JUDGMENT 1. - These three civil special appeal Nos. 63/95, 64/95 & 65/95 arise out of three similar orders dated 21.12.J994 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court whereby writ petition Nos. 6670/94, 6668/94 & 6669/94 filed by the appellants-School against their probationary teachers (respondent No. 4 herein) viz. Dinesh Sharma, Sanjeev Jain & Chimanlal Sharma, were dismissed upholding a common order dated 1.12.1994 of the Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, "Tribunal") in Case Nos. 143/94, 142/94 & 144/94 respectively. Since these three appeals involve common question of law relating to the termination of probationary teachers of the appellants School, they are being decided by this common judgment at the joint request of the parties. 2. Facts relevant for the purposes of common question of law are epitomised thus. Admittedly the trioka teachers (respondent No. 4 herein) (for brevity "teachers") were initially appointed on probation of a period stated in their appointment order (Ann.1). Initial probation period in case of each of two teachers (Dinesh Sharma & Sanjeev Jain) was from 1.8.1992 to o 30.6.1993, whereas in case of third teacher (Chiman Sharma) it was from 25.8.1993 to 16.5.1994. In each of their appointment orders (Ann.1) a common condition was that their services are found unsatisfactory, they will be terminated without any notice. Admittedly, their appointments were approved by the District Education Officer (Boys) Chittorgarh (respondent 5 No. 3) by orders (Ann.2). 3. In cases of two teachers (Dinesh Sharma & Sanjeev Jain) after expiry of their initial term of appointment (supra) Ann.1), on 30.6.1993, they were given fresh appointment on probation from 5.7.1993 to 4.10.1993 which was extended upto 16.5.1994 by order dated 4.11.1993 (Ann.3) & approved vide order dated 29.12.1993 (Ann.4). However, both of them remained absent without information from 4.3.1994, thereby many notices were issued to them besides publication thereof in Daily Newspapers (Anns. 5 to 9), which culminated into their termination from service by resolution dated 4.4.1994 (Ann. 18), against which both of them preferred petition Nos. 49/94 & 50/94 before the Tribunal which by order dated 29.4.1994 (Ann. 19) quashed order (Ann.18) of their termination and in deference to this order of the Tribunal, both of them were reinstated in service on 30.4.1994. 4. 18), against which both of them preferred petition Nos. 49/94 & 50/94 before the Tribunal which by order dated 29.4.1994 (Ann. 19) quashed order (Ann.18) of their termination and in deference to this order of the Tribunal, both of them were reinstated in service on 30.4.1994. 4. Be that as it may, each of these trioka teachers were to serve the appellant School upto 16.5.1994 either as per their initial & fresh appointment or extension as the case may be. However, the Managing Committee of the appellant School in its meeting held on 11.6.1994 decided not to extend probation of their service beyond 16.5.1994 after having considered their service record, because their performance was not satisfactory and upto the mark. This decision was approved U/r 30 of the Rajasthan Non- Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant- in-aid & Service Conditions etc.) Rules, 1993 (for brevity "Rules, 1993") by the respondent No. 3 under his order dated 17.6.1994. Thus, their services stood terminated as approved under Rule 30 of the Rules, 1993 and thereby they were not given extension in service upon expiration of their probation of appointment in question, beyond 16.5.1994. Feeling aggrieved by such a termination of their probation expiring on 16.5.1994, each of these trioka teachers preferred appeal under Sections 19&21 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 before the Tribunal, where reply to the show cause notice was also filed by the School. However, the learned Tribunal by its common order dated 1.12.1994 allowed their petitions-cum-appeals; quashed & set aside the orders of their termination dated 17.6.1994, and directed the School authority (appellants herein) to reinstate each of trioka teachers (respondent No. 4 herein) in service, by further holding that each of them is confirmed as if they have completed their probation. They were also ordered to continue in service, entitling to all consequential benefits. Against this order of the Tribunal, the appellant School preferred three petitions before the learned Single Judge but they were dismissed. Hence, these trioka appeals. 5. They were also ordered to continue in service, entitling to all consequential benefits. Against this order of the Tribunal, the appellant School preferred three petitions before the learned Single Judge but they were dismissed. Hence, these trioka appeals. 5. Albeit manifold points were raised during the course of arguments, 1 but having heard learned counsel for both the parties and considered their rival contentions, at the very threshold we found that fate of these appeals hinges only on single question of law, as to whether the probationer in service has a right to be heard prior to his termination or declining him for 5 extension of his services beyond the period of probation in case of his services having been found unsatisfactory during such probation period, in exercise of powers under Rule 30 of the Rules, 1993; or whether prior to termination of services of a probationer under Rule 30 of the Rules, 1993 upon expiration of his probation in case of his performance having been k found unsatisfactory either a domestic inquiry is necessary as provided under Rule 39 of the Rules, 1993, or the principle of audi alteram partem & natural justice must be followed? 6. According to the learned Tribunal under its common order impugned herein, the appellant-School’s Managing Committee had failed to issue show cause to the teachers during their probationary period in question against their unsatisfactory performance of work and conduct, as was necessary in view of principle of natural justice, therefore, the services of such probationary teachers after one month having expired upon completion of probation period could not have been terminated with retrospective effect, because after expiry of probation period, Rule 31 of the Rules, 1993 comes into play, so as to adopt procedure contemplated under rule 39(2) of the Rules, 1993 before terminating services of the teachers (respondent No.4). 7. At the outset, we must browse through the provisions of the Rules, 1993 relevant for the present controversy. Rule 29 provides that after having obtained the approval of the competent authority, the Managing Committee may make necessary appointment. 7. At the outset, we must browse through the provisions of the Rules, 1993 relevant for the present controversy. Rule 29 provides that after having obtained the approval of the competent authority, the Managing Committee may make necessary appointment. Rule 28 relates to approval by competent authority after due consideration Rule 27 envisages for approval of appointments, according to which the Managing Committee shall within a fortnight of selection, forward the list of selected candidates with its recommendations along with information in the prescribed proforma thereunder, to the competent authority as specified in Appendix IX, for its approval. 8. However, crucial provisions are contained in Rule 30 which prescribes period of probation, and reads as under;- "30. Period of Probation - (a) All persons appointed in the Institution shall be placed on probation for a period of one year. (b) If it appears to the Managing Committee, at any time, during or at the end of the period of probation, that the employee has made not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has failed to give satisfaction, the Managing Committee may discharge or terminate him from service with prior approval of the authority competent to approve the appointment (Appendix IX); Provided that the Managing Committee may, if it so thinks fit in any case, extent the period of probation not exceeding one year." R. 31 which contemplates as to 'confirmation’, makes it clear that a person placed on probation under rule 30 shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of probation period. Here we may make it absolute that neither Rule 31 nor any other provisions in the Rules, 1993 envisaged as to deemed confirmation immediately upon expiration or completion of 5 probation period of any teacher in case of no specific order either of confirmation or of extension. We may observe that there is no rule that on the expiry of the probation period, the probationer shall be deemed to have been confirmed as Teachers of the appellant School under Rule 31 of the Rules, 1993. The scheme of the Rules, 1993 is clear - confirmation of the probationary teachers does not result merely from the expiry of the probation period, itself, and so long as the confirmation order is not made, the holder of the post of Teacher in the School remains a probationer. The scheme of the Rules, 1993 is clear - confirmation of the probationary teachers does not result merely from the expiry of the probation period, itself, and so long as the confirmation order is not made, the holder of the post of Teacher in the School remains a probationer. Thus merely because the probation period has expired and one month beyond it has rolled by, their services could not have been dispensed with or that they shall be deemed to have been confirmed as Teachers, as is the opinion or conclusion of the learned Tribunal, which in our considered opinion, is absolutely illegal and not sustainable in the eye of law. Once the appointment in question had been made on probation for a specified period and admittedly no specific order of confirmation or even any extension of their services has been passed at the end of probation period under Rule 31 of the Rules, nor there is rule of deemed confirmation under the Rules, 1993, then question of deemed confirmation does not arise, inasmuch as the impugned order of termination of the probationer in the instant case has been passed merely after the expiry of the probation period or that they continued as a probationer but admittedly without any specific order of confirmation under rule 31 or extension under Rule 30 (proviso), hence they acquired no substantive right to hold the post, beyond probation period, especially when their performance of work and conduct was found by the Managing Committee of the School and approved by the competent authority (respondent No. 3) was unsatisfactory in exercise of the powers under Rule 30. We are fortified from the dictum of law laid down by the Apex Court in High Court of MP v. Satya Narayan Jhavar ( 2001 (7) SCC 161 ) which was a decision based on catena of pronouncements of the Apex Court referred to therein and relied on before us by both the parties. As expounded therein, three lines of cases were decided by the Apex Court on the question of deemed confirmation. 9. As expounded therein, three lines of cases were decided by the Apex Court on the question of deemed confirmation. 9. One line of cases is where in the service rules or in the letter of appointment a period of probation is specified and power to extend the same is also conferred upon the authority without prescribing any maximum period of probation and if the officer is continued beyond the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no bar against termination at any point of time after expiry of the period of probation. 10. The other line of cases is where while there is a provision in the rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a maximum period for such extension is also provided beyond which it is not permissible to extend probation. The inference in such cases is that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in case, before its expiry, the order of termination has not been passed. 11. The last line of cases is where, though under the rules a maximum period of probation is prescribed, but the same requires a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing an order of confirmation and of passing a lest for the purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum period of probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been passed nor has the period concerned passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said period has expired. 12. Thus, in our fortified view, an order of confirmation is a positive act on the part of the employer (appellant School herein) which it is required to pass in accordance with the Rules governing the question of confirmation i subject to a finding that the probationer is in fact fit for confirmation. Therefore, merely because a maximum period of probation has been provided or that it has expired and they are continued beyond it, it cannot be held that at the end of that period, the probationer must be held to have been deemed to be confirmed. 13. Therefore, merely because a maximum period of probation has been provided or that it has expired and they are continued beyond it, it cannot be held that at the end of that period, the probationer must be held to have been deemed to be confirmed. 13. As per the Scheme of the Rules, in the instant case, positive act on the part of the employer (appellant School herein) as envisaged under Rule 30(b) of the Rules, 1993, is that if it appears to Managing Committee of the School, at any time, during or at the end of the period of probation that the employee has not made sufficient use of his opportunities or has failed to give satisfaction, then it may discharge or terminate him from service but with prior approval of the authority competent to approve the appointment or under proviso to Rule 30(b), extend the period of probation but not exceeding one year; or confirm under Rule 31 at the end of probation period. 14. The Magna Carta of Indian civil servant PL Dhingra v. Union of India ( AIR 1958 SC 36 ) has spawned diverse judicial trends, difficult to be disciplined into a single & practical formula applicable to termination of probation of freshers & of the services of temporary employees. As held in seven Judge Bench decision in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab ( 1974 (2) SCC 831 = AIR 1974 SC 2192 ) , the courts are to look behind the form of the order to find out whether the termination was in substance punitive. The Apex Court in HF Sangati v. RG High Court of Karnataka ( 2001 (3) SCC 117 ) while dealing with a question whether termination of a probationer Munsif could be considered to be punitive when during probation period, several adverse remarks had been made in the confidential records of the probationer, held that once the termination order mentioned that the employee was "unsuitable to hold the post of Munsiff", the order did not cast any stigma on the employee and was not punitive. 15. 15. In latest decision of the Apex Court in PN Verma v. SGPGI of Medical Sciences ( 2002 (1) SCC 520 ) , after having traversed the Magna Carta to HF Sangati(supra), it stood expounded that one of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all the three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely, if anyone of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 16. However, trioka factors are distinguishable as expounded in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) where it was said:- "64.- Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer is faced with an inquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Article 311 (2) he can claim protection." 17. In Sangeeta Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (DB) (1995 (3) WLC (Rajasthan 44) , the petitioner was initially appointed on temporary basis for six months but extended off and on finally till 31.3.1991 but her services came to automatic end on 1.4.1991 resulting in termination duly based on unsatisfactory work. In Sangeeta Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (DB) (1995 (3) WLC (Rajasthan 44) , the petitioner was initially appointed on temporary basis for six months but extended off and on finally till 31.3.1991 but her services came to automatic end on 1.4.1991 resulting in termination duly based on unsatisfactory work. This Court held that her termination was not suffering from malice in fact or in law and neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional and, therefore, no further enquiry or opportunity was necessary prior to termination of temporary or probationary appointee when termination is based on ground of unsatisfactory performance, inasmuch as no judicial review in such case is permissible. Relevant observations are quoted therefrom as under:- "If an employee is on probation and appointment is temporary, the work report is given by the person under whom he is working. No enquiry is contemplated in respect of any observation made in the work report unless it is alleged to be with any malice. If the employer is not satisfied with the work of such an employee who is on probation, the services can be terminated without further enquiry or providing further opportunity to him.": "....The employer is entitled to review the suitability of employee during probation and evaluate the performance and if the termination of service of a temporary servant is on the ground of unsatisfactory performance then no judicial review is possible in such a case." 18. Thus, it stands well settled by a plethora of decisions of the Apex Court right from Magna Carta decision of Constitution Bench in Dhingra and 7 Judge Bench decision in Shamsher Singh (supra), duly adopted and reiterated in latest decision in HF Sangati (supra), that services of an appointee to a permanent post on probation can be terminated or dispensed with during or at the end of the period of probation (as is expressly provided in the present Rules of 1993 relevant for the impugned termination of the respondents Teachers) because the appointee does not acquire any right to hold or continue to hold such a post during the period of probation; and in case of the competent authority having come to the conclusion that the probationer is unsuitable for the job, then such a probationer must be discharged on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperament or other similar grounds not involving moral turpitude and in that situation, no punishment is involved. 19. Be that as it may, once a probationer’s appointment is terminated, it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude. It is trite that the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language, which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. That being so, in several cases, in particular in State of Orissa v. Ramnarayan Das ( AIR 1961 SC 177 ) , it has been held that use of the word ‘unsatisfactory work and conduct’ in the termination order will not amount to a stigma. Applying this dictum of law to the facts of the instant cases before us, we find that the language used in the termination orders in question is that the teachers (respondent No. 4 herein)’s work has been founded to be unsatisfactory", they have not made sufficient use of their opportunities & their work has been unfit for the School & not in the interest of the students". It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the impugned terminations orders are not ex facie stigmatic. The decisions cited on behalf of the teachers herein and relied upon by the learned Tribunal in its common order, also do not hold so. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the impugned terminations orders are not ex facie stigmatic. The decisions cited on behalf of the teachers herein and relied upon by the learned Tribunal in its common order, also do not hold so. None of the factors catalogued (supra) for holding that the termination was in substance punitive, exists here. 20. The impugned termination orders have been passed in strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 30. There was thus no requirement to comply with the principles of natural justice, muchless to hold any formal proceedings of inquiry before making termination orders in question, against the probationary teachers. It was not necessary that there should have been a charge and an inquiry on their work and conduct since the teachers (respondent No.4) where only on probation and it was open to the Managing Committee of the School (appellant) to consider whether they were suitable for confirmation U/r 31 or should not be discharged from service U/r 30 of the Rules, 1993, at the end of the period of their probation. 21. Thus viewed, we do not find any illegality in the termination orders passed by the appellants (School) against the respondent No. 4 teachers. Therefore, the learned Tribunal erred in law in having passed the impugned judgment holding the termination orders in question as illegal and/or arbitrary besides unconstitutional being contrary to the Rules. Consequently we set aside the impugned judgments and orders of the learned Tribunal so also of the learned Single Judge under appeal before us, and hold that the termination orders of the teachers (probationers) are made in accordance with Rules 30 & 31 of the Rules, 1993. All the three appeals are allowed accordingly without, however, any order as to costs.Appeal Allowed & Orders of Tribunal as also of Single judge set aside. *******