JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner seeks to quash and set aside the orders dated April 7, 1997 and May 20, 1999 passed by Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, whereby the application under Sec.33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 moved by the petitioner (for short 'Act') was dismissed. 2. Brief resume' of the case is that the Labour Court, Jaipur vide award dated August 1, 1985 answered the reference in favour the respondent workman and held that the termination of services of the workman w.e.f. August 8, 1981 was illegal and the petitioner was directed to reinstate the workman with back wages. The petitioner was reinstated in the services w.e.f. February 19, 1986 in view of the interim order passed by the High Court. On the allegation of misconduct two charge sheets dated July 2, 1990 and July 8, 1990 were served on the petitioner and after regular departmental enquiry the petitioner was held guilty and dismissed from the services on April 8, 1992. The went petition preferred by the petitioner against the said award dated August 1, 1985 was allowed, thereafter by the Hi h Court vide order dated May 13, 1993 the case was remanded to Labour Court. Prior to decision of the High Court, industrial dispute for Bonus etc., was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur. An application under Sec.33(2)(b) of the Act moved by the petitioner for seeking approval was pending. With the passing of the order dated May 13, 1993 by the High Court the Industrial Tribunal dismissed the application treating it as infructuous. The Labour Court pursuant to the direction o the High Court decided the reference vide award dated April 21, 1994 with the direction to reinstate the respondent workman. The writ petition and special appeal preferred by the petitioner against the said award was dismissed. Thereafter the petitioner again filed application under Sec.33(2)(b of the Act, but the same was dismissed vide order dated October 30, 1994. The workman also filed application to reopen the proceedings earlier dosed by the Industrial Tribunal,which was allowed on November 15, 1996 for examining the application under Sec.33(2)(b) on merits and the case was fixed for examining t e fairness of the departmental enquiry. The workman also filed application to reopen the proceedings earlier dosed by the Industrial Tribunal,which was allowed on November 15, 1996 for examining the application under Sec.33(2)(b) on merits and the case was fixed for examining t e fairness of the departmental enquiry. In the meanwhile the High Court decided the writ petition on March 20, 1997 and in view of this the Industrial Tribunal closed the proceedings vide order dated April 7, 1997 observing that in view of finding recorded in the judgment dated March 20, 1997 no further adjudication was required in the application filed under Sec.33(2)(b). Thereafter the petitioner again filed application for recalling the order dated April 7, 1997, but the same was rejected vide order dated May 20, 1999. Against the orders dated April 7, 1997 and May 20, 1999, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. I have heard the rival submissions and carefully scanned the material on record. 4. Placing reliance on the ratio indicated in (1) 1959 RLW 650, (2) 1977 LIC 1039 and (3) 1984(2) SLR 124 , Mr. Ajay Rastogi learned counsel made scathing criticism of the impugned orders and prayed the impugned orders be set aside and the Industrial Tribunal be directed to examined' application filed by the petitioner under Sec. 33(2)(b) on merits in relation to the fairness of enquiry on the basis of which the workman was dismissed from service vide order dated April 8, 1992. 5. I do not find any merit in the submission of the learned counsel in view of the ratio propounded by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in (4) T.N. State Transport Corporation v. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam (2001) 9 SCC 99 and (5) Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Bank Ltd. v. Shri Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors., JT 2002 (1) SC 182. In T.N. State Transport Corporation (supra) it was held as under: "While the employer has the discretion to initiate a departmental enquiry and pass an order of dismissal or discharge against the workman the order remains in an inchoate state till the employer obtains order of approval from the Tribunal. By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de facto the relationship of employer and employee may be ended but not the de jure relationship for that could happen only when the Tribunal accords its approval. By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de facto the relationship of employer and employee may be ended but not the de jure relationship for that could happen only when the Tribunal accords its approval. The relationship of employer and employee is not legally terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given by the Tribunal." 6. In Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Bank Ltd. (supra) the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated that : "Where an application is made under section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practise; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as it order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed." 7. It appears that the learned Industrial Tribunal dismissed the application under Sec.33(2)(b) of the petitioner in view of the order dated March 20, 1997 of the High Court which read thus : "As the matter stands now, I am of the considered view that the petitioner should be deemed to be in continuous service. On the question of the subsequent termination of his service, no formal approval having been taken within the meaning of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the net effect is that he continues in service and the subsequent order of termination of his services would not be deemed to be operative. On the question of the subsequent termination of his service, no formal approval having been taken within the meaning of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the net effect is that he continues in service and the subsequent order of termination of his services would not be deemed to be operative. While the final decision is to be arrived at by the Labour Court again on these two specified questions, I would make it clear that the petitioner Shankar Lal would be deemed to be in continuous service and it would not be construed that the Award as made by the Labour Court as regards directing reinstatement of the workman Shankar Lal Sharma has in any manner been set aside or recalled." 8. Learned Industrial Tribunal in the order dated May 20, 1999 observed that the Tribunal has no power to review the earlier order and since the petitioner indirectly sought the review of the order dated April 7, 1997 after an inordinate delay, the application of the petitioner dated January 8, 1999 deserved to be dismissed. 9. The Division Bench of this Court in (6) K.C. Bajaj v. State of Rajasthan (2001 (3) RLR 120) held that Tribunal being quasi judicial authority has no inherent power to review its earlier judgment unless the earlier judgment is ex-parte. 10. For the reasons aforementioned, I am of the opinion that the Tribunal has rightly passed the impugned orders. The writ petition being devoid of merits stands dismissed without any order as to costs.Petition Dismissed. *******