T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE unsuccessful defendant is the appellant. She filed the present appeal as against the common Judgment dated 7-6-1993 passed by the learned II Additional judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in o. S. No. 998 of 1983 and O. S. No. 914 of 1984. The respondents herein are the plaintiffs. They filed the suit O. S. No. 998 of 1983 seeking eviction of the defendant from the front portion of the premises bearing no. 10-1-17/1/1 and for a decree in a sum rs. 14,640/- towards past rents and profits and for future profits at the rate of rs. 1,830/ -. They also filed the suit o. S. No. 914 of 1984 for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with their possession of the rear portion of the said premises. ( 2 ) THE case of the plaintiffs was that the entire premises bearing. No. 10-1-17/1/1 situate at Masab Tank, Hyderabad, and known as "ramasmiriti" was purchased by late Dr. Ramachandra Kashinath Bhandari under a registered sale deed dated 5-12-1960. After his death on 12-4-1972, his widow dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari used to manage the same. The plaintiffs are the daughters of the said Dr. Ramachandra kashinath Bhandari and Dr. Smt. Kamala bhandari. Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari renovated and made additional constructions to the suit premises after 26-8-1975. She gave a letter dated 19-11-1973 to the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad for mutating the names of the plaintiffs in the municipal records being the legal heirs of late Dr. Ramachandra Kashinath bhandari. The front portion of the suit premises as shown in red colour in the plan annexed to the plaint was let out to the defendant in the month of May, 1982 for a monthly rent of Rs. 1,830. 00 comprising of rs. 930/- towards rent and Rs. 900. 00 towards hire charges for fittures, fittings, amenities, etc. Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari died on 20-4-1983. After her death, the second plaintiff searched for the rent note. However, on enquiries with the defendant, she came to know that the rent note signed by late Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari was with the defendant as the defendant showed the same to her and the lease was made only for a period of 11 months. The defendant was very irregular in payment of rents from the very beginning of the tenancy. Smt. Kamala Bhandari was with the defendant as the defendant showed the same to her and the lease was made only for a period of 11 months. The defendant was very irregular in payment of rents from the very beginning of the tenancy. She paid the rents only for a period of 5 months. As on 20-6-1983 she was due for a period of 8 months. Not only that, the defendant started interfering with the rear portion of the premises, which was not let out to the defendant. The plaintiffs, therefore, filed the suit for perpetual injunction in O. S. No. 2138 of 1983 on the file of the X Assistant Judge, city Civil Court, Hyderabad. Thereafter, they got the notice dated 20-6-1983 issued to the defendant terminating the tenancy with effect from the end of tenancy month of june-July, 1983. Under the notice, the defendant was called upon to produce the original rent note. Having received the same, the defendant gave a belated reply on 9-7-1983. Hence, the suit for eviction and for arrears of rent. ( 3 ) THE defendant resisted the suit by filing a written statement mentioning inter alia that the defendant obtained the suit house from late Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari under a rental deed dated 15-5-1982 executed by her. Initially, the rent was agreed to at Rs. 930. 00 per month but in view of the changed circumstances some time later the rent was fixed at Rs. 915. 00 per month. No fixtures, fittings or other amenities were provided to the defendant and the defendant never agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 900. 00 per month towards hire charges. Although, red line portion as shown in the plan annexed to the plaint was let out, the rear portion of the main building was also under the possession of the defendant since 3-3-1983. Although the admitted rent was Rs. 930. 00 per month for the main building, it was raised from March, 1983 by Rs. 300. 00 per month for the rear portion. The mother of the plaintiffs used to collect the rent whenever she was in need of money and some times the defendant paid amount in advance also. Thus, she collected a total amount of Rs. 13,540. 00 for the period from May, 1982 to July, 1983 for 14 months at Rs. 915. 300. 00 per month for the rear portion. The mother of the plaintiffs used to collect the rent whenever she was in need of money and some times the defendant paid amount in advance also. Thus, she collected a total amount of Rs. 13,540. 00 for the period from May, 1982 to July, 1983 for 14 months at Rs. 915. 00 per month and the balance was to be adjusted in August, 1983. The quit notice was not proper and valid and the civil Court has no jurisdiction since the lease was governed under the Andhra pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960. ( 4 ) ON the above pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial: (1) Whether this Court (Civil Court) has no jurisdiction to try the suit? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction as prayed for? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for Rs. 14,640. 00 towards past mesne profits and Rs. 1,830. 00 per month towards mesne profits? (4) To what relief? the following additional issues were settled: (1) Whether the plaintiffs supplied any fixtures to the defendant and if so what is the hire charges for them? (2) Whether the quit notice issued is defective? (3) What is the agreed rate of rent for suit premises? the other suit filed for perpetual injunction on the file of the X Assistant Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad, was transferred and re-numbered as O. S. No. 914 of 1984. The following issues were settled for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for injunction? (2) To what relief? both the suits were tried together and the evidence was let in, in the suit O. S. No. 998 of 1983. ( 5 ) THREE witnesses were examined on the side of the plaintiffs and Exs. A-1 to A-12 were marked on the side of the plaintiffs and exs. X-1 to X-3 and C-1 to C-3 were got marked on the side of the plaintiffs. Two witnesses were examined and Exs. B-1 to b-106 were got marked on the side of the defendant. ( 6 ) CONSIDERING the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side, the Court below decreed both the suits filed by the plaintiffs. No appeal has been filed as against the Judgment and decree passed in the suit O. S. No. 914 of 1984. B-1 to b-106 were got marked on the side of the defendant. ( 6 ) CONSIDERING the evidence both oral and documentary adduced on either side, the Court below decreed both the suits filed by the plaintiffs. No appeal has been filed as against the Judgment and decree passed in the suit O. S. No. 914 of 1984. The present appeal is, therefore, confined to the judgment and decree passed in the suit o. S. No. 998 of 1983. ( 7 ) THE contention of Sri Koka Raghava rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-defendant is two fold, namely, (i) the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and (ii) the quit notice issued is defective inasmuch as the rent stipulated was at Rs. 930. 00 per month according to the appellant, the plaintiffs should have approached the Rent Controller seeking eviction but not the Civil Court. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, Sri Vilas V. Afzulpurkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-plaintiffs, contends, that the rent fixed for the building was Rs. 930. 00 per month and the rent for the fixtures, fittings and other amenities was at Rs. 900. 00 per month and, therefore, the appellant is obliged to pay a sum of Rs. 1,830. 00 every month and, therefore the Civil Court has jurisdiction but not the Rent Controller. The learned counsel further contends that admittedly the appellant has best evidence in her possession, namely, the accounts maintained by the Bright School being run by the appellant and non-production of the best evidence would lead to drawing of an adverse inference. The learned counsel further contends that the quit notice issued in the case is valid. ( 9 ) HAVING regard to the above contentions, the points that arise for my determination in this appeal are: (1) What was the rent fixed for the suit premises in betweer he parties inter se? (2) Whether the quit notice is valid and in accordance with law? point No. 1: ( 10 ) ADMITTEDLY, the suit premises bearing no. 10-1-17/1/1 has been under the occupation of the appellant as tenant thereof. The said property belonged to dr. Ramachandra Kasinath Bhandari. He died on 12-4-1972 leaving behind him his wife Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari and the two respondents-plaintiffs herein who are their daughters. Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari also died on 20-4-1983. 10-1-17/1/1 has been under the occupation of the appellant as tenant thereof. The said property belonged to dr. Ramachandra Kasinath Bhandari. He died on 12-4-1972 leaving behind him his wife Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari and the two respondents-plaintiffs herein who are their daughters. Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari also died on 20-4-1983. The plaintiffs are admittedly their daughters and, therefore, there can be no doubt that they succeeded to the property after the demise of their late parents. Even otherwise, Ex. A-1 mutation certificate shows the mutation of the names of the respondents-plaintiffs in the records of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad. It is obvious, therefore, that the respondents are the owners of the suit premises. ( 11 ) IT is the case of the plaintiffs that the suit premises was earlier let out to Kalva suryanarayana College and thereafter to the department of Horticulture; and that the college us ed to pay Rs. 1,200. 00 per month towards rent, furniture and fixtures and the horticulture Department used to pay rs. 1,830/- per month towards rent, furniture and fixtures. Exs. A-1 and A-2 are the two letters addressed by the respondents-plaintiffs to both the departments and Exs. A-3 and A-4 are the replies pursuant to those letters mentioning inter alia that the College as well as the horticulture Department respectively occupied the suit premises as tenants thereof earlier and used to pay the rent at the rate of rs. 1,200/- per month and Rs. 1,830. 00 respectively. This part of the evidence of p. W. I has not been shaken in any way in the cross-examination. Added to it, Exs. A-1 to a-5 amply bear out the testimony of P. W. I. From the oral and documentary evidence of p. W. I and Exs. A-1 to A-5, it is obvious that the suit premises was let out earlier to the college on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,200. 00 and later to the Horticulture Department on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,830. 00. This conclusion is inescapable having regard to the nature of the evidence adduced. ( 12 ) IT is now the case of the respondents-plaintiffs that the suit premises was let out to the defendant by their late mother on a monthly rent of Rs. 930. 00 for the building and at the rate of Rs. 900. 00 per month for fixtures, fittings and other amenities. ( 12 ) IT is now the case of the respondents-plaintiffs that the suit premises was let out to the defendant by their late mother on a monthly rent of Rs. 930. 00 for the building and at the rate of Rs. 900. 00 per month for fixtures, fittings and other amenities. Although there has been some prevarication as regards the quantum of rent towards building as Rs. 930. 00 or Rs. 915. 00 ultimately it is the plea of the appellant-defendant that the suit premises was let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 930. 00 only and there had been no agreement to pay Rs. 900. 00 per month towards hire charges for fixtures, fittings and other amenities. The contentious issue in between the parties inter se is, therefore, as to what was the rent fixed for the building. Apart from the evidence of P. W. I who did speak about the quantum of rent, there has been the evidence of P. W. 2 practising advocate on the side of the respondents- plaintiffs. The evidence of this witness shows that as per the settlement of terms arrived at in between the parties inter se, he prepared the draft lease deed in Ex. X-1; and that late Dr. Smt. Kamala Bhandari got it typed somewhere and both the parties signed before him on Ex. X-1 and the appellant filled up the details left blank on the said document. Ex. X-1 is the said draft lease deed produced by the witness. This witness did not speak anything about the terms of the documents or quantum of rent. Ex. X-1 is unstamped document. However, it was allowed to be introduced without there being any objection on the point of stamp. Such an objection cannot be raised at any leter stage in view of Section 36 of the Indian stamp Act. The fact remains that the document is again an unregistered one and, therefore, it is not admissible in evidence. Ex. X-1, however, can be used for collateral purposes in view of Section 49 of the Indian registration Act. Anyway, no arguments have been addressed on these points by either of the counsel. Ex. X-1 does bear the signature of the appellant at the end. The appellant-D. W. 1 in his evidence was not able to deny her signature and handwritings on Ex. X-1 and X-2. Ext. Anyway, no arguments have been addressed on these points by either of the counsel. Ex. X-1 does bear the signature of the appellant at the end. The appellant-D. W. 1 in his evidence was not able to deny her signature and handwritings on Ex. X-1 and X-2. Ext. X-2 is the handwriting portion on the first page of ex. X-1. She, however, stated in her evidence that she might be having the original lease deed and undertook to produce the same if it were there after verifying her records however, no such document was produced later nor ii was explained to the satisfaction of the Court that there was no such document in existence. Be that as it may, as regards the quantum of rent, D. W. I was so specific in her evidence that although initiall the rent was agreed at Rs. 930. 00 but she had been paying only Rs. 915. 00 per month and there has been no further agreement to pay hire charges for the furniture, fittings, and other amenities. The appellant was running a school under the name and style of "bright School" in the demised premises. Confessedly, the School had been maintaining the accounts. ( 13 ) D. W. I is the defendant. She squarely admitted in her evidence that the School was recognised by the Government and she was the proprietrix of the School by name "bright School"; and that she was an Income tax Assessee; and that the accounts of the school were being maintained and the accounts showed the rents paid. D. W. 2 is the husband of the defendant. He stated in his evidence that he was the Honorary Secretary of the Society which had been running a school at Himayat Nagar; and that he was looking after the accounts of the society. He admitted in cross - exaniination that ho would produce the accounts of the Society for the year 1981. Doth the witnesses, of course, denied the suggestion that they purposefully did not produce the accounts despite the notice inasmuch as the accounts would show the payment of rent at rs 1,830/- per month. There can be no gainsaying that the account books being maintained by the defendant making necessary entries therein about the payment of rent would constitute the best evidence. There can be no gainsaying that the account books being maintained by the defendant making necessary entries therein about the payment of rent would constitute the best evidence. Notwithstanding that the burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove the quantum of rent as pleaded, he who has in possession the best evidence is obliged under law to produce the same. Non-production of the same would entail an adverse inference to be drawn by the Court. I am reinforced in my above view by the Judgment of the Apex court in Gopnl Krishnaji v. Mohd. Haji Latif and Patel Naranbhai v. Dhulabhai and a judgment of this Court in Habeeb Khan v. Valasula Devi. ( 14 ) AS discussed hereinabove, the suit premises was let out earlier to Kalva suryanarayana College and then to the horticulture Department. The oral and documentary evidence produced in this regard would amply prove that the College used to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 1,200. 00 per month and the Horticulture Department used to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 1,830. 00 per month inclusing of the actual rent and rent towards furniture,. fittings and other amenities. This evidence produced is quite impeccable. Therefore, it is obvious that the suit premises used fetch rent at the rate of rs, 1,200/- per month during the years 1977 and 1978 and at the rale of Rs. 1,830. 00 per month from the year 1979 onwards till 1982. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant-defendant seeks to contend that this evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiffs, both oral and documentary, is not germane for consideration inasmuch as what the building used to fetch is not the question and what the defendant has been paying is the question. I am afraid, I cannot accede to the said contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant. Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act is ap, here to be considered. It reads as under:"11 When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant: - Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant- (1) !f they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact; (2) If by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable. It reads as under:"11 When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant: - Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant- (1) !f they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact; (2) If by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable. " ( 15 ) THE said Section reads that the facts which are not otherwise relevant are relevant if by themselves or in connection with other facts, make the existence or non- existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable. Therefore, the fact that the building used to fetch rent at the rate of Rs. 1,200. 00 per month initially and that it fetched rent at the rate of Rs. 930. 00 per month besides the rent towards fixtures, fittings and other amenities at the rate of rs. 900/- per month, in all Rs. 1,830. 00 per month immediately preceding the tenancy of the defendant would highly probabilise the quantum of the rent at which the building is said to have been let out to the defendant. When the building was let out at the rate of Rs. 1,830. 00 including the rent for the fixtures, fittings, etc. , it is highly improbable that the building could have been let out for a rent of Rs. 915. 00 which rent is half of the rent which the building used to fetch earlier. In that view of the matter, the oral and documentary evidence adduced in this regard on the side of the plaintiffs, having regard to the provisions of Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, becomes relevant. ( 16 ) THE amounts paid by the defendant from time to time, if calculated, would not fit in with the theory of the defendant that she has been paying the rent at the rate of rs. 915/- per month. It is nobody s case that the defendant has paid more rent than what is required. When the amount already paid represents more than what the defendant, as per her own plea, should have paid; well, that would demolish the tall claim of the defendant that although the rent was initially fixed at Rs. 930. 00 per month, she has been paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 915. 00 per month. When the amount already paid represents more than what the defendant, as per her own plea, should have paid; well, that would demolish the tall claim of the defendant that although the rent was initially fixed at Rs. 930. 00 per month, she has been paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 915. 00 per month. ( 17 ) TURNING to the oral evidence on the point, P. W. 3 the Assistant Director of horticulture Department deposed that the horticulture Department paid rent at the rate of Rs. 1,830. 00 per month which includes charges towards furniture and fixtures. His evidence further shows that the fittings provided to the tenanted premises were two washbasins, five ceiling fans, electrical and sanitary fittings, and two or three cupboards. There is nothing to discredit the testimony of this witness. D. W. I in her evidence stated that although the rent was fixed initially at Rs. 930. 00- but it was reduced later to Rs. 915. 00. In her cross-examination when she was confronted with Exs. X-4, B-2 and B-1 documents, she stated that the details about the payments of rent were known to her husband; and that she did not know the same. Curiously, when D. W. 2 her husband was examined, there has been no whisper in the chief-examination of this witness about the rent fixed. He only spoke about the amounts paid under various cheques and challans, and the receipts. In the cross-examination portion of the evidence of this witness, he stated that the rent at the inception was at Rs. 915. 00 and yet another stage of the cross-examination he deposed that the rent was originally fixed at rs. 930/- but it was reduced to Rs. 915. 00. He did not deny in his evidence that another amount of Rs. 900. 00 was fixed towards hire charges for fixtures, fittings and other amenities. Apart from the prevaricative statements made by this witness, there has been no assertion that never the rent was at rs. 1,830/- and it was only Rs. 915. 00 per month. The oral evidence of D. Ws. l and 2 is not of definitive nature. Having regard to the same and as admittedly the amounts paid by the defendant from time to time towards rent under various receipts would show that the amounts paid already exceed the required amount to be paid at Rs. 915. 915. 00 per month. The oral evidence of D. Ws. l and 2 is not of definitive nature. Having regard to the same and as admittedly the amounts paid by the defendant from time to time towards rent under various receipts would show that the amounts paid already exceed the required amount to be paid at Rs. 915. 00 per month, and the fact that the building used to fetch rent at Rs. 1,830. 00 immediately preceding the lease of the defendant coupled with non-production of the accounts maintained by the defendant, cumulatively show that the quantum of rent for the building as fixed at the inception was rs. 1,830/- per month but not Rs. 915. 00 per month, ( 18 ) THEREFORE, for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, I see that there is nothing to interfere with the well considered finding of the trial Court that the quantum of rent at which the suit premises was leased out was rs. 1,830/- per month. Point No. 2: ( 19 ) HAVING regard to the discussion hereinabove made on point No. 1 that ex. X-1 is not admtsrible for want of registration, there is somexpress contract in this case which stipulates the conditions for the termination of the tenancy. In the absence of any such contractt, in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act the lease of immovable property other than the lease for agricultural and manufactureing purposes shalll be deemed to be the lease from month to month and is terminable on the part of either lessor or lesses by 15 days notice expring with the end of the month of the tenancy. In the instant case, Ex A-8 quit notice dated 20-6-1983 was received by the appellant- defendant on 22-6-1983. The notice stipulates that the tenancy is terminated on the expiry of 15th day of July, 1983. Therefore, I see no impropriety in the termination of the tenancy. ( 20 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed, but, under the circumstances, I direct both the parties to bear their respective costs. ORDER dated 6-1-2003 (On being mentioned) ( 21 ) AFTER the judgment is pronounced at the request of the learned counsel for the appellant the matter has been listed under the caption "for being mentioned". ORDER dated 6-1-2003 (On being mentioned) ( 21 ) AFTER the judgment is pronounced at the request of the learned counsel for the appellant the matter has been listed under the caption "for being mentioned". The learned counsel for the appellant represents that a reasonable time might be granted so as to enable the appellant to vacate the premises after making her own arrangements. The learned counsel for the respondents represents that a reasonable time may be granted. ( 22 ) THE request for grant of six months under the eircumstances cannot be considered. Instead the request for a couple of months can be considered which is reasonable for the appellant to make her own arrangements. Having regard to the same, time for vacating the premises is granted till 6-3-2003 and subject to the payment of arrears of profits, if any, till that elate. The appellant shall not make any request for extension of time.