Judgment Viney Mittal, J. 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner Ram Sarup Rohilla for expunging the remarks recorded by Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bahadurgarh in criminal case No. 9-2 of January 13, 1986 arising out of FIR No. 490 dated October 22, 1985 under Sections 279/336/427 of the Indian Penal Code, registered at Police Station Bahadurgarh. 2. While conducting the trial of the aforesaid case against the said accused Dharam Singh, the learned trial Magistrate while ordering the acquittal of the aforesaid accused made the following observations :- "Before parting with the judgment, I would like to remark that from the complaint Ex. PA and statement of Sh. Ram Sarup Rohilla J.E. recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. which is Ex. PB on the record, I am satisfied that Ram Sarup Rohilla, J.E. has colluded with the accused and i.e. why he had resiled from his allegations made in the complaint Ex. PB and statement made before the police u/s 161 Cr.P.C. copy of such is Ex. PB on the record. In his complaint Ex. PA Sh. Ram Sarup Rohilla has specifically given the number of truck which has caused damage to the electric poles. He has specifically alleged that truck No. HRO-4522 had struck the electric poles and thereafter caused damage to the tune of Rs. 3000/-. In his statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. recorded on 22.10.85 he has given the name of the accused and number of the truck and has further stated that accused was driving the truck in rash or negligent manner. However, when he appeared in the Court, he has failed to identify the accused, number of truck or to say that accused was driving truck in rash or negligent manner. It was due to the statement on oath of Ram Sarup PW2 that accused had to be acquitted and HSEB had to suffer a loss of Rs. 3000/- or so. This clearly establish that Ram Sarup had accepted some amount from the accused or otherwise resiled from his statement to save the skin of the accused. If it is taken that Ram Sarup has made a correct statement in court then it is also established that Ram Sarup/PW2 has got a false case registered against the accused and thus he is liable for the commission of an offence u/s 182 Cr.P.C. Sh. If it is taken that Ram Sarup has made a correct statement in court then it is also established that Ram Sarup/PW2 has got a false case registered against the accused and thus he is liable for the commission of an offence u/s 182 Cr.P.C. Sh. B.R. Bhati learned ADA is directed to send a copy of the judgment to the Chairman HSEB, SE, HSEB Rohtak and Executive Engineer, HSEB or other immediate loss of Ram Sarup Rohilla/PW2 to initiate departmental action seriously calling his explanation as to why he had resiled from the allegation made in the complaint Ex. PA or his statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. or otherwise he has lodged a false complaint against the accused. It is hoped that learned ADA will comply with this order within 15 days positively." 3. The petitioner has now approached this Court against the aforesaid remarks recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with a prayer to expunge the same. 4. I have heard Ms. Geeta Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and have also gone through the record of the case with her assistance. 5. A challenge to the aforesaid remarks has been made by the petitioner on the ground that the aforesaid remarks are unwarranted under the facts and circumstances of the case and that the remarks are based upon no evidence. A further grievance has been made that remarks were never brought to the notice of the petitioner in order to solicit his explanation nor he was afforded any opportunity of hearing to furnish any explanation. It was also been stated in the petition that because of the aforesaid remarks, the official career of the petitioner would be seriously prejudiced. 6. In my considered opinion, the present petition deserves to succeed. It has been held by the Apex Court in Manish Dixit and others v. State of Rajasthan, 2000(4) RCR(Criminal) 583 (SC), wherein the following observations have been made by the Honble Apex Court :- "36. In our opinion, both the trial Court and the High Court should have avoided making such unsavoury comments against a witness in such a manner as to entail serious implications on his career merely because the answers which were extracted from him through cross questions contained contradictions or inconsistencies. In our opinion, both the trial Court and the High Court should have avoided making such unsavoury comments against a witness in such a manner as to entail serious implications on his career merely because the answers which were extracted from him through cross questions contained contradictions or inconsistencies. It should have been remembered that PW-30 (Devendra Kumar Sharma) was cited by the prosecution and the chief examination was conducted by a Public Prosecutor. Once the witness was cross-examined the Public Prosecutor had an opportunity under law to put such questions as were necessary for "explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination." It is ununderstandable to us why the Public Prosecutor did not put a single question at re-examination stage at least for the purpose of giving him opportunity to explain such incongruities which fell from his mouth during cross-examination." 37. If the Court felt that some of the answers given by that witness during cross-examination were so inconsistent or contradictory and that such answers per se required judicial castigation, the Court also had a duty to invoke its powers envisaged in Section 165 of the Evidence Act. The width of the powers of the Court to put questions is almost plenary and no party can possibly raise an objection thereto. This can be discerned from the language employed in the first limb of the section. It reads thus : "The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of a relevant fact, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, or, without the leave of the Court to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question". 38. This Court has indicated the very wide dimension of the powers of the Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in State of Rajasthan v. Ani, 1997(2) RCR(Crl.) 211 (SC) : 1977(6) SCC 162. 38. This Court has indicated the very wide dimension of the powers of the Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act in State of Rajasthan v. Ani, 1997(2) RCR(Crl.) 211 (SC) : 1977(6) SCC 162. We extract the following observations which would amplify the position : "The said section was framed by lavishly studding it with the word `any which could only have been inspired by the legislative intent to confer unbridled power on the trial Court to use the power whenever he deems it necessary to elicit truth. Even if any such question crosses into irrelevancy the same would not transgress beyond the contours of powers of the Court. This is clear from the words `relevant or irrelevant in section 165. Neither of the parties has any right to raise objection to any such question." 39. In the present case when the Public Prosecutor failed to utilize the opportunity afforded by law to ask PW-30 (Devendra Kumar Sharma) such questions as are necessary for explanation of the matters referred to in cross-examination, and when the trial Judge also failed to invoke the plenary powers to put such questions as he should have put regarding the answers given in cross-examination it was unfair, and we may say uncharitable to a witness to shower him with judicial reprobation in the judgment. Such disparaging remarks and the direction to initiate departmental action against him could have very serious impact on his official career. 40. Even those apart, this Court has repeatedly cautioned that before any castigating remarks are made by the Court against any person particularly when such remarks could ensue serious consequences on the future career of the person concerned he should have been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter in respect of the proposed remarks or strictures. Such an opportunity is the basic requirement for otherwise the offending remarks would be in violation of the principles of natural justice. In this case such an opportunity was not given to PW-30 (Devendra Kumar Sharma). (State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim, 1964(2) SCC 181, R.L. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srivasan, 1975(2) SCC 466, Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushankar, 1986(2) SCC 569 : 1986(2) RCR(Crl.) 93 (SC), State of Karnataka v. Registrar General, 2000(3) RCR(Crl.) 626 (SC) : 2000(5) Scale 504). 41. It is apposite in his context to extract the following observations made by this Court in Dr. Naim, 1964(2) SCC 181, R.L. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srivasan, 1975(2) SCC 466, Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhushankar, 1986(2) SCC 569 : 1986(2) RCR(Crl.) 93 (SC), State of Karnataka v. Registrar General, 2000(3) RCR(Crl.) 626 (SC) : 2000(5) Scale 504). 41. It is apposite in his context to extract the following observations made by this Court in Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka v. State of Assam, 1996(6) SCC 234 : "We are surprised to find that in spite of the above catena of decisions of this Court, the learned Judge did not, before making the remarks, give any opportunity to the appellants, who were admittedly not parties to the revision petition to defend themselves. It cannot be gain said that the nature of remarks the learned Judge had made, has cast a serious aspersion on the appellants affecting their character and reputation and may, ultimately affect their career also. Condemnation of the appellants without giving them an opportunity of being heard was complete negation of the fundamental principle of natural justice." 7. A Division Bench of this court (of which I was also a member), in Dr. Jaswinder Singh v. State of Punjab Crl.M. No. 26480-M of 2000 decided on July 15, 2002, while following the law laid down in Manish Dixits case supra, had taken a similar view and expunged the remarks on the ground that the same had been recorded without affording an opportunity to the officer concerned. 8. In these circumstances, I allow the present petition and expunge the remarks contained in the judgment dated October 23, 1985 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bahadurgarh. It is further directed that the direction contained in the aforesaid judgment for initiating the departmental proceedings against the petitioner are also struck down.