JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is directed against the order dated 14.9.2001 passed by the learned Single Judge during the pendency of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 504/2000. 2. The relevant part of the order dated 14.9.2001, which is impugned in this appeal, is reproduced as under: "In the present case, it goes without saying that the workers are entitled to their unpaid wages for the period from August, 1999 and the company is liable to pay the same. Even though the State was earlier agreeing to pay a loan of Rs. 20 Crores to the company, but for the reasons best known to the State, it did not do so. In my opinion, it is the duty of the State to see that the company is rehabilitated and that the workers who are not been retained so far get their due emoluments and paid accordingly as per law. Without there being any fault of the workers they are made to suffer and plight can be imagined of the struggle in meeting the home expenses, educational expenses of their children to which this Court cannot close its eyes and, therefore, a direction is required to be given to the State Government to make arrangements for payment of at least 3 months salary immediately within 15 days as a very minimal relief which can be treated as a loan to the company, as at one time the State had decided the loan about Rs. 20 Crores to the company out of which only a part payment of Rs. 4.50 Crores was paid. It is also unfortunate to note that no serious efforts have been made for rehabilitating the company even though the matter is pending before the BIFR for last more than one year. Efforts shall be made by the BIFR to frame the rehabilitation scheme within two months and the respondents shall make all endeavour to cooperate. The wages of the workers shall be first charged after the rehabilitation. In my opinion, a good profiting company had been totally finished and closed without there being any apparent reasons, nor any authority has even made efforts to go into this aspect. There are allegations of mis-management, mis-appropriation and mis-direction of the amount. The wages of the workers shall be first charged after the rehabilitation. In my opinion, a good profiting company had been totally finished and closed without there being any apparent reasons, nor any authority has even made efforts to go into this aspect. There are allegations of mis-management, mis-appropriation and mis-direction of the amount. The responsibility of such lapse is required to be fixed and for the purpose of preliminary enquiry is required to be conducted as to how and under what circumstances and with what interest, the company of worth of crores of rupees had been reduced and blocked to such a situation i.e. production is totally stopped, rendering 100s of workers job-less, starving on the road. It requires investigation for fixing a civil as well as criminal liability and therefore, it is a fit case where an enquiry in the matter is required to be made for fixing civil as well as criminal liability so that the facts would become more clear. This court feels it necessary that the preliminary CBI enquiry is required to be initiated without any further delay. It shall be the duty of the State Government and officers of the company to assist the CBI enquiry and to hand over all the record which may be required in this respect by the investigating authority. The Director, CBI, New Delhi, is directed to depute an independent responsible officer to make the enquiry and a report be submitted to this court within a month positively. (Copy be sent to CBI). Further directions shall be given on seeing the report, List this case on 11.10.2001." 3. On 27.9.2001, the appeal was admitted and the Court, while admitting the appeal and issuing notices, recorded that subject to the maintainability of the appeal, there will be stay of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge to the extent of back wages only and not in other respects. 4. During the pendency of this appeal, D.B. Civil Misc. 4. During the pendency of this appeal, D.B. Civil Misc. Stay Petition No. 4895/2001 had been filed and after hearing all the parties, an order was passed on 9.11.2001, directing the appellants and the respondent No. 2 to take immediate steps to make payment of at least one month's salary to all the concerned employees before Deepawali and for that purpose, it was left open to the Jaipur Metals to make use of the finished goods to that extent only which are not under attachment. The matter remained pending and D.B. Civil Misc. Stay Petition No. 4060/2002 was then filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 i.e. Jaipur Metals and Electricals Mazdoor Sangh on 15.7.2002 with the prayer that the State Government be directed to make lumpsum payment of Rs. 50,000/- to each workman so that they could lead their life like normal human beings and discharge their obligations towards family and that the special appeal and the writ petition may be heard and decided at the earliest convenient date. This stay application was taken up on two dates but ultimately, we found that the special appeal itself may be heard and orders were passed accordingly on 13.8.2002 in the stay petition being D.B. Civil Misc. Stay Petition No. 4060/2002. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 raised the preliminary objection in this case that the order, as had been passed by the learned Single Judge, which was impugned in this appeal, was not a final order; it was only an interim order against which appeal was not maintainable and in support of his preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal, Mr. R.C. Joshi has cited before as the following cases: (i) In Mahendra Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in 1997 (2) WLC (Raj.) 574 the Division Bench held that an order rejecting application under Order 45 Rule 13 C.P.C. was not a judgment and special appeal against such an order was not maintainable. (ii) In Rajasthan Trade Union Kendra v. M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd., and others, reported in 1993 (1) RLR 543 , Para 15, after considering the ease of Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben, AIR 1981 SC 1786 which had also been considered in the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1983 RLR 12 , it was held that special appeal against an interlocutory order was not maintainable. (iii) In Ikram v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1980 Rajasthan 182 , it was held that the order vacating previous stay order does not determine any rights of the parties nor determine any points of controversy between the parties and it does not amount to judgment and no appeal lies against such an order under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. (iv) In Mahaveer Singh v. Kesri Singh and others, reported in 1996 (1) WLC (Raj.) 631 , the Division Bench considered the direction given by the learned Single Judge to the Government of India to comply with the order and discharged notice of contempt against the State Government since the matter to be complied with was liability of former and not the latter. The Division Bench of this Court held that it was not a judgment within the meaning of Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 and appeal against such an order was not competent. (v) In M/s. Gulam Abbas Kamruddin v. The State of Rajasthan, reported in 1982 RLW 696 it was held that interim or interlocutory orders are not judgments and appeals against such orders under section 18, Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 are not maintainable. (vi) In Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and others, reported in AIR 1953 SC 198 , where the Supreme Court considered the maintainability of appeal against the order of transfer of a suit, made under Clause 13, Letters Patent, it was held that it was not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 and was therefore, not appealable; an order of transfer of suit cannot be placed in the same category as an order rejecting the plaint or one dismissing the suit on preliminary ground. The Court found that there was difference between the order refusing to rescind leave granted under the Letters Patent and one under Clause 13 directing the removal of the suit from one court to another and there was no good reason to hold that the principle applicable to one applied to the other also. 6. Mr. Rafiq, Addl. The Court found that there was difference between the order refusing to rescind leave granted under the Letters Patent and one under Clause 13 directing the removal of the suit from one court to another and there was no good reason to hold that the principle applicable to one applied to the other also. 6. Mr. Rafiq, Addl. Advocate General has submitted that a difference has to be made in the orders which are passed as interim orders or as interlocutory orders and such orders which are in the nature of final order and he submits that in the instant case, the order as has been passed by the learned Single Judge amounts to final order May be that it does not determine the rights of the parties finally but it does leave the permanent effect on the fate of the present appellant and in case the direction as has been given by the learned Single Judge at intermittent stage during the pendency of the proceedings, and which is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal, is carried out, the Government will be left with no remedy at the ultimate end of the litigation and the money which it is made to part with, shall be gone for ever and therefore, it is a matter in which appeal must be held to be maintainable. In support of his submissions, Mr. Rafiq, Addl. Advocate General has placed strong reliance on the following decisions: (i) In Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1974 SC 1791 the Supreme Court has explained the meaning of the word 'judgment of other court' with regard to the declaration of the land in question which did not belong to a person in whose name the mutation was effected and as to whether it was a 'judgment' as contemplated by Section 32DD. (ii) In Shah Babulal Khimi v. Jayaben D. Kania and another, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 8 , which has.already been discussed in the earlier part of this order, in para 113, the Supreme. Court held that there are three kinds of judgment i.e. a final judgment; a preliminary judgment and intermediary or interlocutory judgment. 7. Mr. Rafiq, Addl. (ii) In Shah Babulal Khimi v. Jayaben D. Kania and another, reported in (1981) 4 SCC 8 , which has.already been discussed in the earlier part of this order, in para 113, the Supreme. Court held that there are three kinds of judgment i.e. a final judgment; a preliminary judgment and intermediary or interlocutory judgment. 7. Mr. Rafiq, Addl. Advocates General has submitted that on these principles, even if an order is there which is an interlocutory order, but it possesses the characteristics and trappings of finality and it seeks to adversely affect the valuable rights of a party or decides an important aspect of the trial in ancillary proceedings, such an order may be appealable and no objection can be taken with regard to the maintainability of the appeal against such orders. He has submitted that the present order, as has been passed by the learned Single Judge, is an order of this nature and therefore, no exception can be taken to the maintainability of this appeal. 8. In Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd. v. Union of India and Another, reported in (2001) 2 SCC 588 , the Supreme Court has held that an interlocutory order which is a final determination affecting the valuable rights and obligations of the parties, is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10. It may be mentioned that it was essentially a case in which order had been passed by the learned Single Judge on an application under section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 directing the employer to pay full back wages instead of 40% back wages awarded by the Tribunal to its workmen whose services were wrongfully terminated. Such an order was held to be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 and was therefore, held to be appealable before the larger bench. In this case, the Supreme Court explained the meaning of the word `judgment' in the context of provisions of Section 17B of the Act. 9. We have considered the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent No. 1 in the light of the decisions as have been cited before us. 10. We may mention that that the writ petition, in the instant case, had been filed essentially with the reliefs that salary be paid to the workmen which was unpaid since July, 1999 and onwards uptil now. 10. We may mention that that the writ petition, in the instant case, had been filed essentially with the reliefs that salary be paid to the workmen which was unpaid since July, 1999 and onwards uptil now. Besides the claim of unpaid salary, other ancillary and allied reliefs with regard to lay off, claim of the loan; appointment of experts in Management, Finance and Engineering, not to sell off the Company to the private persons; not to transfer shares of the employees without their consent and demand of enquiry and audit for a period of about last ten years and to fix responsibility etc. had been claimed. In such a petition, if the learned Single Judge, during the pendency of the writ petition, on finding that a good private company had been totally finished and closed without there being any apparent reasons, had passed an order with regard to the payment of the unpaid salary for a period of three months, it cannot be said that it involved the determination of the rights of any of the parties. Right to unpaid salary was not in dispute. It was an admitted factual position before the learned Single Judge that the workers had not been paid the wages after July, 1999 and the respondent Company was liable to pay the same. It was also shown that the Company was managed by the officials of the State Government throughout and there were very serious allegations that the amount of the Company and its assets had been siphoned at the instance of and for the benefit of the officers of the Government who were managing the affairs of the Company: 11. Our attention was also. invited to certain documents which show that repeatedly thousands of rupees were spent on the Government officers out of the funds of this Company without even giving an account of it, rather mentioning in the documents that it was not possible to make the vouchers available and even without any evidence of actual expenditure, the amounts were sanctioned and paid out of the funds of the Company regularly not only once but frequently which precipitated a situation that the Company had to pay the price so as to be declared a sick industrial company. 12. 12. Our attention in this connection was invited to payment requisitions dated 6.8.1994, 25.2.1995 and 27.3.1997 filed with the writ petition as Ex.3, 4 and 5 for a sum of Rs. 40,000/-, Rs. 30,000/- and Rs. 25,000/- respectively. Mr. Joshi has submitted that this is only a tip of the iceberg to illustrate his point and the same is not exhaustive. 13. In such circumstances, out of the admitted claim of.unpaid salary for more than two years, if the learned Single Judge passed an order that three months' salary be paid, it cannot be said that it determined rights of the parties finally so as to bring this impugned order at the status of a judgment so as to make an appeal maintainable against it. No one contested that salary had already been paid, salary had to be paid and therefore there was no question of determining any right finally or otherwise. 14. Mr. Rafiq, learned Addl. Advocate General submitted that the liability could not be fastened against the State Government and so far as the State Government is concerned, once it parts with the amount, the State Government will be deprived of this amount for ever and it will not be possible for the State Government to recover this amount and therefore, so far as the State Government is concerned, appeal must be held to be maintainable. While making this submission, Mr. Rafiq has submitted that the State Government has no grievance against part of the directions with regard to the holding of the enquiry by the Central Bureau of Investigation and also that salary was required to be paid but the State Government is aggrieved only against the direction against it to make arrangements for payment of at least three months' salary immediately whereas it was the liability of the company to pay the salary. On this aspect of the matter, we may hasten to observe at once that what is the role and position of State Government in this company is amply established in the judgment of this Court rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Ishaq Mohd. v. Jaipur Metal and Electricals Ltd., reported in 1988 (1) RLR 157 . On this aspect of the matter, we may hasten to observe at once that what is the role and position of State Government in this company is amply established in the judgment of this Court rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Ishaq Mohd. v. Jaipur Metal and Electricals Ltd., reported in 1988 (1) RLR 157 . Even otherwise the Government of Rajasthan had taken over this company long back and this court after lifting the veil and cracking the shell to see who is behind this company; whose voice and hands are there, found that it was actually an extended arm of the Government of Rajasthan as its second self or an altered ego. This decision dated 5.2.1988 was also taken to Supreme Court by way of S.L.P No. 7918-28 of 1988 but the decision had been implemented before the S.L.P. came up for final hearing before Supreme Court on 26.4.1995. In this view of the matter, prima facie, it cannot be said that the State Government was not at all concerned with the question of payment of salary or that such a direction could not be issued against the State Government as an interim measure. Therefore, in our opinion, appeal filed at the instance of the State Government, cannot be said to be maintainable against the impugned order, which has been filed challenging the directions given by the learned Single Judge for payment of three months' salary to the Workmen. 15. Alternatively, assuming that this direction is a direction of final nature and the appeal may be held to be maintainable against such an order, we may also examine the merits of the order as has been passed by the learned Single Judge in the context of the facts of this case. 16. So far as merits of the case are concerned, all that we have to examine is whether the direction with regard to payment of three months' salary (to the group of workmen) which has remained unpaid since August, 1999 can be said to he an order which is illegal and warrants interference by this Court in appeal particularly when it is an admitted position between all the parties that the salary has remained unpaid since August, 1999. The case of the respondent No. 1 Union is that the workmen have been facing immense difficulties inasmuch as they are financially shrinken and they are unable to maintain themselves; the Company has stopped making payments of ESI contribution, as a result of which even medical facilities are not provided to the employees and they lack funds to maintain themselves. A list of about twenty persons has been given who have lost their lives on account of lack of the medical facilities and four workmen are said to have lost their mental balance and had been treated in the Mental Hospital for two weeks as indoor patients. It is also the case of the Union that there are several employees who are indoor patients in SMS Hospital, Jaipur and because of financial difficulties, they are not able to get proper treatment. They get themselves treated after borrowing money from the friends and relatives. The particulars and names of such persons have been given in D.B. Civil Misc. Stay Petition No. 4060/2002 in para 3. It has been stated that the workmen do not have any source of income and their borrowing capacity has also come to an end and number of workmen are getting their meals outside the temples where food is donated by the religious minded persons. We have narrated these facts from the stay application to highlight the plight which the workmen are facing at individual level. The views which we are expressing should not be construed as to have been expressed on account of any misplaced sympathy for workmen as it has already come on record that funds of this Company have been siphoned by the officers who had been managing it or for the purpose of entertainment of the officers and the employees have been denied their wages. Realising such a situation, the learned Single Judge, with due application of mind, and after considering the principles which were applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Rohtas Industries case reported in 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 481 gave the impugned direction. Learned Single Judge has noted that the workmen of Rohtas . Realising such a situation, the learned Single Judge, with due application of mind, and after considering the principles which were applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Rohtas Industries case reported in 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 481 gave the impugned direction. Learned Single Judge has noted that the workmen of Rohtas . Industries Ltd., situated at Dalmianagar in District Rohtas had sent a letter to the Chief Justice of India about the closure of the factory and denial of employment to about 10,000 employees with the prayer that the immediate restoration of electricity to the colony, payment of salary and wages for the period since closure should be directed and compensation as per the amendment in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 be granted where a provisional liquidator had also been appointed under the Companies Act, and yet the Supreme Court had made an interim order in the matter of payment of wages by sale of assets. The Supreme Court in that case observed that i huge amounts of wages were outstanding to the workmen and financial institutions had large dues to recover from the Company. The Court, therefore, could not loose sight of the fact that right to life of about 10,000 families had been denied for over five years. 17. Similar fact situation has been precipitated and made to obtain in the present case giving rise to the situation of starvation of hundreds of workmen, their hearths remain cold everyday, and if, in such a situation, while hearing a matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the learned Single Judge gave direction to the State Government for making arrangements for payment of three months' salary, there was no question of filing an appeal against such a direction. The State Government as a welfare State was on the contrary supposed to make arrangements for the purpose of making payment. If at all, there was any financial constraint, the Government could at the most ask for time for the purpose of making arrangements for the payment of salary but certainly, it could not decide to challenge such a legal and valid order which was very much warranted in the dismal fact situation of this case when it is not in dispute that the salary had remained unpaid not only for three months but for a period of more than two years. 18. 18. According to the Union, there are about 1600 workmen and according to Mr. Rafiq, Addl. Advocate General there are only 1200 workmen. Be that as it may the factual position cannot be disputed that hundreds of employees and in any case, more than thousand employees are suffering the agony of starvation and are deprived of basic and minimum needs for their existence and violation of their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India to live with the dignity of a workmen is writ large. 19. The directions as have been given by the learned Single Judge are in absolute conformity with the directions as had been given in the case of Rohtas Industries (supra) by the Supreme Court where direction was to the State Government of Bihar to deposit an amount of Rs. 15 crores with the Administrator within eight weeks and further amount of Rs. 15 crores was to be financed by the Union of India to the State of Bihar from out of the assets of the State. The amount of Rs. 15 Crores paid by the State Government was to be utilised in due course for payment of arrears of wages to the workers and a Committee was to be appointed and headed by a retired High Court Judge, a Retired Distt. Judge and an Accounts Officer having five years' experience of financial adviser, to examine the respective claims. Thus, if the direction given by the learned Single Judge is examined on the touchstone of the directions as were given in the case of Rohtas Industries, we find that the directions can neither be said to be unjust nor it could be said to be illegal rather the directions as have been given by the learned Single Judge are found to be of exactly similar nature without even error of parallax so as to meet the ends of substantial justice. Therefore, even if the appeal is held to be maintainable, we do not find any force in this appeal on merits. 20. Mr. Rafiq, learned Addl. Adv. General has yet argued before us that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Gram Panchayat and Anr. Therefore, even if the appeal is held to be maintainable, we do not find any force in this appeal on merits. 20. Mr. Rafiq, learned Addl. Adv. General has yet argued before us that in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Gram Panchayat and Anr. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Limited and Ors., reported in (1990) 2 SCC 440 , Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., reported in (2000) 5 SCC 515 and Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. Canara Bank and Ors., reported in (1998) 5 SCC 554 , there is no question of giving any direction for entailing any financial liability against the company, once it had been declared a sick industry and for that purpose Mr. Rafiq has made reference to Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. We are simply bemoaned at this argument of the learned Additional Advocate General inasmuch as we do not find that simply because a company is declared to be a sick industry, even its employees cannot get due wages. So far as wages are concerned, we find that there is no bar against the enforcement of the claims of wages of workmen. In our opinion, the status of an sick industrial company to be a sick company cannot come in the way and there is no embargo or any legal impediment against the enforcement of the claim of the wages of the workmen. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, we find that neither the appeal Is maintainable nor there is any force in this appeal on merits and this appeal simply deserves to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed as such. The parties may approach the learned Single Judge for immediate hearing of the writ petition. Whereas the salary of one month has already been paid under the orders of the Division Bench, during the pendency of this appeal, the salary for the remaining period of two months is required to be paid now. Mr. Rafiq, learned Addl. Adv. General has submitted that since the order of the learned Single Judge had been stayed by the Division Bench during the pendency of this appeal and now that the appeal has been dismissed, fifteen days time which had been granted by the learned Single Judge for making payment of salary may be further extended by fifteen days. Adv. General has submitted that since the order of the learned Single Judge had been stayed by the Division Bench during the pendency of this appeal and now that the appeal has been dismissed, fifteen days time which had been granted by the learned Single Judge for making payment of salary may be further extended by fifteen days. Accordingly, the period for compliance with regard to the direction for the payment of salary to the workmen for a period of two months is hereby extended for a period of fifteen days from the date the certified copy of this order becomes available or is made available to the respondents. 22. The appeal is dismissed, the parties shall bear their own costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******