JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - The dispute raised in this application u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure is no more res Integra, yet it needs an answer that is a speaking order inasmuch as the Petitioner has to be satisfied as to how the legal remedy sought for by him is not available to him at present. 2. Petitioner is the accused and the opposite party is the complainant in I.C.C. No. 166 of 1997. That complaint is initiated alleging offence u/s 13B of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short 'N.I. Act'). The fact as stated by the complainant in his complaint is that a cheque was issued by the accused for Rs. 42,979,80. paise drawn in favour of State Bank of Mysore. Bhubaneswar Branch to discharge the liability towards the cost of medicines supplied by the complainant. That cheque was issued on 5.2.1997. It was presented on 19.2.1997 and dishonoured on 28.2.1997. Complainant contacted the accused and on latter's assurance again presented the cheque on 5.7.1997 in the Bank on 19.7.1997, he received the intimation that payment from the Bank had been stopped by the drawer. The cheque bounced in that manner on 19.7.1997. A statutory notice in registered post was sent by the complainant on 22.7.1997 and that notice was received by the accused on 29.7.1997. Thereafter, the complaint was filed on 23.8.1997 when payment was not made by the accused within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the registered notice. 3. While not disputing to the aforesaid averment, accused, after his appearance in the trial Court, filed an application to quash the cognizance order on the ground that after bouncing of the cheque on 28.2.1997, that was again presented on 5.4.1997 and when bounced on that occasion, complainant issued statutory notice on 7.5.1997 which was received by the accused on 29.5.1997 and gave written reply on 9.6.1997. In view of that, the cause of action arose on the first notice of the bouncing of cheque and in view of that the complaint filed on 23.8.1997 is barred by law of limitation and wrongly the trial Court condoned the delay on flimsy grounds. 4. It be kept on record that complainant has not admitted about issuing the statutory notice on any date prior to 22.7.1997. 4. It be kept on record that complainant has not admitted about issuing the statutory notice on any date prior to 22.7.1997. Therefore, contention of the accused, as noted above, is on factual aspect as to whether a notice had been sent earlier as provided u/s 138 of the N.I. Act. Since that is not an admitted fact, this Court while in seisin of the case u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot ascertain that fact by conducting a pre-trial inquiry. That plea of the accused if raised at the trial of the case shall be considered by the trial Court. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case of Biswaranjan Pattnaik v. Teem Finance Co. Ltd., represented by its Managing Director, Bhubaneswar (2000) 18 OCR 398. 5. At the stage of taking cognizance the Court would take a prima facie view of the materials available to it. In this case, the prima facie materials consist of the complaint and the statement of the complainant besides the documents procured by him incorporating the aforesaid facts relating to issue of the statutory notice only on 22.7.1997. Therefore, in view of that prima facie it has to be held that the complaint was filed in time in accordance with the provision in Section 142-B of the N.I. Act. It may be noted that there is no legal bar for presenting the cheque for more than once during the period of its validity and each presentation and dishonour does not make out a fresh cause of action. But once the statutory notice u/s 138 is issued relating to bouncing of cheque then the cause of action starts from that date for the purpose of counting limitation. Similar view has been taken by the apex Court in the case Sudanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998) 15 OCR (SC) 372. Thus, even if it will be proved on record regarding successful presentation of the cheque within the period of its validity that shall not enure to the benefit of the accused unless he shall be able to prove that prior to 22.7.1997. a statutory notice u/s 138, N.I. Act had been issued to him intimating about bouncing of cheque. As noted above, that is factual aspect which can be gone into at the time of trial of raised as a defence plea by the accused. 6. a statutory notice u/s 138, N.I. Act had been issued to him intimating about bouncing of cheque. As noted above, that is factual aspect which can be gone into at the time of trial of raised as a defence plea by the accused. 6. So far as it relates to non-applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act, that is not required to be considered in view of the aforesaid findings. However, for the purpose of record, it may be indicated that in the case of Janardhan Mohapatra Vs. Saroj Kumar Choudhury. this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to a complaint u/s 138 of the N.I. Act. That view has been reiterated and confirmed by Anr. Bench in the case of Satish Kumar Goenka Vs. S.R.K. Mohan and another. No contrary decision of larger Bench of this Court or of the Apex Court has been brought to the notice of this Court in that respect. 7. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned order and accordingly, the application u/s 482. Code of Criminal Procedure stands rejected. Final Result : Dismissed