Judgment R.L.Anand, J. 1. Present is a criminal revision and has been directed against the order dated 12.2.1991 vide which the learned trial Court held that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, all the respondents were acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 325/34 and 323/34 Indian Penal Code. 2. The brief facts of the prosecution case are that Shri Gobind made a complaint to the police on 27.6.1987 on the allegations that on that day at 11.00 a.m. he, his wife Gindori and his daughter Urmila were present at their house when Rattan came there and made certain complaints against his son Bishnu. Gindori told him that she would correct her son if he was at fault. Then respondent Rattan sat on the cot but left after sometime and other respondent Pusgar hurled abuses on the complainant. Gindori tried to pacify the respondents but Pusgar threw a stone which hit on the face of Gindori. Pusgar continued throwing stones. In the meantime, respondent Murari also came there with a lathi in his hand and gave a lathi blow on the left hand of the son of the complainant. After that Suman, daughter of Murari also came there and she also threw a stone which hit the left leg of Urmila. Another stone thrown by Pusgar hit the finger of the right hand of the complainant. The complainant shouted for help and was rescued by the villagers. It is also alleged that while running away Rattan also threatened the complainant of dire consequences. The complainant and his wife after some time went to Civil Hospital, Mohindergarh for medical treatment. The police investigated the case and challaned the respondents. 3. The learned Magistrate for the detailed reasons given in the judgment came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge against the accused. Resultantly, the were acquitted. 4. Not satisfied with the findings of the trial Court, the present criminal revision. 5. I have gone through the grounds of the revision as well as the impugned judgment very carefully. 6.
Resultantly, the were acquitted. 4. Not satisfied with the findings of the trial Court, the present criminal revision. 5. I have gone through the grounds of the revision as well as the impugned judgment very carefully. 6. It has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias B.P. Singh and others v. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and another, 2002(4) RCR(Criminal) 61 (SC) : 2002 AIR SCW 3315 as follows :- "In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction at the instance of the informant. It may be that the High Court on appreciation of the evidence on record may reach a conclusion different from that of the trial Court. But that by itself is no justification for exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 against a judgment of acquittal. The judgment of the trial Court in the instant case was not perverse. No defect of procedure has been pointed out. There was also no improper acceptance or rejection of evidence nor was there any defect of procedure or illegality in the conduct of the trial vitiating the trial itself. At best the High Court thought that the prosecution witnesses were reliable while the trial Court took the opposite view. It has been repeatedly observed by the Supreme Court that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law, and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered. the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction." 7. Following the above ratio I am of the considered opinion that the acquittal of the respondents is well justified. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the High Court may formulate a different opinion than the one formulated by the Magistrate, still it will be slow in interfering the findings of the learned trial Court unless it is held that the findings are perverse or without jurisdiction.
Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the High Court may formulate a different opinion than the one formulated by the Magistrate, still it will be slow in interfering the findings of the learned trial Court unless it is held that the findings are perverse or without jurisdiction. Resultantly, I do not find any merit in this revision which is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.