B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) I have heard Shri K. K. Arora for the appellant and Sri Trioki Nath for the respondents. ( 2 ) THIS second appeal was filed by the defendant against the appellate decree dated 6-5-2002. It is admitted position that on the date the first appeal was decided, the second appeal against the decree was maintainable under S. 100, C. P. C. However, S. 102, c. P. C. has been substituted by C. P. C. Amendment Act No. 22 of 2002 enforced w. e. f. 1-7-2002 to provide that no second appeal shall lie from any decree, when the subject-matter of the original suit is for recovery of money not exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees. ( 3 ) IT is not disputed that this second appeal is covered by this section and a preliminary objection has been raised by Shri tirloki Nath that this second appeal is not maintainable. As against this it has been argued by Shri K. K. Arora, learned counsel for the appellant that the right of appeal accrued to him on the date of the judgment of the first appellate Court, which was delivered prior to 1-7-2002. That therefore, this right can be exercised now and S. 102, C. P. C. does not bar this second appeal. ( 4 ) IT has further been argued by the learned counsel that against the judgment of the appellate Court he filed a writ petition in the High Court in which it was held that the appellant may prefer second appeal under S. 100, C. P. C. , therefore, writ petition is not maintainable and it was accordingly dismissed. That for this reason also this second appeal be admitted. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel has argued that the right to appeal is a substantive right which accrued at the date of institution of the suit. That such a vested right cannot be taken away by procedural amendment. It has therefore, been argued that S. 102. C. P. C. does not bar the second appeal in which the right of second appeal accrued prior to the enforcement of this amended section. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel has referred to S. 6 of General Clauses Act and argued that the right, which had accrued, is protected under cl. (c) and the legal remedy is also protected under Cl. (e ). ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel has referred to S. 6 of General Clauses Act and argued that the right, which had accrued, is protected under cl. (c) and the legal remedy is also protected under Cl. (e ). It is proper to refer the above clauses which are as follows :6. Effect of repeal Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a) and (b ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing act or Regulation had not been passed. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel in support of the argument has referred to the decision of the apex Court in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora, AIR 1975 SC 1843 . The facts of the case were totally different, however, reliance has been placed in the observation of the Apex Court made in para 28 of the judgment which is as follows : "before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well established principles. The first is that "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. The first is that "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment. " The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the application of this rule, viz. (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when the Court to which appeal lay at the commencement of the suit stands abolished. " ( 8 ) ON the basis of this observation of the apex Court, it has been argued that the provisions which touch the right in existence at the time of passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively. That the right of appeal accrued to the appellant and, therefore, it cannot be taken away retrospectively. The other argument is that the right of appeal is a substantive right. However, the present case is covered in the exceptions as mentioned in para 28 itself. The right of appeal has been taken away expressively by the competent enactment in S. 102, C. P. C. It has not been argued in this appeal that S. 102, C. P. C. is ultra vires of the Constitution. Therefore, the amendment in S. 102 is a competent legislation and right of appeal has been taken retrospectively. This decision is therefore of no help to the learned counsel for the appellant. ( 9 ) THE learned counsel has also referred to the following cases : (1) Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal and Co. (2001) 8 SCC 397 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3580 ). (2) Central Bank of India v. Vlth Additional district and Sessions Judge, Kanpur nagar, 1997 (1) All Rent Cas 312 : (1997 All lj 1149 ). (2001) 8 SCC 397 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3580 ). (2) Central Bank of India v. Vlth Additional district and Sessions Judge, Kanpur nagar, 1997 (1) All Rent Cas 312 : (1997 All lj 1149 ). ( 10 ) HOWEVER, both these decisions are beside the point as the decisions in these cases are regarding the pending matters before the power was taken away. These decisions are therefore of no help to the appellant. ( 11 ) AFTER considering the arguments of the learned counsel I am of the view that, S. 6 of the General Clauses Act as referred to above also does not help the appellant. The first reason being that it is not a case of repeal on the other hand S. 102, C. P. C. has been substituted by the Amending Act and i am afraid that S. 6 above may not be applicable to the same. Apart from this, Cl. (c) protect any right, privilege, obligation or liability. It cannot be interpreted to include the right to file repeal or revision. Clause (e) also does not protect the right of institution of a proceeding under repealed Act. ( 12 ) IT is established principle that procedural law can be amended with retrospective effect and will also apply to pending cases. Therefore, the right of second appeal could be taken away with retrospective effect in pending cases also. ( 13 ) THE point that survives is whether the right of appeal can be availed in cases where it accrued before the enforcement of s. 102, C. P. C. No doubt there is no express provision on this point and the Court can lay down law on this point considering aim of the amendment. In purposive interpretation, justice Frankfurter observed :"legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose. (47 Columbia LR 527 at 538 (1947 ). " ( 14 ) JUSTICE Cardozo observed that though the powers of interpretation of the courts are narrow, yet they can fill up gaps. He said : "no doubt, the limits for the judge are narrower. (47 Columbia LR 527 at 538 (1947 ). " ( 14 ) JUSTICE Cardozo observed that though the powers of interpretation of the courts are narrow, yet they can fill up gaps. He said : "no doubt, the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps, he fill the open spaces in the law. " ( 15 ) THEREFORE, to consider the question the above principles shall be borne in the mind, The aim of the law is clear to curtail litigation, which has assumed high proportions, and the peoples are litigating over trifle matters to the highest Court leaving no time with the Courts to devote to important issues. With this aim insight by 1976 amendment, the second appeals were limited on the point of "substantial question of law" only. Again by S. 102, C. P. C. by present amendment right of second appeals have been taken away in certain class of cases. Therefore, policy of law is to minimise the second appeals and the second appeal cannot be accepted for the reason that the right accrued prior to the amendment was enforced. Even if the right accrued, the Court will take the view in accordance with the policy of law that the right of appeals should be curtailed ( 16 ) APART From this, S. 16 of the Amending act 22 of 2002 provides for repeal and savings. Clause (2) (a) is material, which is as follows : "16 (2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of this Act have come into force or repeal under sub-section (I) has taken effect, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses act, 1897 (10 of 1897) : (A) the provisions of S. 102 of the principal act as substituted by S. 5 of this Act, shall not apply to or affect any appeal which had been admitted before the commencement of S. 5; and every such appeal shall be disposed of as if S. 5 had not come into force. ( 17 ) FROM the perusal of this provision it is clear that the pending appeals and the appeals which have been admitted before the commencement of S. 102 only have been saved from the mischief of S. 102. Therefore, the legislature intent is clear that the right to appeal accrued prior to the enforcement has not been saved. ( 17 ) FROM the perusal of this provision it is clear that the pending appeals and the appeals which have been admitted before the commencement of S. 102 only have been saved from the mischief of S. 102. Therefore, the legislature intent is clear that the right to appeal accrued prior to the enforcement has not been saved. ( 18 ) CONSIDERING the entire arguments I find that this second appeal cannot be entertained in view of S. 102, C. P. C. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed. .