JUDGMENT - CHITRE J.G., J.:---Shri Gangal for the petitioners, Shri Karandikar for respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 2 has been served but they are absent, none present for them. This matter pertains to year 1989 therefore, it is being heard treating respondent No. 2 as ex parte. 2. The petitioners are assailing correctness, propriety and legality of the judgment and order passed by Member M.R.T. in Revision Application No. M.R.T. S.H. XII 7/87 (TEN. B. 341/87) Pune dated 22-8-1988. Survey No. 644/1 bearing Gat No. 1359 and Survey No. 644/2 bearing Gat No. 1407 situated in Barsi are disputed lands. The respondent No. 1 Somnath Krushanath Raut was serving in petitioner company as clerk. Jay Shankar Mills Ltd. was taken over by N.T.C. in the year 1972 and on account of that the suit lands were owned and possessed by the present petitioners. On 1-7-1973 a tender notice was advertised in newspaper whereby tenders were invited for handing over possession of the suit land in the custody of the prospective tenderer on leave and licence for a period of 11 months. Responding to that tender notice the respondent No. 1 Somnath Krushanath Raut submitted his tender. Only the respondent No. 1 submitted the tender for the first year and it was accepted and the land was handed over in his custody as licensee. It seems to be the contention of the respondent No. 1 Somnath Raut that he started cultivating the said land and started sowing crop in it. His tender was continued after period of initially for 11 months, thereafter for certain period. Thereafter as record shows no tender notice was published and respondent No. 1 Somnath Raut remained in possession of the said land. In view of that, he contended that he was "deemed tenant and he presented an application before Tenancy Awal Karkoon and A.L.T. Barsi which was numbered as Tenancy Case No. 1/1983. He prayed for a declaration in view of section 70(b) of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, Act for convenience). 3. The original owner of the said land was Anant Madhav Deshmukh. He prayed for a declaration in view of section 70(b) of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as, Act for convenience). 3. The original owner of the said land was Anant Madhav Deshmukh. He had leased out the said land to Jay Shankar Mills Barsi Ltd. and therefore, the name of Jay Shankar Mills Barsi Ltd. appears as owner in V.F. VII and thereafter, the ownership was transferred in the name of Barsi Textile Mills Barsi (N.T.C.), Unit Bombay whose Chief Executive Manager, at that time was one Shri D.G. Gulhane, resident of Barsi. 4. Respondent No. 1 Somnath Krushanath Raut contended that he was continuously in cultivation of the said land since 1-7-1975. However, the present petitioners contended that the said land was never leased out to him, however, he was in possession of the said land only as a licensee. It denied his contention that he was ever a tenant of the said land. 5. Awal Karkoon and A.L.T. Barsi dismissed the petition of Somnath Raut by passing his judgment and order which was challenged by him by submitting the Tenancy Appeal which were numbered as 2/1986 and 13/1986. The learned Assistant Collector, Solapur Division, Solapur dismissed both the appeals. Thereafter, Somnath Raut filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as, M.R.T. for convenience). The said revision application was numbered as M.R.T. Sh-XII-7/1987 (TEN. B. 341/87). The learned Member of M.R.T. allowed the said revision application on 22-8-1988 and declared that respondent No. 1 happens to be the tenant of the suit lands and this judgment and order is being assailed by this writ petition. 6. Shri Gangal, Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the learned Member of M.R.T. did not notice that two courts below recorded finding of fact against respondent No. 1 Somnath Raut holding that he was not the tenant of the suit land. He submitted that when it was so, there was no need for the learned Member to set aside the said concurrent finding of fact recorded by two courts below. He submitted that the said finding of fact recorded by two courts below was consistent with the evidence on record. He made reference in that context to evidence and some documents on record. 7. He submitted that the said finding of fact recorded by two courts below was consistent with the evidence on record. He made reference in that context to evidence and some documents on record. 7. So also Shri Gangal submitted that the operation of the Act stands exempted so far as the suit lands are concerned because of provisions of section 88-C. He prayed for a writ of certiorari for quashing the said judgment and order passed by the M.R.T. He made reference to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Vishnu Mahadeo Pendse v. The Rajen Textile Mils (P) Ltd. and another)1, reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2079. 8. Shri Karandikar, Counsel appearing for respondent No. 1, pointed out the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of (Dahya Lala v. Rasul Mohmed Abdul Rahim)2, reported in LXV. Bom.L.R. 328, wherein the Supreme Court held that: "Under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 a tenant lawfully inducted by the mortgagee on the land will on redemption of the mortgage be deemed to be a tenant of the owner mortgagor under section 4 of the Act. All persons other than those mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, who lawfully cultivate land belonging to other persons whether or not their authority is derived directly from the owner of the land must be tenants of the lands under section 4 of the Act." He justified the judgment and order passed by the learned Member of M.R.T. and submitted that writ petition be dismissed. 9. This Court finds substance in the submission of Shri Gangal so far as his submission that the learned Member of M.R.T. could not have dislodged the findings of fact recorded by two courts below, because the two courts below have considered the evidence on record properly and by applying the legal rule of appreciation of evidence, drawn the conclusion which are against the respondent No. 1 who claims to be the tenant of the suit land. Unless the judgment and order is inconsistent with the evidence on record, perverse and against the provisions of law, the Court exercising jurisdiction in revision should not set aside the findings of fact. Unless the judgment and order is inconsistent with the evidence on record, perverse and against the provisions of law, the Court exercising jurisdiction in revision should not set aside the findings of fact. The Revisional Court can do so if it finds that the judgment and order, which has been moved by the revisional applicant, is one wherein the Court or Tribunal or Forum has exercised the jurisdiction which did not vest in it or has failed in exercising the jurisdiction which is vested in it. If the findings are perverse and inconsistent with the evidence on record or the pleadings, the revisional Court may interfere in such judgment and order. But after examining the judgments and orders passed by the courts below this Court is satisfied that there was no ground whatsoever for the learned Member to dislodge the findings of facts recorded by the two courts below. 10. This takes this Court to another important aspect of the matter which has been hotly contested by the Counsel appearing for the parties and that revolves around the point whether the respondent No. 1 Somnath Raut happens to be a tenant of the suit land or not in view of the provisions of Act. "Section 4(A) provides that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such persons is not--- (a) a member of owners family, or (b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owners family, or (c) a mortgagee in possession. Explanation (1), which has been provided, indicates that a person shall not be deemed to be a tenant under this section under section 2-A of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, declared by a competent authority not to be a tenant. Explanation (II) indicates that- Where any land is cultivated by a widow or a minor or a person who is subject to physical or mental disability or a serving member of the armed forces through a tenant then notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation I to Clause (6) of section 2, such tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of this section. 11. 11. Section 4-A provides that, for the purpose of this Act, a person shall be recognised to be a protected tenant, if such person has been deemed to be a protected tenant under sections 3, 3-A and 4 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, referred to in Schedule I to this Act. 12. Section 4-B provides that, no tenancy of any land (other than the tenancy of the land duly sanctioned under section 36 or section 36-A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966) shall be terminated merely on the ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its direction has expired. 13. All these sections have to be considered because the submissions revolved around the facts indicated by the provisions of these sections. Somnath Raut contended that initially he was inducted as a tenant in the said land by respondent No. 2 and the said lease was continued year to year and he was continuously cultivating the said land and was growing crops in it and after the agreement period was over, he stayed on the said land cultivating it and therefore, he is to be declared as deemed tenant and he is entitled to be declared as deemed tenant. In this context the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the judgment in the matter of Dahya Lalas case (supra). In that judgment the Supreme Court has expressed its opinion about a person who was inducted by a mortgagee on the land and the question which was agitated in the said matter was whether mortgagor had right to evict such a person and in that context a question arose whether he was having derived title directly from the owner of the land. In that context it was held that he happens to be a deemed tenant of the land under section 4 of the Act as he was inducted by mortgagee he was a lawful tenant, lawfully inducted by the mortgagee. In this case the status of respondent No. 1 is quite different. He was undisputedly a person in service of respondent No. 2 when he got possession of the suit land. He derived his right and placed claim of becoming a deemed tenant or tenant under the provisions of Act by virtue of the agreement which was in existence in view of tender notice. He was undisputedly a person in service of respondent No. 2 when he got possession of the suit land. He derived his right and placed claim of becoming a deemed tenant or tenant under the provisions of Act by virtue of the agreement which was in existence in view of tender notice. He got the possession of the suit land only in view of the agreement which was entered into between the respondent No. 2 and Somnath by virtue of that tender notice which was accepted by the respondent No. 2. His possession of the suit land was consequent to the agreement which was entered into between respondent No. 2 and Somnath Raut. Otherwise he could not have been in possession of the suit land. Therefore, the possession of Somnath Raut of the suit land is the result of the said agreement and the contractual relations between the respondent No. 1 and Somnath Raut and nothing more. The said agreement was not an agreement of lease but it was an agreement of licence and it was for a stipulated period only. In addition to that, after the said licence period was over, he remained over the said land. The sum and substance of all these things leads to one conclusion that he was not lawfully inducted as a tenant and he did not remain on the land as in any lawful manner. 14. In addition to that, when his possession in respect of the suit land was the result of the said contractual relations, the respondent No. 1 is estopped from claiming to be a "deemed tenant" by taking a topsy turvy stand. This view stands justified by judgment of this Court in the matter of (Dwarkanath Vishram Ghurye since deceased by heirs Ashok Dwarkanath Ghurye and another v. Narayan Vasudeo Dhond)3, reported in 1989 Mh.L.J. 689, wherein this Court held that : "If a person pleads contractual tenancy, gets an issue framed on that basis from the Civil Court, but fails to prove his contractual tenancy in the Tenancy Court, he cannot turn around and contend that if not contractual tenancy at lease a deemed tenancy under section 4 of the Tenancy Act should be held proved. A deemed tenancy postulates absence of a contractual tenancy at the time when deemed tenancy is pleaded. A tenancy cannot be simultaneously a contractual tenancy and also a deemed tenancy. A deemed tenancy postulates absence of a contractual tenancy at the time when deemed tenancy is pleaded. A tenancy cannot be simultaneously a contractual tenancy and also a deemed tenancy. Deemed tenancy postulates lawful cultivation of the land by a tenant which land belongs to another person. The ingredients of the lease, contemplated by section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, are not present in the case of such deemed tenancy for the very simple reason that if those ingredients are present, it would be a contractual tenancy and there would have been no necessity to invoke the deeming provisions of section 4 of the Tenancy Act." 15. A person who is in possession of the land in view of tender invited and remained on the land in view of such tender and the contractual relations, cannot throw out such relations and make out a case for his claim for tenancy of agricultural land. He is estopped from doing so. If at all he has to make a claim for such claim of tenancy in respect of agricultural lands, he should present an application to appropriate forum by mentioning such facts in clear terms. In the present case it has not been done by the respondent No. 1 and that should have been noticed by the learned Member of M.R.T. 16. The learned Member of M.R.T. did not consider the documents which are on record which expressly speak of contractual relations between respondent No. 1 and the petitioners. On the contrary, the learned member allowed his judgment to sway to irrelevant points and therefore, he landed in the error of dislodging the concurrent findings recorded by two courts below and declaring respondent No. 1 to be a tenant of the suit land. Such judgment cannot be permitted to sustain as it happens to be perverse, illegal and therefore, a writ of certiorari needs to be issued in favour of the petitioners and said judgment and order needs to be quashed. 17. Before parting with this judgment, this Court finds it necessary to mention the strange thing that only one tender was accepted by respondent No. 2 company and that too from its own employee. When the first tender was accepted it is significant to note that only the respondent No. 1 was the only tenderer. 17. Before parting with this judgment, this Court finds it necessary to mention the strange thing that only one tender was accepted by respondent No. 2 company and that too from its own employee. When the first tender was accepted it is significant to note that only the respondent No. 1 was the only tenderer. It is matter of common practice that in some cases tenders are submitted through the "dummies" but here in this case the tender was submitted by an employee of respondent No. 2 and it was accepted and was continued for number of years and that caused respondent No. 2 the expenses of this litigation. That is misuse of public money and that has to be deprecated with disdaining views. In the interest of public at large and for avoiding repetition of such instances the Chairman of N.T.C. is hereby directed to make an enquiry into the cause of floating such tender, accepting it initially and thereafter continuing it for number of years. A report should be submitted within six months through their Counsel Shri Gangal to this Court so as to allow this Court to have concrete information that some action has been taken in this context in public interest. The petition stands allowed with costs. Rule stands made absolute. Petition allowed. -----