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2002 DIGILAW 1539 (AP)

GRANDHI SURYA PRAKASA RAO v. KAKARLA PULLAIAH

2002-12-31

T.CH.SURYA RAO

body2002
T. SURYA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE revision petitioner assails the order dated 5. 3. 1999 passed by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, guntur, in Crl. R. P. No. 158 of 1998. ( 2 ) THE petitioner is the de facto complainant. The Sub-Inspector of Police. Lalapet Lando P. S. , Guntur, laid the charge sheet against the first respondent herein under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code ( the IPC for brevity) alleging inter alia that on 30. 9. 1997 at 11. 00 a. m. , the accused came to M/s. Sita Ratna Rice and Flour Mill of the de facto complainant situated at etukuru Road, Guntur, accompanied by three others; and that he took the telephone key forcibly and threatened the de facto complainant that he would call the Vigilance people and get the Mill seized by the commercial Tax Officer; and that the staff of the accused were harassing the de facto complainant by asking mamoolu for the last some days; and that, therefore, the complainant having not been able to bear the same, poured kerosene upon himself and tried to self-immolate; and that on a report given by the de facto complainant at 8. 15 p. m. , on that day, a case was registered against the accused in Crime No. 224 of 1997 and eventually, after investigation the charge sheet was laid. ( 3 ) THE accused, pursuant to the summons issued by the Court, appeared and then filed the petition in Crl. M. P. No. 4454 of 1998 under Section 37 of the A. P. General sales Tax Act ( the Act for brevity) and under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal procedure ( the Cr. PC for brevity) seeking discharge. It is averred inter alia in that petition that the petitioner is an officer working as Special A. C. T. O. of Patnam bazaar Office, Guntur, at the time of alleged incident and, therefore, he is a public servant and he is protected under Section 37 of the Act and under Section 197 of the cr. PC. As he was performing his official duties in good faith in protecting the revenues of the Government, it requires sanction to prosecute him. PC. As he was performing his official duties in good faith in protecting the revenues of the Government, it requires sanction to prosecute him. While the petitioner reached the Rice Mill along with his staff for the purpose of collecting tax due, he was wrongfully confined along with the staff in a room, thereby preventing him from discharging his official duties for about nearly 8 hours; and that some police officers saved the petitioner and his staff; and that on a report given by him a case in Cr. No. 225 of 1997 was registered against the de facto complainant and the same is pending; and that, therefore, the case of the complainant is totally false. ( 4 ) THE learned IV Additional Munsif Magistrate, Guntur, by his order dated 16. 11. 1998 dismissed the said petition on the premise that it was not proper to hold that the accused visited the Mill for the purpose of collecting the revenue and the same should be decided only after a full- fledged trial and, therefore, the sanction as envisaged under Section 37 of the Act and under Section 197 of the Cr. PC was not required. Having been aggrieved by the said order, the accused carried the matter in revision to the Sessions Court and under the impugned order, as aforesaid, the learned I Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, allowed the revision petition. Inter alia, in his order the learned Sessions Judge observed that the accused went to the shop of the de facto complainant for collecting dues and in the process it would appear that he administered threats to the de facto complainant and, therefore, such threats even if true would fall part of the official duty of the petitioner. As aforesaid, the de facto complainant is assailing the said order. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the revision petitioner contends that there is no nexus between the act complained of and the official functions inasmuch as the threats hurled could never be in discharge of his official duties. ( 6 ) THE points that fall for my determination in this revision case are as to whether the allegations levelled against the revision petitioner attract the offence of criminal intimidation, and if so, whether the sanction is required to prosecute the accused? ( 6 ) THE points that fall for my determination in this revision case are as to whether the allegations levelled against the revision petitioner attract the offence of criminal intimidation, and if so, whether the sanction is required to prosecute the accused? ( 7 ) THERE is no gainsaying that the accused was a public servant at the relevant time, working as Assistant commercial Tax Officer. It is not in dispute that he was attached to the Office of the commercial Tax Officer, Guntur. As can be seen from the case of the prosecution, the accused along with three other staff members visited Sita Ratna Rice and Flour mill of the de facto complainant on 30. 9. 1997 at 11. 00 a. m. The first allegation against him was that he took forcibly the telephone key and threatened the de facto complainant by articulating that he would call the vigilance people and get the Mill seized by No. 5 c. T. O. The other allegation was that the staff of the Commercial Tax Office have been harassing the de facto complainant by asking mamoolu for the last some days. We are not concerned in this case with the second allegation inasmuch as that allegation per se attracts the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is excluded. Therefore, the only allegation which can be taken cognizance by the court against the accused was the alleged threatening by taking forcibly the key of the telephone that he would call the Vigilance people and get the Mill seized by the C. T. O. It inheres in the allegation itself that in his official capacity the accused uttered those words. Unless he has the necessary authority, he cannot call the Vigilance people or the C. T. O. , as the case may be, to get the Mill seized. If it were be any other person, the only course open to him is to report the matter to the necessary authorities. It is obvious, therefore, that the very allegation levelled against the accused presupposes that in exercise of his official function the accused must have uttered the alleged words against the de facto complainant. It is not in dispute that the assistant Commercial Tax Officer has every jurisdiction to visit the Mill in his official capacity and to conduct search and seize the necessary records. It is not in dispute that the assistant Commercial Tax Officer has every jurisdiction to visit the Mill in his official capacity and to conduct search and seize the necessary records. Having regard to these facts, it is squarely a case where at the relevant time the accused was in his official duty and while discharging his functions as a. C. T. O. he uttered the alleged words threatening the complainant. ( 8 ) THE main contention of the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner is that uttering threatening words is no part of the duty of the officer and, therefore, there can, by no stretch of the imagination, be a nexus between the official function and the act complained of. It may be mentioned here that the case against the accused is for the alleged criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 Part-I of the IPC. It is a non-cognizable offence and the police cannot register the case without the necessary permission from the Magistrate. ( 9 ) THAT apart, accepting the allegations made against the accused as true would attract the provisions of Section 506 of the ipc is yet another moot question. Taking away forcibly the telephone key and uttering that he would call the Vigilance people and get the Mill seized by No. 5 C. T. O. is the main allegation against the A. C. T. O. Any officer who visits the Mill in his official capacity and says that he would call the vigilance people or that he would get the mill seized having found the infraction of the provisions of the Act or any other enactment, the same cannot be construed in my considered view as a threatening. As a matter of fact, even if it is an ordinary person, if one says that he would report the matter against the other either with the police or with the other authorities which is not unlawful if they attract the provisions of section 506 of the IPC that would lead to absurdity. That would certainly prohibit any person from saying that he would report the matter to the authorities and entail penal consequences. Certainly it is not the spirit of section 506 of the IPC. That would certainly prohibit any person from saying that he would report the matter to the authorities and entail penal consequences. Certainly it is not the spirit of section 506 of the IPC. ( 10 ) THE offence of criminal intimidation has been defined under Section 503 to the ipc, which reads as under:"whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested with intention to cause alarm to that person or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation :a threat to injure reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section. " ( 11 ) FROM a plain reading of the above provision, it is obvious that there shall be a threat to another with an injury to his person, reputation or property or to another in whom the person is interested with an intention to cause alarm to that person or to cause him to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. To constitute the offence of criminal intimidation, there must be in the first instance a threat with an injury. That injury either to the person, reputation, or property of that person threatened or to another in whom he is interested; secondly that threat must be with an intention to cause alarm to that person; and thirdly it must compel that person to do an act which he is not legally bound to do, or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do. The expression threat is nothing but the declaration of an intention to inflict punishment, loss or pain on another. The word injury is defined under Section 44 of the IPC. It reads as under:"the word "injury" denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property". It is obvious, therefore, that the injury must be caused illegally and without any lawful excuse. The word injury is defined under Section 44 of the IPC. It reads as under:"the word "injury" denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property". It is obvious, therefore, that the injury must be caused illegally and without any lawful excuse. Therefore, it follows that in order to constitute the offence, the threat must be a declaration of one s intention that one would illegally cause harm to the person, reputation or property of either himself or another in whom he is interested. The illegality of the act by which the harm is threatened must be clearly discernible from the facts. By no stretch of the imagination it can be said that the A. C. T. O. has no lawful excuse to complain against the de facto complainant with the higher authorities and express the same openly on the face of the complainant. On the face of the allegation prime facie the offence as defined under Section 503 and punishable under Section 506 Part-I of the ipc is not attracted. ( 12 ) BE that as it may, apart from the merits of the case, assuming for a moment that it attracts penal provisions of Section 506 part-I of the IPC, it cannot be denied that the accused who is a public servant having visited the Rice and Flour Mill of the de facto complainant in that capacity along with his staff when hurled a threat to the effect that he would report the matter to the Vigilance people and see that the Mill is seized by c. T. O. No. 5, it must be in the discharge of his official functions as the Assistant commercial Tax Officer. Therefore, there is every nexus between the official function of the accused and the act complained of, namely, the so-called threat. The very object in having incorporated the provision under section 197 of the Cr. P. C. is to protect the honest public servants from being unnecessarily harassed and persecuted so as to deter them from discharging their lawful functions. Here is a case where in discharge of his functions as A. C. T. O. , obviously the accused visited the Mill and uttered the alleged threat that he would report to the vigilance people and, if that attracts the penal provision, no public servant can work without any fear. Here is a case where in discharge of his functions as A. C. T. O. , obviously the accused visited the Mill and uttered the alleged threat that he would report to the vigilance people and, if that attracts the penal provision, no public servant can work without any fear. If the public servant has no lawful excuse, that is to say, that he would report the matter to the higher-ups, he cannot function as such public servant. Therefore, in my considered view, the allegations levelled against the accused per se attract the provisions of Section 197 of the Cr. PC and Section 37 of the Act. ( 13 ) I, therefore, see no illegality or material irregularity that has been committed by the learned I Additional Sessions Judge in having allowed the revision petition. ( 14 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the Petition dismissed.