STATE THROUGH DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, DHARWAD v. SHIVAPPA BHIMAPPA PATHAT
2002-02-26
M.F.SALDANHA, N.K.PATIL
body2002
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) THE first of these two criminal appeals has been preferred by the state and it assails the acquittal of the accused for the offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and also for enhancement of the sentence awarded for the conviction under Sections 498-A and 304-B, IPC. The companion Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1997 having been preferred by the appellant-Shivappa Bhimappa Pathat who was the original accused before the Trial Court, assails the conviction and sentence awarded to the accused by the Trial Court which had imposed the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under section 304-B, IPC and rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 498-A, IPC, both sentences to run concurrently. ( 2 ) WE have heard both appeals together and we have also done a total review of the evidence on record. We propose to briefly summarise the submissions canvassed under the different heads only to the extent that is material for the present judgment. The learned Counsel who represents the accused-appellant as in the first instance seriously assailed the conviction under Section 304-B, IPC. His submission is that there is no allegation of homicidal death in this case and on the present record it is the prosecution case that the deceased wife consumed poison and died as a result thereof. While the defence was to the effect that she was extremely frustrated and dejected for a variety of reasons viz. , that her health was not good and secondly, the fact that she had no children and that consequently on her own volition the deceased decided to consume poison the prosecution had alleged that the accused was harassing and torturing the wife in order to forcibly get half a tola of gold from her parents which was impossible and that consequently unable to bear the torture any longer she decided to put an end to her life. The prosecution case is that the death was an unnatural one which fact is undoubtedly established and that even though it was a suicide, that it was the cruelty inflicted on the deceased wife which forced her to commit suicide.
The prosecution case is that the death was an unnatural one which fact is undoubtedly established and that even though it was a suicide, that it was the cruelty inflicted on the deceased wife which forced her to commit suicide. After thorough scrutiny of the evidence, the learned Counsel submitted that this is not a case in which a conviction could have been recorded either for abetment of suicide or for having driven the wife to commit suicide because the evidence with regard to cruelty is extremely limited. Consequently, what he submits is that even assuming that the Trial court had come to the conclusion that there was some level of cruelty inflicted on the deceased, that the Court should have to draw a distinction between the lighter levels of cruelty that may be the highest, punishable under Section 498-A, IPC and the very extreme form of cruelty that is required in order to push a person to commit suicide. It is basically on the strength of this distinction that the learned Counsel submits that the conviction under Section 304-B. IPC is untenable. ( 3 ) THE learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submitted that once the prosecution is able to establish the cruelty, that it is not open to the Court to make a distinction with regard to the gravity of the cruelty, particularly in the face of a suicide and that the only logical inference would be that the cruelty was enough to result in the ending of her life. His submission therefore was, since the death has occurred within seven years of marriage, if the death was an unnatural one, that Section 304-B, IPC would apply. ( 4 ) WE need to record here that in given circumstances where it is demonstrated that the suicide is directly attributable to the wrongful acts of the accused-husband, that the culpability for the highest level of offence under Section 306, IPC would be made out insofar as taking into account the deeming provision of law under Section 113-A of the Indian evidence Act, the Court would hold that it was a case where the suicide was abetted or rather caused by the husband.
As far as the present case is concerned, the learned Counsel who represents the accused is justified in pointing out that even in a circumstance where cruelty is pleaded and established that the very high gravity of the cruelty for that matter the consequences of the cruelty having directly led to the suicide must be proved beyond all doubt. We take note of the fact that human reactions may be different and that more sensitive persons may react more violently even to minor incidents. At the same time however, we need to uphold the contention that unless cruelty is demonstrated to be of a level that would give rise to suicide or that it has in fact given rise to the committing of the suicide, it would not be correct to record a conviction under Section 304-B even in a situation where conviction under Section 498-A, IPC is justified. While in many instances the two offences could lead one to the other, we need to record that there could be and there are many situations in which this is not necessarily so. This is one of such cases where we find that even though there is some evidence on the basis of which the Trial Court has justifiably convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 498-A, IPC that the type of cruelty, the duration of the cruelty and the gravity of the cruelty is not of the level that could justify a conviction under Section 304-B, IPC or for that matter under Section 306, IPC. Under these circumstances, we quash and set aside the conviction recorded against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, IPC as also the sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment awarded under this head. ( 5 ) AS far as the offence punishable under Section 498-A, IPC is concerned, despite the so-called admission from the father that the couple were generally living happily, we do have enough of substantiated evidence on record on the basis of which the Trial Court has very justifiably held the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 498-A, ipc.
It is true that the learned Counsel who appears on behalf of the accused submitted that it is a rank contradiction for the Trial Court to record an adverse verdict on the face of the clear admission from the girl's father that she was living quite happily with the accused. What we need to mention is that it is the totality of the evidence which has to be looked into. Whereas, it is true that she may have been generally happy as admitted by her father, there is overwhelming evidence that the accused was harassing and torturing her to get the additional half a tola of gold from her parents which was impossible. We also need to draw an inference from the fact that since the wife ultimately committed suicide that there was no doubt about the fact that even if she may have been otherwise happy at times that there was something serious that did trouble her and that it did distress her to the extent of ultimately resulting in what had happened. Having regard to the material on record we are not prepared to interfere with the conviction recorded under Section 498-A, IPC. However, having regard to the fact that the incident is of the year 1993, the fact that the trial has dragged on for a considerable period of time and the appeal has also taken a long time for disposal that the accused has remarried prior to the disposal of the case before the Trial Court and all other relevant circumstances pointed out on his behalf, we reduce the sentence awarded under Section 498-A, IPC to the period already undergone by the accused. ( 6 ) AS far as the offence under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, though the Trial Court has acquitted the accused we see no justification for this decision. There is ample evidence on record to indicate that the accused did receive a sum of Rs. 2,000/- and one tola of gold at the time of marriage and even though strenuous efforts were made to contend that this comes within the accepted category of gifts or customary gifts given during the marriage we are not prepared to accept that submission having regard to the fact that there is clear-cut evidence to indicate that this amount and the gold were demanded under the head of dowry.
We also have enough evidence on record to indicate that it had been received by the accused at the time of the marriage. Under the circumstances, the acquittal under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition act is liable to be set aside. The accused is convicted of the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. ( 7 ) AS regards the question of sentence, we have already indicated the reasons why we refrain from either confirming the sentence awarded by the Trial Court or enhancing it and one of the strong reasons for this is that at this late point of time we consider it not appropriate to direct that the accused should go back to jail. It is in this background that as far as the sentence is concerned, we direct that the accused shall undergo sentence to the extent of imprisonment already undergone by him. This sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence awarded under section 498-A, IPC. However, this section prescribes a minimum fine of rs. 15,000/ -. We have no option except to direct that the accused shall pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/ -. He is however, granted 12 weeks time to deposit the amount in the Trial Court. We make it clear that if the fine amount is not deposited within the prescribed time, that the Trial Court shall take necessary steps to recover the amount from the accused. On recovery of the said amount, the Trial Court shall issue notice to P. W. 12 who is the father of the deceased and shall pay over the said amount to him as and by way of compensation. If P. W. 12 is for any reason is not alive then, the amount shall be paid either to his wife or to his legal heirs. With this direction, both the appeals which partially succeed to stand disposed of. The bail bond of the accused is cancelled. --- *** --- .