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2002 DIGILAW 1498 (MAD)

S. Ramasamy Gurukal v. K. C. Mahalinga Gurukal

2002-11-29

M.KARPAGAVINAYAGAM

body2002
Judgment :- This is a case where the aged father-in-law had been dragged to the Court of law by the son-in-law. 2. Son-in-law, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of an amount of Rs.50,000/- on the basis of the suit promissory note dated 2-1-1994 against his father-in-law, the defendant. 3. The suit was contested by the defendant by stating that he received only the lesser amount and the same was also discharged through compromise made out of the Court. 4. Accepting the case of the defendant, the trial Court dismissed the suit. In the appeal filed by the plaintiff, the lower appellate Court was not inclined to place reliance on the defence exhibits and however the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved that the amount of Rs.50,000/- was handed over to the defendant on the date of execution of pro-note. 5. Challenging the concurrent judgments, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff, on the strength of the decisions rendered in P.TALAMALAI CHETTY VS. RATHINASAMY (1997 (1) L.W. 483) and RAMASAMI MOOPAR VS. RAMASWAMI MOOPANAR (2002 (4) L.W.360), would submit that when once it is admitted that the defendant has signed the pro-note, his liability cannot be denied by virtue of Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is contended that in this case, the defendant has admitted the execution of pro-note and as such, he cannot escape from the liability. 6. I have gone through the judgments impugned and also the records as well as the citations referred to above. 7. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads as follows:- "Section 20: Inchoate stamped instruments: Where one person signs and delivers to another a paper stamped in accordance with the law relating to negotiable instruments then in force in India, and either wholly blank or having written thereon an incomplete negotiable instrument, he thereby gives prima facie authority to the holder thereof to make or complete, as the case may be, upon it a negotiable instrument, for any amount specified therein and not exceeding the amount covered by the stamp. The person so signing shall be liable upon such instrument, in the capacity in which he signed the same, to any holder in due course for such amount; provided that no person other than a holder in due course shall recover from the person delivering the instrument anything in excess of the amount intended by him to be paid thereunder." 8. A reading of the above Section would clearly indicate that the authority implied by a signature to a blank instrument is so wide that the party so signing is bound to a holder in due course, even though the holder was authorised to fill for a certain amount, and he in fact inserts a greater amount, but it is necessary that the sum ought not to exceed the amount covered by the stamp. 9. It is true in this case that D.W.2 admits the signature of her father, namely, the defendant, found in the pro-note. According to the defendant, when he signed in the blank paper, only one stamp was there, but the pro-note in question admittedly contains four stamps. Under those circumstances, it cannot be held that the defendant admits his signature found in the pro-note in four stamps. 10. According to the defendant, the father-in-law, he obtained Rs.9,000/- as loan from the son-in-law, the plaintiff and during the course of trial, he discharged the loan along with interest. In such circumstances, Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would not come into play. 11. Though the lower appellate Court discarded the defence exhibits as not admissible, it elaborately considered the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and correctly concluded that the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is not reliable, and therefore, the factum of having handed over a sum of Rs.50,000/- on the date of execution of pro-note, had not been really proved. This finding of fact, in my view, is perfectly justified. 12. No substantial question of law would arise for consideration in the second appeal. The second appeal is dismissed in the admission stage itself.