JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition u/Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner on 19.9.2000 against the respondents with the prayer that by an appropriate writ, order or direction, the judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) passed by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority under the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958, Udaipur by which the Prescribed Authority ordered reinstatement of the respondent No. 1-Lalit Prakash in service with 50% back wages, after holding the verbal order dated 2.7.1997 terminating the services of the respondent No. 1 to be improper and invalid, be quashed and set aside. 2. The case of the petitioner as put forward by him in this writ petition is as follows : The respondent No. 1-Lalit Prakash submitted a claim through Annex. 1 before the respondent No. 2 Prescribed Authority on 28.7.1997 stating inter alia that he was appointed as Class IV employee in the petitioner-Bank on 1.9.1995 on monthly salary of Rs. 800/- and, therefore, the salary was increased to Rs. 1,200/- from 1.7.1996, but he was paid Rs. 950/- from 1.7.1996 to 30.6.1997. It was further stated by the respondent No. 1 in his claim that after 2.7.1997, he was asked by verbal order not to come on duty, though he had worked continuously in the employment of the petitioner- Bank from 1.9.1995 to 2.7.1997. Therefore, it was prayed by the respondent No. 1 that he may be ordered to be taken back in service from the date of termination of his service with all consequential benefits. On receipt of the notice of the said claim issued by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority, the petitioner-Bank submitted its reply through Annex. 2 on 20.11.1997 stating inter alia that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as temporary Peon and he was appointed on 1.9.1995 for 12 months only on Rs. 800/- and it was denied by the petitioner-Bank that the respondent No. 1 was asked not to come on duty with effect from 2.7.1997 without any reason, but the fact was that his probation period came to an end on 30.6.1997 and as such, his services automatically came to an end. 800/- and it was denied by the petitioner-Bank that the respondent No. 1 was asked not to come on duty with effect from 2.7.1997 without any reason, but the fact was that his probation period came to an end on 30.6.1997 and as such, his services automatically came to an end. However, services of the respondent No. 1 were further extended for ten months after completion of one year and he was warned from time to time for improvement of his work and since his probation period came to an end, therefore, his services came to an end, as per the terms and conditions of the appointment order Annex. 4 and no notice as required to be given to the respondent No. 1 as provided in Section 28-A(1) of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (here in after referred to as `the Act of 1958'). It was further submitted by the petitioner-Bank that on 9.10.1996, the respondent No. 1 himself submitted an application (Annex. 5) to the petitioner-Bank requesting that since the amount of salary being paid to him was less, therefore, he intended to quit the services of the petitioner-Bank with effect from 15.10.1996. Hence, it was prayed that the claim of the respondent No. 1 be dismissed. Thereafter, both the parties led evidence before the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority in support of their respective cases. After considering the evidence of both the parties, the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority under the Rajasthan Shops & Commercial Establishment Act, 1958, Udaipur through impugned judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) allowed the claim petition of the respondent No. 1 and ordered reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 with 50%, back wages holding inter alia that the removal of the respondent No. 1 from service was improper and illegal, as he was removed from service without giving one month's prior notice or paying him one month's wages in lieu of such notice, as required under the provisions of Section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958. Aggrieved from the said judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) passed by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. Aggrieved from the said judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) passed by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 3. In this writ petition, the following submissions have been made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner : (1) That the findings of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority that before terminating the services of the respondent No. 1, prior notice under section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958 was required to be given to the respondent No. 1 are palpably wrong, as according to the terms and conditions of the appointment order Annex. 4, his services automatically came to an end and no notice was required to be given. (2) That in fact the services of the respondent No. 1 were not terminated by the petitioner, but he himself quit the job after filing of the application Annex. 5 on 9.10.1996. (3) That since the appointment of the respondent No. 1 was purely on adhoc temporary basis on a fixed salary and he was on probation, therefore, no right accrued to the respondent No. 1 to be continued in service. (4) That awarding of 50% back wages is also wrong on the principle of no work no pay. Thus, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority in the impugned judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) are erroneous and perverse one and the same should be set aside. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 supported the impugned judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) passed by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and perused the impugned judgment dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) passed by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority. 6. The respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority in the impugned judgment Annex. 3 dated 28.4.2000 came to the following conclusions : (1) That in the beginning, the respondent No. 1 was appointed for a period of 12 months, but since his work was found satisfactory, he was kept in service for further 10 months by the petitioner- Bank (employer). (2) That an application Annex. 3 dated 28.4.2000 came to the following conclusions : (1) That in the beginning, the respondent No. 1 was appointed for a period of 12 months, but since his work was found satisfactory, he was kept in service for further 10 months by the petitioner- Bank (employer). (2) That an application Annex. 5 was filed by the respondent No. 1 on 9.10.1996 before the petitioner-Bank requesting that he might be relieved from service with effect from 15.10.1996, but no order was passed by the petitioner-bank on that application and even after that application Annex. 5, the petitioner allowed the respondent No. 1 to perform his duties meaning thereby no decision was taken by the petitioner-Bank on the application of the petitioner Annex. 5 dated 9.10.1996 and, therefore, in these circumstances, the petitioner-Bank was not entitled to take any benefit on the basis of the application Annex. 5 dated 9.10.1996. (3) That the petitioner-Bank has failed to prove the fact that on the basis of the application Annex. 5 dated 9.10.1996, the services of the respondent No. 1 were terminated. (4) That before termination of services of the respondent No. 1 on 2.7.1997, no prior notice in any manner was given by the petitioner-Bank to the respondent No. 1. (5) That after expiry of period of probation, the respondent No. 1 was allowed to work for another ten months and during that period, no order was given by the petitioner to the respondent No. 1 that his services had been terminated. (6) That no evidence has been led by the petitioner that during the term of employment, the behaviour and conduct of the respondent No. 1 was not found proper. (7) That the services of the respondent No. 1 were terminated without any due cause and without making compliance of Section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958, as no prior notice of one month or one month's wages in lieu of such notice was given to the respondent No. 1 before terminating his services and thus, termination of services of the respondent No. 1 was improper and illegal. Thus, after giving the above findings, the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority ordered reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 in service with 50% back wages. 7. In exercise of its powers u/Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has very limited scope of interference as per the law laid down in Mohd. Thus, after giving the above findings, the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority ordered reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 in service with 50% back wages. 7. In exercise of its powers u/Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court has very limited scope of interference as per the law laid down in Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustagim & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 38 , wherein it has been held that even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review u/Art. 227 of the Constitution and the power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal etc. has resulted in grave injustice. 8. It is well settled that power u/Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. 9. The jurisdiction of High Court u/Art. 227 of the Constitution of India is, not appellate but supervisory and, therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Court below unless there is no evidence to support the finding or the finding is totally perverse. 10. The High Court in writ jurisdiction does not interfere with the findings of fact unless they are found to be based either on no evidence or that the findings are wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. 11. Thus, the findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose should be taken to have become final and should not be disturbed unless they are found to be perverse and based on no material or evidence. 12. In the present case, from perusing the impugned judgment of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 12. In the present case, from perusing the impugned judgment of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3), it does not appear that the findings of fact recorded by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority, as enumerated in para 6 of this order, are perverse and based on no evidence or material, but on the contrary, it appears that the findings of fact recorded by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority are based on correct appreciation of evidence on record. No illegality has been committed by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority in holding the termination of the respondent No. 1 from services to be improper and illegal. Thus, the findings of fact recorded by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of power u/Arts. 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. 13. The argument that since the respondent No. 1 was appointed through order Annex. 4 on probation for a period of 12 months, therefore, after expiry of period of probation, his service automatically came to an end, is not to be appreciated in this case because of the simple reason that after expiry of period of probation, the respondent No. 1 was allowed to work for further ten months by the petitioner-Bank. Hence, this argument is not tenable and stands rejected. 14. Similarly, the rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in State of Gujarat v. Sharadchandra Manohar Neve, AIR 1988 SC 338 and Ranendra Chandra Banerjee v. The Union of India & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 1552 would not be helpful to the petitioner as in these cases, services of the probationer were terminated during or at the end of the probation not in the manner as has been done in the present case. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Ganganagar Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Prescribed Authority & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2687 has held that rule providing for automatic termination of service on efflux of specified period stands curtailed by the provisions of the Act of 1958 because of Section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sri Ganganagar Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Prescribed Authority & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2687 has held that rule providing for automatic termination of service on efflux of specified period stands curtailed by the provisions of the Act of 1958 because of Section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958. Section 28-A envisages that no employer shall dismiss or discharge an employee from his employment who has been in such employment continuously for a period of not less than six months except for a reasonable cause and that too after giving such employee at least one month's prior notice or on paying him one month's wages in lieu of such notice. The proviso postulates that the employer also shall have the power to dispense with the services of the employee for misconduct and such misconduct shall be enquired into in accordance with the Rules made in that behalf and supported by satisfactory evidence recorded at an enquiry held for the purpose in the prescribed manner. 16. In the present case, since there is a clear cut finding of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority that it has not been proved by the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 has misconducted himself during the term of employment and, therefore, proviso attached to Section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958 would not be attracted and thus, compliance of Section 28-A(1) of the Act of 1958 was necessary and in absence of that, order dated 2.7.1997 terminating the services of the respondent No. 1 was rightly set aside by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority. 17. In view of the discussion made above, all the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner except with regard to award of 50% back wages fail and stand rejected.On point of back wages 18. The case of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that award of 50% back wages to the respondent No. 1 by the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority is wrong on the principle of no work no pay. 19. In my considered opinion, looking to the fact that the petitioner did not work for the relevant period, allowing 50% back wages to the respondent No. 1 is hit by the principle of no work no pay and therefore, it would be in the interest of justice if the respondent No. 1 is awarded Rs. 19. In my considered opinion, looking to the fact that the petitioner did not work for the relevant period, allowing 50% back wages to the respondent No. 1 is hit by the principle of no work no pay and therefore, it would be in the interest of justice if the respondent No. 1 is awarded Rs. 5,000/- as compensation in place of 50% back wages. 20. Fro the reasons stated above, no interference is called for with the impugned judgment of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) holding the termination of the respondent No. 1 to be illegal and invalid and ordering reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 in service, but on point of back wages, the same is liable to be modified in the manner that instead of 50% back wages, the respondent No. 1 would get Rs. 5,000/- as compensation.Accordingly, this writ petition filed by the petitioner is partly allowed in the manner that the impugned judgment of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) holding the termination of the respondent No. 1 to be illegal and invalid and ordering reinstatement of the respondent No. 1 in service is upheld, but on point of back wages, the same is modified in the manner that instead of 50% back wages, the respondent No. 1 would get Rs. 5,000/- (Rs. five thousand only) as compensation and to that extent, the impugned judgment of the respondent No. 2-Prescribed Authority dated 28.4.2000 (Annex. 3) stands modified accordingly.No order as to costs.Writ petition allowed. *******