S. B. Sinha ( 1 ) THIS writ petition is directed against a judgment and order dated 19th November, 1983 passed by Mr. S. P. Singh, Additional District Judge/ appellate Authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to for the sake of brevity as the said Act ) in P. P. A. No. (s) 21/82 and 22/82, whereby and whereunder the appeals filed by the. writ petitioners herein purported to be in terms of Section 9 thereof arising out of an order dated 8th September, 1980 passed by Estate Officer, Life Insurance Corporation of india, in case No. 13/77 were dismissed. ( 2 ) THE basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. A mezzanine floor of the premises in question was left out by M/s. Tropical insurance Company in favour of one Uttam Prakash Bansal in the year 1950. He entered into a partnership with one Deen Dayal Kaushik. In the premises in question office of the firm was opened. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners herein rent used to be paid by both the partners of the said M/s. Tropical Insurance Company to the landlord to which they never objected. ( 4 ) IN the year 1965, in terms of the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity as the lic Act ) all the insurance Companies, including that of the Tropical Insurance Company, were nationalized. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the provisions of the LIC Act the building in question was also taken over by the respondent No. 1. Rent for occupation of the said building continued to be paid from the account of M/s. Uttam parkash and Company. ( 5 ) MR. Uttam Parkash Bansal thereafter from time-to-time took other partners in the said firm and old partners thereof either continued or retired. ( 6 ) ALLEGEDLY during emergency Sh. Uttam Parkash Bansal was detained under misa and during his period of detention cheques for and on behalf of M/s. Uttam parkash and Company used to be signed by other partners. Although two cheques in the denomination of Rs. 280/- and Rs. 210/- were accepted, a third cheque issued by said partnership firm was not accepted. The same was returned alleging that the cheque was issued by a third party. Although two cheques in the denomination of Rs. 280/- and Rs. 210/- were accepted, a third cheque issued by said partnership firm was not accepted. The same was returned alleging that the cheque was issued by a third party. Thereafter notice under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as t. P. Act ) was served upon the aforementioned Uttam Parkash Bansal inter alia on the ground that he had sub-let the said premises unauthorisedly by inducting S/shri ram Dev, Vinod Kumar and Nand Kishore. By reason of the said notice vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in question was demanded by 31st May, 1976. ( 7 ) A proceeding in terms of the provisions of the said Act was thereafter initiated. Yet again a notice under Section 4 of the said Act was issued by the Life insurance Corporation (in short lic ) on or about 9th February, 1977 alleging therein that as the tenant had failed to hand over the possession, he was liable to be evicted. In the said proceedings damages for wrongful use and occupation were also sought for @ Rs. 883. 20p. per month till such time the vacant and peaceful possession of the premises is handed over to the LIC. The said notices are said to have been duly replied to. However, in the second notice the purpose for which the eviction of the tenant was sought for had not been stated. ( 8 ) NOTICE issued under Section 4 and Sub-section (1) as also notice under section 7, Sub-section (3) of the said Act were served. ( 9 ) IN the said proceeding witnesses were examined before the Estate Officer. By the order dated 8th September, 1980 the Estate Officer passed order of eviction as also payment of damages against Shri Uttam Parkash Bansal and his partners. Against the said orders appeals were preferred by the petitioners herein. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said appeals had been dismissed. ( 10 ) MR. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would inter alia submit that having regard to the fact that rent had been accepted from the firm, the partnership firm itself became a tenant and, in that view of the matter, the entire proceeding was vitiated in law. ( 10 ) MR. A. S. Chandhiok, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would inter alia submit that having regard to the fact that rent had been accepted from the firm, the partnership firm itself became a tenant and, in that view of the matter, the entire proceeding was vitiated in law. The learned Counsel would contend that from the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the petitioners and, particularly RW1 Shiv Lal, it would appear that the cheques issued by the partnership firm had been accepted. ( 11 ) LEARNED Counsel relying on or on the basis of a resolution passed on 30th may, 2002 would inter alia submit that having regard to the fact that Ministry of urban Development and Poverty Alleviation has issued the guidelines, the same should have been followed, before a proceeding for eviction could be initiated. In any event, the learned Counsel would contend that notice under Section 106 of the transfer of Property Act being not in accordance with law, the entire proceeding was vitiated. ( 12 ) MR. S. K. Taneja, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, would, on the other hand, submit that in terms of the provisions of section 106 of the T. P. Act no ground is required to be stated for eviction. It is the inherent right of the landlord to issue such a notice and, in the event, said notice is found to be legal and valid the tenancy comes to an end, whereafter a proceeding under the said Act would be permissible in law. According to the learned Counsel, the guidelines issued by the Ministry is not at all binding and once it is found that the tenant has become an unauthorized occupant a proceeding under the said Act can be initiated. Reliance, in this connection, has been placed upon decisions in jiwan Dass v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Another, reported in 1994 suppl. (3)SCC 694:1994 RLR (SC)189;m/s. Jaininkmanufacturingcompanyv. Life insurance Corporation of India and Another, reported in AIR 1981 SC 670 ; Ashoka marketing Ltd. and Another v. Punjab National Bank and Others, reported in AIR 1991 SC 855 , and Dr. K. R. K. Talivarv. Union of India and Another, reported in AIR 1977 Delhi 189. ( 13 ) IT is not in dispute that Sh. Life insurance Corporation of India and Another, reported in AIR 1981 SC 670 ; Ashoka marketing Ltd. and Another v. Punjab National Bank and Others, reported in AIR 1991 SC 855 , and Dr. K. R. K. Talivarv. Union of India and Another, reported in AIR 1977 Delhi 189. ( 13 ) IT is not in dispute that Sh. Uttam Parkash Bansal was the sole tenant Only because he entered into a partnership and rent was being paid by the partnership firm; the same, by itself in our opinion, would not mean that the partnership firm itself became a tenant. There is nothing on records to show that the right of tenancy- was drawn into common hotch-potch of the partnership so as to make the said right a part of the properties belonging to the partnership firm. It is also not in dispute that, irrespective of the changes in the constitution of the partnership firm, the said uttam Parkash Bansal continued as a partner. It is not the case of the petitioners that he upon constitution of the partnership gave up possession of the said premises in favour of the firm. No evidence either oral or documentary has been brought on record to show that he had ever transferred his tenancy right in favour of the aforementioned partnership firm. It further stands admitted that the constitution of the partnership was changed from time-to-time. The name of the partnership firm was also changed from time-to-time. Present partnership, which had been continuing, did not exist when the disputed property was taken on rent. ( 14 ) APART from the alleged acceptance of rent, there is nothing on record to show that the respondents herein, at any point of time, acknowledged the said partnership firm and/or partners of the said partnership firm as their tenants so as to enable the Court to arrive at a finding of fact that a relationship of landlord and tenant came into being. ( 15 ) THE Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 was enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. ( 15 ) THE Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 was enacted to provide for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. "public Premises" had been defined in Section 2 (e) of the said Act to mean (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat; (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of, (i) any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than fifty-one percent of the paid up share capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company. (ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central government. (iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act. (iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961. (v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts act, 1963. (vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 and that Board as and when re-named as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under Subsection (6) of Section 80 of that Act; (vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory situated in the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in any other union Territory. (viii) any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924), and (3) in relation to the (National Capital Territory of Delhi) (i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee, (ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority, and (iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the Government of any union Territory. "unauthorised Occupation" has been defined in Section 2 (g) to mean " (g) "unauthorised occupation", relation to any public premises, means the occupant on by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. " ( 16 ) IT is not and cannot be disputed that the premises in question is a public premises. The respondent is a statutory body and is owned and controlled by the central Government. ( 17 ) ONCE the premises in question is held to be a public premises within the meaning of the provisions of the said Act, a proceeding thereunder would be maintainable. Section 4 of the said Act provides the manner in which notice to show cause against the order of eviction is to be issued. Sections of the said Act authorises eviction of unauthorised occupants. Once the Estate Officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, he had the requisite jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. ( 18 ) IN S. N. Bhatia v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. , reported in 2000 (l)CHN 680 it is observed: "7. The legislative competence of the Parliament was not in dispute in this application. The object of enacting the Public Premises Act was to provide a special remedy in respect to the eviction of unauthorised occupants of governmental premises by avoiding a long-term legal process. It must have been the intention of the Legislature in promulgating the enactment that the recovery of Government properties from unauthorised occupants required special laws expediting the process of the general law. It must have been the intention of the Legislature in promulgating the enactment that the recovery of Government properties from unauthorised occupants required special laws expediting the process of the general law. Indeed the process of eviction under the general law was time-consuming and expensive. Therefore, there can be little doubt that the Public Premises Act had been enacted to ensure special consideration in respect to Government properties and which would be less expensive. " ( 19 ) IN jeevan Das (supra)it is clearly held that before issuing a notice determining the tenancy or revoking a licence, it is not necessary for the owner to assign any reason to establish that it was just and germane for the purpose, which could be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 20 ) RELYING on and referring to its earlier decision in Hari Singh and Ors. v. The military Estate Officer and Anr. reported in 1973 (1) SCR 515 as also in Ashoka marketing Ltd. and Anr. v. Punjab National Bank and Ors. reported in 1990 (4) SCC 406 , it was held that the scope of the provisions of the said Act cannot be cut down on the basis of the apprehension that the Corporations like the Nationalised Banks or lic, which are trading Corporations and cannot be prescribed from buying the property in possession of the tenants at a lowprice and then evicting the tenants after terminating tenancy and selling the property at a much higher value because the value of property in possession of tenants is much less as compared to vacant property. It was observed : "the consequence of giving overriding effect to the provisions of the Public premises Act is that premises belonging to companies and statutory bodies referred to in Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2 (e) of the Public Premises Act would be exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The actions of these companies and statutory bodies while dealing with their properties under the Public Premises Act will not have to be judged by the standard that they would not act as private landlords and their actions would be informed by reason and guided by public interest. Therefore, this Court had negatived the possibility of taking action against the tenants for letting out for higher rent or selling the property at a higher value. Therefore, this Court had negatived the possibility of taking action against the tenants for letting out for higher rent or selling the property at a higher value. " ( 21 ) REFERRING to the provisions of Section 106 of the T. P. Act as also the definition of "unauthorised occupation" as contained in Section 2 (g) of the said Act, it was observed: "when the statute has advisedly given wide power to the Public Authorities under the Act to determine the tenancy, it is not permissible to cut down the width of the power by reading into it the reasonable and justifiable grounds for initiating action for terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the T. P. Act. " ( 22 ) IN M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company (supra), the Apex Court held that the scope and object of the premises Act is different from that of the Rent Act. It was observed : 9. . . . . . . . . . The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises Act inasmuch as it applies to all private premises which do not fall within the limited exceptions indicated in Section 2 of the Premises Act. The object of the rent Act is to afford special protection to all the tenants or private landlords or landlords who are neither a Corporation nor Government or Corporate bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special category has been carved out under Section 25b which provides for special procedure for eviction of landlords who require premises for their personal necessity. Thus, Section 25b itself becomes a special law within the Rent Act. On a parity of reasoning, therefore, there can be no doubt that the Premises Act as compared to the Rent Act, which has a very broad spectrum, is a special Act and override the provisions of the Rent Act. 10. It was also suggested by Mr. Rao that in view of Section 3 (a) of the Rent Act, which is extracted below, it would appear that the intention of the Legislature in passing the Rent Act was merely to exclude from its operation only premises belonging to the Government and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies or Corporations, then Section 3 (a) should have been differently worded : 3. Nothing in this Act shall apply : (a) to any premises belonging to the Government. thus, in our opinion, does not advance the case of the appellant any further because once the Premises Act becomes a Special Act dealing with premises belonging to Central Government, Corporations and other statutory Bodies, the Rent Act stands superseded. We have to consider the provisions of the two acts, they having been passed by the same Legislature, viz. , Parliament, and the rule of harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases. " ( 23 ) WE may notice that in Dr. K. R. K. Talwar (supra), this Court clearly held : 6. Let us consider the validity of each of these orders and the scope of judicial review in respect of each of them (A) the definition of unauthorised occupation in Section 2 (e) of the Act is the occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. The authority for the occupation of Dr. Talwar was the original allotment or lease granted to him. When this lease was terminated or allotment was cancelled, that authority disappeared and he became a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises. The non-payment of rent by the petitioner for a long time was an overwhelmingly sufficient reason for the termination of the lease and the cancellation of the allotment. The petitioner s Counsel contended that the real reason for such action was the suspicion of the authorities that the premises had been sub-let by dr. Talwar to Shri Batra. The lessor or the allotter has an absolute right to terminate the lease or cancel the allotment. It is not permissible in the course of judicial review to probe into the reasons for such action. The justifiability of such an action is not open to judicial review at all. Moreover, the non-payment of rent for a long time was a complete justification for such an action. (B) The order of eviction was passed after Dr. Talwar had the fullest opportunity of showing cause why he should not be evicted from the premises. Before the Estate Officer, Dr. Talwar pleaded that his allotment should not have been cancelled. Moreover, the non-payment of rent for a long time was a complete justification for such an action. (B) The order of eviction was passed after Dr. Talwar had the fullest opportunity of showing cause why he should not be evicted from the premises. Before the Estate Officer, Dr. Talwar pleaded that his allotment should not have been cancelled. But the Estate Officer rightly held that he was not to sit in judgment over the sufficiency of administrative reasons for cancellation of allotment. He found that a notice for more than 15 days had been given to Dr. Talwar for the termination of the tenancy. This was done when the Transfer of Property Act had not been made applicable to Delhi. (C) The duty to hear an appellant is required by the same basic rule of natural justice which requires every person to be heard before an order affecting his rights can be passed. At the appellate stage this duty is not more onerous than it is at the stage of the original hearing. The rule of audialterampartem only requires that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person concerned. It does not require that even if the said person does not avail himself of the opportunity an order against him cannot be passed without hearing him. Such an interpretation of the rule would mean that the person concerned may simply refuse to say anything against the order proposed to be passed against him and may thereby stultify the proceedings against him completely with the effect that no order against him can be passed merely because he does not allow it to be passed by merely refusing to defend himself. The same principle should normally apply to an appeal by a person aggrieved by an order against which the appeal is preferred. Petitioner s Counsel has, however, argued that an appeal under Section 9 of the Act could not be dismissed without an order on merits by the appellate officer. His arguments in support of this proposition run as follows: Firstly, the procedure in appeal is laid down in Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act. It says that an appeal preferred under Section 9 shall be in writing and set forth the grounds of objection of the order appealed against. His arguments in support of this proposition run as follows: Firstly, the procedure in appeal is laid down in Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act. It says that an appeal preferred under Section 9 shall be in writing and set forth the grounds of objection of the order appealed against. On receipt of the appeal and after calling for and perusing the record of proceedings before the Estate Officer, however, the appellate officer shall appoint a time and place for the hearing of the appeal and shall give notice thereof to the Estate Officer against whose orders the appeal is preferred, to the appellant and to the department or authority.