Mohan Lal Sukhadia University v. Chandrabhan Singh
2002-08-23
B.S.CHAUHAN
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT 1. - This revision has been filed against the order dated 13.3.2002 passed by the first appellate Court reversing the order of the trial court dated 5.1.2002 by which a direction was issued to the petitioner- defendant to admit the non-petitioner/plaintiff in the LL.B. course for the academic session 2001-02. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the non- petitioner had appeared in Bachelor of Arts Examination in 2000-01 and as his result had not been declared, provisionally he applied for admission in the Law course for the year 2001-02. He appeared in the written Entrance Test held on 22.7.2001. Result of the entrance test was declared on 31.7.2001 and his name appeared at Serial No. 56 of the merit list. He deposited the fee on 12.8.2001 but he could not be admitted to the course for the reason that he had applied for re-evaluation of answer-books of Graduation and the result of re-evaluation was declared on 28.8.2001. Moreso, he also appeared ins supplementary examination in one paper, whose result was declared subsequently. Non-petitioner filed Civil Suit No. 199/2001 wherein an application for interim relief under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, "the Code") was filed. That application was considered by the learned trial court on 5.1.2002 and rejected on the ground that as the result of the non-petitioner was declared on 28.8.2001 and, thus, he was not eligible to deposit the fee on 10.8.2001 or to be declared eligible for admission on 31.7.2001. It was also considered that the non-petitioner got supplementary in one paper, the result of which could be declared on 5.7.2001. The trial court also considered that as there were only 120 seats available which had been filed up, the non-petitioner had furnished false information that he had passed all the papers though on the date of filing the application, he had not cleared all the papers. His form was not considered on the date of finalising the list for the reason that he had not annexed the marks sheet along with the fee deposit receipt. After considering the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury to the party, the trial court rejected the application for interim relief.
His form was not considered on the date of finalising the list for the reason that he had not annexed the marks sheet along with the fee deposit receipt. After considering the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury to the party, the trial court rejected the application for interim relief. However, the first appellate court reversed the said order and directed the petitioner to admit the non-petitioner in the Law course. Hence this revision. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the rival submissions made by them. 4. In Dr. Subodh Nautiyal v. State of U.P. & ors., AIR 1991 SC 1131 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the court should not issue direction to the educational institution for admission of a student after expiry of four months from commencement of the course. Hence the order impugned is liable to be set-aside on this sole ground.In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Shri Sriman Narayan, AIR 2002 SCW 2907 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope of power of the court while granting interim relief and observed as under:- "It is elementary that grant of an interlocutory injunction during the pendency of the legal proceedings is a matter requiring the exercise of discretion of the Court. While exercising the discretion the court normally applies the following tests:- (i) whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed. The decision whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a time when the exercise of the legal right asserted by the plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and remain uncertain, till they are established on evidence at the trial. The relief by way of interlocutory injunction is granted to mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the period before which that uncertainty could be resolved. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial.
The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights for which he could not be adequately compensated. The court must weigh one need against another and determine where the 'balance of convenience' lies." In Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors., 1990(1) R.R.R. 563 : AIR 1990 SC 867 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, discussing the principles to be kept in mind in considering the prayer for interlocutory injunction observed as under:- "The relief of the interlocutory mandatory injunctions are thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that have been illegally done or the restoration of that which was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great injustice or irreparable harm. Courts have evolved certain guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:- (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is, it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie case that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction. (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which normally cannot be compensated in terms of money. (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case.
(3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the one seeking such relief. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case. Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional circumstances needing action, applying them as a pre-requisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion." There is another aspect of the matter. It is settled legal proposition that interim relief amounting to final relief should not be granted.Hon'ble Apex Court has consistently and persistently observed that the Court of law should not pass an interim order which amounts to a final relief. ( Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandannagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop (India) Ltd., & Ors., AIR 1985 SC 330 ; State of West Bengal & ors. v. Calcutta Hardware Stores & ors., AIR 1986 SC 614 ; State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Mohammed Yakoob Khan & ors., 1992(4) SCC 167 ; U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee & ors. v. Dr.B. Shital Nandwani, 1992(2) SCT 99 (SC) : 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 680 ; and Gurunanak Deo University v. Parminder Kumar Bansal anr., AIR 1993 SC 2412 ; Saint John's Teachers Training Institute (for Women) & ors. v. State of Tamil & ors., 1993(3) SCC 595 ; Dr. B.S. Kshirsagar v. Abdul Malik Mohamma Musa, 1995 Suppl (2) SCC 593 ; The Bank of Maharashtra v. Ray's Shopping and Transport Company Pvt. Ltd., 1995(2) R.R.R. 299 : AIR 1995 SC 1368 ; Commissioner/Secretary, Government Health & Medical Education Department v. Dr. Ashok Kumar Kohli, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 214 ; Union of India v. Shri Ganesh Steel Rolling Mills, 1996(8) SCC 347 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Vyavsaya & Co., 1997(1) SCC 156 ; State of U.P. & Anr. v. Modern Transport Company & anr., JT 2002(1) SC 425 ; and State of U.P. and ors.
Ashok Kumar Kohli, 1995 Suppl (4) SCC 214 ; Union of India v. Shri Ganesh Steel Rolling Mills, 1996(8) SCC 347 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Vyavsaya & Co., 1997(1) SCC 156 ; State of U.P. & Anr. v. Modern Transport Company & anr., JT 2002(1) SC 425 ; and State of U.P. and ors. v. U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Karamchari Sangharsh Morcha & ors., JT 2002 (5) SC 322) .The logic behind this remains that the ill-conceived sympathy emasculates as interlocutory judgment exposing judicial discretion to criticism to de- generating private benevolence and the Court should not be guided by misplaced sympathy, rather it should pass interim orders making accurate assessment of even the prima facie legal position. The Court should not embrace the Authorities under the statute by taking over the functions to be performed by the statutory Authorities.In Union of India v. Era Educational Trust, (2000)5 SCC 57 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering its large number of judgments held that while passing interim order in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, principles laid down for granting interim relief under Order 39 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 should be kept in mind. It can neither be issued as a matter of right nor it should be in the form which can be granted only as final relief.In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that interim injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh for grant of injunction are - (a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff; (b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than grant of it would involve; (c) even if ex parte injunction should be granted, it should only be for limited period of time; and (d) general principles like prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the Court.In Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & ors.
Ltd. & ors. v. Dinabandhu Majumdar & anr., 1995(3) SCT 126 (SC) : (1995) 4 SCC 172 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of grant of interim relief which amounts to final relief, observing that High Court should exercise its discretion, while granting interim relief, reasonably and judiciously and, if loss can be repairable or the loss can be satisfied by giving backwages etc. in the end of petition ultimately succeeds, it is not desirable that the relief should be granted by interim order. Hon'ble Apex Court further observed as under:- "It should be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the damage cannot be repaired, for the reason that if no relief for continuance in service is granted and ultimately his claim ... ... is found to be acceptable, the damage can be repaired by granting him all those monetary benefits which he would have received and he continued in service. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in such cases it would be imprudent to grant interim relief." Similar view has been reiterated in Council for Indian School Certificate Examination v. Isha Mittal & anr., (2000) 7 SCC 521 .In such a case, it is also to be remembered that the result of the examination does not relate back to the date of examination. Therefore, if the result of a candidate is not declared till the last date of submission of the application, he becomes ineligible for making application. (Vide U.P. Public Service Commission v. Alpana, 1994(1) SCT 701 (SC) : (1994) 2 SCC 723 ; Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chandra Sekhar, 1997(2) SCT 123 (SC) : (1997) 4 SCC 18 ; State of Rajasthan v. Hintendra Kumar Bhatt, 1997(4) SCT (SC) 32 : JT 1997(7) SC 287 ; Utkal University v. Dr. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi & Ors., 1999(1) SCT 656 (SC) : (1999) 2 SCC 193 ; and Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Instructions, 1995 (Supp) 4 SCC 706) . 5.
Nrusingha Charan Sarangi & Ors., 1999(1) SCT 656 (SC) : (1999) 2 SCC 193 ; and Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Instructions, 1995 (Supp) 4 SCC 706) . 5. If the instant case is examined in the light of the aforesaid settled legal proposition, the following picture emerges:- (1) On the date of depositing the fee, his result of re-evaluation had not been declared; (2) Admittedly, non-petitioner did not attach the copy of the mark- sheet/result of Graduation along with the fee deposit receipt; (3) Even on the date of depositing the fee, as the result of graduation had not been declared, he was not eligible for admission; (4) He had furnished a false information that he had cleared all the papers while on the date of submitting the application form, his result of supplementary examination was still awaited; (5) Interim relief directing the petitioner university to admit him in Law course amounted to final relief which generally should not be granted; (6) Admittedly, non-petitioner filed the suit after expiry of more than four months from the commencement of the course. In such an eventuality, admission at such a belated stage is not permissible; and (7) Completion of course must mandatorily require completion of particular attendance of the classes. If admission is granted by interim order at such a belated stage, a candidate may not be able to fulfil that requirement. Thus, in view of the above, the interim relief granted by the first appellate court cannot be held to be justifiable.In view of the above, the revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 13.3.2002 passed by the first appellate Court is set-aside. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned trial court is requested to expedite the trial.Revision allowed. *******