ORDER 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. Leave is granted. 2. These appeals are directed against the orders of the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSAs Nos. 4914 of 1999 and 1566 of 2000 dated 8-7-2002 and Review Application No. 6575 of 2002 in RSA No. 1566 of 2000 dated 8-8-2002. 3. The short point that arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the order of the High Court transferring the second appeal pending before it, to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh, is legal. 4. The High Court purported to follow the judgment of this Court in Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bankl. In that case, the transfer sought was of the execution proceeding and not of an appeal, therefore, the reliance on the a aforesaid judgment was misconceived. 5. The provision, which directs transfer of pending cases, is Section 31 (1) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short "the Act"), which is in the following terms: "31. Transfer of pending cases.-(l) Every suit or other proceeding' pending before any court immediately before the date of establishment of a b Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court." 6. From a perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act, it is evident that the automatic transfer relates to suit or other proceeding before any court immediately before the date of establishment of the Tribunal. The second appeal, pending before the High Court, could not be termed as a proceeding within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act. In any event, the proviso to the said sub-section makes it abundantly clear when it says that d nothing in the sub-section [namely, sub-section (1)] shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court. In any event, the proviso to the said sub-section makes it abundantly clear when it says that d nothing in the sub-section [namely, sub-section (1)] shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court. Had the High Court adverted to the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 31 of the Act, it would have become clear that the second appeal, pending before it, was not within the contemplation of Section 31 (1) of the Act. 7. In this view of the matter, the orders impugned are set aside. The civil e appeals are allowed and the cases are remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. 8. No costs.