family properties and business or management for immoral and illegal purpose and so those alienation are not binding on the plaintiff or the joint family. 5. It is the case of the plaintiff that during 1966-1967, the first defendant alienated several joint family properties and business or management for immoral and illegal purpose and so those alienation are not binding on the plaintiff or the joint family. It is also stated that the considerations received from out of those alienation are inadequate and further there was no necessity for the family to alienate the properties. Referring to Schedule VIII, which relates to 'Sea View' bungalow, Santhome High Road, Chennai, it is the case of the plaintiff that the 1st defendant was living with the 5th defendant as husband and wife in concubinage, and due to her undue influence and coercion, the 1st defendant entered into an agreement with her to sell the property and as such the said agreement of sale is void and unenforceable. It is also stated that such an agreement is not binding on the plaintiff, as it is a joint family property, and the sale is also not for the benefit of the family. 6. The 1st defendant filed a written statement and contested the suit contending inter alia that all the properties are his absolute properties and no one has any right or claim in the same. In support of his plea that the suit properties are not the joint family properties, he further stated that his father Sathappa Chettiar died in 1950 leaving behind his widow Seethai Achi as the sole surviving legal heir and she succeeded to the entire estate of her husband , acquiring limited estate as provided under the Hindu Women's right to Property Act, 1937. The 1st defendant claims that he never exercised his option for his share in the estate of his father till the demise of his mother, and after the death of Seethai Achi, all her absolute properties including the suit properties devolved upon the 1st defendant and so the said properties are the separate properties of the 1st defendant, and the plaintiff cannot claim any right of succession by birth, as if they are the ancestral properties. With respect to alienation, he has come forward with the plea that the properties were sold for the purpose of improving the business by replacing outdated machineries and for other legal necessities of the family concerns and the family. With respect to alienation, he has come forward with the plea that the properties were sold for the purpose of improving the business by replacing outdated machineries and for other legal necessities of the family concerns and the family. He denied the allegation in the plaint that the alienations are for immoral purpose and there is no necessity for the family to sell the properties. 7. The purchasers, namely, defendants 5, 13 and 14, 19, 40, 41, 58 and 74 filed written statement stating that the properties were sold by the 1st defendant for the benefit of the joint family and to improve the business as well as to discharge the debts incurred for the business. 8. The learned Judge while answering the issues framed, has found thus:- (1) Rao Bahadur Somasundaram Chettiar is the purchaser of item 10 of the plaint first schedule property, and the documents relied on by the 48th defendant did not confer any title, right or interest upon Kaleeswarar Mils Ltd., over the said property; (2) EX.P3 can be relied on for the limited purpose of showing the nature and character of the properties covered under the said document and on that basis the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that the 1st defendant had admitted that item Nos.1 to 5 and 7 to 9 of the plaint 1st schedule properties are the ancestral properties of the family and so they have to be treated only as joint family properties; (3) Item No.1 of Plaint Schedule 4 is the ancestral property of the plaintiff as being purchased by Diwan Rao Bahadur Somasundaram Chettiar, under Ex.p4; (4) The claim of the plaintiff with respect to item No.5 of the plaint schedule IV was rejected, and as no Appeal was filed againt the same, now it is specifically stated that the plaintiff is not claiming any right in the said property; (5) Item Nos.6, 7, 8 and 12 of the plaint Schedule IV are the ancestral properties acquired by Diwan Rao Bahadur Somasundaram Chettiar, the great grandfather of the plaintiff by virtue of specific sale deeds under Ex.P8; (6) Similar finding has been given with respect to item Nos. 8 and 10 of plaint Schedule IV on the basis of Ex.P10; (7) The property under plaint Schedule VIII was purchased under Ex.P13 by Sathappa Chettiar, the father of the 1st defendant and so it cannot be held as self-acquired or absolute property of the 1st defendant; (8) Though properties mentioned in two schedules viz., IX and X were added subsequently in the year 1986 after a lapse of nearly about 12 years, plaintiff has failed to establish his case that the said Schedule of properties are joint family properties; (9) The partial partition of the property under Ex.P3 was cancelled by executing a cancellation deed subsequently under Ex. P29 and so the entire suit properties are the joint family properties, and they do not belong to any one of the individuals as claimed, as the plaintiff and 1st defendant have no avocation or profession to purchase or acquire any property except the source of money derived from the joint family properties; (10) The plaintiff is not entitled to claim possession of his share in respect of item Nos.5, 7and 9 of plaint first schedule properties on the basis of Ex.P3 as it has already been cancelled and so the said items of properties have to be construed as joint family properties; (11) Debts were contracted by the 1st defendant towards family business by creating equitable mortgage in favour of South India Bank Ltd., as well as in favour of the 5th defendant, which are clearly binding on every member of the joint family and particularly the plaintiff and so the plaintiff cannot challenge the alienation of the 8th schedule property by the first defendant, as the sale deed executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 5th defendant is valid and binding on the plaintiff; (12) The plaintiff is not entitled to return the document mentioned as item Nos.1 to 8 in plaint Schedule VII, so long as the debts remain unpaid; (13) The alienations by the 1st defendant are meant for the legal necessity and for the benefit of the joint family and so they are binding on the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 4 and so the plaintiff cannot sustain his claim with reference to those properties; (14) The plaintiff is entitled to claim half share in such of the joint family properties available now which are specifically mentioned in the judgment and the remaining half share goes to the 1st defendant. 9. The 1st defendant in the above suit has filed a separate suit in C.S.No.442/83claiming that he is the absolute owner of the properties, on the basis of the plea put forth in the written statement filed in C.S.No.188/72. Unfortunately, he did not give any details of schedule furnishing the description of the properties in the plaint. The 1st defendant therein who is the plaintiff in C.S.No.188/72 has filed a written statement raising the same contention which has been raised in the plaint in C.S.188/72. Unfortunately, he did not give any details of schedule furnishing the description of the properties in the plaint. The 1st defendant therein who is the plaintiff in C.S.No.188/72 has filed a written statement raising the same contention which has been raised in the plaint in C.S.188/72. The learned Judge has referred to Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure and found that the suit cannot be sustained without identification of any property and on that basis further found that the plaintiff is not entitled for any relief in the said suit. The learned Judge has also taken into consideration the fact that the said suit was filed on 19.8.83 after a lapse of 12 years from the date of filing of C.S.188/72. Ultimately, the learned Judge had rejected the suit, finding that C.S.442/93 is barred by limitation and there is no cause of action arises for the said suit. 10. Challenging the above said common judgment of the learned Judge both the plaintiff and 1st defendant in C.S.188/72 have filed Appeals as stated above. 11. In the appeal, the plaintiff has pressed his relief only with respect to Item Nos.9 and 10 in first Schedule, Item Nos.1, 6 to 10 and 12 in the IV Schedule, the title deeds mentioned in VII Schedule with respect to the above said properties, and the properties mentioned in the VIII to X Schedules. With respect to other items mentioned in the plaint, we are not concerned in these Appeals. 12. To establish his case, the plaintiff in C.S.188/72 examined himself as P.W.1. On behalf of the defendants, the purchasers of the properties have been examined as D.W.1, D.W.2 ,D.W.4 ,D.W.5 and D.W.6 to establish that the alienations made by the 1st defendant binds on the plaintiff. Unfortunately, the first defendant in C.S.No.188/72 did not enter into the box to give evidence. Even the mother, Meenakshi Achi, 76th defendant, who originally signed the plaint filed in C.S.No.188/72 also did not examine herself as a witness. 13. The points that arise for determination in these appeals are:- (1) Whether the suit properties mentioned in C.S.188/72 are the joint family properties or the absolute properties of the 1st defendant as claimed? (2) What is the quantum of share that the plaintiff is entitled to? 13. The points that arise for determination in these appeals are:- (1) Whether the suit properties mentioned in C.S.188/72 are the joint family properties or the absolute properties of the 1st defendant as claimed? (2) What is the quantum of share that the plaintiff is entitled to? (3) Whether the alienations made by the 1st defendant in favour of defendant Nos.5, 13,14, 19, 40, 41, 58 and 74 are binding upon the plaintiff and other family members? (4) Whether the suit in C.S.No.442/83 is sustainable in law as the plaintiff therein has not given any description of the properties, though he has sought for a declaration of his title to the properties? 14. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the suit properties originally belonged to Somasundaram Chettiar, and his son Sathappa Chettiar inherited the same. He died issueless giving an authority to his wife Seethai Achi to adopt a son. Accordingly, the first defendant Somasundaram Chettiar was adopted on 25.5.1951. In view of the said adoption, it has to be taken that he is the son of Sathappa Chettiar, and thereby he is entitled to inherit half share in the properties of Sathappa Chettiar, and Seethai Achi to inherit another half share therein. Though Somasundaram Chettiar inherited the share of Seethai Achi, on her death, he treated the said property also as the joint family property and so the plaintiff is entitled to half share in all the properties. To establish the intention of blending, learned Senior Counsel has relied on Ex.P3 dated 15.3.1971, the partition deed and Ex.P29, the cancellation deed dated 9.6.1976. With respect to the properties sold by the 1st defendant, Somasundaram Chettiar, he submitted that the said alenations were not on behalf of the joint family as a Kartha, but in his individual capacity treating those properties as if his absolute properties. He also submitted that the alienations are not for the family necessity, and there is no proof regarding the antecedent debts to be discharged. He took us to the sale deeds executed by the first defendant to refer the recitals in the said documents with respect to each items, which are under challenge in the Appeals. He also submitted that the alienations are not for the family necessity, and there is no proof regarding the antecedent debts to be discharged. He took us to the sale deeds executed by the first defendant to refer the recitals in the said documents with respect to each items, which are under challenge in the Appeals. With respect to 9th and 10th Schedule mentioned properties, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that though no documents were produced by the plaintiff, the admission of the 1st defendant with respect to the said documents in Application No.4390/82 and in the compromise memo, to the effect that the said properties are the joint family properties and so the plaintiff is entitled for partition of his half share in the said properties. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that even with respect to the property which is not the subject matter in the suit, on the basis of the written arguments filed by the 1st defendant, the learned Judge had included the said property for partition and granted half share to the plaintiff, though the said properties stand in the name of the plaintiff. 15. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st defendant in C.S.No.188/72 and the plaintiff in C.S.No.442/83 submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to only 1/4th share and not half share as claimed. According to him, the 1st defendant and his adoptive mother are entitled each for half share. Only in the said half share of the 1st defendant, plaintiff can claim half i.e. 1/4th share, as the share of Seethai Achi devolved on the 1st defendant absolutely and in the said share, plaintiff cannot claim any right. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that there is no evidence to establish that the share of Seethai Achi was treated as the joint family properties by blending. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Exs.P3 and P29 will apply only to the properties mentioned therein and the same cannot be relied on as if the 1st defendant had an intention to blend the entire half share of Seethai Achi with the joint family property. With respect to the alienations, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the alienations are for the purpose of family business and to discharge the debts obtained to improve the family business and the same will be binding on the plaintiff. 16. With respect to the alienations, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the alienations are for the purpose of family business and to discharge the debts obtained to improve the family business and the same will be binding on the plaintiff. 16. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 75th defendant who is the legal representative of 19th defendant has submitted that the said defendant purchased item Nos.6 and 7 of IV Schedule from the 1st defendant under Ex.P9 and Ex.D135. D.W.4, the brother of the 19th defendant was examined to establish their case. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the 1st defendant's family inclusive of the plaintiff is a business family and as manager of the family, the 1st defendant had borrowed debts to improve the business and so the creditor need not prove that the debts incurred for the first defendant were for the benefit or necessity of the family. Referring to item No.12 of plaint Schedule IV, which was purchased by the 58th defendant under Court auction sale, the judgment of the Court regarding the same has been marked as Ex.D137, and D.W.5, who was examined to speak about the said purchase, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the sale was only to clear the debts under the decree and as such debts were only for the purpose of the business and so the plaintiff's case that such debts cannot bind him, has to be rejected. 17. Learned counsel appearing for defendant Nos.77 to 84, who are the Legal Representatives of the 5th defendant, submitted that the decree obtained in C.S.18/1968 for specific performance binds the plaintiff. He as also submitted that the same contentions raised by the plaintiff to attack the agreement of sale in respect of VIII Schedule property were raised by the 1st defendant in the said suit, which had been negatived both by the learned Judge of this Court and the suit was decreed. The same was confirmed by the Supreme Court. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this court that the mother of the plaintiff filed a suit representing the plaintiff when he was a minor, who was also added as the 2nd plaintiff, but subsequently, she transposed herself as 76th defendant and after such transposition she changed her attitude and disputed the claim of the plaintiff. The learned counsel also brought to the notice of this court that the mother of the plaintiff filed a suit representing the plaintiff when he was a minor, who was also added as the 2nd plaintiff, but subsequently, she transposed herself as 76th defendant and after such transposition she changed her attitude and disputed the claim of the plaintiff. The learned counsel also relied on the written statement filed by the defendant Nos.77 to 81 to show that the bank debts had been discharged by the 5th defendant. The learned counsel took us through the findings rendered in the judgment in C.S.18/1968 in support of his argument that the property was agreed to be sold for proper consideration, and the agreement was not sham and nominal and that the 1st defendant agreed to sell the property as he was badly in need of money to discharge the debts. He also submitted that there is no evidence to establish that the amount received under the agreement was used for any immoral purpose. Referring to the evidence of P.W.1, learned counsel submitted that the plaintiff did not dispute the judgment in C.S.18/1968, but only claiming share in the property. He has also pointed out that in the evidence of the plaintiff as P.W.1, he has admitted that his family is a trading family and he has no personal knowledge about the debts of his father. He also stated that he did not accept the partial partition. 18. Before dealing with the above arguments of the respective counsel, we have to decide the quantum of share for which the plaintiff is entitled to. According to the plaintiff, he is entitled to half share in the suit properties. According to the 1st defendant, the father of the plaintiff, he is the absolute owner of the suit properties and the plaintiff is not having any share. Sathappan Chettiar, the adoptive father of 1st defendant died on 07.03.1950 leaving his wife Seethai Achi. Thereafter, 1st defendant was adopted on 25.05.1951. As held in Shripad Vs. Dattaram ( AIR 1974 SC 878 ), when a widow adopts a son to her husband, the doctrine of relation back makes sonship retroactive from the moment of the death of the late husband and the adopted son is deemed to have been born on the date of the death after adoptive father. As held in Shripad Vs. Dattaram ( AIR 1974 SC 878 ), when a widow adopts a son to her husband, the doctrine of relation back makes sonship retroactive from the moment of the death of the late husband and the adopted son is deemed to have been born on the date of the death after adoptive father. Seethai Achi as only surviving wife of Sathappan Chettiar inherited along with 1st defendant under the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, though her right in the half share inherited was only a limited interest known as a "woman's estate" in the property. The said rights were enlarged as absolute one in view of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. After the death of Seethai Achi in February, 1966, the 1st defendant inherited and got her half share as contemplated under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act of 1956. This legal position is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant while arguing the above appeals. So, the plaintiff can claim half share in the share got by the 1st defendant as son, namely, half share in the property of Sathappan Chettiar and thereby the plaintiff is entitled only to 1/4th share in the joint family properties. 19. To get over this, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that the 1st defendant had blended his right with that of the other shares and treated all the properties as joint family properties and so the 1st defendant cannot claim 3/4th share, and the plaintiff is entitled for half share. To substantiate this argument, learned Senior Counsel relied on Exs.P3 and P29. Ex.P3 dated 15.03.1971 is a deed of partial partition executed between the 1st defendant and the plaintiff. 20. Learned Senior Counsel relying on the recitals in Ex.P3 submitted that the property has been treated as a joint family property and thereby the 1st defendant had blended his right with the joint family property, and so the 1st defendant cannot claim any absolute right on the basis of inheritance of Seethai Achi's share in the property, on her death in February, 1966. The said recital is as follows:- Such deed of partial partition had been subsequently cancelled under Ex. P29, dated 09.06.1976. The said recital is as follows:- Such deed of partial partition had been subsequently cancelled under Ex. P29, dated 09.06.1976. In the said document, it is stated by the 1st defendant that he had executed partial partition deed as kartha of his Hindu Undivided Family. It is also stated that :- "Whereas however not withstanding such partial partition the properties are continued to be possessed enjoyed and owned by me as the Kartha of the Hindu Undivided Family which status is not till date broken." 21. It may be relevant to mention here that though the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff regarding the blending of the 1st defendant's right with the joint family property such a plea is not available in the pleadings. The learned counsel appearing on either side have also pointed out the same and submitted that there is no need for any specific plea of blending be made, in the pleadings in view of the judgment in B.Shaw V. Presiding Officer Labour Court, Coimbatore ( AIR 1978 SC 1201 ), wherein the learned Judges of the apex Court held that no such specific plea of blending is required, and the case cannot be rejected only on that basis. Reference was also placed in the decision in Rabindra Kumar Nayak Vs. Collector, Mayurbhanj, Orissa, (AIR 1999 SC 1166) to contend that there should be some evidence of blending of separate property with the joint family property. 22. Before considering the evidence available in this case, we are inclined to deal with the legal position regarding "blending". In the decision in Mallesappa V. Mallappa ( AIR 1961 SC 1268 ), the Apex Court has dealt with the rule of blending, as follows:- "(11)... The rule of blending postulates that a coparcener who is interested in the coparcenary property and who owns separate property of his own may by deliberate and intentional conduct treat his separate property as forming part of the coparcenary property. The rule of blending postulates that a coparcener who is interested in the coparcenary property and who owns separate property of his own may by deliberate and intentional conduct treat his separate property as forming part of the coparcenary property. If it appears that property which is separately acquired has been deliberately and voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock with the clear intention of abandoning his claim on the said property and with the object of assimilating it to the joint family property, then the said property becomes a part of the joint family estate; in other words, the separate property of a coparcener loses its separate character by reason of the owner's conduct and get thrown into the common stock of which it becomes a part. This doctrine, therefore, inevitably postulates that the owner of the separate property is a coparcener who has an interest in the coparcenary property and desires to blend his separate property with the coparcenary property. There can be no doubt that the conduct on which a plea of blending is based must clearly and unequivocally show the intention of the owner of the separate property to convert his property into an item of joint family property. A mere intention to benefit the members of the family by allowing them the use of income coming from the said property may not necessarily be enough to justify an inference of blending; but the basis of the doctrine is the existence of coparcenary and coparcenary property as well as the existence of the separate property of a coparcener. How this doctrine can be applied to the case of a Hindu female who has acquired immovable property from her father as a limited owner it is difficult to understand. Such a Hindu female is not a coparcener and as such has no interest in coparcenary property. She holds the property as a limited owner, and on her death the property has to devolve on the next reversioner. Under Hindu Law, it is open to a limited owner like a Hindu female succeeding to her mother's estate as in Madras or a Hindu widow succeeding to her husband's estate, to efface herself and accelerate the reversion by surrender; but, as is well known, surrender has to be effected according to the rules recognised in that behalf. Under Hindu Law, it is open to a limited owner like a Hindu female succeeding to her mother's estate as in Madras or a Hindu widow succeeding to her husband's estate, to efface herself and accelerate the reversion by surrender; but, as is well known, surrender has to be effected according to the rules recognised in that behalf. A Hindu female owning a limited estate cannot circumvent the rules of surrender and allow the members of her husband's family to treat her limited estate as part of the joint property belonging to the said family. On first principles, such a result would be inconsistent with the basic notion of blending and the basic character of a limited owner's title to the property held by her." 23. Following the principles set out in the above said decision, the Apex Court, in another decision in Pushpa Devi V. I.T. Commr. New Delhi ( AIR 1977 SC 2230 ), has held as follows:- "19.Having considered the decisions cited at the bar, it may be useful to have afresh look at the doctrine of blending. The theory of blending under the Hindu Law involves the process of a wider sharing of one's own properties by permitting the members of one's joint family, the privilege of common ownership and common enjoyment of such properties. But while introducing new sharers in one's exclusive property, one does not by the process of blending efface oneself by renouncing one's own interest in favour of others. To blend is to share along with others and not to surrender one's interest in favour of others to the exclusion of oneself. If a Hindu female, who is a member of an undivided family, impresses her absolute, exclusive property with the character of joint family property, she creates new claimants to her property to the exclusion of herself because not being a coparcener, she has no right to demand a share in the joint family property by asking for a partition. She has no right of survivorship and is entitled only to be maintained out of the joint family property. Her right to demand a share in the joint family property is contingent, inter alia, on a partition taking place between her husband and his sons (see Mulla's Hindu Law, 14th Ed. p.403, para 315). She has no right of survivorship and is entitled only to be maintained out of the joint family property. Her right to demand a share in the joint family property is contingent, inter alia, on a partition taking place between her husband and his sons (see Mulla's Hindu Law, 14th Ed. p.403, para 315). Under Section 3 (2) and (3) of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, her right to demand a partition in the joint family property of the Mitakshara joint family accrued on the death of her husband. Thus, the expression 'blending' is inapposite in the case of a Hindu female who puts her separate property, be it her absolute property or limited estate, in the joint family stock." So, to establish 'blending', there should be a joint family nucleus in which the person who wants to blend the property must have a share. There should be an unequivocable declaration on the part of a cosharer giving up or abandoning his interest in his self-acquired property and the property should be thrown into the common hotch-pot. 24. On the basis of the above principle, now we have to consider as to whether the plaintiff had established such blending so as to enable him to claim half share in the joint family property? 25. It is not in dispute that if the plaintiff is not able to establish the same, he is entitled to only 1/4th share in the properties. To establish the same, as stated above, reliance was placed only on Exs.P3 and P29. The relevant recitals of which have been narrated supra. Even in the said documents, nowhere it is stated that the 1st defendant had given up or relinquished his 3/4th share inherited both from his father and from his mother in favour of the other family members. The declaration made in those documents is only to the effect that the properties therein are the joint family properties and he is acting as a Kartha of the family. Even now there is no dispute about the same. Merely because the 1st defendant had declared that he is the Kartha of the joint family and the properties belong to the joint family, it cannot be said that he had given up his absolute right in respect of his share inherited through his mother and treated the same as belonging to the joint family. 26. Merely because the 1st defendant had declared that he is the Kartha of the joint family and the properties belong to the joint family, it cannot be said that he had given up his absolute right in respect of his share inherited through his mother and treated the same as belonging to the joint family. 26. Moreover, there cannot be any blending of shares as submitted by the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff. According to him, the 1st defendant's 3/4th share has been blended with the share of the plaintiff and thereby the plaintiff is entitled to claim half share in the suit property. The said submission is contrary to the principles set out regarding the scope of 'blending' in the above said judgments of the Apex Court. Moreover, no evidence is available even to establish the same. The learned Judge has simply relied on Exs.P3 and P29 to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to half share in the suit properties. The trial Judge has not framed any such issue but however proceeded to discuss and found that the entire properties were treated as joint family properties by the 1st defendant by blending his absolute properties with that of the joint family properties and decreed the suit as prayed for. When it is not established that there was blending then the suit properties cannot be held to be joint family property. The 1st defendant is entitled for 1/2 share as his absolute property through his adoptive mother. Consequently, the half share inherited by 1st defendant through his adoptive father alone is available for partition as joint family property. Out of the same the plaintiff will be entitled to1/2, i.e., 1/4 of the plaint Schedule properties. 27. Now, we are inclined to proceed to deal with the claim made by the plaintiff in C.S.No.188/72 with respect to the properties which are subject matter in O.S.A.No.261/95. We are now concerned only with Item Nos.9 and 10 of I Schedule, Item Nos.1, 6 to 10 and 12 in IV Schedule and properties mentioned in VIII, IX and X Schedules and the title deeds mentioned in VII Schedule with respect to the above said properties, as the learned trial Judge had dismissed the suit in C.S.No.188/72 regarding the same. 28. 28. Regarding Item No.9 of plaint I Schedule, the trial Judge had rejected the plaintiff's claim only on the basis that the said property was sold pending suit to clear the income tax dues. But, unfortunately, no evidence is available. The learned Judge had come to such conclusion only on the basis of written argument filed on behalf of the 1st defendant. No sale deed was filed or the 1st defendant has not given any evidence to that effect. When the learned Senior Counsel for the 1st defendant did not put forth any submission to the effect that Item No.9 is not the joint family property and in the absence of any evidence to come to a conclusion that the said property is not available for partition, the learned Judge is not correct in dismissing the suit with respect to Item No.9 of the plaint I Schedule and the plaintiff is entitled for partition of his 1/4th share in the said property. Accordingly,we set aside the finding of the learned Judge in this regard. 29. Item No.1 in plaint IV Schedule was purchased by Somasundaram Chettiar under Ex.P4 dated 18.09.1933. But the same was sold by the 1st defendant under Ex.P5 dated 14.06.1966 to the defendants 13 and 14. The said Theatre was already leased out under Ex.D16 dated 30.09.1965. The purpose for sale has been mentioned in the said document. D.W.1, the 64th defendant, who is the son of 13th defendant has spoken about the said sale. 30. Item Nos.6, 7 and 12 were purchased by Somasundaram Chettiar under Ex.P8 dated 27.11.1925 and Item Nos.6 and 7 were sold by the 1st defendant under Ex.P9 to the 19th defendant, whose legal representative was impleaded as 75th defendant (18th respondent). 31. Item No.12 was sold in Court auction to 58th defendant on 26.05.1979 on the execution of the decree arising out of the judgment marked as Ex.D137 dated 15.04.1976. The said suit was filed to recover the debt borrowed. 32. The 58th defendant examined himself as D.W.5 to speak about the Court auction sale. D.W.4 speaks about the sale of item 6 and 7 under Ex.P8. 33. Item Nos.9 and 10 were purchased by Somasundaram Chettiar under Ex.P10 dated 9.5.98. The said suit was filed to recover the debt borrowed. 32. The 58th defendant examined himself as D.W.5 to speak about the Court auction sale. D.W.4 speaks about the sale of item 6 and 7 under Ex.P8. 33. Item Nos.9 and 10 were purchased by Somasundaram Chettiar under Ex.P10 dated 9.5.98. The northern portion of item 9 was sold by the 1st defendant under Ex.P11 dated 24.11.1968 to the 40th defendant, southern portion of that item was sold to 41st defendant (9th respondent) under Ex.D19 dated 24.11.1968 and item 10 was sold to the 74th defendant under Ex.P12 dated 24.11.1968. The 40th defendant who is the brother of 41st defendant has examined himself as D.W.2 and explained the circumstances under which the said properties were sold. 34. With respect of item 8, though the learned Judge has held that it belongs to the joint family, no relief was granted to the plaintiff. Even though no document was filed to show how the plaintiff's family acquired the same, evidence is available on record to show that it situates abutting item 7 and the same was being enjoyed along with item 7. No materials produced by any counsel to reject the plaintiff's claim in this regard especially when the Learned Judge held that it is a joint family property. So in modification of the decree in C.S.No.188/72, with respect to item 8 in IV Schedule, it is held that the plaintiff is entitled for partition of his 1/4th share in the said item. 35. With respect to plaint Schedule VIII, the same was purchased by Sathappa Chettiar under Ex.P13 dated 30.08.1943. On the basis of an agreement by the 1st defendant in favour of the 5th defendant a suit in C.S.No.18/1968 was filed by the 5th defendant. In the judgment and decree marked as Exs.P18 and P19 dated 26.4.1971 this Court had decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of the 5th defendant and the same was confirmed by the Apex Court. Pending suit in C.S.No.188/72, 5th defendant died and the defendants 77 to 81 were impleaded as her legal representatives. The 77th defendant examined himself as D.W.6 to explain the above proceedings. Pending suit in C.S.No.188/72, 5th defendant died and the defendants 77 to 81 were impleaded as her legal representatives. The 77th defendant examined himself as D.W.6 to explain the above proceedings. Evidence is available to show the 1st defendant entered into the said agreement to clear the mortgage debt created in favour of South India Bank Ltd., Coimbatore and 5th defendant got the assignment of the mortgage after paying the amount to the said bank as admitted by P.W.1 in chief examination. 36. The learned Judge has rejected the plaintiff's claim for partition of his share in the above said properties in Schedules IV and VIII on the basis that the sales by the 1st defendant would bind the plaintiff. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiff/appellant in O.S.A.No.261/95 has submitted that the learned Judge is not correct in rejecting the claim of the plaintiff in these properties as the agreement, sales by, or the decree against the 1st defendant are not binding on the plaintiff, as such sales made, were not for the family necessity and the same have been made in his individual capacity by the 1st defendant as if those properties are his absolute properties. The decrees both in Ex.P19 and the decree pursuant to the judgment in Ex.D137 are the personal decrees passed against the 1st defendant. It is also submitted that the amounts were not borrowed as Kartha of the joint family and the properties were also not sold in that capacity. The sales made by the first defendant are all to discharge his debts incurred to meet out his illegal activities. According to him, the purchaser who purchased the properties from the 1st defendant in his individual capacity without making any enquiries about the rights of the 1st defendant to sell the property and also about the fact whether the sales were for the benefit and necessity of the joint family. 37. To consider the above submission of the learned counsel for plaintiff, it is necessary to have a look at the relevant averments in the plaint which are in para 15 and 18, as follows:- "15. The plaintiff further states that in 1966 to 1967 the first and fifth defendants were living as husband and wife in concubinage. The first defendant had taken the 5th defendant to several places in South India and Bombay and spent several lakhs of rupees on her. The plaintiff further states that in 1966 to 1967 the first and fifth defendants were living as husband and wife in concubinage. The first defendant had taken the 5th defendant to several places in South India and Bombay and spent several lakhs of rupees on her. For this purpose, the first defendant recklessly alienated several ancestral and joint family properties by way of sales, mortgages, gift and otherwise to several defendants in this suit. The first defendant was so reckless that he has gone to the extent of alienating and gifting personal properties belonging exclusively to the plaintiffs or defendants 2 to 4 in which the 1st defendant can have no manner of right or title. 18.The plaintiffs further state that the first defendant has, as stated above during the short period of 8 months from 1966 to 1967 been recklessly alienating several joint family properties and business or management. The said alienations being for immoral and illegal purposes are not binding on the plaintiff or the joint family. Nor were the said alienations being effected for any legal necessity or for the benefits of the joint family or to avert any danger to the family estate and as such they are not binding on the plaintiffs. The consideration for the alienations are also grossly inadequate. The alienees of defendants 6 to 46 were joint family properties and that the alienations were only for immoral purposes or for purposes not binding on the joint family. The alienees conspired with the first defendant to bring about the several alienations with a view to subserve their interest......" 38.On the contrary, the first defendant in his written statement has stated as follows: "This defendant states that the averments in para 15 of the plaint are absolute false. This defendant denies that he recklessly alienated the personal properties of the plaintiffs are that of the defendants 2 to 4. The plaintiffs cannot make such wild allegation without furnishing the relevant material to substantiate the same. In paragraph 15 of the written statement of the first defendant it is stated as follows: "The defendant, to replace the out dated machineries with new machineries and to have additional working capital to improve the production level, had to find out necessary funds. For this legal necessity, this defendant had to alienate some of his personal properties. In paragraph 15 of the written statement of the first defendant it is stated as follows: "The defendant, to replace the out dated machineries with new machineries and to have additional working capital to improve the production level, had to find out necessary funds. For this legal necessity, this defendant had to alienate some of his personal properties. All these sale proceeds had been duly accounted in respect of the concern, wherein the said amounts were invested." 39.On the basis of the statements of the first defendant in his written statement, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff vehemently contended that the first defendant claimed the properties as his absolute properties and also claimed that the alienations made by him are in his individual capacity and for his personal benefits. Even though the properties have been found to be joint family properties by the learned Judge, on the basis of the plea raised by the first defendant that he alienated the properties only in his individual capacity for his personal benefits, it has to be held that the alienations made by the first defendant are not for the family benefit and as such the same are not binding on the plaintiff. Though the argument seems to be attractive at a glance, when we consider the plea put forth by the parties in the pleadings, the same as a whole to be taken into consideration and cannot be divided in piece meal and hence we are of the view that the above said contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant cannot be countenanced. The plaintiff filed the suit claiming that all the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties. Whereas the first defendant claimed that all the properties are that of his individual properties and the plaintiff has no share in the same. Only in that sense, the first defendant in the written statement also pleaded that he had alienated his properties that too, only to meet out the expenses incurred for the development of his business as claimed by him and also to replace the old machineries in the mill which he claims to be his absolute property by virtue of Ex.D169. Only in that sense, the first defendant in the written statement also pleaded that he had alienated his properties that too, only to meet out the expenses incurred for the development of his business as claimed by him and also to replace the old machineries in the mill which he claims to be his absolute property by virtue of Ex.D169. When the dispute is with regard to the nature of the property and when the court finds that the properties are joint family properties, then it is for the court to consider as to whether the alienations made by the first respondent is for the family necessity as well as for the development of the business or not. Merely because it is found that the portion of the plea of the first defendant that the plaint schedule properties are his individual properties is false, it is not for the court to simply accept the plea of the first defendant in other respects i.e., with regard to the expenses incurred by him relates to his personal benefit. Here again it is for the court to go into the nature of expenses incurred by the first defendant and consider as to whether such expenses had been incurred for the benefit of the family or development of the business or for his illegal or immoral purpose. 40. Coming to this aspect, it is necessary for us to have a look at the evidence. The plaintiff, as P.W.1, in his evidence had challenged the alienation of Item 12 of plaint Schedule IV on the basis that since the property was sold in court auction the consideration is too low and the alienation is not for the benefit of the family. So far as the other alienations in respect of the properties of plaint Schedule IV is concerned, nothing has been said. 41.So far as plaint Schedule VIII is concerned, the plaintiff has stated in his evidence that the agreement entered into by the first defendant in favour of the fifth defendant is under undue influence and to meet out the expenses incurred for his immoral activities, as he was addicted to liquor. The first defendant also signed many papers to many people and when the main business was in Coimbatore; the first defendant never stayed in Coimbatore; thereby he totally neglected the business. The first defendant also signed many papers to many people and when the main business was in Coimbatore; the first defendant never stayed in Coimbatore; thereby he totally neglected the business. The alienation in respect of plaint Schedule VIII is not for the family necessity as there was no necessity for the family to borrow money. The business was very well flourished and the first defendant was getting very good income from the ginning factory, cinema theatre and other business concerns of the family. P.W.1 admitted that the business concerns are of joint family concerns, since the first defendant family being trading family. So far as the alienations in respect of the other properties are concerned, P.W.1 had not stated anything in his deposition with regard to the binding nature of the debts or alienations, except stating in general terms that the properties being the joint family properties, any alienation made by the first defendant is not binding on him. 42. It is for us to consider as to whether the plaintiff has discharged his burden of proof since burden lies on him to establish that the alienations are to meet out the immoral expenses incurred by the 1st defendant. On principle, it has been held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the judgment reported in HINDUSTAN IDEAL INS.CO.LTD. v. P. SATTEYYA (AIR 1961 A.P.183 at page 189) as follows: "Where a Hindu son comes into Court to assail a mortgage made by his father .... it rests upon him, if he seeks to escape from having his interest affected by the sale, to establish that the debt which he desires to be exempted from paying was of such a nature that he, as the son of a Hindu, would not be under a pious obligation to discharge .... The burden of proof which is upon the son to establish that the debts in question were incurred by proving a general charge of immorality but there must be proof of direct connection between the debt or the expenditure and the acts of immorality. .... It is unnecessary for the alienees or the creditors to show that there had been a proper inquiry or that the money had been borrowed for necessity." 43.The same view was confirmed by another Division Bench of the same court in SYDULU v. VENKATRESHWARLU ( AIR 1965 AP 318 ). 44. .... It is unnecessary for the alienees or the creditors to show that there had been a proper inquiry or that the money had been borrowed for necessity." 43.The same view was confirmed by another Division Bench of the same court in SYDULU v. VENKATRESHWARLU ( AIR 1965 AP 318 ). 44. A Division Bench of this court in SANTANAVENUGOPALAKRISHNAN v. VENUGOPAL (1976 II MLJ 134) has held as follows: "The mere ipse dixit of the plaintiff as soon as he becomes a major basing his information on hearsay and gathering some witnesses who would parrot-like repeat what he wants them to say would not improve the position." In that case, the son filed the suit challenging the alienations made by the father to discharge certain debts. The liability of the son was denied on the ground that the debts are not for the family necessity and as such the alienations made by the father to discharge such debts will not be binding on him. The Division Bench held that it is for the son to discharge his burden of proof to establish that the debts are not binding on him. 45.Another Division Bench of this court in the case of SAMPOORNA AMMAL v. ASOKAN (1984 I MLJ 66) held as follows: "Where the Manager or a father of the joint Hindu family alienates joint family property the alinee is bound to inquire into the necessity for the sale and the burden lies on him to prove either that there was a legal necessity in fact or the alienation by the father was for the discharge of an antecedent debt or that he made proper and bona fide enquiry as to the existence of such necessity. It is also clear that the purchaser is not bound to see that the money advanced by him was actually applied to meet the necessity. This is on the principle that the purchaser can rarely have the means of having control and directing the actual application of the money. It is also clear that the purchaser is not bound to see that the money advanced by him was actually applied to meet the necessity. This is on the principle that the purchaser can rarely have the means of having control and directing the actual application of the money. It is also well-settled that where the existence of family necessity is established, the manner in which it should be met and the manner of the application of the money for the purpose of meeting the necessity is a matter entirely for the manager to decide, and so long as he does it honestly and prudently in the interest of the family, the fact that another person in the position of a Manager could have or would have made a better arrangement for meeting the necessity is not an argument available to invalidate the actual arrangement made by the Manager. Of course, if the challenge to the alienation is on the ground that the antecedent debts incurred by his father were fainted by immorality, it is for the son; to prove that the antecedent debts were immoral and also that the purchasers had notice that they were so tainted." 46. A recent Division Bench judgment in MINOR S. VIJAYAKUMAR v. SUBBARAYAN (2002) 3 MLJ 43 ) is also to the same effect that the sons filing the suit to declare the alienation by the father are not binding on them, then the onus lies on them to prove that the alienations were for illegal and immoral purposes. 47. These Division Benches relied upon several other Apex Court judgments as well as other judgments of various High Courts to hold that the burden lies on the person who challenges the alienation made by the kartha of the family. We do not want to multiply the citations, when it is more than enough to refer a few judgment to high light the principles to decide the issue. 48. From the principles laid down by the above judgments, it is clear that the burden lies on the plaintiff to establish that the debts incurred by the first defendant are for the illegal and immoral purposes and not for the family necessity. It is also for him to establish that the alienations made by the first defendant are only to meet out such debts and expenses incurred by the 1st defendant for his immoral activities. It is also for him to establish that the alienations made by the first defendant are only to meet out such debts and expenses incurred by the 1st defendant for his immoral activities. 49.We have extracted the plaint averments supra which do not disclose any specific plea by the plaintiff that the debts incurred and the alienations made by the first defendant to discharge those debts are only to meet out his immoral and illegal acts. More over, when the burden lies on the plaintiff, it is for him to give out the details of each and every alienations and it has to be correlated with the immoral activities of the first defendant in order to establish that all the transactions entered into or the alienations made by the first defendant are only in respect of the immoral debts or the expenses and not otherwise. 50. Coming to the evidence, the plaintiff, as P.W.1, has stated that he has no personal knowledge of the debts incurred by the first defendant. He came to know about the nature of the the debt through somebody on enquiry. The fact remains that he had not examined any other person in support of his statement. When the plaint averments and also the evidence of the plaintiff as P.W.1 is so vague, without any details or particulars of the illegal and immoral activities of the 48th defendant and connecting each and every alienations made by the first defendant with such of his immoral activities, we have to hold that the plaintiff has miserably failed to discharge the burden in establishing his case. Consequently his plea that the debts incurred and the alienations by the first defendant were only for the illegal and immoral purpose has to be rejected. 51. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also contended that the first defendant being a party to the proceedings has not got into the box to explain the nature of the debt incurred by him and the purpose of the alienations. Hence an adverse inference has to be drawn so far as the first defendant is concerned and it has to be held that in the absence of any evidence by the first defendant to establish his case that the alienations were for family necessity, it has to be held that the alienations made by him is only for his immoral activities. 52. 52. It may be worth to refer a Division Bench judgment reported in SANT BAKHSH SINGH v. LACHHMAN PRASAD (AIR (33) 1946 Oudh 92) wherein the learned Judges have held that though the father was a party to the proceeding, has failed to give evidence as to the nature of the debts incurred by him, there cannot be any presumption that the debts are for illegal activities. The learned Judge further held that the presumption is otherwise that the debts are only for the legal necessity. 53. In the absence of any evidence with regard to the immoral conduct of the first defendant, his plea that the alienations were made to meet out the business expenses i.e., to replace the machinery in the mill and to develop the business, has to be accepted. 54. A Division Bench of this court in RAMAKRISHNA v. MANIKKA (AIR 1937 Madras 375) held that the manager or accredited agent or even a junior member conducting family business can mortgage or sell joint family property for debts and liabilities incurred in the course of that business. 55.Yet another Division Bench in RAJAGOPALA AIYAR v. RAMAN CHETTIYAR (AIR 1927 Madras 1190) has held that the manager of a trading family has wider powers than those of the manager of a non trading family. There is no deviation from the fundamental principle that what is done must be for the benefit or necessities of the family, but acts as the incurring of debts and drawing of negotiable instruments are necessities to a trading family while they would not be to a non-trading family. Even where the debts in fact are incurred merely for personal purposes of the manager they will bind the family if they are within the ostensible authority of the manager as conducting the family business. So it is that those who deal with him and to whom he incurs debts are not put upon enquiry as to whether the debts were incurred for the benefit or necessity of the family so long as they are incidental to the family business. 56. In the case on hand, the plea of the first defendant that he incurred the debts for the development of the family business and also for replacement of the machineries in the mills were not denied by the plaintiff. 56. In the case on hand, the plea of the first defendant that he incurred the debts for the development of the family business and also for replacement of the machineries in the mills were not denied by the plaintiff. Moreover, all the Companies have been included in Item No.18 of the plaint IX Schedule as if they belong to the family and plaitniff is entitled for the share. When that be so, there cannot be any dispute that the debts incurred by the first defendant is only in respect of the development of the family business and as such the alienations made by him are to meet out those expenses which will be binding on the plaintiff. In such case, as held by the learned Judges in RAJAGOPALA AIYAR v. RAMAN CHETTIYAR (AIR 1927 Madras 1190), it is not for the purchaser to make any enquiry so long as the expenses is to meet out the family business concern. 57. It may be worthwhile to refer the Division Bench judgment of this court in MEENAKSHI v. MANIKKAM (AIR 1960 Madras 99) where the learned Judges have held that the validity of an alienation of joint family property in a case where the alienee proved that he made bone fide enquiries as to the existence of necessity is not based on any theory of ostensible authority. An alienation by the father to discharge his antecedent debt is by virtue of a power vested in him to alienate in certain circumstances, and not for the reason that there would be sufficient consideration from the point of view of his sons. In either case it is a power vested in the manager or father to lawfully alienate family property if certain circumstances exist. 58. In the case on hand some of the alienees have been examined who deposed that they made enquiries and satisfied with the existence of the debts which were incurred as well as the expenses incurred by the first defendant for the family necessity. Such evidence of the alienees had not been effectively challenged by the plaintiff. More over, the learned Judge who tried the suit had accepted the evidence of the alienees. When that be so, we do not propose to differ from the learned Judge in this aspect. 59. Such evidence of the alienees had not been effectively challenged by the plaintiff. More over, the learned Judge who tried the suit had accepted the evidence of the alienees. When that be so, we do not propose to differ from the learned Judge in this aspect. 59. Even in respect of plaint VIII schedule, the plaintiff has stated in his evidence that the first defendant entered into an agreement to sell the said property to the fifth defendant only under undue influence. In fact such a plea was put forth by the first defendant himself in the suit filed by the fifth defendant for specific performance in C.S.18 of 1958. The said plea was rejected by the Court in the judgment which is marked as Ex.P18. Such a plea of the first defendant was rejected and the suit was decreed, finding that the first defendant entered into an agreement to sell the property in favour of the fifth defendant for valuable consideration to discharge the bank loan. When identical a plea of the first defendant had been rejected by this court, we are of the view that though the plaintiff was not a party to the said proceeding, the finding rendered by this court, which was ultimately confirmed by the Apex Court, will have a bearing in deciding the present plea of the plaintiff. 60. In this case, the plaintiff in his oral evidence has admitted that the fifth defendant had paid the bank loan and taken the assignment by getting back the title deeds. This court having held that the debts incurred by the first defendant are for family necessity, for development of business and for the replacement of the machineries, then such debts are undoubtedly binding on the plaintiff. 61. So far as schedules IX and X are concerned, the same were included in the plaint schedule by way of amendment by including in para 47(a) of the plaint at a later point of time. Those properties were sought to be included by way of amendment on the ground that those properties also belong to the joint family wherein the plaintiff is entitled for a share. The learned Judge has rejected the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff did not produce any document to establish that those properties are belonging to the joint family of the first defendant. The learned Judge has rejected the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff did not produce any document to establish that those properties are belonging to the joint family of the first defendant. The plaintiff put forth such claim only on the basis of the averments made in Application No.4390 of 1982 and a compromise memo filed by the 1st defendant wherein the first defendant had admitted that those properties are joint family properties. It is an admitted fact that the plaintiff has not given any details with regard to the schedule IX and X as to how they belong to the joint family properties. In paragraph 47-A of the plaint, it is vaguely stated that the schedule 9 and 10 are joint family properties and the first plaintiff is entitled for half share. 62. The defendants 2, 3, 4 and 76 had acquired rights in Items 3,6, 7, 16 of IX Schedule. The plaintiff has not impleaded defendants 2 to 4 as parties in this Appeal. Moreover, the plaintiff, who attained majority in 1974 cannot challenge the right of the said defendants by making amendments in the plaint with respect to those properties in1982. So, his claim against these defendants cannot be sustained. In the written statement filed by 1st defendant it is stated that Item No.I was not available as it was taken over by the Government and Item No.II was not allotted to the 1st defendant as he has to pay some more instalments. Item No,.IV belongs to Seethai Achi and it cannot be treated as joint family property. Item No.V belongs to the Company and so the plaintiff cannot claim any right in the said property. Item Nos. VIII to XI were sold in Court auction even before they were added in the plaint and Item No.XII was purchased by the 1st defendant from out of his self-earnings. Item Nos.XIII to XV had been dedicated to the charitable purpose. Item No.XVII belongs to Sathappa Textiles which is a Coroprate Body. The Companies had been described in Item No.XVIII by the plaintiff as if he is entitled for partition. Schedule X is with respect to rights in Corporate bodies. 63. But the plaintiff has not filed any document or adduced any acceptable evidence to establish that the above said properties in IX and X Schedules are joint family properties. The Companies had been described in Item No.XVIII by the plaintiff as if he is entitled for partition. Schedule X is with respect to rights in Corporate bodies. 63. But the plaintiff has not filed any document or adduced any acceptable evidence to establish that the above said properties in IX and X Schedules are joint family properties. So, in the absence of any document or evidence to show that they are the properties belonging to the joint family, the learned Judge is correct in rejecting the case of the plaintiff in this regard. We also do not see any reason to differ from the findings of the learned Judge in this regard. 64. With respect to Item No.10 in Schedule I, We have held in the judgment in O.S.A.No.224/96 that it is not a joint family property and it is not available to the plaintiff to claim for partition. 65. It is not in dispute that the appellant in O.S.A.237/1996 has not given any description of the properties for which he is seeking the relief of declaration of his absolute title. Under Order VII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, giving such description of the property is mandatory in a suit with respect to immovable property to sustain the claim. We are not able to understand as to how the said suit was entertained even without the details of such properties are being mentioned. Moreover, no argument was put forth before us to substantiate such a claim of the appellant in O.S.A.No.237/1996 In view of the discussion made earlier in this judgment regarding the quantum of shares for which the appellant is entitled to, the claim made in C.S.No.442/1983 cannot be sustained and the learned Judge is correct in dismissing the suit in C.S.No.442/1983. 66. on the basis of the discussion made above, we are inclined to modify the judgment and decree passed in C.S.No.188/1972 insofar as they relate to the claim made in the Appeal in O.S.A.Nos.261/1`995 and 284/1994, as follows:- (1) The appellant in O.S.A.261/1995 (plaintiff inC.S.188/1972) is entitled for partition of his 1/4th share and the appellant in O.S.A.284/1996 is entitled to 3/4th share in the properties for which they are entitled for partition. (2) Neither the appellant in O.S.A.No.261/1995 nor the appellant in O.S.A.No.284/1996 (1st defendant in C.S.No.188/1972) are having any right in Item No.10 of plaint Schedule I as held in O.S.A.No.224/1996. (2) Neither the appellant in O.S.A.No.261/1995 nor the appellant in O.S.A.No.284/1996 (1st defendant in C.S.No.188/1972) are having any right in Item No.10 of plaint Schedule I as held in O.S.A.No.224/1996. (3) The appellant in O.S.A.No.261/1995 is entitled to claim 1/4th share in Item No.9 of the plaint Schedule I and in Item No.8 of the Schedule IV. (4) In other respects, the decrees of the trial Judge in C.S.No.188/1972 and 442/1983 are confirmed. Hence both the O.S.A.Nos.261/1995 and 284/1996 are partly allowed to the above extent, and O.S.A.No.237/1996 is dismissed. No costs.