A. GOPAL REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE issue, which requires for adjudication in all the writ petitions, is one and the same. Hence, it is felt expedient to dispose of them by this common order. ( 2 ) THE facts, which are not disputed, are as under: ( 3 ) W. P. Nos. 14568 and 8465 of 2002 are filed by the Indian Oil Corporation limited (for short )the Corporation ) whereas w-P. Nos. 14565 of 2002 and 13424 of 2001 are filed by its dealer. The Corporation established the petrol bunk in an extent of 980 square yards in Sy. Nos. 266/1 and 266/2 co-related T. S. No. 29, Road No. 12 Banjara hills in the year 1973, which is owned by respondents 4 and 5 in W. P. No. 14568 of 2002. The Corporation obtained a lease deed in its favour on 12-7-1973 for a period of 20 years with renewal clause and permitted its dealer-6th respondent to run the bunk. In WP No. 14565 of 2002 the petitioner carrying on business of the retail outlet in the name and style of M/s. Hill Top service Station in the leased area. The corporation made a request to the land owners on 4-1-1993 to sell the land in its favour as per the recitals of the lease deed whereunder the landowners agreed to sell the property in its favour in case they are proposed to sell the same to any third parties. But on expiry of the lease the corporation has not invoked the renewal clause nor any fresh deed was obtained for a further period as agreed. But, however, the Corporation requested the respondents 1 to 3 for acquisition of the land in its occupation to an extent of 980 square yards in T. S. No. 29 Ward No. 11 for the existing petrol/diesel retail outlets through its letter dated 1-11-1998. When the proposal of the corporation was under process, the Joint commissioner of Police (Traffic), Hyderabad vide its letter dated 27-3-1999 proposed the very same land for traffic island. Apart from the same, the Chief City Planner, municipal Corporation of Hyderabad also proposed the land for road widening in its letter dated 5-1-2000. But before the said requests made by the Joint Commissioner of Police as well as Chief City Planner, municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, the petitioner-Corporation was directed to deposit Rs. Apart from the same, the Chief City Planner, municipal Corporation of Hyderabad also proposed the land for road widening in its letter dated 5-1-2000. But before the said requests made by the Joint Commissioner of Police as well as Chief City Planner, municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, the petitioner-Corporation was directed to deposit Rs. 98,30,000/- for enabling the 1st respondent to initiate land acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, the Corporation deposited the said sum on 28-9-1999 in favour of the 2nd respondent. Alleging that the corporation encroaching into the land on the southern side of the retail outlet the landladies instituted a suit-O. S. No. 890 of 1997 on the file of V Junior Civil Judge, hyderabad. On contest it was dismissed on 5-6-2000. When the suit was pending respondents 7 to 15 in W. P. No. 8464 of 2002 sent a letter to the Corporation on 27-4-1998 stating that they have purchased the share of the landladies and requested to send the rents to them. The Corporation in its reply dated 5-5-1998 requested them to furnish the title deeds for taking necessary action. It is stated that at the instance of the purchasers the authorities are not acquiring the land by one reason or the other and the 7th respondent in W. P. No. 8464 of 2002 made an offer through the police to acquire the land for traffic island which resulted the Police Department sending a letter to the District Collector, Hyderabad district requesting to acquire 980 square yards in favour of Police Department for the purpose of traffic island, who in turn through letter dated 20-3-1999 requested the joint Commissioner of Police (Traffic), petitioner-Corporation, Deputy Director of survey and Land Records, Hyderabad and mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikpet to attend on 30-3-1999 to decide the initiation of land acquisition proceedings for the purpose of traffic island as per the request made by the Police Department and also for the existing petrol bunk of the Corporation. Accordingly, joint inspection was made on 30-3-1999 and it was decided that 300 square yards is enough for the proposed traffic island and the remaining land in T. S. No. 29 can be acquired by giving land in T. S. No. 28 which is not in use by the Corporation at present for retail outlet. Accordingly, joint inspection was made on 30-3-1999 and it was decided that 300 square yards is enough for the proposed traffic island and the remaining land in T. S. No. 29 can be acquired by giving land in T. S. No. 28 which is not in use by the Corporation at present for retail outlet. The Collector after satisfying the proposal and in consultation with the Police Department called upon the petitioner-Corporation to deposit a sum of rs. 98,30,000/ -. But however, at the instance of respondents 7 to 15 in W. P. No. 8464 of2002 and the M. C. H. Officials, respondents 2 to 3 did not show any interest and negatived the proposal for acquisition by proceedings of the Government of andhra Pradesh Industries and Commerce department in Memo No. 440/imf-A1/99-6 dated 13-6-2000. In view of the same, the Corporation through its letter dated 21-12-2000 requested the District Collector, hyderabad District to acquire the land in t. S. Nos. 27 and 28 to an extent of 980 square yards which is in its occupation as lessee. Basing on the said letter the Collector addressed a letter dated 1-2-2001 to the mandal Revenue Officer, Shaikept Mandal to send a detailed report for acquiring the land in Sy. Nos. 266/2 and 266/15 co- related to T. S. Nos. 27 and 28, but no action was taken by the Collector thereafter. But meanwhile, the Municipal Corporation of hyderabad without following due procedure resorted to demolish the petrol bunk. At that stage the dealer filed W. P. No. 14060 of 2000 questioning the high-handed action of the M. C. H. The said writ petition was allowed on 8-9-2000 holding that the dealer is entitled to run his business forthwith till 31st December, 2000 or till such time beyond 31st December, 2000 when respondents 1 to 7 complete the due process of law for taking possession of the land in question and also directed the respondents 1 to 7 therein not to interfere with the business activities of the writ petitioner during the above said period with a liberty to the respondents 4 to 6 to follow due process of law in taking possession of the property in question for a public purpose. After disposal of the writ petition, the M. C. H. by its letter dated 11-6-201 directed the petitioner-Corporation and the dealer to handover the site on or before 15-7-2001 for road widening and junction improvement. Questioning the same the petitioner-Corporation instituted O. S. No. 1272 of 2001 on the file of V Additional senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad and sought for injunction restraining the MCH from interfering with its possession in which status quo order was granted in IA No. 982 of 2001. The dealer also filed W. P. No. 13424 of 2001 challenging the action of the official respondents in not acquiring the land in t. S. No. 29 or alternatively the land in t. S. Nos. 27 and 28 as illegal. When the said writ petition was pending the Special Deputy collector Land Acquisition through its letter dated 7-2-2002 directed the District treasury. Officer to issue a pay order in favour of the petitioner-Corporation stating that the request for acquiring the land in t. S. No. 29 was rejected on 30-6-2000 and he sent a cheque for an amount of rs. 98,30,000/- deposited by it along with covering letter dated 7-2- 2002. Questioning the said letter and the consequential letter dated 6-4-2002 the Corporation filed w. P. No. 8464 of 2002. ( 4 ) WHILE the matter stood thus, the collector, Hyderabad District issued notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act ) dated 10-2-2002 for acquiring the land to an extent of 1460. 37 square yards in t. S. Nos. 27/2,27/3 and 29/2 invoking urgency clause under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act dispensing with enquiry under section 5a of the Act. As 746. 20 square yards in T. S. No. 29/2, which is in occupation of the Corporation, was also sought to be acquired the dealer filed W. P. No. 14565 of 2002 challenging the said notification contending that the said acquisition amounts to depriving the petitioner s right to carry on business and the same is arbitrary, mala fide and motivated. There is no master Plan or HUDA approved plan for the said traffic island and road widening in between T. S. Nos. 29 and 27, therefore invoking of urgency clause is total non- application of mind. There is no master Plan or HUDA approved plan for the said traffic island and road widening in between T. S. Nos. 29 and 27, therefore invoking of urgency clause is total non- application of mind. The draft notification under Section 4 (1) and the publication of substance in local newspapers and in the locality is not made in accordance with law, so also draft declaration under section 6 of the Act. Further, issuance of notice under Sections 9 (1) and 10 of the act do not satisfy the mandatory provisions under Sections 4 (1) and 6 of the Act therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. In the absence of any traffic congestion in the said locality warranting any road widening or any traffic island, the said acquisition proceedings are initiated only to evict the petitioner from the land. When the petitioner s request for acquisition was initially conceded and called upon the corporation to deposit a sum of Rs. 98,30,000/- the respondents are under obligation to acquire 980 square yards in T. S. Nos. 28 and 27 along with the land which is likely to be affected, as the request made by the corporation is also a public purpose. In the notification, the names of the owners, namely respondents 4 and 5 are not shown. In view of the same, the entire acquisition is invalid. The dealer, who filed W. P. No. 14565 of 2002, also impleaded the Minister for municipal Administration as 6th respondent who is instrumental in initiating acquisition proceedings at the behest of M. A. Azeem zakee and 8 others who claim to be the purchasers of the property from the landowners. There is sufficient place available within the existing location of petrol bunk and its adjacent space and if there is any genuine need of road widening the same could be carried out by maintaining the existing bunk within the remaining space, and this will not only facilitate the free flow of traffic but also ensure public utility service for vehicular traffic users. ( 5 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 filed a counter in opposition of W. P. Nos. 14568 and 14565 of 2002 stating that the corporation placed a requisition for acquisition of land in T. S. No. 29 and during the process of the said proposal the commissioner of Police, Hyderabad proposed the very same land for development of traffic island. ( 5 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 filed a counter in opposition of W. P. Nos. 14568 and 14565 of 2002 stating that the corporation placed a requisition for acquisition of land in T. S. No. 29 and during the process of the said proposal the commissioner of Police, Hyderabad proposed the very same land for development of traffic island. The Chief City Planner, MCH through its letter dated 5-1-2000 also proposed the said land for the purpose of road widening. In view of the same, the collector sought clarification from the government. In reply to the Collector s clarification, the Government through its memo dated 30-6-2000 rejected the proposal for petrol/diesel retail outlet in view of dire public purpose of road widening and development of traffic island in the densely populated city. In view of rejection of the proposal at the primitive stage the amount so deposited by the Corporation has been refunded by the 2nd respondent through its letter dated 16-4-2002 and informed the corporation that the land acquisition proposals were dropped. It is also denied about taking decision with regard to acquiring 300 square yards only for the proposed traffic island at the time of joint inspection, and basing upon the said decision the city Level Co-ordination Committee which is constituted by the Government vide g. O. Rt. No. l 110 Municipal Administration dated 26-9-1995 for close co-ordination among the departments in execution, maintenance and supervision of works for development in twin cities took a decision in its meeting held on 21-10-1999 to improve the junction at Road Nos. 1 and 10 and got prepared junction improvement plan by expert team according to the standards and specifications etc. According to the plan approved by the Commissioner, an extent of 1248 square meters or 1483 square yards falls in T. S. Nos. 27/2, 27/3 and 29/2, but the actual area affected after survey and demarcation by the Deputy Director of survey and Land Records is 1221 square meters or 1460. 37 square yards in the above said survey numbers. Accordingly, draft notification under Section 4 (1) has been issued after following due procedure of law and got published the same in Gazette on 22-7-2002 and in two local newspapers on 24-7-2002 and substance of the same was published on 31-7-2002. 37 square yards in the above said survey numbers. Accordingly, draft notification under Section 4 (1) has been issued after following due procedure of law and got published the same in Gazette on 22-7-2002 and in two local newspapers on 24-7-2002 and substance of the same was published on 31-7-2002. After publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6, notices under sections 5 (1), 9 (3) and 10 of the Act were issued to the interested parties duly fixing the date of award enquiry on 13-8-2002. T. S. No. 28 consisting an extent of 332 square meters, which is covered by road and it is recorded as road (GVM road in the TSLR ). Before publication of notification under section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6, it is mandatory to sub-divide the T. S. numbers marking the acquired area and balanced area. Therefore, T. S. Nos. 27 and 29 were sub-divided into T. S. Nos. 27/1, 27/2 and 27/3 and T. S. Nos. 29/1, 29/2 and 29/3. After sub- division of survey numbers the lands falling in T. S. Nos. 27/2, 27/3 and 29/2 have been notified. In view of urgency and in the larger interest of public and to have free flow of traffic, enquiry under Section 5a of the Act was dispensed with and draft declaration under Section 6 has been published on issuance of draft notification notices were issued for completing the award enquiry. ( 6 ) THE Commissioner, Municipal corporation of Hyderabad in its counter 2003 (1) FRF-52 stated that in view of compromise decree passed in O. S. No. 1731 of 1996 on the file of II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad on 12-11-1997 Mohd. Abdul azeem Zakee and 8 others have become absolute owners of the property who executed the general power of attorney in favour of Mohd. Abdul Muneem @ Azeem zaki and given consent to handover the land under junction improvement. During the year 1999 the City Level Co-ordinating committee appointed by the Government in its meeting on 21-10-1999 discussed about the widening of the road Nos. l and 10 and also the improyement of the junction and decided to take up junction improvement at road Nos. l and 10, Banjara Hills, as this will become one of the important link road towards Jubilee Hills and Madhapur. l and 10 and also the improyement of the junction and decided to take up junction improvement at road Nos. l and 10, Banjara Hills, as this will become one of the important link road towards Jubilee Hills and Madhapur. According to the plan, more than 1248 square meters or 1483 square yards, which falls in Sy. Nos. 27/2,27/3 and 29/2 are getting affected in junction improvement. In view of the same, a letter was addressed on 20-7-2000 to the owner of the land in question and the Chief General Manager, indian Oil Corporation Limited requesting to give their consent for surrendering the land affected under junction improvement. In response to the same, the owners have given consent on 21-7-2000 to surrender the affected portion. In view of the consent given by the landowners, the M. C. H. has initiated action for taking over the affected portion of the land in question. At that stage the dealer filed W. P. No. 14060 of 2000 and in view of the directions issued in the above said writ petition the Corporation issued notice to the petitioner-Corporation on 11-6-2001 to hand over the site for development of road widening and junction improvement. Questioning the same the Corporation filed o. S. No. 1272 of 2001 before the V Additional senior Civil Judge, Hyderabad. As the petitioner failed to give consent, land acquisition proceedings were initiated. The municipal Corporation is not a party to the joint meeting wherein it was decided that only 300 square yards is enough for the purpose of traffic island therefore, the same is not binding on the Municipal Corporation. Whereas the City Level Co-ordination committee constituted for developmental activities took a decision to improve the junction and to acquire 1248 square meters for road widening, and improvement will be taken up as per the Master Plan only. In the Master Plan Road Nos. 1 and 10, Banjara hills were indicated as 100 and 66 respectively. The decision taken by the municipal Corporation is in tune with the master Plan. Notification under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6 were notified and published in the District Gazette. The said initiation is as per the directions of the court in W. P. No. 14565 of 2002 and prayed for dismissal. ( 7 ) THE purchasers of the property from the landlords of the petitioner- corporation filed implead application- wpmp. Notification under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6 were notified and published in the District Gazette. The said initiation is as per the directions of the court in W. P. No. 14565 of 2002 and prayed for dismissal. ( 7 ) THE purchasers of the property from the landlords of the petitioner- corporation filed implead application- wpmp. No!l9591 of 2002 stating that the corporation in its counter in W. P. No. 14060 of 2000 categorically stated that if however, for any reason the Government is not willing to accede to its request, it would be necessary for the I. O. L. to verify the suitability of various sites suggested by the municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for housing a new retail outlet. Thereafter, it would be necessary for the Corporation to obtain the required approvals and licences for operating the retail outlet from the new premises. The estimated time necessary for the actual construction and establishment of the retail outlet at the very minimum is about four months. Thus, at least 6 months time would be required to re-site the retails outlet and rehabilitate the dealer. It is not open for the Corporation to question the notification now having agreed to shift the retail outlet to some other suitable site. In view of the said averment this Court permitted the dealer forthwith to resume the business and can continue till 31-12-2000 and the Corporation Officials are directed not to interfere with the business activities and the respondents 4 to 6 have to follow due procedure of law for taking possession of the property for public purpose. The said judgment has become final. In view of the same, the petitioner-Corporation is estopped to question the notification issued under section 4 (1) of the Act. Mere request for acquisition nor deposit of the market value do not confer any right on the petitioner- corporation to insist that the land should be acquired for the Company only unless the procedure contemplated under Part-VII of the Act has been followed. Unless by entering into agreement by the Corporation with the Government and the said agreement is gazetted, the petitioner-Corporation cannot derive any right over acquisition of the very same land, which is in occupation of the corporation as tenant. Once the owner agrees for widening of the road the same cannot be termed as mala fide or illegal. Unless by entering into agreement by the Corporation with the Government and the said agreement is gazetted, the petitioner-Corporation cannot derive any right over acquisition of the very same land, which is in occupation of the corporation as tenant. Once the owner agrees for widening of the road the same cannot be termed as mala fide or illegal. As implead petitioners are owners and have given their consent for acquisition and since they are interested in grant of extra FSI for commercial building which is going to be given up in T. S. No. 27, it is not correct to say that the land in T. S. No. 28 is a government road and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners in W. P. Nos. 14568 and 8464 of 2002, sri P. Gangaiah Naidu contends that the entire acquisition proceedings are mala fide and only to deprive the Corporation of its right to remain in possession under the lease which provides a renewal clause. The total extent of land which is required for acquisition is only 1248 square meters or 1483 square yards and out of which 547 square yards which is in possession of the petitioner-Corporation is affected by road widening. The remaining land is sufficient for the petitioner-Corporation to carry on its business. In view of the same, notification could have been included the land which is in occupation of the petrol bunk in the absence of any alternative site suggested by the MCH for establishment of bunk. Having made belief by the Collector that they are going to acquire the land and asked the petitioner-Corporation to deposit a sum of rs. 98,30,000/-, the Government is estopped from rejecting the request of the corporation and returning the amount deposited by it. In the absence of any specific requirement of traffic island and road widening, and in the meeting held on 30-3-1999 they have decided to acquire only 300 square yards for traffic island and the remaining for the purpose of retail outlet. But all of a sudden it was increased to 1248 square meters without any such requirement. The need for public purpose also serves if the land in Sy. Nos. But all of a sudden it was increased to 1248 square meters without any such requirement. The need for public purpose also serves if the land in Sy. Nos. 28 and 29 is acquired for the purpose of retail outlet along with the land which was notified for the traffic island and road widening and the land in Sy. No. 28 is a Government land and the remaining land left over is in petitioner s possession and if the same is notified the same will serve the Corporation s need in the absence of any alternative site suggested. ( 9 ) MR. R. V. Chalapathi, learned counsel for the petitioner in W. P. No. 13424 of 2001, contends that the permission given by the Municipal Corporation to the landowners is in T. S. Nos. 27 and 29, and to favour them acquisition proposals were initiated by the Municipal Corporation so that value of the owners property will be increased, if the dealers are evicted from the said land under the garb of acquisition. ( 10 ) SRI T. Suryakaran Reddy appearing for dealer in W. P. No. 14565 of 2002 contends that originally owners are not opposing for acquisition, which also strengthen the case of the petitioner- corporation, and they want to evict the petitioner-Corporation under the garb of acquisition. In the joint meeting held on 30-3-1999- it was decided that only 300 square yards is sufficient for traffic island when the Corporation deposited the amount, at the instance of subsequent purchasers the respondent No. 5 influenced the Municipal corporation Officials and Police to see that the dealer is evicted from the suit schedule premises. ( 11 ) LEARNED Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 to 3 in W. P. Nos. 8464 of 2002 and 13424 of 2001 contends that when acquisition is not feasible in view of requirement of the Police and Municipal corporation for widening of the road, the request of the petitioner-Corporation was not acceded therefore, the amount so deposited was refunded and no mandamus as such can be issued to compel the government to acquire the land. In the absence of specific plea with regard to mala fides, the petitioner-Corporation cannot attribute mala fides for refusing the request for acquisition by placing reliance on rajendra Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1236 . In the absence of specific plea with regard to mala fides, the petitioner-Corporation cannot attribute mala fides for refusing the request for acquisition by placing reliance on rajendra Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1236 . When larger public interest is involved, namely road widening and traffic island, rejection of Corporation s request and the issuance of notification for acquisition cannot be faulted with. ( 12 ) LEARNED Additional Advocate general appearing for Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad drawn my attention to the counter filed by the petitioner- Corporation in W. P. No. 14060 of 2000, wherein its agreement for the proposal of road widening to an extent of 316 square meters and the remaining area in its occupation will be sufficient for the purpose of operating retail outlet and also stated that the plan attached to the letter received by the corporation dated 1-8-2000 shows that major portion of housing retail outlet will have to be surrendered and only an extent of approximately 100 square yards will be left. Therefore, the petitioner-Corporation is not in a position to run the bunk in a small bit of land. When the petitioner-Corporation suggested to provide private lands in various localities in the city cannot now contend that the land required for the purpose of road widening is first time decided in january, 2001. He also drawn my attention to various averments made in the counter filed by MCH in W. P. No. 14060 of 2000 whereunder it is specifically stated by the municipal Corporation that City Level co-ordination Committee in its meeting held on 29-10-1999 stated the junction was prepared on 28-11-1999 which shows that 1248 square meters or 1480 square yards are required for such road widening and traffic island. As per the approved plan, an extent of 730 square meters or 933 square yards, which belongs to Nazir Associates is affected and an extent of 547 square yards under occupation of petitioner-Corporation is affected. As per the lease agreement entered by the Corporation with the owners is only 980 square yards and out of which 248 square yards were already affected and taken Over by the MCH in the year 1986 for road widening and out of the remaining 732 square yards, 547 square yards under the occupation of the tenant is affected. What remains is only 185 square yards. What remains is only 185 square yards. In view of the same, the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-Corporation that the remaining land is sufficient for running the petrol bunk is totally misconceived. When larger interest is involved in road widening and traffic island, smaller interest of the individual will not come in the way of acquiring the property. No mala fides can be attributed for acquisition in the public interest. ( 13 ) SRI Vedula Venkataramana, appearing for the respondents 4 and 5 in w. P. Nos. 14565 of 2002 (landladies) contends that challenge is only for part of notification but not entire notification. In the absence of any challenge to the public purpose, no mala fides can be attributed when the respondent No. 5 gave consent for acquisition of the land belongs to them apart from the land in possession of the tenant which is always open for the owners to waive approval and the same will not amount to mala fide by placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in m. Padmanabha lyengar v. Govt. of andhra Pradesh, AIR 1990 AP 357 . In the absence of any local grants this Court cannot interfere with the acquisition proposals. Dealer is only licensee and whereas Corporation is a tenant. Renewal clause does not invalidate the land acquisition proceedings. Right to compensation if any on such acquisition on the lessee can be only under the Act but he cannot question the acquisition by placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Naveen chand v. Nagarjuna Travels and Tours (P) Ltd, (2002) 6 SCC 331 . It is also contended that on expiry of the lease period renewal is not automatic nor it is pleaded that they are lessees. Whereas the petitioner-Corporation requested to acquire the land for itself shows that it is not interested in renewal of the lease. In the absence of any mala fides at least suggested in the pleadings mere stating that the acquisition is mala fide will not be a ground for questioning the acquisition. In the absence of any agreement gazetted as contemplated under Section 41 of the act, mere deposit of the amount will not create any right in the Corporation to claim that they are entitled to acquisition and claim estoppel against the Government. In the absence of any agreement gazetted as contemplated under Section 41 of the act, mere deposit of the amount will not create any right in the Corporation to claim that they are entitled to acquisition and claim estoppel against the Government. ( 14 ) IN view of the above rival contentions, the points that emerge for consideration are: (a) Whether the petitioner-Corporation can insist for acquisition of equivalent land either from its lessor or from the land owned by the Government in t. S. No. 28 and the Government is estopped in rejecting the request of the Corporation fof such acquisition; (b) Whether the issuance of notification under Section 4 (1) and declaration under Section 6 of the Act for acquiring the land in the possession of the petitioner-Corporation can be termed to be mala fide and liable to be set aside or not. Point No. 1: ( 15 ) BEFORE answering the issues, it is useful and appropriate to refer certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act under chapter VII. Sections 39, 40 and 41 of the act read as under:39. Previous consent of appropriate government and execution of agreement necessary :the provisions of Sections 6 to 16 (both inclusive) and Sections 18 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company under this part, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned. 40. Previous enquiry : (1) Such consent shall not be given unless the appropriate government be satisfied, either on the report of the Collector under Section 5-A, sub- section (2) or by an enquiry held as hereinafter provided: (a) that the purpose of the acquisition is to obtain land for the erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith, or (aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, or (b) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some work, and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. (2) Such enquiry shall be held by such officer and at such time and place as the appropriate Government shall appoint. (3) Such officer may summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel the production of documents by the same means and, as far as possible in the same manner as is provided by the Code of Civil procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the case of a civil Court. 41. Agreement with appropriate government:if the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector under Section 5-A, subsection), or on the report of the officer making an inquiry under Section 40 that the proposed acquisition is for any of the purposes referred to in clause (a) or clause (aa) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 40, it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government providing to the satisfaction of the appropriate Government for the following matters, namely: (1) the payment to the appropriate Government of the cost of the acquisition; (2) the transfer, on such payment, of the land to the Company; (3) the terms on which the land shall be held by the Company; (4) where the acquisition is for the purpose of erecting dwelling houses or the provision of amenities connected therewith, the time within which, the conditions on which and the manner in which the dwelling houses or amenities shall be erected or provided; (4-A) Where the acquisition is for the construction of any building or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, the time within which, and the conditions on which, the building or work shall be constructed or executed; and (5) where the acquisition is for the construction of any other work, the time within which and the conditions on which the work shall be executed and maintained, and the terms on which the public shall be entitled to use the work. Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) rules, 1963 (for short the Rules ) is also useful to resolve the controversy, which reads as under:4. Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) rules, 1963 (for short the Rules ) is also useful to resolve the controversy, which reads as under:4. Appropriate Government to be satisfied with regard to certain matters before initiating acquisition proceeding: (1) when a Company makes an application to the appropriate Government for acquisition of any, that Government shall direct the collector to submit a report to it on the following matters, namely: (1) that the company has made its best endeavour to find out lands in the locality suitable for the purpose of acquisition; (ii) that the Company has made all reasonable efforts to get such lands by negotiation with the persons interested therein on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have failed; (iii) that the land proposed to be acquired is suitable for the purpose; (iv) that the area of land proposed to be acquired is not excessive; (v) that the Company is in a position to utilize the land expeditiously; and (vi) where the land proposed to be acquired is good agricultural land, that no alternative suitable site can be found so as to avoid acquisition of that land. (2) The Collector shall, after giving the company a reasonable opportunity, to make any representation in this behalf hold an inquiry into the matters referred to in sub- rule (1) and while holding such enquiry he shall (i) in any case where the land proposed to be acquired is agricultural land consult the Senior Agricultural Officer of the district whether or not such land is good agricultural land; (ii) determine, having regard to the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the Act, the approximate amount of compensation likely to be payable in respect of the land, which, in the opinion of the collector, should be acquired for the company; and (iii) ascertain whether the Company offered a reasonable price (not being less than the compensation so determined), to the persons interested in the land proposed to be acquired. Explanation :for the purpose of this rule "good agricultural land" means any land which, considering the level of agricultural production and the crop pattern of the area in which it is situated, is of average or above average productivity and includes a garden or grove land. Explanation :for the purpose of this rule "good agricultural land" means any land which, considering the level of agricultural production and the crop pattern of the area in which it is situated, is of average or above average productivity and includes a garden or grove land. (3) As soon as may be after holding the enquiry under sub-rule (2) the Collector shall submit a report to the appropriate Gvernment and a copy of the same shall be forwarded by the Government to the Committee. (4) No declaration shall be made by the appropriate Government under Section 6 of the Act unless (i) the appropriate Government has consulted the Committee and has considered the report submitted under this Rule and the report, if any, submitted under Section 5a of the Act; and (ii) the agreement under Section 41 of the act has been executed by the Cmpany. Section 39 lays down two conditions precedent before proceeding for acquisition of the land for the Company under Part VII, namely; (i) there must be previous consent of the appropriate Government for the acquisition given after previous inquiry as provided by Section 40. (ii) there must be an agreement executed between the Company and the appropriate Government in accordance with requirements of Section 41. The Collector s Report will be the basis for the satisfaction of the Government regarding the public purpose for acquiring the land under Chapter-VII. Sub-rule (1) of the above quoted Rule 4, requires the appropriate government to which an application is made by a Company for acquisition of land to direct the Collector to submit a report on the matters specified in clause (i) to (vi ). Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 makes it obligatory for the Collector to hold an enquiry into the six matters referred to in sub-rule (1), namely, the purpose of enquiry is to find out whether all reasonable efforts have been made by the Company to get the land by negotiation on payment of reasonable price and such efforts have not fructified and to determine the approximate amount of compensation likely to be payable in respect of land sought to be acquired keeping in view of the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of the land Acquisition Act, is of vital importance to the persons interested in the land. Sub- rule (3) of Rule 4 requires the Collector to submit his report to the appropriate government which in turn is required to be considered before issuing a declaration under section 6 of the Act as well as the report, if any, submitted by it under Section 5-A of the Act after ascertaining the view of the committee constituted under Rule 3 of the rules in regard to the Collector s Report under Rule 4 of the Rules. ( 16 ) THOUGH the Rule is silent regarding the mode and method of enquiry, it is now an accepted principle, in conducting the enquiry, the Collector has, in the interest of fair play, to observe the Principles of natural Justice has to afford an opportunity to the persons interested in the land to refute the allegations of the Company applied for acquisition. ( 17 ) NO declaration under Section 6 of the Act shall be made by the appropriate government unless the Committee has been consulted by the Government and has considered the report submitted by the collector under Section 5-A of the Act. In addition, under Cl. (ii) of sub-rule (4) of rule 4, the Company mandatorily has to execute an agreement under Section 41 of the Act. In this back drop, it is, thus, obvious that previous consent of the appropriate government followed by concluded contract with the Government may entitle the company to invoke Part-VII of the Act. The Company may apply for acquisition on its behalf and by mere parting of the amount by the Company, it cannot invoke the principle of promissory estoppel against government s disinclination to invoke part VII, unless all other ingredients for invoking the aid of Part-VII are fulfilled. ( 18 ) THE Apex Court in Motilal padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U. P. , (1979 ) 2 SCC 409, held as under:". . . . . . . ( 18 ) THE Apex Court in Motilal padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U. P. , (1979 ) 2 SCC 409, held as under:". . . . . . . THE true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore, seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in future, knowing or intending it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. "in the entire pleadings it is not pleaded that there was an enquiry as contemplated under Section 40 nor the petitioner- corporation entered into any agreement with the Government as contemplated under section 41 read with Rule 4 of the Rules for invoking promissory estoppel against the state Government for acquisition of the land in its favour. Mere calling upon the corporation to deposit certain amounts by the Collector and the petitioner depositing the said amount is inconsequential unless the mandatory formalities are complied with. ( 19 ) IN view of the above, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner-Corporation that the petitioner- corporation has deposited the amount and entitled to acquire the land for continuing its retail outlet cannot be accepted in the absence of any previous consent by the state Government and the petitioner complying the necessary formalities contemplated for such acquisition. Even otherwise the petitioner s request for acquisition is incapable of compliance for the reason out of 980 square yards which is in occupation of the petitioner-Corporation in T. S. No. 29 an extent of 248 square yards was already affected by the road widening and out of the remaining 732 square yards, 547 square yards is in occupation of the petitioner-Corporation which is now sought to be acquired under the provisions of the Act. What remains is only 185 square yards in T. S. No. 29. The petitioner- corporation in its counter in W. P. No. 14060 of 2000 clearly admitted that the remaining left over land is not sufficient for it to run the petrol bunk. The M. C. H. provided the petitioner-Corporation a list of alternative sites in the various localities of the city though vast extent of land immediately to the rear side of the premises, which is not affected by the road widening and suitable extent from the said area can be acquired for continuing the retail outlet. The Government after satisfying itself about the preferential need for which land is required, namely, widening of road and traffic island, rejected the proposals for petrol/diesel retail outlet. It is well settled that such subjective satisfaction of the Government cannot be subjected to judicial review, when it acted in good faith. In view of the same, I do not see any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel that the government is under obligation to acquire the land for the purpose of retail outlet from the adjacent land owned by the lessor- landlord and the authorities shall not refund the amount so deposited. Point No. 1 is accordingly answered. ( 20 ) POINT No. 2: It is next strenuously contended by the learned Counsels for the petitioners that acquisition is mala fide, as it was made at the instance and influence of subsequent purchasers. Mere ipse dixit of the petitioner cannot be said to be sufficient discharge of burden that the said acquisition was at the instance of minister who was impleaded in person, in the absence of necessary pleadings and evidence, on which the mala fides have been alleged. In view of the same, I do not see any substance in the argument that the acquisition was at the instance of respondents 5 to 15. That, apart from 547 square yards, which is now sought to be acquired for the traffic island which is under the occupation of the petitioner- corporation, an extent of 930 square yards which belongs to Nazir Associates is also sought to be acquired for traffic island and road widening. That, apart from 547 square yards, which is now sought to be acquired for the traffic island which is under the occupation of the petitioner- corporation, an extent of 930 square yards which belongs to Nazir Associates is also sought to be acquired for traffic island and road widening. Mere giving consent by the owners for acquisition of the land for the public purpose cannot be said acquisition is mala fide and at the instance of land owners as held by this Court in the case of padmanabha lyengar (supra ). In the present case, the land proposed to be acquired, is for the road widening and for development of traffic island is distinctly a public purpose which have to be attended to on priority basis than that of the petitioner- corporation. ( 21 ) THIS Court while considering the public purpose in the case of Padmanabha lyengar (supra) held as follows:"we do not see any substance in the argument that since some of the properties proposed to be acquired are owned by mutts or other religious institutions, and because some of them are also running choultries thus catering to the needs of pilgrim-traffic, they too are serving a public purpose and hence their properties cannot be acquired for giving another public purposes. No decision has been brought to our notice supporting the proposition that merely because a particular property is being used for serving a public purpose, it cannot be acquired compulsorily by the Sate for serving a public purpose. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has ruled in Abdul hussain v. State ofgunjarat, AIR 1968 SC 432 , following its earlier decision in somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 , that land used for one purpose can be acquired for serving another public purpose. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has ruled in Abdul hussain v. State ofgunjarat, AIR 1968 SC 432 , following its earlier decision in somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 , that land used for one purpose can be acquired for serving another public purpose. Learned Counsel for the respondents brought to our notice the decision of the supreme Court in Gulam Mustafa v. State of maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 448 , where it was held that once the acquisition is valid and then vests in the Municipality, the owner (whose property was acquired for the said purpose) can no longer object that the land acquired is in excess of the need, or that it is being used for a different public purpose, it was held that just because a larger area than the area that was actually required, was acquired, it is no proof of mala fides behind the acquisition, nor can it be quashed on that ground. Though no such allegation is made, this decision emphasizes the principle that once the acquisition is for a public purpose, this court would not sit in judgment over the precise extent that ought to have been acquired, nor would it interfere even if there is a diversion of land for another public purpose. So long as the need of t. T. D. to acquire private lands on both sides of four Mada Streets for the purpose of a proper development of the area cannot be questioned, it is not necessary for this court to enquire into the precise use to which the land acquired is put, after acquisition. It is not suggested that the t. T. D. is trying to trade in the said properties, or that the appellants lands are being acquired for the purpose of resale to other private owners. The material on record makes it clear beyond any doubt that the purpose behind the acquisition in all the impugned notifications is a public purpose, and that the need of the T. T. D. is real and urgent. No interference is called for in such a situation by this Court. A minor error here or there, even if proved, would not warrant the quashing of the acquisition in such a situation. No interference is called for in such a situation by this Court. A minor error here or there, even if proved, would not warrant the quashing of the acquisition in such a situation. " ( 22 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner though made a feeble submission that the petitioner-Corporation is entitled to renewal of lease and the entire acquisition invoking urgency clause by dispensing with 5a enquiry will amount to termination of lease appears to be a fallacy for the simple reason that when the petitioner-Corporation was called upon to surrender the land which is likely to be affected for road widening and the lessor agreed to surrender the same, the dealer filed W. P. No. 14060 of 2000 and this Court permitted to run the petrol bunk till the end of December, 2000 with a liberty to the Municipal Corporation to follow due procedure of law for acquisition of the same for road widening. The very fact that the road widening and traffic island could not be undertaken due to non-cooperation of petitioner-Corporation and its filing of OS No. 1272/2001, wherein status quo was ordered, in spite of the fact that this Court permitted the MCH and its officials to follow due process of law in taking possession of the property in question, having felt that the same is required for public purpose, which has become final. ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court in First Land acquisition Collector and others v. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli and another, 2002 (2) Supreme 320 , held as follows:". . . ANY post-Notification delay subsequent to the decision of the State Government dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5 (A) by invoking powers under Section 17 (1) of the Act would not invalidate the decision itself specially when no mala fides on the part of the Government or its officers are alleged. Opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that action of the State Government is mala fide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of Law, except for the grounds already indicated but the said satisfaction must be of the appropriate government and that the satisfaction must be, as the existence of an urgency. Though the satisfaction under Section 17 (4) is a subjective one and is not open to challenge before a Court of Law, except for the grounds already indicated but the said satisfaction must be of the appropriate government and that the satisfaction must be, as the existence of an urgency. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency even though cannot be conclusive but is entitled to great weight as has been held by this Court in Jaga Ram and others v. The State of Haryana and others ( AIR 1971 SC 1033 ). . . . "in fact the City Level Co-ordination committee decided to take up road widening and for development of traffic island programmes as early as on 21-10-1999 and a joint inspection was held with the officials of Chief City Planner, MCH, Special officer (Planning), HUDA, Executive engineer (Traffic) and prepared a Junction improvement Plan on 28-11-1999 and the same could not be implemented due to status quo orders obtained by dealer as well as the owners. As the requirement is pending since last three years, the appropriate Government thought it felt to dispense with 5-A enquiry in view of existence of urgency, therefore the same cannot be interfered with by this court and the same cannot be vulnerable to judicial review on mere allegations. Point no. 2 is accordingly answered. ( 24 ) IN view of the legal position as enunciated above and for the reasons aforementioned, I do not find any merit in the Writ Petitions and they are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.