Judgment R.C.Kathuria, J. 1. The petitioner seeks quashing of complaint filed under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18, 29 and 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act) read with Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as `the Rules) and the subsequent proceedings taken therein. 2. For adjudication of the present petition, a few facts need to be stated which led to the institution of the complaint against the petitioner-accused. Balwinder Singh, Insecticides Inspector, Moga inspected the shop of M/s. Ganesh Agro Service Centre, Moga on 31.5.1990 at 12.00 p.m. in the presence of Kulwant Singh, Agriculture Inspector, Moga. He took three samples of Butachlore 50% EC from the packing of one litre which was manufactured by M/s. B.L. Industries in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The sample in question was sent for analysis on 25.6.1990 which was found to be misbranded with the remark that the sample is showing lower contents. Thereafter copy of the analysis report was served with a show cause notice upon the petitioner- accused. After obtaining the sanction for the prosecution of the petitioner, the present complaint was instituted against the petitioner as well as manufacturer M/s. B.L. Industries. The complaint was filed on 7.8.1998 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Moga. Hence, the present petition. 3. I heard counsel for the petitioner as well as State counsel at length. 4. Primary ground on which quashing of the complaint has been sought is that the sample in question was taken on 31.5.1990 which was analysed on 25.6.1990 and on analysis it was declared misbranded, while the complaint was filed in Court on 7.8.1998 so to say after the expiry of period eight years and thus the complaint suffers from delay and laches as the same could have been filed within the period of three years in terms of the requirement of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `the Code). It was also pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that in pursuance of the summoning order passed by the Court, the petitioner put in appearance on 26.8.2001. 5. It was also pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that in pursuance of the summoning order passed by the Court, the petitioner put in appearance on 26.8.2001. 5. The factual position has not been disputed by the State counsel in this regard through it was submitted during the course of arguments and had also been stated in the reply filed that the petitioner had filed appeal against the decision of the Chief Agricultural Officer, Faridkot and it is after the appeal was decided on 17.9.1990 (Annexure P-8) that licence of the petitioner was cancelled and thereafter complaint was filed. Position of law in this regard has been well settled by the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Sanjay Kumar, 1998(3) RCR(Crl.) 846 (SC), wherein in paras 6, 7 and 8, it was observed as under :- "6. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXVI has been added prescribing limitation for taking cognizance of certain offences with a view to expedite the process of detection and investigation of crimes and also to ensure observance of the principle of fairness in the trial of the offences by barring belated prosecution. Delay in prosecution of offences causes undue hardship as it keeps the sword hanging on the heads of accused persons and it also results in the material evidence getting vanished. This chapter applies to all such offences for which punishment prescribed is less than three years. But it does not apply to offences for which punishment prescribed is more than three years and to economic offences under various Acts, which are excluded under Central Act No. 12 of 1974 or any State Acts. It contains seven Sections (467-473). Section 467 defines the expression period of limitation used in the chapter. Sections 468 of 473 deal with various aspects of computation of limitation. Of the aforesaid provisions, we are concerned with Sections 468 and 469. Sub-section (1) of Section 468 ordains that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the periods of limitation prescribed thereunder. This, however, is subject to the other provisions of the Code. Of the aforesaid provisions, we are concerned with Sections 468 and 469. Sub-section (1) of Section 468 ordains that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the periods of limitation prescribed thereunder. This, however, is subject to the other provisions of the Code. Sub-section (2) postulates different periods of limitation for offences with reference to the punishment provided for them; if the punishment provided for an offence in any Act is only fine, the period of limitation fixed is six months; if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, the period of limitation prescribed is one year and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, the period of limitation laid down is three years. And sub-section (3) spells out the rule of limitation in cases of joinder of charges; if a person is tried for more offences than one, then the period of limitation will be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment; for example, if a person is tried for various offences and some of them are punishable with fine and some with imprisonment for a term less than a year and some for which the punishment is provided upto three years, then the period of limitation for all the offences, if they are tried together, will be three years. 7. Section 469 deals with commencement of the period limitation and it reads thus : "469. Commencement of the period of limitation :- (1) The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence :- (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigating into the offence, whichever is earlier." 8. A plain reading of the provision extracted above shows that in sub-section (1) three alternative starting points of limitation have been specified - (a) the date of the offence; (b) the first day on which an offence came to the knowledge of the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, whichever is earlier, in a case where the commission of the offence was not known to any of them; or (c) the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the police officer making investigation into the offence, whichever is earlier, but this can be called in aid in a case where it is not known by whom the offence was committed. Basically from the date of the offence the period of limitation will start but there will be cases where the commission of offence or identity of the offender comes to the knowledge of those concerned with it long thereafter so in such situations clauses (b) and (c), as the case may be, would be the date of commencement of period of limitation." 6. In the above mentioned case reference was made to the decision in R.S. Arora v. State, 1987(1) RCR(Crl.) 693 (Delhi) : 1987 Cri.L.J. 1215, wherein question arose whether period of limitation of six months would start from the date of collection of samples under clause (a) or from the date of Seed Analyst report for purposes of clause (b) of Section 469(1) of the Code. It was held by the Delhi High Court that the limitation commences from the date of submission of the report of the Seed Analyst to the Inspector, so Section 469(1)(b) of the Code would apply. The other case to which reference was made in Omprakash Gulabchandji Partani v. Ashok, 1992 Crl.L.J. 2704, wherein similar view had been taken by the Bombay High Court. Reliance was also placed on M/s. Satyanarayana General Traders v. State, 1993(2) Crimes 203, wherein Honble Single Judge of the Adhra Pradesh High Court has held that for the prosecution of offences of misbranding under Insecticides Act, the period of limitation would start from the date on which the report of Analyst was received not from the date of taking samples and thus Section 469(1)(b) of the Code would be attracted. The observations made were approved by the Honble Supreme Court. The observations made were approved by the Honble Supreme Court. Similar view has also been taken in Smt. Shailaja v. State of Karnataka, 2002(2) RCR(Crl.) 423. 7. Turning to the facts of the present case as already stated the sample was analysed on 25.6.1990 by the Public Analyst and was declared as misbranded. It is admitted case of the complainant that show cause notice dated 28.8.1990 was served upon M/s. B.L. Industries, Jaipur which means after the report of the Public Analyst was received. Though exact date of the receipt of the report by the complainant as such had not been stated in the complaint but it has to be inferred that it was received prior to the date of show cause notice. The present complaint came to be filed on 7.8.1998 so to say after lapse of about 8 years. No explanation had been rendered by the complainant for the delay in the filing of the complaint and no prayer for condonation of delay has been made in the complaint filed. 8. Manifestly, under Section 29 of the Act, punishment for violation of the provisions in case of commission of first offence is imprisonment for two years with fine which may be extended to two thousand rupees, or both and in case of second and subsequent offence, imprisonment for a term which may be extended to three years, or with fine, or with both. Similarly, punishment for violation of any rules prescribed in sub-section (3) of Section 29 of the Act for the first offence, is imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both. Thus, in terms of the requirement of Section 468 of the Code, the period of limitation is three years. In terms of the provisions under Section 469(1)(b) of the Code, the period of limitation would commence from the date of receipt of the analysis report of the Public Analyst. Manifestly, the present complaint has been filed after the expiry of a period three years, as such the cognizance taken by the Judicial Magistrate on the basis of complaint filed was unwarranted under the circumstances of the case and on this short ground alone, the complaint in question and the proceedings taken by the Judicial Magistrate on the basis of complaint filed deserve to be quashed. 9. 9. In fairness to the counsel for the petitioner, grievance was also made by him that shelf life of the sample in question had expired when the petitioner had put in appearance in Court on 26.8.2001 and as the copy of the report of the Public Analyst with the show cause notice was not given to the petitioner and show cause notice dated 28.8.1990 was given only to M/s. B.L. Industries, who is manufacturer of the insecticide, the petitioner has been denied his right to get the sample re-analysed under Section 24 of the Act and for that reason proceedings are liable to be quashed. It was also submitted by him during the course of arguments that right to approach for re-analysis arises after the complaint is filed in Court and not before that date. In support of the stand taken reference was made to M/s. Om Parkash Beej v. State of Haryana, 1996(2) RCR(Crl.) 551; M/s. Singh Kheti Store, Chogawan (Amritsar) v. State of Punjab, 1996(3) RCR(Crl.) 854; M/s. Krishi Kainder v. State of Punjab, 1997(3) RCR(Crl.) 711; M/s. Artee Minerals v. State of Punjab, 1997(4) RCR(Crl.) 620 and M/s. Pesto-Chem (India) Limited v. State of Punjab, 1999(1) RCR(Crl.) 681. 10. Additionally, it was submitted that even where no reply to the show cause notice was given, the petitioner is entitled to get the sample analysed after his appearance in Court. In this regard reference was made to Bhai Manjit Singh, Managing Director, Montari Industries Limited v. State of Punjab, 1992(1) RCR(Crl.) 244; Jhajhan Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana, 1996(3) RCR(Crl.) 42; Mewa Singh v. Prithipal Singh, 1994(1) RCR(Crl.) 94 and M/s. Dwarka Dass Sham Lal v. State of Punjab, 1993(3) RCR(Crl.) 583. 11. The submissions made in this regard have been refuted on behalf of the respondent on two grounds. Firstly, that the petitioner as well as M/s. B.L. Industries, manufacturer had never applied to the complainant for re-analysis despite the fact that copy of the analysis report was served upon the petitioner as well as on the manufacturer as required under the Act. Secondly, that after the show cause notice was served upon the petitioner in terms of the requirement of Section 24 of the Act, the petitioner could have applied for re-analysis within 28 days of the receipt of the copy of the report as laid down in Section 24(3) of the Act. Secondly, that after the show cause notice was served upon the petitioner in terms of the requirement of Section 24 of the Act, the petitioner could have applied for re-analysis within 28 days of the receipt of the copy of the report as laid down in Section 24(3) of the Act. Having not done so, no complaint can be made on behalf of the petitioner in this regard. There is considerable merit in the stand taken on behalf of the respondent. Reading of Section 24(3) of the Act would lead to the conclusion that unless the report is contested in the manner indicated in the provisions, the report of the Analyst has to be accepted as a conclusive evidence of its contents. The position in this regard has been settled by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Unique Farmid Pvt. Ltd., 1999(4) RCR(Crl.) 540 (SC), wherein it was observed as under :- "It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondents in these appeals have been deprived of their valuable right to have the sample tested from the Central Insecticides Laboratory under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act. Under sub-section (3) of Section 24 report signed by the Insecticide Analyst shall be evidence of the facts stated therein and shall be conclusive evidence against the accused only if the accused do not notify in writing to the Insecticides Inspector or the Court before which proceedings are pending that they intend to adduce evidence to controvert the report. In the present case Insecticide Inspector was notified that the accused intended to adduce evidence to controvert the report." 12. In view of the statutory provisions as observed in the above mentioned case the cases to which reference was made on behalf of the petitioner in support of his contention that where the accused does not notify its intention to contest the report, he will still have a right to get the sample analysed after his appearance in the Court are of no avail to the petitioner as the observation referred to is contrary to the observations made by the Apex Court. 13. With regard to the other question raised on behalf of the petitioner that he had applied to the Inspector for re-analysis, the definite case of the respondent is that no such prayer was made on behalf of the petitioner or on behalf of the manufacturer. 13. With regard to the other question raised on behalf of the petitioner that he had applied to the Inspector for re-analysis, the definite case of the respondent is that no such prayer was made on behalf of the petitioner or on behalf of the manufacturer. In view of the conflict in the stands taken by the parties, with regard to question of fact that same can only be decided on the basis of evidence to be adduced on record and not in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. 14. Other ground taken on behalf of the petitioner was that the sanction order for the prosecution of the petitioner is bad because it does not mention the date and time when the sample was taken. It even does not specify the name of the Insecticides Inspector who had drawn the sample which was found to be misbranded. Thus, the sanction order is mechanical and stereotyped and the prosecution launched is bad on this count. The sanction order Annexure R-5 has been placed on record wherein it has clearly stated that concerned record had been perused by him in relation to M/s. Ganesh Agro Service Centre, Moga- I, dealer who had committed violation of Sections 3(k)(i), 13, 18, 29 and other provisions of the Act and after perusal of the record sanction had been granted by the Joint Director Agriculture (ICDP) vide order dated 22.4.1991. The question whether it has resulted in any prejudice to the accused as such has to be decided during the trial of the case and ex-facie on this ground the proceedings cannot be quashed as sought to be done on behalf of the petitioner. 15. For the reasons recorded in the earlier part of the order, where it has been held that the complaint has not been filed within the period of limitation prescribed, the petition deserves to be accepted. Consequently, the complaint filed against the petitioner and the subsequent proceedings taken therein in the Court of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Moga are quashed.