JUDGMENT 1. - This special appeal is preferred by the State of Rajasthan and its Devasthan Department, assailing an order of the learned Single Judge passed on 14.9.2001 in Writ Petition No. 4920/2000 directing the appellants not only for the grant of family pension and all retrial benefits to the widow of Nanagram Meena, but also for appointment on compassionate ground in accordance with law to the respondent No. 2 (s/o of Nanagram), apart from arrears & interest thereon w.e.f. 1.1.1994 @ 10% p.a.Undisputed facts are Nanagram Meena (husband & father of writ petitioner No. 1 & 2 respectively) was a permanent employee holding the post of Chowkidar w.e.f. 1.5.70 and continued to serve the appellants till his disappearance w.e.f. 3.4.1986 and thus he had put in about 15 years of service. Upon his disappearance & having not been traceable from 3.4.1986, admittedly Assistant Devasthan Commissioner (appellant No. 3) had got published a public notice in Daily newspaper `Dainik Navjyoti' on 11.10.1987 asking Nanagram Meena to present himself in the Office, and followed by another publication of such notice 22.3.1988.Ultimately, the writ petitioners (wife) made a representation on 15.4.96 seeking appointment in the Government service on the plea that her husband has not been traceable for last about 10 years; she being a poor lady having a minor child was unable to maintain herself and children and therefore, was entitled to appointment in place of her husband. But all in vain, hence firstly she sent a notice for demand of justice for grant of family pension, arrears of salary of her husband etc. so also appointment on compassionate ground to her only son upon having become major on 24.7.2000 and it culminated in presenting writ petition No. 4920/2000. A reply to this writ petition was filed by the appellants State asserting inter alia that Nanagram Meena has been absent from duty unauthorisedly w.e.f. 3.4.86' and, therefore, besides publication of public notices on 11.10.87 & 22.3.88, in the newspapers, a charge sheet was also issued on 28.5.93 but returned back and after enquiry, he was removed from service by order dated 23.4.2001 which too was also served upon the writ petitioners but they have not challenged the removal of Nanag Ram Meena and, therefore, according to the appellant, unless order of removal is set aside, the writ petitioners were not entitled to the relief as sought for in their petition. 2. 2. It was also the case of the appellants that neither the writ petitioners nor Nanagram Meena before or after his unauthorised absence from duty from 3.4.86 had lent prior information either to remain absent or to avail of any leave, nor Nanagram Meena returned back to duty despite publication of public notice'so also issuance of charge sheet, nor any report as to missing of Nanagram Sharma was lodged either at any police station or published in any Newspapers, nor any proceedings were initiated before competent court for a finding that he is presumed to be dead on the ground that he has not been heard of for last more than seven years by the person, and therefore, unless an order presuming him to be dead, is passed, the writ petitioners are not entitled to any relief sought for in their petition. 3. After hearing both the parties, the learned Single Judge passed the impugned order directing the appellants as under : "I allow the writ petition with the direction to the respondent to grant family pension and all retrial benefits within a period of four months to the widow of Nanag Ram Meena who is presumed to be legally dead under the presumptive clause of Section 108 of the Evidence Act for having not been heard of right from April, 1986 alongwith arrears and interest thereon which interest shall start commencing from 1.1.94 i.e. after 7 years of the presumption of death @ 10% p.a. and in case the compliance is not made within the stipulated period, the interest rate shall stand enhanced to 12% p.a. The respondent shall be liable for any other action as well for not complying with the order of this Court." The case of respondent No. 2 shall be considered for appointment on compassionate ground in accordance with law six months." 4. Hence, this special appeal. After having heard the learned' counsel for both the parties and considered their rival contentions, we find that whatever the contentions raised by the appellants before us are mere reiteration of their case urged in their reply to the writ petition so also before the learned Single Judge, which has comprehensively been dealt with in the judgment assailed herein. 5. After having heard the learned' counsel for both the parties and considered their rival contentions, we find that whatever the contentions raised by the appellants before us are mere reiteration of their case urged in their reply to the writ petition so also before the learned Single Judge, which has comprehensively been dealt with in the judgment assailed herein. 5. However, the decks are clear that fate of this litigation hinges on pure and simple question as to whether the learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances of the case has rightly presumed Nanagram Meena to be legally dead under presumptive clause of section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act for having not been heard of right from April, 1986, thereby entitling his legal heirs to the relief sought for in writ petition.Reliance has been placed upon decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mohanlal v. State (1999 WLC (UC) (Rajasthan) 274) and R. Gopala Pathar v. N. Jayalakshmi Ammal ( AIR 1984 Mad. 340 ) , by Shri Rakesh Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant State. Per contra, learned counsel for the writ petitioners relied on the decision of this Court in Chaya Nandini v. State (1996 Writ LR (Rajasthan) 87) , which too have been considered in the impugned judgment. 6. In Mohanlal v. State (supra) neither the petitioner nor the respondents did mention as to what was the age of father of the petitioner at the time of disappearance, nor the date, on which he had joined the service, therefore, it was difficult for the Court to hold as to whether petitioner's father was alive in 1984, i.e. on the date of presumption. Hence it was a case where this court held in para 10 that a party is supposed to plead and prove the averments made by it by adducing cogent and sufficient evidence which, the petitioner in that case failed to do. Whereas, in the present case, the writ petitioners have specifically pleaded and proved that Nanagram Meena (government servant) had joined upon his appointment on 1.5.70 followed by an order of his confirmation dated 4.3.72 w.e.f. 1.5.70. Whereas, in the present case, the writ petitioners have specifically pleaded and proved that Nanagram Meena (government servant) had joined upon his appointment on 1.5.70 followed by an order of his confirmation dated 4.3.72 w.e.f. 1.5.70. Even a photo copy of State Insurance Policy No. 317133 issued by the Government of Rajasthan has also been produced as Annexure 3 to the writ petition, besides Transfer Certificate issued by Education Department as Annexure 4 which shows date of birth of Nanagram as 8.6.46, and the writ petitioner (wife of Nanagram) had also moved an application (Ann. 7) on 15.4.96 for her employment on compassionate ground due to disappearance of her husband for about 12 years but she was not acceded to her request. 7. A careful perusal of the decision in Mohanlal v. State (supra), makes it clear that it was a case where petitioner's father was missing since 1977, seven years had completed in 1984 where the petitioner therein filed application for the first time in 1996 and the writ was filed in 1998, when he was 26 years of age as he claimed to have born in 1970 and at the time of disappearance of his father (1977) he was seven years of age. In this view of the matter, this Court observed that it is difficult to hold that the petitioner may be entitled consideration for grant of any benefit under the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of Dependents of Deceased Government Servants Rules, 1996 and ultimately, it has been observed as under : "In a given case if a person deems to have died after a period of seven years from the date his whereabouts are not known, and he had reached the age of superannuation, by that time his dependents would certainly be not entitled for drawing any benefit under the Rules." "Such an employment is available only to redeem the- grieved family which has lost its bread earner, the case of "presumed death" for the reason that whereabouts of an employee is not known, will not fall within the ambit of the term "deceased employee' as provided under the Rules, 1996." 8. We have carefully analysed the decision of Madras High Court in R. Gopala Pathar v. N. Jayalakshmi (supra), according to which the presumption Under section 108 of the Evidence Act could be raised to extent of the fact of death at the expiration of seven years and not to the date of death at any particular period, yet there is no presumption that death took place at the end of seven years or at any particular time within that seven years. It has been categorically held that the precise date of death cannot be a matter of presumption on the language of S. 108 of the Evidence Act, but one of proof by evidence and the onus of proving that death did take place at a particular point of time within the period of seven years or even later, lies on the person who seeks to establish a right based on that fact. It was further held that equally on the language of section 108 of the Evidence Act, death cannot be presumed to have occurred on the date on which the suit was filed, though it may perhaps be presumed that the person was not alive on the date of the institution of suit. 9. It was a case where the whereabouts of a coparcener of a joint Hindu family consisting of two coparceners were not heard of sometime after August 1930 and there was absence of proof, therefore, the Court held that in the absence of proof that coparcener 'G' died on or after 14.4.1937, when the Act of 1937 came into force, so it could not be said that his wife became entitled to his undivided share in the joint family property under the Act of 1937.and that she in turn was competent to convey title in the property; and on the death of a coparcener, the surviving coparcener became entitled to the entirety of the joint family property by survivorship and was competent to convey title in the property. 10. There is no quarrel with proposition of law laid down in the decisions (supra) cited at the bar. 10. There is no quarrel with proposition of law laid down in the decisions (supra) cited at the bar. The present one is not the case involving question as to on which date the death of husband of the writ petitioner has occurred so as to presume the death within the meaning of section 108 of the Evidence Act on a particular or precise date, nor it is the case of any of the parties herein that the death did take place at a particular point of time within seven years or even later on. In this view of distinguished facts as were involved in the decisions cited at the bar, ratio thereof does not render any help to the present appellant. In none of the decisions cited at the bar it has been held that there is bar to raise presumption of death Under section 108 of the Evidence Act, in order to adjudge the entitlement or grant of benefits to the legal heirs in case of disappearance of a Government servant for more than seven years. 11. Though it is the case of the State appellant that Nanagram Meena had been habitual absentee from duties, and remained absent on duty w.e.f. 3.4.86 till date, inasmuch as he did not report back to the duty despite publication of notices in Newspapers dated 11.10.87 (Ann. 5) and 22.3.1988 (Ann. 6) which ultimately culminated in issuing memo of charge sheet dated 28.5.93 (Ann. R1) followed by order dated 23.4.01 (Ann. R4) for removal of Nanagram from service, but curiously enough a bare reading of such published notices, memo of charge sheet or even inquiry report (Ann. R3), it stands not only proved but also admitted fact that whatever the pre and/or post inquiry proceedings initiated against Nanagram, were totally against the constitutional mandate so also principles of natural justice. none of the communications issued prior to or after initiation of inquiry upon charge sheet dated 28.5.93 were got served upon him as they returned back duly unserved as is established from the statements of memo of the chargesheet itself or published notices (supra), obviously because Nanagram has been missing; his whereabouts were neither known nor heard of since 3.4.1986. none of the communications issued prior to or after initiation of inquiry upon charge sheet dated 28.5.93 were got served upon him as they returned back duly unserved as is established from the statements of memo of the chargesheet itself or published notices (supra), obviously because Nanagram has been missing; his whereabouts were neither known nor heard of since 3.4.1986. Even the charge sheet was issued on 28.5.93 after expiration of seven years from 3.4.86 the date of disappearance of Nanagram, which too could not have been served rather returned back with the remarks of his whereabouts being not known since 3.4.86, and further inquiry report (Ann. R3) was given on 17.4.2001 after presentation of the writ petition. 12. Rather action of the appellant State in initiating inquiry proceedings after seven years of disappearance of the Government servant and further holding such inquiry proceedings without service of pre and/or post initiation of proceedings in order to culminate into order of punishment of removal, both are against the constitutional mandate and principle of natural justice. That being so, the learned Single Judge has rightly condemned the action of the appellant State by holding that termination of a Government servant who has not been traced out or not heard of at all or his whereabouts were not known for more than seven years, is no meaning, inasmuch as no charge sheet could be issued to a dead person who by virtue of section 108 of the Evidence Act is presumed to have died. 13. Once the decks are clear that admittedly Nanagram Meena was not heard of at all for more than seven years from the date of his disappearance or missing (3.4.1986), in support of which there is an uncontroverted pleadings of the writ petitions duly supported by an affidavit to the effect that she has not heard of her husband (Nanagram Meena) since 3.4.86 and for last more than seven years, a presumption would must arise in her favour by virtue of Section 108 of the Evidence Act that her husband has been dead. Thus viewed, the appellant State therefore have to grant relief to the writ petitioners on the presumption that her husband is dead and she is a widow of deceased Government servant entitling to grant of relief as sought for in their writ petition. Thus viewed, the appellant State therefore have to grant relief to the writ petitioners on the presumption that her husband is dead and she is a widow of deceased Government servant entitling to grant of relief as sought for in their writ petition. Having scanned the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge assailed before us, we find no infirmity whatsoever in the said judgment and the learned Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition and in granting relief in favour of the writ petitioners as detailed above, which does not warrant any interference by this Court. In the said view of the matter, this appeal is dismissed. No costs.Appeal Dismissed. *******