All Orissa State Bank Officers Co-operative Society Limited, Khurda v. State Bank of India
2002-03-14
P.K.TRIPATHY
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 14. 3. 2002 — This Civil Revision is directed against the judgment dated 25.3.2000 in Misc. Appeal No. 11/24 of 2000 of the Court of Second Addl. District Judge, Bhubaneswar. Respondent before the Court below is the petitioner in this revision. 2. Petitioner is a Co-operative Society constituted by a group of officers of the State Bank of India (in short ‘S.B.I.’) working within the State of Orissa who are not members of any other Co-operative Society or any other associations in the State as per their by-law, a copy of which has been placed for perusal by the learned counsel for the petitioner. When the Head Office of the S.B.I. was functioning at Forest Park and IDCO Tower the plaintiff-society was allowed accommodation within the Bank prem¬ises to run its office. The dispute arose when the Head Office was shifted to its own building without providing any accommoda¬tion to the plaintiff-society. Thus, the plaintiff-petitioner instituted T.S. No. 53 of 2000 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Bhubaneswar praying for the declaration which in essence is to the effect that it be declared that the plain¬tiff-Society is entitled to an accommodation in the new building at Unit-III, Bhubaneswar and the defendant/opposite party members i.e. the Bank and its Assistant General Manager he injuncted not to withhold such accommodation and not to shift to the new build¬ing in Unit-III until providing such accommodation to the plain¬tiff-Society. Along with the suit application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure (in short C.P.C.) was filed and registered as Misc. Case No. 52 of 2000. The opposite party members contested the prayer for interim injunction, inter alia, on the ground of absence of a prima facie case, balance of con¬venience and no irreparable loss and injury. It was also stated by them that compassionate accommodation granted to the petition¬er at Forest Park and IDCO Tower cannot be regarded as a substan¬tial right to claim accommodation when the petitioner-society is not an integral part of the Bank. It was also stated by the opposite parties that grant of ad interim injunction will result in premature disposal of the suit. 3.
It was also stated by the opposite parties that grant of ad interim injunction will result in premature disposal of the suit. 3. After hearing the parties learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) allowed the application and passed the order in the following manner : “.......The opposite parties are directed to provide a room for occupation of the petitioner’s society in the newly con¬structed building with the local Head Office having regard to the precedent as adopted by the Bank.” The opposite party challenged the said order and vide the im¬pugned judgment in Misc. Appeal No. 11/24 of 2000 learned Second Addl. District Judge set aside the above quoted order on the ground of non-existence of a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner and also on the grounds that a case of irreparable loss and injury and balance of convenience being not made out by the petitioner. The appellate Court also recorded that in the absence of a subsisting legal right and under the given facts and circumstances petitioner is not entitled to the interim relief of mandatory injunction which will tantamount to grant of the relief which they have claimed in the suit. Accord¬ingly, the appellate Court vacated the order of injunction. In course of hearing of the appeal an application under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. filed by the appellant regarding the petitioner-society functioning in another building was taken into considera¬tion as well. 4. At the conclusion of argument in xxxxxxx this Court petitioner files an affidavit counteracting to the contention in that additional evidence. 5. It is not disputed at the Bar that to consider the prayer of ad interim injunction the party who is seeking such relief has to satisfy the Court regarding existence of a prima facie case, sustaining of irreparable loss and injury if the interim relief is not granted and the balance of convenience leaning in petitioner’s favour. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. R. K. Mohanty heavily criticised the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff does not possess a prima facie case though learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties sup¬ports that finding. It appears that in that respect the finding recorded by learned Addl.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. R. K. Mohanty heavily criticised the finding recorded by the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff does not possess a prima facie case though learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties sup¬ports that finding. It appears that in that respect the finding recorded by learned Addl. District Judge is erroneous inasmuch as the term prima facie means the case as projected by the plaintiff makes out existence of a dispute which needs adjudication relat¬ing to establishing or extinguishment of rights or remedies. The term ‘prima facie’ means on the face of it. Therefore, on a bare perusal of the plaint and plaintiff’s uncontroverted contention relating to grant of accommodation by the Bank at Forest Park and IDCO Tower while Head Office was functioning in such places on succession does not make out a prima facie case i.e., an arguable case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner has no prima facie case. To that extent the finding recorded by the appellate Court is liable to be set aside. 7. It is the settled position of law that an application for temporary injunction is not to succeed only on establishing the factum of existence of a prima facie case. Along with that applicant has to satisfy regarding sustaining of irreparable loss and injury and the balance of convenience being in his favour. Though several facts have been stated disputing to the contention of each other regarding petitioner having shifted to a premises after the shifting of the Bank to Unit-III, but this Court does not propose to enter into that factual debate because the present location of the office of the plaintiff-Society has no relevancy to consider the prayer for interim injunction. While seeking the relief of interim injunction petitioner advances two grounds, viz: (i) When the Bank has consistently provided accommodation to the Consumer Co-operative Society, Civil Security Officers department and Provident Fund Department at the previous places as well as, in the present building in Unit III, Bhubaneswar, the opposite party should not give a discriminatory treatment to the petition¬ers by refusing an accommodation in the new building, and (ii) like the above noted other Societies and associations plain¬tiff-Society is also an integral part of the Bank to get such accommodation.
In that respect the alternative plea is advanced that if the petitioner-Society is not regarded as an integral part then also it being functioned by the members who are a group of officers of the Bank they should be provided with accommoda¬tion in the interest of the Bank and the officers. The respondents have routed their argument adopting the logic of the appellate Court in that respect. 8. Looking to the bye-law of the petitioner-society it is prima facie not made out that the society is an integral part of the Bank. So far as the grant of parity at par with the other associations like the consumer society and the security depart¬ment are concerned, the findings of the Courts below is that those organisations are integral part of the Bank. One of them is distributing the consumer goods to all the employees and the other is dealing with the security of the Bank. Though the case of parity or equity may be considered while adjudicating the suit but for the matter of interim relief of injunction, petitioner does not make out a case of balance of convenience in its fa¬vour. Similarly refusal of the prayer for interim injunction is not shown in any manner to inflict a loss or injury which can be termed as irreparable. 9. For the reasons indicated above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned order of refusal of tempo¬rary injunction by the appellate Court. Accordingly, the Civil Revision stands dismissed. Revision dismissed.