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Rajasthan High Court · body

2002 DIGILAW 1504 (RAJ)

Ram Singh v. Union of India

2002-08-29

ARUN MADAN

body2002
Honble MADAN, J.–This writ petition arises out of an order of removal of the petitioner from service duly upheld by the appellate Authority (respondents) in disciplinary inquiry initiated for the charges as to the absence from head quarter station at Shamgarh (Kota) and overstay permitted ten days during the period of suspension. (2). In nut shell, the facts relevant for the present controversy are thus:- After completion of initial training course from 15.12.86 to 14.7.87 and further practical training from 15.7.87 to 14.8.87, the petitioner was appointed as Constable and then confirmed as such. However, he was placed under suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary inquiry by suspension order dated 15.1.90 (Annex.1), whereby he was directed to report his attendance daily at Kota (W) but with a specific condition that he is not permitted to leave his headquarter during suspension without permission of the competent authority since otherwise he will be liable to the taken up for necessary disciplinary actin under RPF Rules. By subsequent order dated 19.3.90 the Divisional Security Commissioner (RPF) Kota (respondent No.3) shifted headquarter of the petitioner from Kota to Shyamgarh with immediate effect, whereby it was also specified that during suspension the petitioner would be subject to responsibilities of the members of the Force u/Rule 143 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (for short, ``RPF). Admittedly pursuant to order dated 19.3.90 he petitioner reported for attendance at Shyamgarh (100 kms. away from Kota) on 23.3.90. (3). It is the case of the petitioner that he was asked by Shri L.R. Jatav, Post Commander RPF Post Shyamgarh, to record his presence twice every day once at 10 AM and secondly, at 6 PM, inasmuch as he was further directed to come to the office like a regular employee as if not under suspension. His further case is that since he raised finger against the attitude of Shri Jatav by way of his written representation dt.17.4.90 (Annex.2), Shri Jatav got furious resulting into making him s absent in the muster roll on 17.4.90, besides further showing absent on the three more days from 27.4.90 to 29.4.90. (4). His further case is that since he raised finger against the attitude of Shri Jatav by way of his written representation dt.17.4.90 (Annex.2), Shri Jatav got furious resulting into making him s absent in the muster roll on 17.4.90, besides further showing absent on the three more days from 27.4.90 to 29.4.90. (4). It is admitted case of the parties that the petitioner was granted permission to leave head quarter for ten days on the ground of his wife being critically ill, and therefore, he left Shyamgarh post in the afternoon of 22.5.90 and continued to remain absent by sending no application for leave but transmitting only sickness certificate of his wife one after the other, though it is the allegation of the petitioner that he did not requests for leave extension or permission thereof by registered posts (Annex.3), but he reported back on 23.9.90. (5). Ultimately, a memo dt.22/27-09/1990 alongwith charge-sheet and statement of allegation u/Rule 53 of he RPF rules, was served on the petitioner, as per which, despite written orders the petitioner remained absent at the head quarter on 17.4.90, from 27.4.90 to 29.4.90 and from 2.6.90 to 22.9.90. One, M.M. Parashar, an office of the rank of Inspector was appointed as inquiry officer but the petitioner applied for change of this inquiry officer by his letter dt.18.10.90 but his request was turned down on 24.10.90. (6). It is also the case of the petitioner that he was not afforded sufficient opportunity to appoint his defence nominee which was necessary under the rules because of he being an illiterate person, and as he was not familiar with the niceties of procedure pertaining to disciplinary inquiry, in as much as the only witness examined by the department was Shri L.R. Jatav, who bore animosity and bias against him and to whom only one question was put as to whether letters (Annex.5 to 13) were issued under his signatures or not. In defence the petitioner did also submit his final statement (Annex.15) on 12.11.90. However, the Inquiry Officer produced his report (Annex.16) on 29.12.90 holding that the charges imputed against the petitioner were proved. (7). In defence the petitioner did also submit his final statement (Annex.15) on 12.11.90. However, the Inquiry Officer produced his report (Annex.16) on 29.12.90 holding that the charges imputed against the petitioner were proved. (7). It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that a number of documents including notice allegedly issued by the respondent No.3 were taken on record and considered by the inquiry officer but curiously enough they were not at all tendered in evidence even without referring it either in the list of documents or in the statements of the allegation attached to the charge sheet or even in the statement of Shri L.R. Jatav (only departmental witness). (8). The respondent No.3 on the basis of inquiry report (Ann.16) passed an order (Ann.17) on 22.1.1991 holding the petitioner guilty of the imputed charges and awarded punishment of his removal from service, against which an appeal (Ann.19) was preferred by the petitioner on 9.2.1991 to the respondent No.2 who dismissed the same by order dt.18.10.1991 (Ann.20). Hence, this writ petition. (9). It is trite that para-meter as to the scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in any of matters either contractual or employment under statutory rules, and the relief available, are different but that does not justify the review of total exclusion of Article 14 when the modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness of approach adopted against the delinquent by the inquiry or disciplinary authority, if so alleged. Where there is arbitrariness in State action, the principles enshrined under Art.14 would immediately spring in and in exercise of judicial review, such impugned action of a State functionary can be struck down because of the settled principle that every action of the executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason so as to exclude any remote possibility of biased or unreasonable approach and, therefore, whatever be the activity of the public authority it should meet the tests as stipulated under Article 14. (10). Conferment of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power, is couple with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. (10). Conferment of the power together with the discretion which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power, is couple with the duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the object for which the power is conferred, which undoubtedly is public interest and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. The Governmental action must not be arbitrary or capricious, but must be based on some sound principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Such a rule of administrative law was validated by the Courts as emanation flowing directly from the doctrine of equality. Any departure from standard or principle meeting the test of reasonableness and non discrimination would certainly be invalid unless it can be supported or justified on some rational and non- discriminatory ground. (11). Similarly a statute may enjoin on an administrative authority to act administratively or judicially. The Act may not expressly confer a duty to act judicially but this duty may be inferred from the provisions of the statute. It can be gathered from the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, manner of the disposal provided, and the objective criterion to be adopted. Duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances. A hard and fast rule or any inflexible rule of guidance is neither possible nor advisable to be laid down. (12). Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. (13). The doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. There has been a steady refinement as regards the doctrine of natural justice because strait jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (13). The doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. There has been a steady refinement as regards the doctrine of natural justice because strait jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if no examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law courts ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact, the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most accepted methodology of a governmental action. (See Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. vs. Girja Shankar Pant (1). (14). No doubt, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts in disciplinary proceedings and this Court may not interfere with the factual findings but the availability of judicial review even in case of disciplinary proceedings cannot be doubted. That being so, the apex Court held in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam vs. Girja Shankar Pant (supra) that judicial review of administrative action is feasible and the same has its application to its fullest extent even in departmental proceedings where it is found that the recorded findings are based on no evidence or the findings are totally perverse or legally untenable. Judicial review of the adequacy of evidence of course is not permitted but in the event of there being a finding so recorded in the order of an authority under challenge, which otherwise shocks the judicial conscience of the Court, it is a well high impossibility to decry available of judicial review at the instance of an affected person. (15). In Dr. (15). In Dr. Sujata Malhotra vs. State of Rajasthan (2), a Division Bench of this Court, to which I was a Member, after having made comprehensive analysis of a catena of decisions referred to therein, held that the High Court can invoke Article 226 of the Constitution in case of the State action being not based on relevant principles application alike to similar situate, or guided by extraneous or irrelevant considerations or unreasonableness or being based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of a statute or law. It was a case where the learned Single Judge referred the case to the Division Bench for adjudicating two points as under: 1. Whether the misconduct of Government servant in the disciplinary proceedings is proved, whether any interference under Article 226 could be made on the quantum of punishment? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the punishment of removal of the petitioner from service was justified? This Court held as under:- ``That being so, as analysed supra, even in case of proved misconduct of the charge of willful absence, the punishment of termination or removal from service has been interfered or removal from service has been interfered with by this Court by invoking Art.226 of the Constitution, holding punishment of removal from service as disproportionate and the relief of reinstatement with all monetary and service benefits has been granted with liberty to visit minor punishment even to the extent of lowest punishment of censure but only keeping in view nature of gravity in charge. (16). In my fortified view, undisputably the action of the disciplinary authority under the disciplinary rules is quasi judicial and the order passed by it is also quasi judicial and, therefore, even in the absence of a requirement by the statute, it is always imperative for disciplinary authority to record reasons before arriving at any conclusion in favour or against the delinquent because fulfillment of such pre-requisite of recording of reasons is a part and parcel of the requirement of complying with principles of natural justice. (17). Let me have a resume of RPF Rules relevant in the context of the present issue. Chapter XI of the RPF Rules relates to discipline and conduct. Rule 133 relates to suspension. (17). Let me have a resume of RPF Rules relevant in the context of the present issue. Chapter XI of the RPF Rules relates to discipline and conduct. Rule 133 relates to suspension. As per Rule 134, any superior officer or an enrolled member of the Force may be placed under suspension in the circumstances as contemplated under its sub-rules (a) to (g). (18). Admittedly the impugned order of removal from service of the petitioner relates to the period of suspension during which he is charged with allegation that when he was under suspension he failed to give his daily attendance on 17.4.90, 27.4.90 to 29.4.90 and from 2.6.90 to 22.9.90 i.e. till the date of issue of charge sheet. Once the impugned charge sheet relates to the absence during suspension period, therefore, it was imperative for the inquiry officer so also the disciplinary authority to have considered relevant provisions of statutory rules i.e. RPF Rules with regard to suspension. (19). The purpose for which the petitioner was suspended, was contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding against him by invoking sub-rule (a) of Rule 134, i.e. where a disciplinary proceeding against him is either contemplated or is pending. This fact is not disputed by either of the parties atleast by the respondents herein. But curiously enough as provided under proviso to Rule 135 of the RPF Rules, it is not the case of any of the parties that the charge on which the petitioner had been placed under suspension on 15.1.90 had been furnished to him within thirty days from the date of suspension. Rather admittedly no charge sheet has been issued for which the petitioner has been placed under suspension, atleast within thirty days from the date of his suspension, whereas order as provided under Rule 139.1 has also not been produced for continuation of suspension in case of any other disciplinary proceedings being commenced against him during that suspension in question. Thus, there has been total violation of statutory rules viz., 135 & 139.1 of RPF Rules in case of the petitioner under suspension while commencing any other disciplinary proceedings than one for which he was suspended, the Competent Authority should have exercised statutory duty to issue orders as to continuance of earlier suspension, which it has miserably failed to exercise. (20). Rule 135, its 2nd proviso reads as under:- ``135. (20). Rule 135, its 2nd proviso reads as under:- ``135. Public interest shall be guiding factor in deciding whether or not a member of the Force, including when he is on leave, should be placed under suspension: Provided that before taking a decision on suspension, the competent authority may consider whether the purpose would be served if the member is transferred from his post or sanctioned leave: Provided further that charge on which a member has been placed under suspension shall be furnished to him within a period of thirty days from the date of suspension after which the incumbent shall be deemed to have reinstated if no such charge is made available to him... Rule 139.1 runs as under:- ``Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 135 where member of the Force is suspended (whether in connection with any disciplinary proceedings or otherwise) and any other disciplinary proceedings commenced against him during the continuation of that suspension, the authority competent to place him under suspension may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the member of the Force shall continue to be under suspension until the termination all or any of such proceedings. (21). Rule 143 relates to responsibilities of member of the Force during suspension. As per Rule 143.1, by reason of his suspension though the petitioner is not ceased to a member of the force but the powers of the members of the force vested in him are kept in abeyance and is subject to the responsibilities and discipline and penalties to which he would have been subject, if he were on duty. According to Rule 143.2, every member of the Force shall during the period of his suspension stay at his head quarters or at such place specified by the disciplinary authority and shall present himself daily for attendance to the authority nominated by the disciplinary authority. According to its proviso to Rule 143.2, the disciplinary authority may for special reasons, grant permission in writing to the member to leave the station for a specified period and on revocation of such suspension the period of such absence shall be regularised as kind of leave due in case the period of suspension is treated as period spent on duty. (22). (22). Rule 147 prescribes the offences relatable to duties of enrolled members, under which commission of any of the act of facts by an enrolled member of the force, as stated in its sub- rule (i) to (xxii) shall render him liable for punishment u/Sec.9 or 17 or both. Since the impugned charges relate to overstay leave or absence after sanctioned leave during suspension period, sub-rule (vi) to Rule 147 so also Rule 156(b)(iii) being relevant are reproduced as under:- ``147. Offences relatable to duties of enrolled members: Commission of any of the following act or acts by an enrolled member of the Force- (vi) absenting himself without proper intimation to his controlling authority or without sufficient cause overstaying leave granted to him or failing without reasonable cause to report himself for duty on the expiry of such leave; ``156. Imposing of punishment of dismissal, etc.: Before coming to any lower punishment, the disciplinary authority with a view to ensuring the maintenance of integrity in the Force shall consider the award of punishment of dismissal or removal from service to any member of the Force in the following cases, namely:- (b) Removal from service: (i) any of the misconduct for which he may be dismissed under clause (a) above; (ii) repeated minor misconducts; (iii) absence from duty without proper intimation or overstay beyond sanctioned leave without sufficient cause. (23). Even as per afore quoted rules, in case of the member of the force like the petitioner constable having overstayed leave granted to him or having been absent from duty without proper intimation, much emphasis is laid that there should have been sufficient cause for overstaying leave granted to him or for overstay beyond sanctioned leave, and reasonable cause for reporting himself for duty on the expiry of such leave. Thus, order of punishment of removal from service can be passed in case of absence from duty only when sufficient cause to remain absent from duty is not made out or found by the inquiry and/or disciplinary authority. (24). Chapter XII pertains to disciplinary and penal punishments. Rule 148 to 166 is relevant to disciplinary whereas rest of Rules 167 onwards pertain to penal punishments. (24). Chapter XII pertains to disciplinary and penal punishments. Rule 148 to 166 is relevant to disciplinary whereas rest of Rules 167 onwards pertain to penal punishments. Rule 148 prescribes description of punishments, but as per Rule 148.1 any of the punishments as envisaged in Rule 148.2 to 148.5 so also in Rule 149, can be imposed on an enrolled member of the Force like the petitioner delinquent but for good and sufficient reasons. Under Rule 148.2(b) removal from service is one of major punishments. Once the rule requires that reasons to be recorded in support of punishment order must be good and sufficient, it is open to the court to examine those reasons and consider for itself whether reasons are good and sufficient because even sufficiency of reasons is open to scrutiny not only by the appellate a reviewing authority but also by the Courts of law. (25). Now I advert to the merits of the case assailing conclusions of the disciplinary authority for imposing punishment of removal of the petitioner from service on the imputation of charges of absence from duty during suspension period. The petitioner was served with a charge sheet u/Rule 153 of the RPF Rules by imputing the following charge:- ``Constable (under suspension) Ram Singh KE 2558 of Kota (Workshop) HQ shifted to SGZ failed to give his daily attendance on 17.4.90, 27.4.90 to 29.4.90 and from 2.6.90 to 22.9.90 i.e. till the date of issue of charge sheet. (26). Admittedly, the petitioner was given permission to leave the station Shamgarh Junction (the place of his head quarter to stay during his suspension period) for ten days by relieving him on 22.5.90 for the cause of illness of his wife, as is evident from letter No.2558 dt.22.5.90 (Annex.5), so obviously illness of wife of the petitioner was found to be sufficient cause, and upon expiry of 10 ten days on 1.6.90, the petitioner was supposed to report back for his daily attendance on 2.6.90 but he failed to do so, and continued to remain absent upto 22.9.90 i.e. till the date of charge-sheet. (27). (27). As per proviso to Rule 143.2 of the RPF Rules, the period of such absence with permission in writing to the petitioner to leave the station can be regularised as kind of leave due only upon revocation of such suspension and in case suspension period is treated as period spent on duty. Admittedly the suspension of the petitioner has neither been revoked spent on duty, and, therefore, question of regularisation of absence of the petitioner either with due permission or overstay such permission period during suspension, as kind of leave, does not either arise or was not permissible till revocation of his suspension. (28). Be that as it may, it is not the case of the petitioner that after expiry of ten days for which he was permitted to leave the station (HQ) for special reasons of illness of his wife, he was not supposed to report back for daily attendance during suspension, rather only grievance admittedly was that he had to overstay such ten days as a result of illness of his wife which continued till he reported back, and for which he sent registered post letters which were admittedly received by the respondents, consisting of certificates of private doctor Vaidya Raghuvir Prabhakar ``Ayurvedacharya Sikandra Road Bandikui and the petitioner presented himself on 23.9.90 and additionally submitted sick certificate of his wife from 30.5.90 to 22.9.90 alongwith his final defence t the impugned charge sheet, besides different certificates of illness of his wife for the charged period by registered posts, referred to above. (29). It has also been the case of the petitioner that on the one hand, he has been charged with absence during suspension for the period in question whereas on the other hand, for the self-same charged period, he was paid subsistence allowance, which depicted that he was not treated absent rather held his absence during suspension as having sufficient cause and that being so, his fault stands impliedly condoned resulting the disciplinary inquiry in question vitiated. (30). (30). The respondents have failed to controvert the payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner during suspension period even for the charged period of absence and the only case on behalf of the respondents in reply to Ground C was that no deduction in the subsistence allowance can be made either on account of absence of for like reasons; and that it is erroneous to say that by making the payment of subsistence allowance, the answering respondents have regularised the absence of the petitioner. (31). Be that as it may, I find some substance in the case of the petitioner. Once the payment of subsistence allowance for the period under the charge-sheet as to the absence of the petitioner during his suspension has been admittedly made then for he self- same period no charge sheet could have been issued against the absentee under suspension. Payment for subsistence allowance to the delinquent under suspension for the charged period of absence, by itself proved that the charged period of absence was treated as having sufficient cause. (32). Question of regularisation of imputed absence as kind of leave would arise only on revocation of suspension in case of suspension being treated as period spent on duty, as is provided in Rule 143.2 (proviso). This significant aspect having been eschewed as irrelevant for not only by the inquiry officer but also by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, has certainly resulted in miscarriage of justice, rather it smacks of arbitrariness on the part of the respondents, warranting judicial review by this Court. (33). A fervent attempt was made by Shri A.K. Sharma on behalf of the petitioner by contending that the impugned order of punishment for removal of the petitioner from service during his suspension for the charge of absence in question is illegal being contrary to the disciplinary rules because Rule 156(b) of RPF Rules does not include the commission of the act on the part of the delinquent like the petitioner as to the absence during suspension. Such a contention on behalf of the petitioner is bizare and barren of force because the punishment of removal from service to the delinquent can be imposed by the disciplinary authority under rule 156(b)(iii) for the charge of absence from duty without proper intimation or overstay beyond sanctioned leave without sufficient cause, which is analogous provisions defining offences relatable to duties of enrolled members and further prescribing commission of act or acts liable to penalty or for punishment under Section 9 or Section 17 or both, or under Chapter XII of the RPF Rules, as discussed above. (34). Though under aforesaid Rule 156, for the act of the delinquent as to his absence from duty without proper intimation or overstay beyond sanctioned leave without sufficient cause, penalty for removal from service is prescribed, but the controversy raised by Shri Sharma for the petitioner is as to whether the absence during suspension includes `absence from duty or `overstay beyond permission to leave the HQ for specified period. To answer this question, suffice is to say that under Rule 143 (which relates to responsibilities of member of the Force during suspension) by reason of his suspension, the petitioner delinquent is not ceased to be a member of the force because the powers vested in him as member are kept in abeyance but it is categorically provided that he shall be subject to the same responsibilities and discipline and penalties to which he would have been subjected if he were on duty. That being so, while keeping the petitioner under suspension, a condition was imposed in writing under order dt.15.1.1990 (Annex.1) as under:- ``3. You are not permitted to leave your HQ during suspension without prior permission of the competent authority otherwise you shall render yourself liable to be taken up under RPF D & R Rules. 5. You should report you attendance daily at KTT (W) Post and entry thereof recorded in post diary. (35). You are not permitted to leave your HQ during suspension without prior permission of the competent authority otherwise you shall render yourself liable to be taken up under RPF D & R Rules. 5. You should report you attendance daily at KTT (W) Post and entry thereof recorded in post diary. (35). Thus in my considered view, by virtue of Rule 143.1 the delinquent under suspension like the petitioner is subject to the discipline and penalties to which he would have been subjected if he were on duty and therefore, merely because he was under suspension, it cannot be said that he could not be removed from service for his absence during suspension or overstay beyond permission granted under proviso to Rule 143.2 for ten days, by invoking jurisdiction under Rule 156(b)(iii) of the RPF Rules, but it is subject to the satisfaction by the disciplinary authority in the context of sufficient cause for the charged act of absence or overstay permission for specified period during his suspension. (36). This leads me to examine the question of justifiability of absence of the petitioner whether without sufficient cause or not. Allied question to it is as to whether the inquiry or disciplinary authority both have failed to record good and sufficient reasons for imposition of punishment or holding the petitioner guilty for the impugned charge. (37). The factum of (1) illness of wife of the petitioner, (2) permission for which having been granted by the competent authority for 10 days to leave the station during suspension in favour of the petitioner, and (3) doctors certificate depicting continuance sickness of his wife beyond the permitted period to leave the station till his reporting back for daily attendance on 23.9.90, having been received through registered post by only departmental witness L.R. Jatav and forwarding the same to the higher authority alongwith his report, are not disputed, rather are admitted factors not only at the bar before this court but also before the inquiry and disciplinary authority. (38). (38). It is the case of the respondent department so also the conclusions of the inquiry and disciplinary authority during disciplinary proceedings that the petitioner did not send application for extension of permission to leave the station beyond specified period of ten days for which he was permitted during suspension, hence his absence and overstay was an unauthorised act rendering him liable for punishment of removal from service. Such a contention merely smacks of hallucination because of provisions contained in Rule 156(b)(iii), which contemplates sufficient cause to be proved either for overstay beyond sanctioned leave or beyond permission to leave the station, or for absence from duty either without proper intimation or without sufficient cause. (39). Be that as it may, keeping in view the provisions contained in Rule 156(b)(iii) the inquiry and/or disciplinary authority being a quasi judicial authority was legally obliged to have assigned good and sufficient reasons as to whether the cause stated by the delinquent for his overstay the permitted period to leave the station or even absence from duty without proper intimation was sufficient or not, with a view to find out delinquency of the absentee. (40). In the instant case the cause shown by the delinquent petitioner for his overstay the permitted period to leave the station (HQ) while under suspension was sickness of his wife, for which as stated above, the department itself during the course of disciplinary proceedings proved by way of admission in its evidence that to support the cause of overstay or absence, the sickness certificates of his wife for the period of delinquency were received by registered post which were forwarded by the departmental witness L.R. Jatav to his superior authority from time to time. But despite such admission the inquiry officer so also the disciplinary authority failed to assign by reason, what to talk of good and sufficient reasons, to hold the cause shown by the petitioner as insufficient. (41). But despite such admission the inquiry officer so also the disciplinary authority failed to assign by reason, what to talk of good and sufficient reasons, to hold the cause shown by the petitioner as insufficient. (41). The only conclusions arrived at by the inquiry and disciplinary authority inter alia are:- (1) that the departmental witness LR Jatav denied to have received any application (either for extension of leave or for overstay the permission to leave the station) alongwith his wifes sick certificate received with registered post letters; (2) that mere intimation of his wife by sending her sick certificate is not sufficient to grant him leave, in as much as (3) the delinquent produced copies of applications indicating his prayer for extension of leave but those copies and applications were not having any date of sending the applications and also the periods for which the extension of leave sought for; and (4) further that the medical/certificates sent and produced on record did not bear any signature of the patent and secondly there was no serial number in any of medical certificate except in one certificate as Sr. No.311. (42). The gist of the conclusions is that though medical certificates were admittedly received but they could not be believed as they did not bear Sr.No. and signature of the patient, but alongwith it, the departmental witness denied to have received any application for extension of leave or overstay and moreover the office copies of such applications produced on record did not depict/bear date of despatch so also period for which extension of leave or overstay was sought and on this basis genuineness of applications sent by the delinquent was held doubtful and as such in the absence of any such applications, it was not possible for the administration to pass any order in his favour and there was no way except in treating the Constable absent from HQ during suspension. (43). (43). Having carefully analysed the reasons assigned by inquiry/disciplinary/appellate authority, the decks are clear that any of these authorities have not held illness of wife of the petitioner and continuance thereof for the period of delinquency as insufficient cause whereas such a cause was not denied by the departmental witness by stating that in fact wife of the delinquent was not sick during charged period of absence, nor this witness stated that these medical certificates sent from time to time and produced on record were fake nor such a plea or allegation was taken while imputing the charge. (44). Once the sickness, certificate of wife of the petitioner for the imputed absence have admittedly been received by the respondents from time to time even before issuing the impugned charge sheet as is proved during inquiry proceedings, then surprisingly enough the inquiry authority and disciplinary authority should have no option but to believe the contents of those contents unless and until they were either denied or controverted in rebuttal by adducing admissible, cogent and reliable evidence to disprove the defence of the delinquent as to the facts of his wife having been sick and undergone treatment as per medical certificates, for which he had to keep away from headquarter during suspension which was beyond his control on account of compelling reasons as explained by him through production of medical certificates either before or during inquiry proceedings. But having discarded them, not only the inquiry officer but also disciplinary authority, both have committed an error apparent on the face of record warranting interference by this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution by judicial review, inasmuch as they have failed to assign good and sufficient reasons for discarding his evidence in the nature of documents especially medical certificate so also for holding him guilty of wilful absence for the period in question. (45). (45). Admission on the part of the departmental witness so also the respondents, as to having received sickness certificates of wife of the petitioner from time to time during the period of delinquency, itself, proved rather it can thereby be reasonably inferred that there was proper intimation as to the cause of the petitioner being away from headquarter during suspension after he was permitted to leave the station for ten days for the self same cause of illness of his wife and that cause has continued till he returned back for daily attendance during suspension on 23.9.90 and the respondents had prior knowledge of sickness of the wife of petitioner for which he was unable to report back for daily attendance after permitted days. Thus unless the factum of illness of the wife of petitioner was controverted or denied and denied and similarly unless the medical certificates are proved to be faked by way of producing evidence in rebuttal by the respondents during inquiry proceedings (because it was their case to doubt genuineness of these certificates hence onus lays on them to disprove the same by calling the doctor issuing such certificates in evidence so as to controvert as against the defence of the delinquent), the conclusions arrived at by the inquiry or disciplinary authority holding medical certificates and illness of the wife of petitioner as doubtful are totally erroneous in law, inasmuch as both the inquiry and disciplinary authority failed to categorically hold the illness of wife of the petitioner as sufficient cause, nor they held such sickness as insufficient cause. The reasons assigned for holding the petitioner guilty for the delinquency under the impugned charge- sheet are not good and sufficient reasons being based on extraneous considerations and no evidence on record. (46). The inquiry officer failed to apply his mind and to carry out his quasi judicial duty in finding the petitioner guilty of the imputed charge of absence during suspension. The conclusions are based on no evidence and it is a case of a flagrant contravention of the rules and principle of natural justice resulting in vitiating the inquiry proceedings, itself, and the findings suffered from grave incongruities besides infirmities and could not be sustained. The conclusions are based on no evidence and it is a case of a flagrant contravention of the rules and principle of natural justice resulting in vitiating the inquiry proceedings, itself, and the findings suffered from grave incongruities besides infirmities and could not be sustained. It was incumbent upon the inquiry officer and disciplinary authority under the RPF Rules before rendering the petitioner liable to penalty of removal from service on the imputation of delinquency of absence period during suspension, to assign good and sufficient reasons as to whether the imputed absence of the petitioner was having sufficient cause or not, which they failed to do so. I find that the findings recorded by the Inquiry officer are totally vitiated for want of any legal acceptable or relevant evidence to support the charges of delinquency of absence during suspension. In the absence of any evidence the inquiry officer could not have reached the conclusion in the manner he did, and these findings affirmed by the disciplinary authority so also the appellate authority also stand vitiated. Thus I have no option except to quash the impugned order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority so also upheld by the appellate authority. (47). Now the question arises as to what relief should be granted. Admittedly the impugned order of punishment related to the imputed absence during suspension. In the instant case the petitioner was suspended in contemplation of a disciplinary action (as is evident from para 3 of reply to the writ petition), vide order dt.15.1.1990, under Rule 134(a) of the RPF Rules. As discussed above, a careful reading of provisions contained in Rule 135 makes it clear that as per further proviso to Rule 135, charge on which a member has been placed under suspension shall be furnished to him within a period of thirty days from the date of suspension, after which the incumbent shall be deemed to have been reinstated if no such charge is made available to him, and thus there has been total violation of statutory Rules 135 & 139.a of the RPF Rules, because the competent authority (respondents) failed to exercise statutory duty under Rules 135 & 139.1 by issuing orders as to continuance of the suspension while commencing any other disciplinary proceedings than one for which he was suspended earlier. Therefore, such continuance of suspension even after quashment of the impugned punishment of delinquency of the absence during suspension would itself be violative of statutory provisions referred to above. By virtue of holding the punishment order illegal and inquiry proceedings vitiated, and further holding the continuance of suspension period as violative of statutory rules, the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement in service. Further directing fresh enquiry for the delinquency of absence during suspension at hand would itself be disproportionately harmful to the petitioner as has been observed by this Court in AIR 1996 SC 484 (3) followed by this Court in Suresh Kumar Chugh vs. State (4) and in Dr. Sujata Malhotra vs. State (supra), and therefore, shortening the duration of litigation, I have decided not to remand this matter to the disciplinary authority as that would entail multiplicity of litigation besides infraction of several proceedings. (48). In the result, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of punishment dated 22.1.91 (Annex.17), 23.1.91 (Annex.18) and 18.10.91 (Annex.20) passed by the respondents against the petitioners so also his suspension order are quashed and set aside and however, the period of absence of the petitioner under the impugned charge-sheet be regularised as kind of leave due by treating it as period spent on duty because suspension of the petitioner is directed to be deemed to have been revoked upon expiry of thirty days from the date of its order and the petitioner be deemed to have been reinstated in service by virtue of Rule 135 of the RPF Rules (supra). Further by virtue of quashment of impugned orders of punishment (supra), the petitioner is directed to be reinstated with continuity of service from the date of his suspension, and with all consequential benefits (to which he would be otherwise entitled to on quashing of penalty in disciplinary proceedings), including seniority and salary except that he will be entitled to only 50% of back wages including pay fixation on revision of pay scales admissible. The writ petition will stand disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within fifteen days and to implement the aforesaid directions of this court for consequential benefits within eight weeks from the date of submission of the certified copy of this order.