ORDER : Civil Appeals Nos. 1857-58 of 2000 1. These appeals are directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court reversing the judgment of a learned Single Judge of that High Court. 2. The question for consideration is, whether a restaurant and a bar which is admittedly a "place of entertainment" by virtue of the definition of that term under Section 2(15) of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 would also become a "place of public amusement" as defined under Section 2(14) thereof and consequently would attract the requirement of a licence under the Licensing and Controlling of Places of Public Amusements (Bangalore City) Order, 1989 (for short "the Licensing Order"). 3. Mr S.S. Javali, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, contends that a place which is basically meant for food and drink and to which public are admitted for consumption of food and drink in the premises would not be a place of public amusement merely because music is also provided therein, particularly when the legislatures have maintained a distinction between the two terminologies; (i) "place of public amusement" and (ii) "place of public entertainment". 4. Mr S.R. Hegde, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, contended that in view of the use of the expression "any place" which is wide enough to include all activities carried on therein, if any activity of music or singing or dancing is also carried, a "place of public entertainment" would also become a "place of public amusement" and, therefore, such premises would be covered under the provisions of the Licensing Order. 5. In order to appreciate the correctness of the rival submissions, it would be necessary for us to examine the provisions of the Karnataka Police Act as well as the Licensing Order in question. The said Act is intended to confer power on the authority for maintenance of public order and for prevention of gambling. The definition clause contained in Section 2(1) thereof defines the two expressions differently; Section 2(14) being the definition for "place of public amusement"; and Section 2(15) being the definition for "place of public entertainment". 6. The aforesaid two provisions are extracted here-in-below in extenso: "2. The definition clause contained in Section 2(1) thereof defines the two expressions differently; Section 2(14) being the definition for "place of public amusement"; and Section 2(15) being the definition for "place of public entertainment". 6. The aforesaid two provisions are extracted here-in-below in extenso: "2. (14) place of public amusement' means any place where music, singing, dancing or any diversion or game, or the means of carrying on the same is provided and to which the public are admitted and includes a race course, circus, theatre, music hall, billiard room, bagatelle room, gymnasium, fencing school, swimming pool or dancing hall; (15) place of public entertainment' means any place to which the public are admitted and where any kind of food or drink is supplied for consumption in the premises by any person owning or having an interest in or managing such place and includes a refreshment room, eating house, coffee house, liquor house, boarding house, lodging house, hotel, tavern, or a shop where wine, beer, spirit, arrack, toddy, ganja or other kind of liquor or intoxicant or any kind of food or drink is supplied to the public for consumption in or near such shop;" 7. Regulatory provisions under Chapter IV begin with Section 31 which confers power on the Commissioner and the District Magistrate in areas under their respective charges, to make regulations for different purposes as enumerated in different clauses. For our purpose in the case in hand the relevant provision would be Section 31(l)(w). The said provision is for licensing and controlling "places of public amusement or entertainment". Therefore, in exercise of such power under Section 31 of the Police Act, a Commissioner or a District Magistrate could make provision for licensing or controlling of both the places of "public amusement" and "public entertainment". But the respondents chose to make regulatory provisions only in respect of "public amusement". The Licensing Order which has been issued in this case in exercise of power under sub-section (6) of Section 31 is the Licensing and Controlling of Places of Public Amusements (Bangalore City) Order, 1989. Be it stated that though the Commissioner was entitled to make a similar order in respect of place of public entertainment, but no such order has been made. Be it stated that though the Commissioner was entitled to make a similar order in respect of place of public entertainment, but no such order has been made. It is undisputed that though the premises in question is essentially a place of public entertainment where public are admitted and food and drinks are supplied for consumption in the premises, a live band is also provided for. 8. According to Mr. Hegde, when music or singing or dancing is provided in a place to which public are admitted, it would also come within the definition of "place of public amusement". In support of this contention reliance has been placed on three decisions of this Court in Calcutta Municipal Corpn. v. East India Hotels Ltd. (1994) 5 SCC 690 , Markand Saroop Aggarwal v. M.M. Bajaj, (1979) 1 SCC 116 and M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 6 SCC 289 . When the legislatures themselves have maintained a distinction between the two premises, one defining "place of public amusement" and the other defining "place of public entertainment", while interpreting any provision or rule or regulation made thereunder, the aforesaid distinction should also be bome in mind. 9. In the case of Calcutta Municipal Corpn.1 Section 443 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951 cropped up for consideration. That provision provided for licensing and controlling of theatres, circuses and places of public amusement. There was no specific definition either of "public amusement" or "public entertainment". The Calcutta High Court, applying the principle of ejusdem generis, came to hold that the licensing provision contained in Section 443 will not apply to a restaurant. That judgment has been reversed by this Court in the aforesaid case on a conclusion that when the language of Section 443 is clear it was not necessary to apply the principle of ejusdem generis and, further the expression "other similar place" of public resort, recreation or amusement is wide enough to include the premises in question which was a restaurant, to bring the same within the sweep of Section 443 of the Municipal Corporation. We fail to understand as to how. We fail to understand as to how. the aforesaid decision will be of any assistance to us in the case in hand where the legislatures themselves have maintained a distinction between the two premises and the Licensing Order in question is only in respect of "a place of public amusement" and not in respect of "a place of public entertainment". 10. Even on factual matrix, the case is distinguishable. In that case the respondents themselves in the counter-affidavit categorically admitted that arrangement for holding dance had been made in the restaurants where for separate charges are levied by issuing tickets, in the following terms: (Calcutta Municipal Corpn. case, (1994) 5 SCC 690 , SCC p. 694, para 8) "In order to be categorised as a Government classified hotel, it should have certain basic features and amenities like cabaret and evening entertainments etc. and unless these special facilities were available and continued to remain available your petitioners' said hotel would not have been a Government classified hotel. Your petitioners crave leave to refer to the said question arise for classification at the time of hearing if necessary. Your petitioners state that the said hotel is a residential hotel and maintain a very high standard of service for twenty-four hours round the clock. It also provides entertainment during the evening, specially to cater for the tourist foreign visitors but also earn foreign exchange for the country. The said hotel enjoys international reputation.... As stated above your petitioners run a hotel, in which lodging and meals including service of alcoholic beverages, both foreign liquor and Indian-made foreign liquor are provided to the residents and customers from the restaurants, bars and other rooms within the hotel precincts. The said restaurants cater for outsiders though mostly foreign tourists and the said restaurants are being maintained and/or run in accordance with the international standards for which your petitioners have had to incur heavy overhead expenses as is the case in the matter of maintenance of lodging. These restaurants and bars are part and parcel of the hotel though the same is not restricted to residents of the hotel only.' In the written statement filed before the High Court on 22-3-1983, the Corporation affirmed as under: With reference to paragraph 7 of the petition I dispute and deny the allegations. I say that the hotel provides entertainment with all items of music amusement etc. I say that the hotel provides entertainment with all items of music amusement etc. and is famous for its cabaret any allegation contrary thereto are denied. I say that before entering into the cabaret room one has to purchase a special ticket for admission on a very high price.' " In the instant case admittedly, no separate charges are levied for live band music. 11. The second decision on which Mr. Hegde relied upon is the case of Markand Saroop Aggarwal (1979) 1 SCC 116 where the question for consideration was, as to whether the fee that is charged as minimum charges would be taxable for the purpose of levy of entertainment tax under the U.P. Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1937. On construing the relevant provisions of the very Act and on going through the evidence that was adduced, the Court held that on the facts of that case it would be an admission to an entertainment. We also fail to understand as to how this decision will be of any assistance in interpreting the question as to whether a "place of public entertainment" within the ambit of Section 2(15) of the Police Act would also become a "place of public amusement" under Section 2(14) thereof. 12. That decision was also rendered in the fact of the matter involved herein. This Court noticed the advertisements issued by the owner of the establishment and also the nature of activities set out therein. That is as under: (Markand Saroop Aggarwal case (1979) 1 SCC 116 , SCC p. 119, para 6) "The customers are invited for the cabaret to take their seats by 6.30 and 9.30 p.m. and to listen to music during which time large selection of eatables would be available. It is not alleged that any extra rate is charged for the eatables because of the show but it is not disputed that a minimum fee is levied, for taking a seat for witnessing the show and for taking tea or dinner. It is not alleged that any extra rate is charged for the eatables because of the show but it is not disputed that a minimum fee is levied, for taking a seat for witnessing the show and for taking tea or dinner. If the normal rates are charged for the items consumed and incidentally a show is put up, it cannot be said that any payment is made for admission for the entertainment but requiring a minimum of Rs 5 and Rs 10 whether the customer consumed any eatable or not would lead to an irresistible conclusion that a payment of fee for admission to the entertainment is also included." It is on the basis of the facts involved in the said case, this Court held that the activities of the establishment amount to admission to entertainment. The said decision, therefore, cannot be said to have any application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 13. The last decision relied upon by Mr. Hegde is M.J. Sivani case (1995) 6 SCC 289 where the question for consideration was, as to whether the place providing video game would be a place of gaming under the definition of the Tamil Nadu Act of 1930 and also Section 2(7) of the Mysore Act of Gaming. In view of the definition of "gaming" in the two Acts, the Court held that a video game also would be an act of gaming. Mr Hegde very much relied upon the observations made by the Court in para 21 of the aforesaid judgment where the Court had indicated the purpose for conferring power on the Commissioner and on the District Magistrate to regulate by licensing or controlling in respect of the different premises which is in the interest of public order or decency or morality. We are not concerned in the case in hand with the power of Police Commissioner. But we are concerned with the question whether the relevant Licensing Order made in exercise of the specific power provided in Section 31(l)(w) of the Police Act could be applicable to "a place of public entertainment". 14. We are not concerned in the case in hand with the power of Police Commissioner. But we are concerned with the question whether the relevant Licensing Order made in exercise of the specific power provided in Section 31(l)(w) of the Police Act could be applicable to "a place of public entertainment". 14. Having regard to the different terminologies, defining "a place of public amusement" as well as "a place of public entertainment", in order to find out whether a place can come within the definition of both, one will have to examine the dominant purpose for which the premises is put to use. 15. A place to which the public are admitted and where any kind of food and drinks are supplied for consumption in the premises, would undoubtedly come within the expression "place of public entertainment" and in the case in hand the restaurant and the bar in question would come within the aforesaid definition of "place of public entertainment". The very fact that "the place of public amusement" has been defined to mean any place where music, singing, dancing or gaming is provided and to that place public are admitted emphasises that the place in question before attracting the definition must essentially be used for either providing music, singing, dancing or gaming and to such premises, the public would be admitted. The latter part of the definition clause in Section 2(14) by including certain other clauses of premises makes the definition, no doubt, more extensive, but that by no stretch of imagination, would bring within its sweep where a premises is essentially a place of public entertainment and in that premises some music is provided for. In the case in hand, the restaurant and bar is a place to which public are admitted and food and drinks are supplied for consumption in the premises. Merely because a live band is also provided it would not assume the character of "public amusement" within the ambit of Section 2(15). The Licensing Order also unequivocally is an order for controlling places of public amusement. Though Section 31 of the Police Act confers power on the authority to issue the Licensing and Controlling Orders both in respect of "place of public amusement" and "place of public entertainment", but in the case in hand the Order has been made only in respect of "public amusement". Though Section 31 of the Police Act confers power on the authority to issue the Licensing and Controlling Orders both in respect of "place of public amusement" and "place of public entertainment", but in the case in hand the Order has been made only in respect of "public amusement". That being the position, in interpreting any provision of the Licensing Order, the legislative intent engrafted in making distinction between the two terminologies also shall have to be borne in mind. 16. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants' premises which is "a place of public entertainment" cannot be held to be also "a place of public amusement" merely because a live band is also provided in the place of entertainment where food and drinks are served and consequently the provisions of the Licensing Order will have no application to such premises. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and these appeals are accordingly allowed. Civil Appeals Nos. 1862-68 of 2000, 3966 of 1999, 1860, 1859, 1861 of 2000 and 2498 of 2001 17. These appeals stand disposed of in view of our aforesaid order in CAs Nos. 1857-58 of 2000. Writ Petitions (C) Nos. 200, 201, 202 and 412 of 1999 18. The writ petitions are dismissed as withdrawn. Appeals allowed.