DUBAGUNTA SUBRAHMANYAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against the judgment dated 30. 8. 1989 in A. S. No. 25 of 1985 on the file of the II Additional district Judge, Visakhapatnam setting aside the judgment and decree dated 20. 12. 1984 in O. S. No. 32 of 1983 on the file of the district Munsif Court, Bhimunipatnam. Defendants 2 to 8 are the appellants. The sole respondent-plaintiff died during the pendency of this appeal. Respondents 2 and 3 are brought on record as Legal Representatives of the deceased sole respondent-plaintiff. ( 2 ) NECESSARY facts for the disposal of this second appeal are as follows: Defendant no. 1 is the father of defendants 2 to 6. Defendant No. 7 is the wife and defendant no. 8 is the daughter of the first defendant. On 6. 6. 1982 the first defendant sold the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff under ex. A-1, registered sale deed. The plaintiff filed the suit alleging that the plaint schedule property is the self-acquired property of the first defendant and after execution of ex. A-1, sale deed by the first defendant in his favour, the other defendants in the suit high-handedly trespassed into suit property. He sought the relief of declaration of his title and also for possession of the suit property after evicting the defendants from the possession of the suit property. Soon after the suit was filed, the first defendant died. He did not file any written statement before his death. The fifth defendant filed the written statement opposing the suit. His written statement was adopted by the other defendants in the suit. According to the contesting defendants, the suit property is the joint family property of all the defendants including the first defendant. They also pleaded that there was a family arrangement between the members of the family and as per that family arrangement the first defendant gave the suit properties to his sons viz. , defendants 2 to 6, who agreed to give paddy and cash every year for the maintenance of their father (the first defendant), mother and sister. In view of the pleadings of both the parties, the trial court settled appropriate issues for trial. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the trial Court. , defendants 2 to 6, who agreed to give paddy and cash every year for the maintenance of their father (the first defendant), mother and sister. In view of the pleadings of both the parties, the trial court settled appropriate issues for trial. Both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the trial Court. On a consideration of the entire evidence available on record the trial Court came to the conclusion that the suit property is self- acquired property of the first defendant. It did not accept the plea of the defendants that it is the joint family property or that it was acquired by the joint efforts of the members of the family. Regarding the family arrangement pleaded by the defendants, the trial Court accepted the version of the defendants. However, the trial Court held that the first defendant was entitled to sell the property under Ex. A-1 sale deed. It further held that the only remedy of the plaintiff is to file a separate suit for partition regarding 1/6th share of the first defendant in the suit property. In view of the above finding, the trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. However, it directed the defendants in the suit to pay the plaintiff the suit costs. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A. S. No. 25 of 1985 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, visakhapatnam. Aggrieved by the decision of the trial Court directing the defendants to pay the suit costs to the plaintiff, defendants preferred cross-objections before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court disposed of the appeal as well as the cross- objections by its judgment dated 30. 8. 1989. The lower appellate Court proceeded on the basis that the trial Court did not accept the plea of the defendants regarding the family arrangement. Proceeding on that basis the lower appellate Court held that when the trial Court found that the sale deed, Ex. A-1 is binding on the defendants, it committed an error in refusing to grant decree of possession in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the appeal. A-1 is binding on the defendants, it committed an error in refusing to grant decree of possession in favour of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the appeal. While setting aside the judgments and decree of the trial court, the lower appellate Court did not interfere with the judgment of the trial Court regarding the costs directed to be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the lowe. appellate Court dismissed the cross- objections filed by the defendants. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the defendants in the suit preferred the present appeal. ( 3 ) AT the time of admission of this appeal, the learned admission Judge treated the following points formulated in the grounds of appeal as substantial questions of law that arise for consideration in the present appeal. Points: i. Whether the judgment of the lower appellate Court is vitiated for the reason that it misread and misunderstood the judgment of the trial Court and reversed the decree. ii. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule land if the family arrangement pleaded by the defendants 2 to 6 is proved as found by the trial Court. iii. Whether the lower appellate Court could reverse the finding of the trial court regarding the family arrangement without considering the evidence on record. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court held that the suit property is self-acquired property of the first defendant. It also disbelieved the version of the defendants that the suit property is the joint family property of the first defendant and his sons. It also disbelieved the version of the defendants that the suit property was acquired by the joint efforts of all the defendants. These are all findings of fact recorded by the trial Court. It is already noticed that the defendants preferred cross-objections before the lower appellate Court. I have perused the grounds taken by the defendants in their cross-objections. In those cross-objections, the defendants did not question or challenge the above findings of fact recorded by the trial Court. They limited cross-objections only to the extent of the direction given by the trial Court directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff the suit costs while dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff. In those cross-objections, the defendants did not question or challenge the above findings of fact recorded by the trial Court. They limited cross-objections only to the extent of the direction given by the trial Court directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff the suit costs while dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff. As the defendants themselves did not challenge the above finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, this Court has to proceed on the basis of the above findings of fact recorded by the trial Court. ( 5 ) REGARDING the family arrangement pleaded by the defendants, the lower appellate Court proceeded on the wrong assumption that the trial Court negatived the plea of the defendants regarding the family arrangement set up by the defendants. But the trial Court accepted the family arrangement set up by the defendants but refused to grant decree of possession to the plaintiff. The plea of the defendants in paragraph 4 of the written statement regarding family arrangement reads as follows: the defendants 2 to 6 have been in continuous possession of their family properties including the suit schedule even from the time the father late Gadu Rajanna was alive as the acquired family properties were given away towards these defendants shares in their family arrangement and late gadu Rajanna was not in possession of the suit lands by 6. 8. 1982 and as such late Gadu rajanna delivered the suit schedule lands under the sale deed dated 6. 8. 1982 to the plaintiff is not correct. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents contended that the said plea cannot be treated as a plea setting up family arrangement and that plea is to rebut the case of the plaintiff that he purchased the plaint schedule property under the sale deed, Ex. A-1. In view of the plea extracted above, the said contention cannot be accepted. It is his contention that the details of the family arrangement and the date of family arrangement and other relevant factors are not mentioned by the defendants in their written statements. However, in view of the evidence adduced by the parties and also in view of the admission made by the plaintiff and some of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff, the trial Court accepted the plea of the defendants regarding the family arrangement. However, in view of the evidence adduced by the parties and also in view of the admission made by the plaintiff and some of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff, the trial Court accepted the plea of the defendants regarding the family arrangement. It recorded a finding of fact that the family arrangement set up by the defendants is true. That finding of fact recorded by the Trial court is not set aside by the lower Appellate court. On the other hand, it proceeded on the presumption that the Trial Court disbelieved the family arrangement pleaded by the defendants. P. W. 3 is one of the attestors of Ex A-1, sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. In his evidence in the cross-examination he deposed as follows: there is a family arrangement between the first defendant and his sons for the effect that the sons have to give money and groceries. In 1982 his sons gave Rs. 1200/- to their father i. e. , first defendant, when he filed a complaint before the police. The amount was given prior to the registration of ex. A-1. I do not know how many days prior to the registration it took place. Incidentally, he happens to be the attestor of ex. B-1 document produced by the defendants in a way to prove that the family arrangement was acted upon and in pursuance of that family arrangement the first defendant received paddy and cash. P. W. 3 admitted that the contents of Ex. B-1 are true. ( 7 ) REGARDING family arrangement, the evidence of the plaintiff as P. W. 1 in the cross-examination reads as follows: the first defendant owned lands prior to the execution of the lands owned by the first defendant s father. 4 or 5 years back the lands are divided into 5 shares among sons of D-1. D-1 divided the properties into 5 shares and gave it to his sons. I verified the record and consulted an advocate before purchasing the said land from D-1. The Trial Court relied upon the admission made by another witness examined by the plaintiff as P. W. 2. P. W. 2 deposed that he signed one receipt in 1981 when Rajanna (D-1) received 20 Putties of paddy and Rs. 1300/- in cash from the defendants for his maintenance. The Trial Court relied upon the admission made by another witness examined by the plaintiff as P. W. 2. P. W. 2 deposed that he signed one receipt in 1981 when Rajanna (D-1) received 20 Putties of paddy and Rs. 1300/- in cash from the defendants for his maintenance. In view of the evidence of the above 3 witnesses and in view of the evidence adduced by the defendants, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the family arrangement set up by the defendants is true. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon some decisions regarding the family arrangement and also scope of the second appeal. The Supreme ceurt of India in Ishwar Das Jain v. Sohan lal, AIR 2000 SC 426 , held that there are two situations in which interference with findings of fact is permissible. Firstly, when material or relevant evidence is not considered, which if considered, would have led to an opposite conclusion. Secondly, as per the judgment of the Supreme Court, interference with finding of fact is permissible where a finding has been arrived at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which, if it was omitted, an opposite conclusio was possible. ( 9 ) THE principles of law laid down in the above decision of the Supreme Court are not in dispute. They are well known principles of law applicable for disposal of second appeal by a High Court. In the present appeal, this Court is not setting aside or interfering with any findings of fact recorded by the Courts below. Therefore the above decision is of no relevance for the disposal of this appeal. As already noticed, the finding of fact recorded by the Trial court regarding the family arrangement was not at all noticed by the lower Appellate court. It proceeded on the wrong assumption that the finding of the Trial Court is against the defendants. ( 10 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Veerayee Ammal v. Sinni Ammal, AIR 2001 SC 2920 . In paragraph 10 of the said judgment the supreme Court observed that merely because of appreciation of evidence another view is also possible would not clothe the High court to assume the jurisdiction by terming the question as substantial question of law. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment the supreme Court observed that merely because of appreciation of evidence another view is also possible would not clothe the High court to assume the jurisdiction by terming the question as substantial question of law. For the reasons already stated supra, this decision is also not relevant for the disposal of the present appeal. ( 11 ) REGARDING the family arrangement, the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on two judgments of the supreme Court. In S. S. Pillai v. K. S. Piliai, air 1972 SC 2069 , the Supreme Court held as follows: although the conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in futuro is generally a condition for the validity of the family arrangements, it is not necessarily so. Even bonafide disputes present or possible, which may not involve legal claims, would be sufficient. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a family arrangement. If such an agreement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereto are fair in the circumstances of a peculiar case, the Courts would more readily give assent to such an agreement than to avoid it. ( 12 ) IT is in the evidence of the plaintiff that there are disputes between the first defendant and his sons regarding properties even prior to Ex. A-1 sale deed. It is his contention that as the property is held to be self-acquired property of the first defendant, the other defendants have no right to claim any share in the said property and therefore the family arrangement set up by the defendants cannot be accepted. I find no force in that contention. According to the defendants, the suit property is a joint family property and it is acquired by the efforts of all the members of the family. In view of the said claim, irrespective of the fact as to whether the said claim is legally tenable or not, there is scope for the members of the family with intention to resolve the disputes between them to enter into some arrangement or agreement regarding the disputed properties. In view of the said claim, irrespective of the fact as to whether the said claim is legally tenable or not, there is scope for the members of the family with intention to resolve the disputes between them to enter into some arrangement or agreement regarding the disputed properties. According to the evidence placed by the defendants in the trial Court, the sons of the first defendant were given the entire property and in lieu of that fact the first defendant has to receive a fixed quantum of paddy as well as money every year from his sons. Ex. B-1 shows that in pursuance of the said family arrangement or agreement subsequently the first defendant received paddy and cash under Ex. B-1. As already noticed, P. W. 3 is one of the attestors of the said document and he admitted that the terms of Ex. B-1 are true and correct. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that there is no family arrangement. ( 13 ) ANOTHER decision relied upon in this regard is the judgment of the Supreme court in Hiraji Tolaji Bagwan v. Shakuntala, air 1990 SC 619 . The properties disputed in the said matter are ancestral properties, which were divided between coparceners. One of the coparceners, according to the family arrangement pleaded therein, divided the properties between him, his wife and daughter. The sons are not parties to that family arrangement. In view of the above fact situation, the Supreme Court held that a female could be given a share either in the self-acquired property of the husband or the father in the coparcenary property after the property is partitioned. It held that there cannot, therefore, be a partition and hence a family settlement with regard to the ancestral property, so long as it is joint, cannot be in favour of either wife or daughter. In that case, family arrangement is said to have taken place on three occasions and the third and last family arrangement fell for consideration before the Apex court. The present family arrangement related to the self-acquired property of the father. It took place between the father and his sons. Therefore, the above decision also has no application to the facts of the present case. The present family arrangement related to the self-acquired property of the father. It took place between the father and his sons. Therefore, the above decision also has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Brij Mohan v. Smt. Sugra Begum, JT 1990 (3) SC 255. The Supreme Court held that heavy burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that there was consensus ad idem between the parties for a concluded oral agreement for sale. In the present case, the oral family arrangement pleaded by the defendants was accepted by the trial Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by both the parties and also in view of the crucial admissions made by the plaintiff and witnesses examined by him. ( 15 ) AS the trial Court accepted the family arrangement set up by the defendants, and as it is not challenged by defendants before the lower appellate Court as that finding of facts is not reversed by lower appellate Court, the said family arrangement is binding on the plaintiff who purchased the property under Ex. A-1 sale deed subsequent to the said family arrangement. Inasmuch as the trial Court held that the said sale deed is binding on the defendants regarding the share of the first defendant alone and inasmuch as the said finding was not challenged by the defendants in the cross-objections filed by them, I am not interfering with the judgment of the trial Court insofar as the said finding is concerned. Normally, when the trial Court accepted the family arrangement and recorded a finding that under Ex. B-1 the defendants received paddy and cash in lieu of the terms of the family arrangement, it ought to have dismissed the entire suit but as the trial Court found on fact that the first defendant is having 1/6th share in the disputed property, I am not interfering with that finding of fact. For all the reasons stated above, it is very clear that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside. I accordingly, hold these points in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. I make it clear that as Ex. For all the reasons stated above, it is very clear that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is liable to be set aside. I accordingly, hold these points in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. I make it clear that as Ex. A-1 sale deed executed by 1st defendant was held to be binding on the other defendants, the plaintiff is at liberty to enforce the said sale deed and seek relief of partition of his share, if he so desires, in accordance with law. ( 16 ) IN the result, the judgment of the lower appellate Court in AS No. 25 of 1985 is set aside. The second appeal is allowed with costs.