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2002 DIGILAW 1397 (PNJ)

Shakuntal Kaur @ Kulwant Kaur v. Nirmal Kaur

2002-12-16

S.S.SARON

body2002
Judgment S.S.Saron, J. 1. The dispute in the present criminal revision petition relates to land measuring 3 kanals 12 marlas situated in village Behram Sarishta, Tehsil and District Jalandhar. The respondents herein filed a petition under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as the Code), before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jalandhar, on the ground that they have been in actual and physical cultivating possession of the said land for the last many years and that their names exist in the revenue records. It is alleged that the petitioners had no right, title or interest in the said land. However, they came armed with 30-35 persons on 14.5.1986 and destroyed and uprooted the crops of the respondents on the plea that they had purchased the said land. The respondents filed several applications before the police authorities but in vain. Therefore, they prayed for initiating proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. 2. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jalandhar, on receipt of the petition issued notice to the present petitioners who appeared and filed their reply and denied the correctness of the petition. During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners filed an application for dropping the proceedings as the matter was pending in civil Court and a status quo order had already been passed in their favour. On this ground, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate dropped the proceedings holding that the learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Jalandhar, had passed an order on 13.6.1988 directing the parties to maintain status quo regarding possession over the suit land. In view of the pendency of the proceedings before the civil Court, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate vide his order dated 8.8.1989 dropped the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. 3. Against the said order dated 8.8.1989 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jalandhar, the respondents herein filed a criminal revision before the learned Session Judge, Jalandhar, vide order dated 27.8.1990 accepted the revision and set aside the aforesaid order dated 8.8.1989. Accordingly, proceedings under Section 145 of the Code were ordered to be restored to the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate at the stage at which they were shut and the same were ordered to be continued. It is against the said order dated 27.8.1990 that the present criminal revision has been filed. 4. Accordingly, proceedings under Section 145 of the Code were ordered to be restored to the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate at the stage at which they were shut and the same were ordered to be continued. It is against the said order dated 27.8.1990 that the present criminal revision has been filed. 4. Notice was issued in the case on 8.11.1990 and further proceedings in the Executive Court were ordered to be stayed till the next date of hearing i.e. 5.12.1990. Thereafter on 5.12.1990 it was ordered that the proceedings in the Executive Court shall remain stayed till further orders. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that initially order dated 13.6.1988 was passed by the learned Sub Judge Ilnd Class, Jalandhar, directing the parties to maintain status quo regarding the possession in repect of the land in question. He further submitted that thereafter the respondents instituted civil suit on 30.11.1988 for declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs (the present respondents) are not bound by the judgment and decree dated 7.5.1988 passed in civil suit No. 216 of 1988 titled Boota Singh and others v. Lal Singh and that they are owners in possession of the suit land and also under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for possession of the land in question. The said suit of the respondents was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Jalandhar, vide judgment dated 7.4.1995. After dismissal of the suit the respondents filed civil appeal in the Court of learned District Judge, Jalandhar, which has also been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jalandhar, vide judgment and decree dated 16.8.2001. Against the said judgment and decree dated 16.8.2001 Regular Second Appeal No.201 of 2002 is pending in this Court which has been admitted on 6.8.2002 and the interim order dated 16.1.2002 restraining the respondents from allenating the suit land or encumbering the same in any other manner has been ordered to be continued. In this view of the matter, he contends that the present proceedings under Section 145 of the Code are liable to be quashed by accepting the criminal revision. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, contends that mere pendency of the civil litigation is no ground to quash the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. In this view of the matter, he contends that the present proceedings under Section 145 of the Code are liable to be quashed by accepting the criminal revision. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, contends that mere pendency of the civil litigation is no ground to quash the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. He further contends that the order dated 27.8.1990 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, is just and equitable and the same is liable to be unheld. 7. I have considered the respective contentions of the parties and with their assistance gone through the record of the case. 8. This Court in case of Jasbir Singh v. State of Haryana, 1997 (1) RCR 573 [1997(1) All India Criminal Law Reporter 735 (Pb. & Hry.)], held that where civil proceedings are already pending disposal before the Court of law which has passed order of status quo as well, the Magistrate by no stretch of imagination could pass a preliminary or final order of the property under Section 145 of the Code. To somewhat similar effect observations have been made in the case of Manohar Lal v. Sub Divisional Magistrate, 1993 (2) RCR 448 wherein this Court held that where civil Court is seized of the same disputed land and an injunction hand been granted by it in favour of the petitioners restraining the other side from interfering with their possession, the criminal Court was bound to abide by the order of the civil Court and proceedings under Section 145 of the Code were clearly unwarranted. 9. In the case in hand it is not in dispute that the civil Court on 13.6.1998 had passed order of status quo. The learned Additional Sessions Judge distinguished the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. AIR 1985 S.C. 472, on the ground that in the said case the proceedings were dropped as before the disposal of the petition under Section 145 of the Code, the civil Court decided the point of possession between the parties and it was under these circumstances that it was held that parallel proceedings could not continue in the criminal Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that in the present case only an exparte interim injunction had been granted directing the parties to maintain status quo and that civil suit had not been decided as it had been done in Ram Sumer Puri Mahants case (supra). This matter, however, now stands settled in view of the two afore-said judgments in the case of Jasbir Singh (supra) and Manohar Lal (supra) where this court held that with the passing of interlocutory order by the civil Court, it can be said that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of peace with regard to the subject matter of dispute. Besides, the Honble Supreme Court in a later case titled Amresh Tiwari v. Lalita Parsad Dubey, AIR 2000 S.C. 1504, explained its earlier decision in Ram Sumer Puri Mahants case. It was observed by the Honble Apex Court that it was unable to accept the submission that the principle laid down therein would only apply if the civil Court had already ajdudicated on the dispute, regarding the property and given a finding. It was held that multiplicity of litigation should be avoided as it was not in the interest of parties and public time would be wasted over meaningless litigation. On this principle, it was held when the question of possession was being examined by the civil Court, there was hardly any justification for initiating a parallel criminal proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. The following observations made in Amresh Tiwaris case (supra) are apposite :- In this case, the civil suit had been filed first. An order of status quo had already been passed by the competent civil Court. Thereafter Section 145 proceedings were commenced. No final order had been passed in the proceedings under Section 145. In our view on the facts of the present case the ratio laid down in Ram Sumers case (AIR 1985 SC 472; 1985 Cri. LJ 752) (supra) fully applies. We clarify that we are not stating that in every case where a civil suit is filed, Section 145 proceedings would never lie. In our view on the facts of the present case the ratio laid down in Ram Sumers case (AIR 1985 SC 472; 1985 Cri. LJ 752) (supra) fully applies. We clarify that we are not stating that in every case where a civil suit is filed, Section 145 proceedings would never lie. It is only in cases where civil suit is for possession or for declaration of title in respect of the same property and where reliefs regarding protection of the property concerned can be applied for and granted by the civil Court that proceedings under Section 145 should not be allowed to continue. This is because the civil Court is competent to decide the question of title as well as possession between the parties and the orders of the civil Court would be binding on the Magistrate. 10. Apart from the above, the Honble Supreme Court in the case Mahant Ram Saran Dass v. Harish Mohan & Another, J.T. 2000 (Suppl.2) SC 438, where a civil suit for declaration under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was pending, held that the Civil Court being in seisin of the matter, any appropriate relief could be obtained from the civil Court itself and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under Section 145 of the Code and to pass any order thereon. The proceedings under Section 145 of the Code were set aside. 11. Besides the Honble Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of Randhir Singh v. Dalbir Singh, (2002) 3 S.C.C. 700 : [2002(4) All India Criminal Law Reporter 525 (SC)], upheld the order of the High Court to the extent proceeding under Section 145 and the order attaching the land ender Section 146 (1) of the Code were quashed in view of the pendency of the civil litigation between the parties, leaving the parties to approach the civil Court for appropriate interim order. 12. 12. In the present case, it may be noticed that after the passing of the order status quo on 13.6.1988, the respondents themselves had instituted a civil suit on 30.11.1998 for declaration to the effect that they were not bound by the judgment and decree dated 7.5.1988 passed by the learned Sub Judge IInd Crass, Jalandhar, in civil suit No. 216 of 1988 titled Boota Singh and other v. Lal Singh and also that they were the owners in possession of the land in dispute measuring 3 kanal 12 marla, besides for possession of the said land in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The said suit was dismissed by the learned Sub Judge on 7.4.1995. and the appeal of the respondents against the same was also dismissed on 16.8.2001. However, Regular Second Appeal No. 201 of 2002 has been admitted on 6.8.2002 and the interim order dated 16.1.2002 restraining the respondents therein from alienating the suit land or encumbering the same in any other manner has been ordered to be continued. Therefore, it is the admitted position that the petitioners are in possession of the land and even the claim of the respondents for declaration and for possession in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act has been declined by the civil Courts. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, the judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Sumer Puri Mahants case (supra) and Amresh Tiwaris case (supra) would apply and proceedings under Section 145 of the Code ought not be allowed to continue. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the order dated 27.8.1990 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, is not sustainable and is accordingly set aside and quashed. 13. Resultantly, this criminal revision petition is accepted and the order dated 27.8.1990 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jalandhar, is set aside and that of the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Jalandhar, dated 8.8.1989 is hereby restored.