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2002 DIGILAW 1499 (RAJ)

DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER v. MAGAN LAL

2002-08-29

GYAN SUDHA MISRA

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Judgment GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition has been filed challenging the order passed by the Labour court, Kota on 4/01/1996 wherein he has determined wages to the extent of Rs. 19,030/- and directed the petitioner to pay this amount within a period of three months and in default of payment 12% interest has also been payable to the respondent- workman-No. 1. This order was passed by the labour Court on the premise that a compromise has been entered into between the petitioner-Divisional Forest Officer and respondent-workman No. 1-Magan Lal on the basis of which the respondent was ordered to be reinstated in service from 1/06/1988. The respondent-workman had alleged that as he was not reinstated either on that date or thereafter, wages were payable to him at the rate of Rs. 572/- per month from 1/11/1990 to 7/07/1992 which comes to Rs. 19,030/-, since he had continued to attend duties during this period. ( 2 ) THE petitioner-Divisional Forest officer had denied the existence of any compromise between the workman and the petitioner and submitted that he had voluntarily left his duties as a result of which he ceased to be in service of the petitioner-Divisional Forest officer and hence no wages were liable to be paid to him. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Mr. O. P. Gandhi assailing the aforesaid order, has submitted that once it was detected that a dispute was existing between the petitioner and the respondent-workman before the Labour court, it was not open to the Labour Court to adjudicate upon that dispute by passing a summary order for payment of the wages. According to his submission the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) had exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order for payment of the wages claimed by the respondent workman. According to his submission the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) had exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order for payment of the wages claimed by the respondent workman. ( 4 ) IT appears that a show cause notice was issued to the respondent and an interim order of stay of the impugned order was also passed in favour of the petitioner which is in existence as on date, yet the respondents advocate has failed to appear in the matter not only on one occasion but on several occasions which are april 15, 2002, April 18, 2002 and Jund July 23, 2002 on which dates the counsel for the petitioner was heard but it was deferred in order to enable the counsel for the respondent to appear in the matter. Yet, again no one appears for the respondent, although it was called out twice. In a situation of this nature, it is not possible to continue to adjourn the matter. Hence the counsel for the petitioner was heard whose submission has been recorded hereinbefore. ( 5 ) IT is no doubt true that if a dispute has already been adjudicated by the Labour Court holding therein that the back wages should be paid or there is no contest between the parties regarding the facts the wages are payable and only computation is required to be done, the labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be well within its legal right to compute the wages and pass the order for its payment. But if the primary question whether the workman is entitled to get wages or not is itself in dispute as in the instant case where the petitioner denied having entered into any compromise with the respondent-workman and the copy of the compromise was also not produced before the labour Court, it was more than apparent that a dispute in fact was existing between the parties regarding the fact whether the respondent ever discharged any duty with the petitioner. Thus the main controversy was not beyond dispute and hence in that situation, the labour Court should have directed the workman for initiating reference of the dispute before the Labour Court under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it had no jurisdiction to straightway compute the wages and issue direction for its payment in the wake of the existing controversy. ( 6 ) THE Labour Court while considering an application under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act cannot avail jurisdiction which is available to it under Section 10 of the I. D. Act as that adjudication has to be in pursuance of reference of a dispute. The ambit and scope of Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act is different from section 10 of the said Act and hence the provision under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act cannot be allowed to mingle with it as each provision is earmarked for a separate remedy. While Section 10 of the Act is for reference of an industrial dispute where the appropriate government is of the opinion that it is existing, the provision under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act is for payment of those kinds of wages which either has been determined under a particular provision or the same is beyond dispute. Where a workmans claim under section 33-C cannot be disposed of without his rights to such claim being adjudicated on a reference under Section 10 (1), his application under Section 33-C (2) is not maintainable. This is the ratio of the Judgment and order of the supreme Court also delivered in the case of p. K. Singh v. Presiding Officer reported in AIR 1988 SC 1618 : 1988 (3) SCC 457. In the instant case, the claim of the respondent-workman that he was entitled to be reinstated in service in pursuance of a compromise, was never put to test and therefore his claim for wages under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act of 1947 could not have been straightway allowed by the Labour Court as that was the subject matter of a scrutiny in the light of the evidence which the workman had never adduced before any forum. In that view of the matter, the Labour Court was not justified in allowing the application of the respondent workman under Section 33-C (2) of the I. D. Act. Consequently, the impugned order dated 4/01/1996 passed by the labour Court, Kota for payment of wages is quashed and set aside. The petitioner therefore, would be under no obligation to pay any amount to the respondent-workman. Consequently, the impugned order dated 4/01/1996 passed by the labour Court, Kota for payment of wages is quashed and set aside. The petitioner therefore, would be under no obligation to pay any amount to the respondent-workman. However, the respondent workman would be at liberty to initiate a proceeding for adjudication of any dispute under the appropriate provision of law, if he is able to establish before the authorities, that the dispute exists. This writ petition thus stands allowed and disposed of.