COMMITTEE OF MANAGEMENT CHHETRIYA SAHKARI SAMITI LTD KURRA v. STATE OF U P
2002-10-28
G.K.GUPTA, S.P.SRIVASTAVA
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents. 2. The tenure of the Committees of Management, the petitioners, had been statutorily fixed to be for a period of three years. The contention of the petitioners is that by virtue of the provisions contained in Uttar Pradesh Sahkari Samiti (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 2001 (U. P. Ordinance No. 27 of 2001) the three years term of the Committee of Management got automatically extended for a period of five years and the elected members of the Committee of Management became entitled by operation of law to hold the office for a period of five years instead of three years. It is not disputed that the aforesaid Ordinance had lapsed. The result was that it became nullity. However, subsequently another Ordinance being Uttar Pradesh Sahkari Samiti (Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 2002 (U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002) was promulgated w. e. f. 4th July, 2002. The aforesaid Ordinance, as provided therein, was to apply to those Committees and elected office bearers who were in existence on 4th July, 2002. The U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002 provided for a five years tenure for the Committees of Management and its elected office bearers. The effect of the aforesaid Ordinance was that the tenure of the eligible Committees of Management alongwith their elected office bearers got automatically extended from three years to five years. 3. From the materials on record, it is apparent that the District Assistant Registrar, proceeding on the basis that the petitioners Committees of Management could not be deemed to have a tenure of five years because of the lapsing of the U. P. Ordinance No. 27 of 2001 and could not fall in the category of the Committees of Management which could be taken to be in existence so as to be entitled to the benefits contemplated under the U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002, had appointed Administrators for reconstituting the Committees of Management in accordance with law. 4. The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, have approached this Court seeking redress, praying for quashing of the orders passed by the District Assistant Registrar and for a direction requiring the respondents to allow the petitioners to continue till the expiry of five years period from the date of their election. 5.
4. The petitioners, feeling aggrieved, have approached this Court seeking redress, praying for quashing of the orders passed by the District Assistant Registrar and for a direction requiring the respondents to allow the petitioners to continue till the expiry of five years period from the date of their election. 5. It is disputed that, but for the provisions contained in the U. P. Ordinance No. 27 of 2001, the Committees of Management ceased to be in existence much before the promulgation of U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002. 6. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that in spite of the U. P. Ordinance No. 27 of 2001 having lapsed and becoming a nullity, the tenure of the Committees of Management and their elected office bearers had to be taken to have been extended by operation of law for a period of five years and this benefit could not be deemed to have been wiped out because of the Ordinance having lapsed. This submission does not bear scrutiny. If that had been the position in law, there could not arise any occasion to promulgate U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002 providing for the extension of the tenure of the Committees of Management and the elected members of such Committees in existence on the date of the commencement of the said Ordinance. Further while the action taken by the Committees of Management during the extended period of their tenure ending with the lapsing of the Ordinance No. 27 of 2001 could be taken to have been saved, the period of tenure could not, by operation of law, be taken to have been extended once the Ordinance itself had lapsed and became a nullity. This is obvious from the provisions contained in Section 6-C of the U. P. General Clauses Act also. With the lapsing of the Ordinance, the right to continue beyond three years had ceased to exist. The petitioners original term of three years having expired, they had no legal right to function on the date of the promulgation of the U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002 and were consequently disentitled to get the benefit secured thereunder. 7.
With the lapsing of the Ordinance, the right to continue beyond three years had ceased to exist. The petitioners original term of three years having expired, they had no legal right to function on the date of the promulgation of the U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002 and were consequently disentitled to get the benefit secured thereunder. 7. Shri Ashok Verma learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel has pointed out that a writ petition involving identical facts and similar controversy as raised in the present writ petitions, had been finally decided by the main seat of this Court negativing the contentions of the petitioners in regard to the implications arising under the U. P. Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001 (U. P. Ordinance No. 27 of 2001) as well as U. P. Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002 ). In its aforesaid decision in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 42383 of 2002, Badam Singh and another v. State of U. P. and others, decided on 4-10- 2002 the Division Bench had clarified that since the petitioners society was not legally in existence on 4-7-2002 i. e. the date of the enforcement of the U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002, it could not in its own right exist beyond the period of 3 years of its election and hence is cannot get the benefit of U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002. 8. A copy of the judgment disposing of the aforesaid writ petition in the case of Badam Singh and another v. State (supra) has been produced by the learned Standing Counsel. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment indicates that the Division Bench which coming to the aforesaid conclusion, had taken into consideration the decision of another Division Bench disposing of Civil Misc. Modification/review Petition No. 87293 of 2002 in Re : Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8375 of 2002, Committee of Management, Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd. , Gorakhpur and another v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur and others, decided on 29th August, 2002 [since reported in 2002 (2) LBESR 913 (All)]. A copy of the judgment in the aforesaid case of Committee of Management, Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd. , Gorakhpur v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur (supra) has also been produced by the learned Standing Counsel.
A copy of the judgment in the aforesaid case of Committee of Management, Nagar Sahkari Bank Ltd. , Gorakhpur v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Gorakhpur (supra) has also been produced by the learned Standing Counsel. A perusal of both the above decisions rendered by the different Division Benches indicates that the Division Benches had considered the implications arising under the observations made by the Apex Court in its decisions in the cases of The State of Orissa and another v. Bhupendra Kumar Bose and others, AIR 1962 SC 945 and T. Venkata Reddy and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 3 SCC 198 . 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has tried to urge that the implications arising under the aforesaid Ordinance have not been considered by the aforesaid different Division Benches of this Court in a correct perspective. 10. In this regard, suffice it say that the two different Division Benches of this Court have already considered the implications arising under the decisions of the Apex Court in quite detail and have come to the similar conclusions. In the circumstances, it is not open to this Bench to scrutinise the correctness or sit in appeal over the decisions of the earlier Division Benches of this Court, referred to here-in- above. Moreover, we are not inclined to take a different view. 11. The learned Standing Counsel has rightly urged that in the present cases, the Committee of Management in question cannot be deemed to be continuing to be in existence in their own right on the date of the enforcement of the U. P. Ordinance No. 10 of 2002. In this view of the matter, the ratio of the aforesaid Division Benches cases stands clearly attracted. 12. In view of what has been indicated herein above, these writ petitions deserve to be and are hereby dismissed in limine. Petitions dismissed. .