I.A. ANSARI, J- This appeal has been preferred under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, praying for setting aside the order, dated 19.8.98, passed by the learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati in Application No. Misc. 4/97. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, according to the appellant, may, in brief, be stated as follows: (i) A consignment of 150 bags and 260 packets of rice, was booked, under Invoice No. 38/061267 dated 7.5.93 from Gorakhpur Railway Station to Silchar for being delivered to the appellant, which is a partnership firm at Kalibari Road, Silchar. The consignment got diverted and reached its destination after inordinate delay. The rice having been damaged on transit, the appellant served the respondent with a notice, dated 11.7.93. Under Section 106B of the Railway Act demanding Rs. 11,151.00 as compensation for damage caused to 1593 kgs of rice @ Rs. 7.00 per kg. The appellant kept pursuing the matter by sending reminders, the last one having been sent on 9.2.96, but the Railways remained silent. However, after the period of limitation was over, the Railways (i.e. respondent) sent to the appellant a cheque No. F-081488, dated 12.12.96, for Rs. 5905.00 vide its letter dated 18.4.96. The appellant received the said cheque under protest vide its letter dated 19.12.96, and informed the respondent accordingly. As the respondent did not pay to the appellant balance unpaid amount, the appellant instituted Application No. 4/97 aforementioned praying for recovery of Rs. 5346.00 as balance of compensation amount. (ii) As the claim petition was filed beyond the period of limitation, a prayer under Section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, was made before the learned tribunal seeking admittedly, condonation of delay of about 8 months 13 days in making the claim. The respondents filed its objection resisting the claim of the appellant. Upon hearing both sides, learned tribunal passed an order, on 19.8.98, holding to the effect that no sufficient reason for condonation of delay in filing the claim application could be made out by the appellant. The Application Misc. Case No. 4/97 aforementioned was accordingly dismissed with direction to the parties to bear its own cost. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 3.1 have carefully perused the relevant records including the impugned order. The Application Misc. Case No. 4/97 aforementioned was accordingly dismissed with direction to the parties to bear its own cost. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 3.1 have carefully perused the relevant records including the impugned order. I have heard Mr H.P. Barman, learned counsel for the appellant, and Mr J. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 4. In support of appellant's case, Mr Barman has submitted that the appellant cannot be made responsible for lodging his claim application after expiry of the period of limitation, because the appellant was, according to Mr Barman, waiting for favourable settlement from the end of the respondent, but the respondent, eventually, sent a cheque, dated 12.12.96, for an amount of Rs.5905/- only. The appellant was, thus, contends Mr Barman, prevented by sufficient cause from instituting its claim within time, but the learned tribunal, submits Mr Barman arbitrarily rejected the prayer for condonation of delay made by the appellant. In support of his conteniton, Mr Barman has placed reliance on Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag- Vs-Katiji & Ors. ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) and The Madras Port Trust -Vs-Himanshu International ( AIR 1979 SC 1144 ) and submitted that instead of denying applicant's prayer for condonation of delay on technical ground, learned tribunal ought to have decided the matter on merit. Mr Barman pleads that the impugned order, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be set aside and the learned tribunal be directed to dispose of the claim application on merit. 5. Controverting the above submissions made on behalf of the appellant. Mr J. Singh has submitted that the claim application reveals no reasons for justifying delayed making of claim application by the appellant. That apart, Mr Singh submits, the respondent had sent the said cheque to the appellant along with a letter, wherein it was clearly mentioned that if the said amount of Rs. 5,905/- was not acceptable to the appellant in full and final settlement of its claim, the cheque should be returned forthwith, but the appellant retained the cheque, encashed the amount and, then filed long after expiry of the period of limitation, the present claim application demanding payment of the alleged balance amount of compensation. In such circumstances, submits by Mr Singh, the claimant is barred from making any further claim for realisation of the alleged disputed claim amount. In such circumstances, submits by Mr Singh, the claimant is barred from making any further claim for realisation of the alleged disputed claim amount. Mr Singh, in support of his contention, has drawn this Court's attention to a decision of this Court reported in AIR 1973 SC Gau. Ill (The Union of India-Vs-Rameshwarlal Bhagchand). 6. Having heard both sites and upon perusal of the relevant records, I find that under Clause (e) of para 7 at page 3 of the claim application, the appellant has merely stated that after preferring its claim for Rs. l 1,151.00, it perused its claim by several reminders, the last reminder being on 9.2.96, and when the respondent sent the cheque aforementioned, the same was placed under protest by its letter dated 19.12.96. The appellant, thus, I notice, assigned no reasons whatsoever as to why it did not lodge the claim application within the period of limitation, which, admittedly expired as early as on 8.6.96. According to the appellant's own statement made under Clause (e) Para 7 at Page 3, it sent its last reminder on 9.2.96. There is absolutely no indication in the claim application that the appellant made any further correspondence with the respondents after 9.2.96 seeking either settlement or its claim or demanding payment of its alleged dues. Situated thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that so far as the claimant was concerned, the chapter of its demand for damages stood closed on and from 9.2.96 and it was for this reason that no convincing reason was assigned by the appellant as to why it did not file its claim application on or before 8.6.96. 7. In fact, the record reveals that it was only after receiving the cheque, as late as on 12.12.96 (i.e. long after due date of limitation expired), that the appellant re­opened the chapter of its time-barred demand. The appellant, thus, exhibited no alertness, vigilance and/or anxiety to recover its alleged dues within the period of limitation. 8. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that the respondent, while forwarding the said cheque to the appellant, sent a letter stating to the effect that the said cheque was being forwarded to the appellant in full and final settlement of the claim and if the said offer was not acceptable to the appellant, the cheque be returned forthwith. The appellant, it appears from the record, retained the cheque with it and brought it to the notice of the respondent that if the balance amount was not remitted to it within 15 days, the appellant will institute a civil suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount. It is clear that the said letter of offer of the respondent had not given to the appellant any option to retain the cheque in partial satisfaction of its claim; rather, the said letter of the respondent contained a conditional offer, the offer being either to accept the cheque in full and final satisfaction of its claim or return the cheque if this offer was not acceptable. Far from acting on this conditional offer, the appellant, suddenly, revived its time-barred claim, encashed the cheque in contravention of the offer made by the respondent and demanded payment of balance of the alleged compensation amount. 9. In the above view of the matter, the law laid down in AIR 1973 Gau. Ill (supra), I find, squarely applies to the facts of the case at hand and I see no reason to deviate from the law so laid down. I, therefore, hold that the appellant was not justified, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to encash the cheque and thereafter proceed to institute claim application seeking recovery of its time-barred claim for the alleged balance amount because Section 8 of the Contract Act does not permit such a conduct. 10.1 may pause here to point out that the case at hand is a classic case covered by the provisions of Section 8 of the Contract Act which makes provisions for one of the modes of acceptance of a proposal. Section 8 lays down that performance of the conditions of a proposal, or the acceptance of any consideration for a reciprocal promise which may be offered with a proposal, is an acceptance of a proposal. In fact, though Section 7 to 9 of the Contract Act describe various modes in which proposals may be accepted Section 8 provides for acceptance of a proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance, such as, verbal or written communication contemplated by Section 7 and 9. 11. In fact, though Section 7 to 9 of the Contract Act describe various modes in which proposals may be accepted Section 8 provides for acceptance of a proposal by conduct as against other modes of acceptance, such as, verbal or written communication contemplated by Section 7 and 9. 11. In the case at hand, when appellant received, after expiry of the period of limitation, a conditional offer from the respondent to either accept the cheque in full and final satisfaction of the appellant's claim or return the same forthwith to the respondent, the appellant was, undoubtedly, left with only two portions, as contemplated under Section 8 of the Contract Act. One option being to accept the offer and encash the cheque and the other option being to accept the cheque and forget the whole episode because the appellants claim was, in any case, time barred. The appellant, it appears, chose not to accept the offer. In such a case, the only course left for the appellant was to return the cheque and forget, if I may reiterate, the whole chapter, which stood closed almost 6 months before the offer was so made by the respondent. Amasingly enough, the appellant decided, if I may say so to have the cake and eat it too, which Section 8, as discussed above, does not envisage and/or permits. Had the appellant received the cheque before the period of limitation had expired, and had, then, the appellant encashed cheque and yet demanded payment of remaining alleged unpaid dues, the matter would have perhaps, been a little different. 12. It is no doubt, true that both the cases cited by Mr Barman, namely, the Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag (supra) and the Madras Port Trust (supra) directs Courts to adopt a liberal approach towards prayer made for condoning delay, particularly, if the just claim of an individual stands pitted against the technical plea of limitation raised by Governments or public authorities. However, in the face of the facts of the case at hand, when the appellant appears to have revived the claim long after the expiry of period of limitation by attempting to take advantage of the said conditional offer of settlement received by it (appellant) after about 6 months of the expiry of the period of limitation. However, in the face of the facts of the case at hand, when the appellant appears to have revived the claim long after the expiry of period of limitation by attempting to take advantage of the said conditional offer of settlement received by it (appellant) after about 6 months of the expiry of the period of limitation. I am firmly of the view that the principles laid down by the Apex Court, in these two cases aforementioned, cannot be made applicable. 13. In short, in the face of the facts and attending circumstances of the present case, I find that the appellant has not been able to make out any case, which would have warranted the learned tribunal to condone delay in making the claim application. 14. In the result, and for the foregoing reasons, this appeal is disallowed and the impugned order is maintained. No order as to costs. 15. Sent back the case record with a copy of this judgment and order.