GOPALAKRISHNA TAMADA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against the judgment in Sessions Case No. 171 of 1998 dt. 3-11-2000 on the file of the II Additional Sessions Judge, nalgonda, wherein the sole appellant was tried as an accused for the alleged offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and after trial, the court below found him guilty and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life under Section 302 IPC and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months. ( 2 ) THE substance of the charge as framed against the appellant herein by the court below is that the appellant has intentionally committed the murder of Machanapalli lingaiah (hereinafter called the deceased ) on 4-7-1997 at 8. 30 hours on the main road at nidamanoor, when the deceased came and asked the appellant herein about beating his son which resulted in a quarrel and the appellant picked up an empty beer bottle found nearby,broken it and inflicted injuries on the neck and other parts of the deceased, due to which the deceased sustained bleeding injuries and died while shifting to the government Hospital, Miryalaguda. ( 3 ) THE case according to the prosecution, as per the legal evidence let in during the course of hearing is as follows: The deceased was running a hotel on the main road of nidamanoor village. On 4-7-1997, P. W. 2 who is the son of the deceased went to the hotel of one Ramu, (P. W. 6) at the request of the appellant herein to see as to whether there are any persons present at the hotel. When P. W. 2 returned and informed the appellant that none were present in the hotel, the appellant along with P. W. 2 went to ramu s hotel and having found several persons present there, the appellant beat p. W. 2 stating that he told him a lie that none were present in the hotel. Immediately thereafter, P. W. 2 went to his father i. e. , the deceased, and informed him about the appellant beating him. Immediately thereafter, P. W. 2 went to his father i. e. , the deceased, and informed him about the appellant beating him. On coming to know about the beating of his son by the appellant, the deceased went along with his son to the hotel of P. W. 6 and questioned the appellant as to why he beat his son and so saying he beat the appellant with hands, on account of whichhe fell down. Thereupon, the appellant picked up an empty beer bottle, broke it and stabbed the deceased on the left side of the neck with the said bottle and thereby attempted to murder him. At the time of the incident, P. Ws. 3, 4 and 5 were present as they were taking meals in the hotel. After the incident, P. W. 2 i. e. , the son of the deceased, went to his mother (P. W. 1) and while they were shifting the deceased to the Government hospital at Miryalaguda, he died: ( 4 ) ORIGINALLY, a report was given by p. W. 1 on 4-7-1997 at about 9. 00 p. m. which was registered under Section 307 IPC. Subsequently on coming to know about the death of the deceased, the Sub-Inspector of police (P. W. 12) altered the Section of law from Sec. 307 to 302 IPC. During the course of investigation, the Sub-Inspector of Police (P. W. 12) examined P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 and recorded their statements. On 5-7-1997, the in-charge Inspector of Police (P. W. 11) visited the scene of offence and after securing the presence of mediators, he conducted panchanama at the scene of offence and had drawn a rough sketch of the scene of offence (Ex. P-8 and also seized the Material Objects. P. W. 11 visited the Government Hospital and held inquest over the dead body of the deceased in the presence of P. W. 8. The inquest report is Ex. P-5. He also recorded the statements of other witnesses. Immediately after the inquest, P. W. 11 gave a requisition to the Medical Officer to conduct autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and accordingly the Medical Officer (P. W. 10) conducted autopsy and issued post-mortem certificate (Ex. P-7 ). The inquest report is Ex. P-5. He also recorded the statements of other witnesses. Immediately after the inquest, P. W. 11 gave a requisition to the Medical Officer to conduct autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and accordingly the Medical Officer (P. W. 10) conducted autopsy and issued post-mortem certificate (Ex. P-7 ). The appellant was arrested on 13-7-1997 by the Inspector of police (P. W. 13) and on a confession of the appellant, material objects i. e. , bloodstained shirt without collar and trouser were seized under Ex. P-6. On production, the appellant was remanded to judicial custody on 14-7-1997. The material objects which were seized were sent to Forensic Science laboratory and after receipt of the report from the said Laboratory, i. e. , Ex. P-12, p. W. 13 filed charge-sheet against the appellant for the offence under Section 302 ipc. ( 5 ) IN support of the case of the prosecution, p. Ws. 1 to 13 were examined and got exs. P-1 to P-12 marked. P. W. 1 is the wife and P. W. 2 is the son of the deceased. P. Ws. 3,4 and 5 are the eye-witnesses. P. W. 6 is the owner of the hotel, known as Ramu hotel. P. Ws. 7, 8 and 9 are panch witnesses for the inquest over the dead body of the deceased and seizure of the M. Os. P. W. 10 is the Medical Officer who conducted the autopsy. P. Ws. 11,12 and 13 are the Police officers. ( 6 ) ON a consideration of the entire material on record, the Court below held that the prosecution pro ved the guilt of the appellant herein beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as stated supra. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for appellant mr. Hari Prasad Reddy submitted that even if the case of the prosecution is accepted in its entirety, it does not fall under Section 302 ipc as nowhere it is elicited during the course of evidence that the petitioner with an intention to kill the deceased and with a premeditation has caused the injuries on the body of the deceased. The second submission madeby the learned counsel for the appellant is that though the prosecution examined the alleged eye-witnesses as P. Ws. 3 to 5, p. Ws. 4 and 5, they did not support the case of the prosecution. The second submission madeby the learned counsel for the appellant is that though the prosecution examined the alleged eye-witnesses as P. Ws. 3 to 5, p. Ws. 4 and 5, they did not support the case of the prosecution. He further contended that P. Ws. 1 and 2 are the wife and the son of the deceased and P. W. 3 is a police constable and they are all interested witnesses and that therefore their version, cannot be believed. The third submission made by learned counsel for the appellant is that the doctor who conducted post-mortem has not specifically stated that the injuries caused on the body of the deceased are the cause of death of the deceased. Learned counsel further contended that there is no direct evidence to establish that the appellant alone has inflicted the injuries on the body of the deceased and that the medical evidence does not specify that the injuries found on the body of the deceased are the cause for the death of the deceased. In view of the above evidence, he contended that it is not safe to convict the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302ipc. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the deceased is a known goonda and he is one of the accused in the murder case of one Venkat Reddy and there is possibility of anybody committing the murder of the deceased and foisting a case against the appellant. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, the learned Public prosecutor strongly opposed the submissions of the learned Advocate and submitted before us that the evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2 and 3 cannot be thrown away on the simple ground that P. Ws. 1,2 are related to the deceased and p. W. 3 is a police constable. It is further submitted that although P. Ws. 4 and 5 are declared hostile witnesses, their evidence categorically establishes that there was an altercation between the appellant and the deceased. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, fairly conceded that the medical evidence is perfunctory but submitted that simply on that ground the entire case of the prosecution need not be thrown out, as the occurrence of the incident was established by the eye-witnesses and the death occurred within an hour of the incident. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, fairly conceded that the medical evidence is perfunctory but submitted that simply on that ground the entire case of the prosecution need not be thrown out, as the occurrence of the incident was established by the eye-witnesses and the death occurred within an hour of the incident. Therefore, it can safely be inferred that the death is due to multiple injuries received by the deceased. To substantiate his con tent ions, he has relied upon a decision ot the apex Court in state of west Bengal v. Mir Mohammed Oman Learned public Prosecutor, in the alternative, argued that if this court is of the view that the medical evidence is not sufficient, this court can take further evidence as contemplated under section 391 of the Criminal Procedure Code. On this proposition, he relied upon a judgment of the apex court as reported in raghtmandan p. State of U. P. . ( 9 ) IN the light of the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and learned Public Prosecutor, the point for consideration is as to whether the deceased died of homicidal death or not and, if it is held that the death is homicidal, whether the accused is responsible for the said death. ( 10 ) FROM a perusal of the post-mortem report (Ex. P-7) and inquest report marked as ex. P-5, this court has no hesitation to hold that it is homicidal death. However in view of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, this court has to see whether it is a murder falling within the provisions of Section 300 or homicidal death not amounting to murder as per Section 299 of IPC. ( 11 ) IN this case, P. Ws. 2 and 3 are the eyewitnesses to the occurrence, P. W. 2 is the son of the deceased. According to his evidence, he is a student of 8th class and he used to assist his father in the hotel business daily after school hours. On the date of incident at about 8. 00 or 8. 30 p. m. , when the appellant came and asked him to see who are the persons present in Ramu s hotel, i. e. , the hotel belonging to P. W. 6. On the date of incident at about 8. 00 or 8. 30 p. m. , when the appellant came and asked him to see who are the persons present in Ramu s hotel, i. e. , the hotel belonging to P. W. 6. When P. W. 2 visited the said hotel and informed the appellant that nobody was present in the said hotel, the appellant went to the said ramu s hotel, returned back, took P. W. 2 to the said hotel and accosted him as to why he gave a false information that nobody was present in the said hotel although several persons were present and thus saying the appellant beat P. W. 2 on his buttocks. When p. W. 2 went and reported the matter to his father (deceased), the deceased and P. W. 2 went to the said hotel. Then the deceased questioned the appellant as to why he beat p. W. 2 and also slapped the appellant twice, on account of which he fell down. Immediately thereafter, the appellant took an empty bottle lying there, broken it and stabbed the deceased on the left side of the throat (neck ). ( 12 ) THE evidence of P. W. 3 is similar to the evidence of P. W. 2. According to P. W. 3, he is working in the Police Department and as he was on sick leave and as nobody was present at his house, he went to the hotel of Ramu i. e. , p. W. 6 at 8. 30 p. m. to have his meals. According to him also, when the deceased came along with his son (P. W. 2) and questioned the appellant as to why he beat his son and slapped the accused, the accused fell down and thereupon the accused took an empty bottle and stabbed the deceased. ( 13 ) IT is true that P. Ws. 4 and 5 who are cited as eye-witnesses to the scene of offence turned hostile. But, from their evidence, it can safely be inferred that the incident as alleged by the prosecution had taken place on 4-7-1997 at the hotel. In their chief examination, they stated that they know p. Ws. 1 to 3 and that on 4-7-1997, they along with P. W. 3 went to Ramu s hotel for taking meals at about 8,00 or 8. In their chief examination, they stated that they know p. Ws. 1 to 3 and that on 4-7-1997, they along with P. W. 3 went to Ramu s hotel for taking meals at about 8,00 or 8. 30 p. m. The deceased came to the upstairs of Ramu s hotel and questioned the appellant as to why he beat his son and slapped the appellant, on account of which he fell down. From the above evidence, this court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that there was a quarrel between the appellant and the deceased on that day at the hotel, during the course of which the appellant stabbed the deceased. But the question is whether the death occurred was only on account of the injuries received by the deceased in the said quarrel. The medical evidence on this aspect as spoken to by P. W. loisthathe examined the deceased at about 4. 00 p. m. on 5-7-1997 and found the following injuries: (1) Stab wound 4x1x4 cms. upper part left side of neck. (2) Lacerated wound 1 1/2 x 1/2 x 1/2 cm. left cheek. (3) Abrasion 1 x 1/2 cm. left foot sole. According to the evidence of P. W. 10. coupled with post-mortem certificate issued by him, the cause of death is due to the injuries. But, nowhere it is specified as to what are those injuries which are responsible for death. The learned Public Prosecutor who conducted the trial in the Court below ought to have been more careful in eliciting from the Medical Officer the nature of the injuries and as to whether they are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Under these circumstances, following the judgment cited by the learned Public Prosecutor in Raghunandan s case (2 supra), we are of the opinion that this matter needs to be remanded to the trial court for adducing further evidence, but in view of the fact that the death took place within half an hour from the time of offence (the incident in question took place at 8. 30 p. m. and the deceased died at about 9. 00 p. m.), we are not inclined to do so and proceed to dispose of the appeal with the evidence that is available on record. 30 p. m. and the deceased died at about 9. 00 p. m.), we are not inclined to do so and proceed to dispose of the appeal with the evidence that is available on record. ( 14 ) HAVING regard to the categorical evidence of eye-witnesses, this court is of the considered opinion that the death is due to the injuries sustained by the deceased. Now, the question is whether the offence committed by the accused is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder . Section 300 of IPC reads as follows:"section 300 - Murder: Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or secondly - if it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or thirdly - if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or fourthly - if the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid". ( 15 ) WHENEVER a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is murder of culpable homicide not amounting to murder , on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code is reached. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of murder contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder , punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions, enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be "culpable homicide not amounting to murder", punishable under the first part of Section 304 of the Indian penal Code. ( 16 ) COMING to the case on hand, from a narration of the events and also from the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 who are the direct eye witnesses to the scene of offence, we are unable to hold that the appellant had the "intention to cause the death" of the deceased. There was no enmity between the appellant and the deceased. Similarly, there was no premeditation and the alleged stabbing has taken place during the heat of passion. However, the appellant had the "intention to cause such bodily injury which is likely to cause death" and the appellant has knowledge that such bodily injury is likely to cause the death of the deceased. His intention was not to commit the act of murder, but to cause such bodily injury but with the knowledge thatsuchbodily injury may cause death. Therefore, we are of the considered view that although the act does not amount to murder as defined under Section 300 ipc, the same falls within the definition of section 299 IPC for which the appellant is liable for conviction under Section 304 Part II of IPC. ( 17 ) IN the light of the aforementioned discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the conviction and sentence imposed by the court below under Section 302 IPC is liable to be set aside and accordingly it is set aside. ( 17 ) IN the light of the aforementioned discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the conviction and sentence imposed by the court below under Section 302 IPC is liable to be set aside and accordingly it is set aside. However, the appellant is convicted for an offence punishable under Section 304 part II of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. ( 18 ) SUBJECT to the above modification, the appeal is partly allowed.