S. B. SINHA ( 1 ) THE petitioners herein are third parties to the suit. ( 2 ) THE second petitioner and the second respondent herein entered into an agreement for sale on 3 April 1995. A General Power of attorney was executed by the second respondent in favour of the petitioner No. 2. In the said General Power of Attorney, the said respondent described himself as co-owner and co-sharer of leasehold rights with structures thereon in respect of properly No. 14/26 East Patel nagar, New Delhi. A Special Power of Attorney was also, executed on the said date by the respondent No. 2 in favour of petitioner No. 2. Allegedly, the consideration amount of Rs. 1,90,000/- as specified in the agreement for sale has been paid by the petitioners to the said respondent. It is staled therein: "the 1st Party hereby assures the 2 party thai the above mentioned properly i. e. barasali floor with terrace roof rights out the property No. 14/26 East Patel Nagar, New delhi, under sale is free from all sorts of encumbrances, burden, decree, sale, mortgage, gift, lien, liability, injunction orders, legal flaws, litigation, stay orders, attachment or transfer etc. and there is no legal defect in the title of the first party, if proved otherwise or if the 2 party is deprived of said properly under sale or part thereof, owing to the above reasons, the first parly shall be liable to indemnify the 2 party (in full or part to the extent of loss sustained by the 2 party) wilh costs and damages, etc. On the basis of this agreement to sell and purchase the 2 party has become complete owner of the above mentioned entire barsati floor with terrace roof rights out of property No. 14/26 East Patel Nagat new Delhi and the 2nd party is empowered to use, enjoy sell transfer Ihe same as he likes as owner. " ( 3 ) ADMITTEDLY, a suit was filed by the first respondent herein against the second respondent. " ( 3 ) ADMITTEDLY, a suit was filed by the first respondent herein against the second respondent. In the said suit, it has been contended that ihe property in question is a perpetual leasehold from the Government of india in terms whereof neither the construction can be raised without a sanctioned plan of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi nor any transfer of property could be effected nor even the possession could be transferred without the permission of the Land and Development Office. Allegedly, the father of the first and second respondents executed a Will dated September 1991 bequeathing the ground door and terrace rights to the second respondent and the first floor to the first respondent. Hlaving found that unauthorized construction was started by respondent No. 2 on 11 february 1995 as a result whereof obstruction to the use by the first floor was created by the second respondents; the first respondent in the said suit filed an application for injunction on 17 February 1995. In response to the notice issued in this behalf on the said application, the second respondent stated: "i am not raising any new construction in my premises No. 14/26 East patel Nagar. It is a two and half storey building. I am not raising any new construction on the second floor of the said property. I am only renovating the existing structure. I undertake not to raise any construction in the said property against the building bye laws. " ( 4 ) PURSUANT thereto an order was passed that he shall be bound by the said undertaking and on that basis, the application for grant of injunction was disposed of 30 March 1995. ( 5 ) THE respondent No. 2 inspite of his undertaking allegedly went on constructing the properly. The respondent No. 1 noticed the construction on 30. 4. 1995 and moved an application for contempt under order 39 Rule 2a C. P. C. for action against the respondent No. 2 and attachment of property on 3. 5. 1995. A notice was served on respondent no. 2. The respondent No. 2 filed a reply dated 6. 5. 1995 and first time disclosed that he had entered into an agreement to sell his right, title and interest in the said property in favour of one Mr. Vinod Chhabra on 3. 4. 1995 i. e. after about 2 months of filing the suit dated 17. 2. The respondent No. 2 filed a reply dated 6. 5. 1995 and first time disclosed that he had entered into an agreement to sell his right, title and interest in the said property in favour of one Mr. Vinod Chhabra on 3. 4. 1995 i. e. after about 2 months of filing the suit dated 17. 2. 95 and 3 days after his undertaking dated 30. 3. 95. ( 6 ) THE second respondent herein filed an application purported to be under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for misleading the petitioners herein as parties. The said application was rejected, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioners themselves should file the said application. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC bringing, inter alia, the afore-mentioned facts to the notice of the learned court below. By reason of the impugned order dated 20 March 1996, the learned court below dismissed the said application holding: "in so far as the present case is concerned; admittedly the applicants entered into an agreement to sell with the defendant no. 2 on 3. 4. 95, that is after the suit was filed and the undertaking dt. 30. 3. 95 was given to the court by the defendant no. 2. Thus, at the time when the suit was filed and the above undertaking was given by the defendant no. 2, applicants had no interest in the subject matter of the suit and the controversy before the court. Besides, this, as already slated, in a suit for injunction, a third person cannot seek himself to be impleaded as a party. Otherwise also, if the applicants would be permitted to be brought on record as the defendants, it would amount to paying premium to the questionable conduct of the applicants and the defendant no. 2 in as much as the applicants must be presumed to have entered into the agreement to sell with the defendant no. 2 with the knowledge that a suit is pending with regard lo the subject matter of the agreement to sell and also that the defendant no. 2 has given an undertaking with regard to the said property. "it was observed that as the defendant No. 2 is still owner of the property, he can look after the interest of the petitioners. ( 7 ) MR. 2 has given an undertaking with regard to the said property. "it was observed that as the defendant No. 2 is still owner of the property, he can look after the interest of the petitioners. ( 7 ) MR. J. P. Sengh, learned cousel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would contend that the doctrine of dominus litns no longer holds the field. He would urge that the petitioners herein have substantial interest in the property inasmuch as the constructions have keen carried out by (hem. He would contend that even an application for taking action against the second respondent against willful disobedience of the court s order has been filed and on that ground too, the petitioners should be impleaded as parties. ( 8 ) MR. Scngh would argue that (he learned court below misdirected itself in law in so far as it failed to take into consideration that even if the petitioners are not necessary parties, they are proper parties and in support of the said contention reliance has been placed on Joginder Singh Bedi v. Sardar Siimh Narank and Anr. . 26 1984 DLT 162 Sanjm gupta v. Kala Wall, 2000 (53) DRJ 653 . ( 9 ) MS. Geeta Luthra, on the other hand, supports the impugned order. The learned counsel would extend that the plaintiff being the dominus litus no person can be impleaded againsl his will. The counsel would urge that the matter is covered by a decision of Hivision Bench of this Court in Joginder Singh Bcdi vs. Sardar Singh inarang and Anr. . 26 (1984) DLT 162. ( 10 ) THE first respondent herein filed the suit for a decree for grant of permanent injunction directing stopping of unauthori/ed constructions and demolishing of the unauthorized construction already carried out on second floor of the premises in question. Para 12 of the plaint is as follows: "12. That the construction is not yet complete though it is in process of being completed just in about a week ten days time. " ( 11 ) THE undisputable fact is that the second respondent has transferred his interest in the property in favour of the petitioners. Para 12 of the plaint is as follows: "12. That the construction is not yet complete though it is in process of being completed just in about a week ten days time. " ( 11 ) THE undisputable fact is that the second respondent has transferred his interest in the property in favour of the petitioners. Although in terms of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or the indian Registration Act, the title in the property as such has not been passed on to the petitioners, they have a substantial interest in relation thereto. It is not a case where the petitioners herein are managing the property by reason of a power of attorney. Both General Power of attorney and Special Power of Attorney granted in favour of the petitioner no. 2 by respondent No. 2 are coupled with interest. The said Power of attorney is not a revocable one. ( 12 ) IN Halsbury s Laws of England, Fourth Edn, Vol. 27 at page 21 it is stated: "licence coupled with grant of interest. A licence coupled with a grant of an interest in property is not revocable. Such a licence is capable of assignment, and covenants may he made to run with it. A right to enter on land and enjoy a profit a prendre or other incorporeal hereditament is a licence coupled with an interest and is irrevocable. Formerly it was necessary that the grant of the interest should be valid; thus, if the interest was an incorporeal hereditament, such as a right to make and use a watercourse, the grant was not valid unless under seal, and the licence, unless so. made, was therefore a mere licence and was revocable but since 1873 the court has been bound to give effect to equitable doctrines and it will restrain the revocation of a licence coupled with a grant which should be, but is not, under seal. " ( 13 ) THE transaction, therefore, stands on a different footing from the one which would fall strictly within the purview of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. " ( 13 ) THE transaction, therefore, stands on a different footing from the one which would fall strictly within the purview of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. ( 14 ) ORDER 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC empowers the court, inter alia, to implead a person who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectively and completely lo adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. ( 15 ) IT is not a case where by reason of implcading the petitioners as parties, a de novo trial would start or the scope of the suit would be enlarged. The petitioners claim substantial interest in the property. In the event the suit is decreed, not only the petitioners herein shall substantially be prejudiced, they would suffer an irreparable loss if an order of mandatory injunction is granted. It is, therefore, not a case where the court can come to a set conclusion that the interest of the petitioner would be safe at the hands of the second respondent. The second respondent, having regard to the fact that he has washed off his hands in the property, may not take interest in the suit. The suit is between a sister and brother. Admittedly, the brother and sister arc joint owners of the property having different portions thereof in their possession. ( 16 ) IN Gurmauj Saran Baluja v. Mrs. Joyee G. Salim and Ors. , air 1990 Del 13 , a Division Bench of this court has clearly held that the doctrine of dominus litus cannot be applied in all circumstances. It was observed: "16. Plaintiffs right to choose his defendants is circumscribed by the provisions of R. 10 of O. I. His right to choose his defendants is not absolute. Where a person has a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit and the decision on one of the issues involved in the suit might knock out the basis of the suit for specific performance filed by him against one of the defendants in the present suit filed by the plaintiff, the Court can direct the plaintiff to implead him as defendant. . . . . A transferee pendente lite of property in suit may not be a necessary as he would be bound by the decree passed, the suit on account of the doctrine of lis pendence as contained in S. 52 of the T. P. Act. Provisions of S. 52 are applicable in suit for specific performance of a contract of sale of immovable property, but inspite of the fact that in such a suit a plaintiff is protected by lis pendence the court does times protect him further by an injunction restraining the defendant from transferring the property during the pendency of the suit, particularly where the court prim a facie finds that a valid contract of sale exists. ( 17 ) IT is true that doctrine of- lis pendence shall apply in the instant suit but application of the said doctrine itself would not debar a person from being impleaded as a party particularly when there is a possibility that the petitioners, if not impleaded, may suffer substantial injury. ( 18 ) IN Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 976 it has been held that in case an interim injunction is granted restraining the respondents from alienating the property, the purchasers are necessary parties for avoiding the multiplicity of the proceedings. ( 19 ) IN Saniay Gupta v. Kala Wati 2000 (53) DRJ 653 , a learned single Judge of this court has REFERRED TO to a large number of decisions but, with respect, failed to consider Mahinder Kaur v. Sudarshan Krishna, 1992 RLR 274 in its proper perspective. It is not correct that Mahinder Kaur was not an authority for deciding the question of right of transferee pendente lite being impleadcd as parly during pendency of the suit. It is true that Mahinder Kaur did not consider the decision of Joginder Singh Bedi v. Sardar Singh Narang and Ors. , 26 ( 1984) dlt 162 (Delhi) but the fact situation obtaining therein was absolutely different. In Joginder Singh Bedi, a suit for specific performance of contract was filed and during the pendency of the suit, the property was transferred. Therein, the doctrine of lis pendence was applied and it was held that Order 1 Rule 10 GPC would not be attracted. However, we may notice that in Dwarka Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Harikant Prasad Singh and ors. Therein, the doctrine of lis pendence was applied and it was held that Order 1 Rule 10 GPC would not be attracted. However, we may notice that in Dwarka Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Harikant Prasad Singh and ors. , (1973) 1 SCC 179 , it was held that vender is a necessary parly in a suit for specific performance against a purchaser with notice of prior agreement for sale. ( 20 ) IN the instant case a prayer for mandatory injunction has also been made. In the event such a decree is passed, the constructions raised by the petitioner may be demolished, as a result whereof he would sustain irretrievable injury. ( 21 ) THE question, in the opinion of this court, must be determined having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. The prejudice that may be suffered by the applicants is a relevant factor. It is one thing to say that by reason of an agreement for sale, no title passes in terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act but it is also a relevant factor that when the attorney has interest in the property, he is entitled to the benefits thereof by reason of such interest and particularly having regard to the fact that he may ultimately suffer irreparable injury, the court below in a case of this nature for effective adjudication of the suit, should have impleaded the petitioners as parties. ( 22 ) FOR the reasons afore-mentioned, this civil revision petition is allowed; the impugned judgment is set aside and the lower court below is hereby directed to implead the petitioners as parties in the suit. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.