JUDGMENT 1. - The second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 24.9.2001 passed by the first appellate court, by which it affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 16.1.1999, by which the suit of the respondent-plaintiff for ejectment of the appellant-defendant from the tenanted premises had been decreed. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the respondent-plaintiff purchased the tenanted premises in 1978 and at that time, the appellant-defendant was a tenant in the suit premises. The respondent- plaintiff had purchased two shops adjacent to each other and subsequently filed suits for eviction against both the tenants on the ground of bona fide need alongwith other issues. However, so far as the present appeal is concerned, the grounds of bona fide need, non-payment of rent, making material alteration in the suit premises were taken. So far as the suit in respect of other adjacent shop was concerned, it had been decreed and the said tenant vacated the shop. In the present case, admittedly the defendant contested the suit and in view of the pleadings, large number of issues were framed, including bona fide need, comparative hardship, partial eviction and as to whether the need of the landlord got satisfied by eviction of the other tenant in the adjacent shop, non-payment of rent, i.e. default. The trial Court considered the issue of bona fide need, alongwith evaporation of the need by ejectment of other shop and decided in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. The issue of comparative hardship was also decided in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. On the issue of partial eviction, the Court held that partial eviction would not serve the purpose for the reason that the landlord needed one shop for preparation of food-stuff and another shop for serving the same. On the issue of material alteration, the Court held that no material alteration had been made by the appellant-defendant. For a particular period, the appellant was found to be defaulter in payment of rent but being the first default, he was held entitled for the benefit of the statutory provisions. In view of the above, the suit was decreed by the trial Court. 3. For a particular period, the appellant was found to be defaulter in payment of rent but being the first default, he was held entitled for the benefit of the statutory provisions. In view of the above, the suit was decreed by the trial Court. 3. The first appellate Court affirmed the findings on all the issues and also took into consideration the application filed by the appellant-defendant under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code"), wherein the judgment and decree in respect of eviction of the other shop was taken on record to determine as to whether the eviction of the other tenant in the adjacent shop would serve the need of the landlord. Hence this second appeal. 4. Mr. R.R. Nagori, learned counsel for the appellant has raised all the issues which had been raised by the appellant-defendant in the Courts below and submitted that large number of questions of law are involved; the Courts below did not consider the material evidence on record; the issue of bona fide need was not considered objectively; the first appellate Court did not consider the application of the appellant under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code objectively and mis-interpreted the provisions of the statute. In support of his submissions regarding bona fide need and comparative hardship, he has placed reliance upon certain judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, e.g. In M/s. Central Tobacco Co. Ltd., Bangalore v. Chandra Prakash, 1969 AIR CJ 702 ; the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court has to consider the totality of the circumstances including whether other reasonable accommodation was available for the landlord, as well as for the tenant. 5. In Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishanker Tribhoyan, AIR 1981 SC 1690 , the issue of comparative hardship was considered and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is one of the important factor in considering the question of greater hardship as to whether reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant. 6. In Jivram Ranchhoddas Thakkar & Anr v. Tulshiram Ratanchand Mantri & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1357 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines to decide the issue of partial eviction. 7. In Liaq Ahmed & Ors. 6. In Jivram Ranchhoddas Thakkar & Anr v. Tulshiram Ratanchand Mantri & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1357 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the guidelines to decide the issue of partial eviction. 7. In Liaq Ahmed & Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman, AIR 2000 SCW 2604 , the Apex Court observed that the Rent Control Act is a piece of social legislation which seeks to strike a balance between the rights of the landlord and the requirement of the tenant. 8. Undoubtedly, the second appeal can be entertained only on a substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been taking a very serious view of the matter emphasising that the High Courts should not entertain a second appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code") unless it raises a substantial question of law. In Panchu Gopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1041 , the Court observed that while entertaining the second appeal, the Court should not over-look the change brought about by the Amendment Act of 1976 restricting the scope of second appeal drastically and now it applies only to appeals involving substantial question of law, specifically set-out in the memorandum of appeals and formulated by the High Court. The Court, for the reasons to be recorded, may also entertain a second appeal even on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if the Court is satisfied that the case involves such a question. Therefore, the existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the amended provisions of Section 100 of the Code. It is the obligation on the Court of Law to further the clear intendment of Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. 9. Similarly, in Kondiba Dagadu Kadain v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 2213 , the Apex Court held that right of appeal is a creation of the Statute. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force, ensuring the full compliance of the conditions mentioned in the provision. Therefore, the Court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provision. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force, ensuring the full compliance of the conditions mentioned in the provision. Therefore, the Court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provision. Second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on substantial question of law, something distinct from the substantial question of fact. The Court cannot entertain the second appeal unless the substantial question of law is involved. 10. In Kashibai v. Parwatibai, (1995) 6 SCC 273 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court cannot ignore the statutory provisions of Section 100 of the Code and re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of facts unless the substantial question of law or a question of law duly formulated is to be decided. The second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence. 11. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2517 , the Supreme Court observed that while deciding the second appeals, mandatory statutory requirements are seldom borne in mind and second appeals are being entertained without conforming to the above discipline. It further placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Mahendra & Mahendra Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 798 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : ....... It is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100. Under the proviso, the Court should be `satisfied' that the case involves a substantial question of law and not a mere question of law. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be recorded by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same, it is not any legal plea that would be alleged at a stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." 12. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." 12. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. & Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2730 , the Supreme Court held that existence of substantial question of law in a sine-qua-non for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 of the Code and entering into the question as to whether need of the landlord was bona fide or not, was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court as the issue can be decided only by appreciating the evidence on record. 13. Similar view has been reiterated in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331 ; State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652 ; Rajapps Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 2108 ; Santakumari & Ors. v. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma, (2000) 7 SCC 60 ; Satyamma v. Basamma (Dead) by LRs., (2000) 8 SCC 567 ; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965 ; Kulwant Kaur & Ors. v. Gurdial Singh Mann, AIR 2001 SC 1273 ; M.S.V. Raja v. Seeni Thevar, (2001) 6 SCC 652 ; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed & Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 189 ; V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal, AIR 2001 SC 2446 & Neelakantan & Ors. v. Mallika Begum, (2002) 2 SCC 440 . 14. There may be a question, which may be a "question of fact", "question of law", "mixed question of fact and law" and "substantial question of law". Question means anything inquired; an issue to be decided. The "question of fact" is whether a particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, in the Realm of Jurisprudence, has been explained as under : "A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way of demonstration. A question of opinion is one that cannot be so answered. An answer to it is a matter of speculation which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right or wrong." (Vide Salmond, on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. page 69, cited in Gadakh Yashwantrao Kantarrao v. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 678 ). 15. A question of opinion is one that cannot be so answered. An answer to it is a matter of speculation which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right or wrong." (Vide Salmond, on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. page 69, cited in Gadakh Yashwantrao Kantarrao v. E.V. alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 678 ). 15. In Smt. Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narayan Roy & Ors., AIR 1947 PC 19 , the Privy Council has provided the guidelines as in what cases the second appeal can be entertained, explaining the provisions existing prior to the amendment of 1976, observing as under: "....... that miscarriage of justice means such a departure from the rules which permeate all judicial procedure as to make that which happen not in the proper sense of the word `judicial procedure' at all. That the violation of some principles of law or procedure must be such erroneous proposition of law that if that proposition to be corrected, the finding cannot stand, or it may be the neglect of some principle of law or procedure, whose application will have the same effect. The question whether there is evidence on which the Courts could arrive at their finding, is such a question of law. "That the question of admissibility of evidence is a proposition of law but it must be such as to affect materially the finding. The question of the value of evidence is not sufficient reason for departure from the practice ....." 16. In Suwalal Chhogalal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1949) 17 ITR 269 , the Apex Court held as under : "A fact is a fact irrespective of evidence, by which it is proved. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case is when it is alleged that there is no material on which the conclusion can be based or no sufficient evidence." 17. The only time a question of law can arise in such a case is when it is alleged that there is no material on which the conclusion can be based or no sufficient evidence." 17. In Original Investment Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 852 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered large number of its earlier judgments, including Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1957 SC 49 , and held that where the question of decision is whether certain profit is made and shown in the name of certain intermediaries, were, in fact, profit actually earned by the assessee or the intermediaries, is a mixed question of fact and law. The Court further held that inference from facts would be a question of fact or of law according as the point for determination is one of pure fact or a "mixed question of law and fact" and that a finding on fact without evidence to support it or if based on relevant or irrelevant matters, is not unassailable. 18. In Sir Chunnilal V. Mehta & Sons v. Centuary Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , the Supreme Court held as under : "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raises in the case is substantial, would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 19. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of J & K v. Thakur Ganga Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356 , considered as what may be the substantial question and held that authentic interpretation of the Constitutional provisions amounts to substantial question of law. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in State of J & K v. Thakur Ganga Singh, AIR 1960 SC 356 , considered as what may be the substantial question and held that authentic interpretation of the Constitutional provisions amounts to substantial question of law. However, where the substantial question of law had already been decided by the Authority which is binding on the other Courts like the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court u/Art. 141 of the Constitution is binding on all other Courts etc., it does not remain a substantial question of law because there remains no scope to interpret further the said provision. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Apex Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments in Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41 ; Ram Kishan Dalmia v. Justice Tandolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 & Mohammed Haneef Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 . The same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Swaroop v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682 . 20. In Reserve Bank of India v. Ramakrishna Govind Morey, AIR 1976 SC 830 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether trial Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently, is not a question of law or a substantial question of law and, therefore, second appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court on this ground. 21. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of the Courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter. [Vide Jagdish Singh v. Nathu Singh, AIR 1992 SC 1604 ; Smt. Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 ; Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 ; Raghuvendra Kumar v. Firm Prem.Machinery & Co., AIR 2000 SC 534 & Molar Mal vs. M/s. Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261 ]. 22. The provisions of Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, certain expressions like "reasonable" and "bona fide need". 23. 22. The provisions of Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, certain expressions like "reasonable" and "bona fide need". 23. The expression "reasonable" means: rational, i.e. based on reasons; not excessive or immoderate; something conformable or agreeable to reasons; having regard to the facts of a particular case; something not per se preposterous or absurd; something within the limits or reasons. [Vide Raghuvir Singh v. Commissioner, Income Tax, AIR 1958 Pb. 250 & M/s. Kelvin Cinema v. State of Assam, AIR 1996 Gau. 103 ]. 24. In R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the same expression, observed as under:- "The action is called `reasonable' which an informed, intelligent, just minded civilised man would rationally favours. The concept of `reasonableness' does not exclude notions of morality and ethics." 25. The word "reasonable" implies intelligence, care and deliberation with, as a course, which reason dictates. [Vide Chintamanrao & Anr. v. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118 ; P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 1016 & M/s. Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 331. 26. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s. Jaggannath Ashok Kumar & Anr., AIR 1987 SC 2316 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the word "reasonable" has, in law, the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances, of which the actor called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. 27. In Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 977 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word `reasonable'; the reason varies in its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks ... 28. Thus, it is evident that the expression "reasonable" means rational, based on reason and should not be arbitrary, whimsical and unreasonable.BONA FIDE NEED : 29. "Bona fide" means : something more than a desire or wish; in good faith or genuinely; in other words, it conveys absence of intent to deceive; something done with care and attention. The phrase relates with things and actions which have relation to mind or motive of an individual. It connotes good faith, which is suggestive of honesty of purpose. "Bona fide" means : something more than a desire or wish; in good faith or genuinely; in other words, it conveys absence of intent to deceive; something done with care and attention. The phrase relates with things and actions which have relation to mind or motive of an individual. It connotes good faith, which is suggestive of honesty of purpose. [Vide Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Devi Tekchand, AIR 1965 Pb. 188 ; Sohan Lal v. Poonam Chand, AIR 1961 Raj. 32 ; Kumari Leena Gupta v. Institute of Medical Science, Banaras Hindu University, AIR 1989 All.L.J. 676 & Girja Debi v. The Rent Control & Eviction Officer, AIR 1965 All. 366 ]. 30. Bona fide need is not merely a ruse to get rid of the tenant from the suit premises. [Vide Joginder Pal (supra)]. 31. In Ram Chandra v. Ishwar Chandra & Ors., (1988) 3 SCC 131 , the Supreme Court considered as what constitutes the "bona fide need" of the landlord for the purpose of rent control matters, observing as under:- "It is, no doubt, true that the question whether the requirement of a landlord is bona fide or not, is essentially one of fact, notwithstanding the circumstances that a finding of fact in that behalf is a secondary and infrantial fact drawn from other primary and perceptive one. All the conclusions drawn from primary facts are not necessarily questions of law. They can be, and quite often, are pure questions of fact ..... But the essential idea basic to all such cases is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith; and that further, the Court must also consider it reasonably to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession, how honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element in it and that desire, to become a `requirement' in law, must have the objective element of a `need'. It must also be such that the Court considers it as reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing so, the Court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded by law, tenant is not rendered merely illusory and writtled down. It is something out from absolute necessity but more than mere desire or a mere requirement." 32. In doing so, the Court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded by law, tenant is not rendered merely illusory and writtled down. It is something out from absolute necessity but more than mere desire or a mere requirement." 32. In M/s. Bega Begum & Anr v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 , the words `reasonable requirement', as contained in J & K Houses and Shopping Land Control Act, 1966, is concerned, were interpreted and explained as under: "Reasonable requirement, which, undoubtedly, postulates that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or which; the distinction between a desire and need should doubtlessly be kept in mind but not so as to make even the tenant's need as nothing but a desire ..... The connotation of the term ..... should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or stained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree of eviction. Such a course would deviate the very purpose of the act which afforded the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds." 33. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Phiorze Bamanji Desai v. Chandra Kant Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 . 34. In Bapubhai Mohanbhai v. Mahila Sahkari Udyog Mandir, AIR 1975 SC 2128 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that whether the requirement of the landlord is reasonable or not, is to be Judged from all the facts and circumstances and a highly relevant circumstances bearing on the reasonableness of the landlord's requirement is that the purpose for which the possession is sought, is a purpose for which the premises cannot be used save on pale of the penal consequences. The Court must be vigilant that the provisions of the law should not be interrupted in such away that it may encourage the breach of the statutory provisions itself. 35. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the landlord is the best judge of his need and when a landlord asserts that he requires the building for his own occupation, the Court or the Tribunal should not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 100 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the landlord is the best judge of his need and when a landlord asserts that he requires the building for his own occupation, the Court or the Tribunal should not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. If he fulfils the conditions stipulated in the statute and landlord shows his prima facie case, the Court/Tribunal has to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. The Court observed as under: "When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by the Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate the terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fide of the requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself." 36. In Smt. Prativa Devi (supra), it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the landlord is the best Judge of his residential requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is no concern of the Courts to take to the landlord how and in what manner he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard thereon. Thus, the matter is to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties and in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Similar view has been reiterated in Raghuvendra Kumar (supra); and R.C. Tamrakar & Anr v. Nidilekha, (2000) 8 SCC 431. 37. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mukesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under : "Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in good faith : genuine". The word "genuine" means "natural : not spurious : real : pure : sincere". In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean "good faith, without fraud or deceit". Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The word "genuine" means "natural : not spurious : real : pure : sincere". In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whitley define bona fide to mean "good faith, without fraud or deceit". Thus the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bona fide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretense or pretext to evict a tenant. ....... . The Judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide.......... The Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the Court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need ........ An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pendantic must be guarded against." 38. In Deenanath v. Puranmal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that findings of fact recorded by the Court below can also be reversed in second appeal if they are shown to have been taken without considering the statutory mandate for the reason that every finding mst be in consonance with the statutory mandate. The Court further held that bona fide requirement of land lord means that there must be actually pressing need not a whim or fancy desire. It must be present need and also the land lord must be in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. 39. The Court further held that bona fide requirement of land lord means that there must be actually pressing need not a whim or fancy desire. It must be present need and also the land lord must be in possession of reasonably suitable accommodation of his own in the town or city concerned. 39. In Johan Mathai Abbraham v. British Physical Laboratory (India) Ltd., (2001) 9 SCC 691 , the Supreme Court held that being in occupation in a portion of the building having a fraction, undoubtedly share in it cannot be held a buyer to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for the reason that he may require the other portion for professional activity in the premises where he was living. 40. In Shashi Kapila v. R.P. Ashwin, (2002) 1 SCC 583 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that bona fide requirement of the landlord cannot be questioned on the ground that sometimes in the past, he wanted to dispose of the tenanted premises. Even if there is an agreement to sell in respect of the said premises, the landlord cannot be said to be un-suited on that ground. 41. In Kannimmal v. Chellaram, (2002) 4 SCC 627 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while dealing with a case of eviction on the ground of bona fide need, the Court or Tribunal must be careful as for what purpose the eviction is sought and whether the tenanted premises can be used for that purpose or suitable for that purpose. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Shri Bala Gnesan Metals v. M.N. Shanmughan Chetty, (1987) 2 SCC 707 , wherein it was held that if a person wants the eviction of a tenanted premises for commercial purpose, there may be surplus accommodation meant for residential purpose with the landlord but not being suitable for commercial purpose, the said factor would not tilt the balance in favour of the tenant. 42. In Siddalingamina & Anr v. Maratha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "The concept of bona fide need or bona fide requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life and approach either too liberal or too conservative or pendantic must be guarded against. 42. In Siddalingamina & Anr v. Maratha Shenoy, (2001) 8 SCC 561 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : "The concept of bona fide need or bona fide requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life and approach either too liberal or too conservative or pendantic must be guarded against. If the land lord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compell him to squeeze himself and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation in tenanted premises." 43. Similar view has been reiterated in Kempaiah v. Lingaiah & Ors., (2001) 8 SCC 718 holding that there must be a requirement in realities. The real distinction between `desire' and `requirement' lies in circumstances of the need. There is an element of "must have" in the case of `requirement' which is not present in the case of mere `desire'. The term reasonable and bona fide requirement are complementary and supplementary to each other in the context. 44. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr., (1999) 4 SCC 1 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that when the legislature employ the two terms i.e. reasonable and bona fide requirement together, the message took part is that requirement must be rally genuine from any reasonable standard. 45. Thus, in view of the above, it is clear that the landlord is the best Judge of his need and he cannot be asked to accommodate himself in a lesser accommodation so that the tenant may not be evicted. A person has a right to maintain his living-standard according to his status and financial condition. The Court is bound to take note of the requirements of the statutory provisions and once the Court is satisfied regarding the reasonableness and genuineness of the claim of the landlord, it is bound to up-hold it. 46. In the instant case, it has been the case of the respondent-plaintiff that he had purchased two shops adjacent to each other so that he can prepare the food-stuff in one shop and serve the same in the another shop and may have a residential house over the said two shops. The finding has been recorded by both the Courts below that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide. The finding has been recorded by both the Courts below that the need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide. Moreso, the appellant never tried to find out any alternative accommodation. The partial eviction would not serve the purpose for the reason that the plea raised by the appellant-defendant was not acceptable that the landlord could prepare the food-stuffs on the road belonging to the municipal corporation and serve the food-stuff in the restaurant. There is nothing on record to show that the findings of facts recorded by the Courts below on the issues of bona fide requirement, partial eviction and comparative hardship can be held to be perverse being based on no evidence or contrary to the evidence on record. Even the application of the appellant filed under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code has been dealt with by the appellate Court in accordance with law for the reason that it recorded the finding that the eviction from one shop gave an opportunity to the landlord to open a restaurant but that makes it more necessary for him to have the suit property for preparation of food-stuff. 47. The aforesaid issues are pure questions of facts. No substantial question of law is involved. Therefore, I am not inclined to interfere in the second appeal. 48. The first appeal was dismissed by the first appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 24.9.2001. A period of about eleven months has already expired. In the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the appellant is in possession of the suit premises for a long time and may get some time to find out a suitable accommodation, he may hand-over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property upto 31.3.2003. During this period, he shall not induct any tenant or make any alteration in the suit premises and shall pay the monthly rent regularly by 15th of every month and shall file an undertaking to this effect with the trial Court within the period of three weeks from today. 49. With these observations, the second appeal stands dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******