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2002 DIGILAW 143 (SC)

STATE OF BIHAR v. MOHD. MANJUR ALAM

2002-01-25

G.B.PATTANAIK, P.VENKATARAMA REDDI

body2002
ORDER 1. Delay condoned. Leave granted. The short question that arises for consideration in these appeals, is whether the State Government would be bound to pay the salary of the extra staff recruited on upgradation of the madarsa in die year 1976. 2. There is no dispute that the original staff attached to the madarsa would get their salary from the Government. Since the staff recruited to the madarsa subsequent to the upgradation, were not given their salary by the State Government, they approached the High Court by filing a writ petition. The madarsa in question is at Kashpur in the district of Purnia. There is no dispute that the writ petitioners were appointed by the Managing Committee of madarsa. 3. The learned Single Judge construed the Circular of the State Government dated 8-12-1982 and came to the conclusion that since the institution in question had been upgraded prior to the aforesaid circular, the a extra staff recruited for the upgraded classes would also be entitled to get their salary from the State Government. The learned Single Judge also placed reliance on an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the said Court in CWJC No. 3098 of 1988 which was disposed of on 8-12-1988. 4. Against the judgment of the Single Judge, the State approached the Division Bench in appeal and having been unsuccessful therein, is before this b Court. 5. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Bihar contended that the Single Judge misconstrued the Resolution of the Education Department dated 8-12-1982. According to him, since the upgradation of madarsa has not been granted approval by the State Government, the State Government cannot be burdened with the financial liability so far as the staff recruited to the upgraded section is concerned. Mr S.N. Mishra, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that since the institution was in existence prior to 8-12-1982, the staff recruited to the institution would be entitled to the financial assistance, inasmuch as the Resolution of the State Government dated 8-12-1982 is prospective in nature. 6. There is no dispute that the aforesaid resolution of the State Government is prospective in nature, but that resolution unequivocally states that the State Government would bear the expenditure of teaching and non-teaching staff of only those institutions which have already been recognised before this decision. 6. There is no dispute that the aforesaid resolution of the State Government is prospective in nature, but that resolution unequivocally states that the State Government would bear the expenditure of teaching and non-teaching staff of only those institutions which have already been recognised before this decision. Needless to mention that there is no document to show that after the upgradation of madarsa, the Government, at any point of time, has accorded approval to the said upgradation. In fact, the writ petitioners in the counter-affidavit filed, have taken the stand that question of further approval does not arise since the institution (madarsa) was a recognised institution. We are afraid, this stand of the writ petitioners possibly is not correct. 7. The madarsas have not been recognised and/or approved as far as the upgraded cases are concerned. The original staff recruited to the madarsa will certainly get their salary, etc. from the State Government and the State Government is bound to take the financial liability so far' as they are concerned. But, on upgradation, for the additional staff until and unless the State Government has accorded approval, question of burdening the State Government with financial liability does not arise. That is, in our view, the clear statement of the Resolution dated 8-12-1982. 8. In this view of the matter, in our considered opinion, the High Court was in error in granting the relief prayed for. We, therefore, allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court.