Judgment SUNIL KUMAR GARG, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners against the respondents on February 21, 2002 with a prayer that by an appropriate writ, order or direction the impugned judgment and award dated 3/11/2001 (Annexure 1) passed by the Labour Court, Bhilwara (respondent No. 1) by which respondents No. 2 to 5 (Suresh Kumar, Fateh Singh, Manoj Dhobi and ramaju Meena respectively) were ordered to be reinstated in service without back wages be quashed and set aside. ( 2 ) IN nutshell, the facts of the present case are that the respondents No. 2 to 5 were engaged as daily wage employees of the municipal Board, Pratapgarh on 1/08/1991, April 1, 198 4/01/1994 and 8/07/1980 respectively, but appointments were not given to them after following the regular process of selection and they were appointed purely on daily wage basis. The respondent No. 3 Fateh Singh and respondent No. 5 Ramaju meena were working as gardener on part time basis and they were engaged for fixed term. The services of respondents No. 2 to 5 were terminated by the petitioners with effect from 2/05/1997 on the ground that no work was required from them. Thereafter the government through notification dated 8/12/1990 made a reference to the labour Court, Bhilwara (respondent No. 1) to the effect whether termination of services of respondents No. 2 to 5 was valid or not? thereafter the respondents No. 2 to 5 filed claim before the Labour Court. The petitioners contested the claim filed by the respondents no. 2 to 5 and submitted reply. 8. The learned Labour Court, Bhilwara after hearing both the parties passed impugned award dated 3/11/2001 (Annexure 1) by which the respondents No. 2 to 5 were ordered to be reinstated in service without back wages. Hence, this writ petition with the above mentioned prayer. 2 to 5 and submitted reply. 8. The learned Labour Court, Bhilwara after hearing both the parties passed impugned award dated 3/11/2001 (Annexure 1) by which the respondents No. 2 to 5 were ordered to be reinstated in service without back wages. Hence, this writ petition with the above mentioned prayer. ( 3 ) IN this writ petition, the main submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the respondents No. 2 to 5 were not appointed by regular process of selection, but were engaged in service dehors the Rules on part time basis and for a particular period and, therefore, they were not entitled to any protection of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 and further more, since the work for which they were engaged on part time basis had come to an end, therefore, in these circumstances, the termination order was rightly passed against the respondents No. 2 to 5 and the findings of the Labour Court in this respect are perverse and should be set aside. ( 4 ) IT has been submitted by the learned counsel for respondents No. 2 to 5 that this case is squarely covered by decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Board, Pratapgarh and another v. Labour Court (S. B. Civil Writ petition No. 868/2002) decided on August 20, 2002 and hence this writ petition should also be dismissed in light of the decision rendered in the case of Municipal Board,. Pratapgarh (supra ). ( 5 ) HEARD and perused the record. ( 6 ) IN this case, there is no dispute on the point that the respondents No. 2 to 5 were appointed on daily wages basis and not as a class IV employee. ( 7 ) THERE is also no dispute on the legal proposition that Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 is applicable even to a daily rated workman and further more, illegality of, or irregularity in, the making of appointment cannot be a ground to refuse to follow the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. ( 7 ) THERE is also no dispute on the legal proposition that Section 25-F of the Act of 1947 is applicable even to a daily rated workman and further more, illegality of, or irregularity in, the making of appointment cannot be a ground to refuse to follow the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. ( 8 ) THERE is also no dispute on the legal proposition that a part time worker is a workman as defined in Clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act of 1947 because the principal factor to determine whether a person is a workman or not is the main or substantial work for which he has been employed and engaged and not his designation nor any incidental work done or required to be done by him. ( 9 ) SINCE in the present case, the respondents No. 2 to 5 were engaged for performing the duties on part time basis, therefore, from every point of view, they should be termed as workman as defined in clause (s) of Section 2 of the Act of 1947. ( 10 ) THERE is also no dispute on the legal proposition that retrenchment of workman as defined in Section 2 (oo) of the Act of 1947 without complying with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act of 1947 would be void ab initio. ( 11 ) THERE is also no dispute on the point in this case that the respondents No. 2 to 5 worked with the petitioners for more than 240 days in a calendar year as there was clear cut and positive findings of the Labour Court to that effect on the basis of the evidence and affidavits produced by the parties. ( 12 ) IN my considered opinion, the findings recorded by the Labour Court to the effect that before termination of their services on 1/05/1997, the respondents No. 2 to 5 had worked for more than 240 days in a calendar year and the work of the respondents No. 2 to 5 was found satisfactory and the respondents No. 2 to 5 were entitled to the protection of Section 25-B of the Act of 1947 and, therefore, without compliance of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947. the termination of services of respondents No. 2 to 5/05/1997 was bad in law and without jurisdiction, are based on correct appreciation of entire evidence and material available on record. It cannot be said that the findings of the labour Court are erroneous or perverse or patently unreasonable or based on no material or evidence. It also cannot be said that the labour Court committed any illegality in holding the termination of respondents No. 2 to 5 as invalid and illegal. The findings of the labour Court do not suffer from any basic illegality or infirmity on the point of applicability and Scope of Article 227 of the constitution of India ( 13 ) IT is well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept in or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a Court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 14 ) THE power of general superintendence conferred by Article 227 involves a duty on the part of the High Court to keep all Courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction within the bounds of their authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and they do it in a legal manner. This means that the High court can interfere in cases of: (A) Erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction. (b) Refusal to exercise jurisdiction. (c) Error of law apparent on the face of the record, as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or error of law relating to jurisdiction. (d) Violation of principles of natural justice. (e) Arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or discretion. (f) Arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material. ( 15 ) UNDER Article 227, the High Court cannot interfere with the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the inferior Court or Tribunal, unless its findings or order is clearly perverse or patently unreasonable. ( 16 ) IN the present case, as already stated above, the findings of facts of the Labour Court just quoted above are based on correct appreciation of evidence and material available on record and they do not suffer from any illegality. ( 16 ) IN the present case, as already stated above, the findings of facts of the Labour Court just quoted above are based on correct appreciation of evidence and material available on record and they do not suffer from any illegality. There is no error of law apparent on the face of the record and it cannot be said that the findings of the Labour Court are perverse or based on no material. ( 17 ) DURING the course of arguments, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, that the present case is squarely covered by decision of this Court in the case of municipal Board, Pratapgarh and another v. Labour Court, Bhihvara (S. B. Civil Writ petition No. 868/2002) decided on August 20, 2002 as the facts of that case and the facts of the present case are similar in nature. Since in the case of Municipal Board, Pratapgarh (supra), the writ petition was dismissed, this writ petition is also liable to be dismissed. ( 18 ) FOR the reasons mentioned above, the impugned award dated 3/11/2001 (Annexure 1), passed by the Labour Court, bhilwara does not warrant (sic) any interference of this Court and this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 19 ) ACCORDINGLY, the present writ petition is dismissed. ( 20 ) COST made easy.