JUDGMENT Arun Kumar Goel, J.—Claim petition filed by the appellant before the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur was dismissed on 2.9.1998. Reason for such dismissal was that the appellant failed to prove that he suffered injuries in the accident involving vehicle bus No. PB-12A-8743 being driven by Surjit Singh, respondent No. 3. It was not disputed that at the time of accident, the bus in question was owned by respondents No. 1 and 2 and was being driven by respondent No. 3 Surjit Singh and it was on way from Ludhiana to Manali. 2. According to the appellant when this bus reached Bilaspur, he boarded the same since he was to go to Bairi. According to >him, the bus stopped at Bairi, when he tried to disembark from the bus on 1.5.1995, driver started it. This resulted in his (appellant) falling down. He sustained fracture in his left leg. Cause of this accident was negligence on the part of respondent No. 3. His further case was that his monthly income was Rs. 4,000. He remained as indoor patient for 42 days in the District Hospital, Bilaspur and continued his treatment till the date of filing of the claim petition. He attached some bills of medicines with the claim petition. Thus, a compensation of Rs. two lacs was claimed. 3. Respondents No. 1 and 2, when put to notice denied the contents of paras 1 to 7 of the claim petition for want of knowledge. While admitting the factum of accident, they pleaded that the accident was due to sheer negligence of the appellant. According to them, the appellant was not entitled to any compensation. Thus, they prayed for dismissal of the claim petition. 4. Respondent No. 3 also took up almost identical stand. According to him, appellant tried to get down from the bus when it was in motion without any signal either from the said respondent or from the conductor of the bus. In this exercise, according to respondent No. 3, appellant might have sustained some injury, but at was purely on account of his negligence. At the same time, he denied that the bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and/or as a result of it, he (appellant) sustained injury. In this exercise, according to respondent No. 3, appellant might have sustained some injury, but at was purely on account of his negligence. At the same time, he denied that the bus was being driven in a rash and negligent manner and/or as a result of it, he (appellant) sustained injury. Rejoinders were filed to the aforesaid pleadings of the respondents, wherein facts which were contrary to the claim made in the claim petition were denied and in rejoinder facts set up in the claim petition were reaffirmed. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, learned Tribunal below framed the following issues:— 1. Whether the petitioner suffered injuries in an accident involving vehicle bus No. PB-12-A-8743 being driven rashly and negligently by respondent No. 3, as alleged ? OPR 2. If issue now is proved in affirmative, to what amount of compensation and from whom the petitioner is entitled ? OPP. 3. Relief. 5. After conclusion of the trial, learned Tribunal below dismissed the claim petition while recording findings on issue No. 1. As a consequence of it, issues No. 2 and 3 were also held against the appellant. Hence, this appeal. 6. By referring to evidence produced during the course of proceedings before the learned Tribunal below, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that premise on which the claim petition was dismissed is wrong. According to him, acquittal in criminal case of the respondent regarding accident in question was totally irrelevant, which according to him, weighed heavily with the learned Tribunal below. He further submitted that on preponderance of the evidence examined by the parties in no case, the impugned award of the learned Tribunal below can be sustained. Thus, he has prayed for allowing this appeal by reversing the impugned judgment and consequently ordering the payment of compensation in favour of the appellant. 7. All these pleas have been controverted by the learned Counsel for the respondents. According to them, reliance on judgment of Criminal Court acquitting the respondent No. 3 regarding accident in question (out of which the claim petition and arisen) is perfectly justified. This judgment coupled with other oral evidence examined by the parties during the course of trial leads to one and irresistible conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal below. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the impugned award. Thus they have prayed for upholding the same. 8. This judgment coupled with other oral evidence examined by the parties during the course of trial leads to one and irresistible conclusion arrived at by the learned Tribunal below. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the impugned award. Thus they have prayed for upholding the same. 8. In this case, copy of FIR is proved by PW-1 H.C. Prabh Dayal as Ext. PW-1/A according to original. 9. For purposes of examining the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal on issue No. 1, material evidence is of RW-1 Surjit Singh, driver-respondent No. 3, besides that of PW-4 (appellant) and Arjun Singh, PW-5. 10. Appellant has clearly stated that he retired as Mail Overseer from the Department of Posts and Telegraph. On 1.5.1995, he boarded the bus in question from Bilaspur for going to his place at Bairi. It reached there at about 3.00 p.m. It was stopped by the driver at the instance of the Conductor. He tried to get down having set one foot on the road and the other being on the foot board of the bus, when it was set in motion by the driver. With the result that he fell down from the window causing fracture in his left leg. At the spot he was helped by Arjun Singh (PW-5), who took him to Primary Health Centre, Panjgain for treatment. From there he was referred to District Hospital, Bilaspur. He remained as an indoor patient for 42 days there. He has not fully recovered and on the treatment he has spent about Rs. fifty lacs. In addition to this, for check ups, he has to frequently go in a van and he has spent about Rs. 18,000 to Rs. 20,000 in this exercise. He has further stated that his wife was sick after the accident, but because of the accident, he could not attend to her properly As a consequence of it, she died. So far this part of the evidence of the appellant regarding ailment of his wife is concerned, this is just being referred to without being commented for upon the reasons to be recorded hereinafter. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he did not lodge any report in the police because he was unconscious. He admits that he made a statement before the Magistrate. When confronted with his statement Ext. RA including portion A to A, he denied having made it. In his cross-examination, he has stated that he did not lodge any report in the police because he was unconscious. He admits that he made a statement before the Magistrate. When confronted with his statement Ext. RA including portion A to A, he denied having made it. He also denied that he obtained exorbitant bills. He has also denied that he had disclosed his income on higher side or that no accident of the bus had taken place. 11. We may observe with reference to the statement of the appellant that on material aspects of the case as to how the accident occurred, not a single question has been directed to him in his cross-examination. What is its effect, will be examined in the subsequent paras of this judgment. 12. PW-5 is Arjun Singh. According to him, on the date of the accident, he was present in his shop when the accident took place. Bus had stopped opposite his shop. Two passengers had got down through the rear window and from the front window, appellant was in the process of getting down. He had put his one foot on the road and with one hand he was holding the handle of the bus. Suddenly Conductor of the bus blew whistle and the bus started moving. This resulted in the appellants falling on the road and he sustained injuries. This witness took away the appellant to Panjgain Hospital. In his^ cross-examination, he has stated that the bus remained parked at the spot. He was unable to say whether the driver was at fault or not. Further at a distance of two feet from the spot at the road, there was a parapit. 13. RW-1 Surjit Singh admitted his being employed as driver in Punjab Roadways as also having driven the bus in question on the fateful day. According to him, at Bairi he had slowed down the bus, but had not stopped it. He claims that the appellant got down from the moving bus while holding bags in his hands. As a result-of it, he fell down on the parapit and sustained injuries. There was signal to him to stop the bus. Similarly, appellant had also not signalled for the said purpose. Bus was moving slowly. According to him, he was not at all at fault. As a result-of it, he fell down on the parapit and sustained injuries. There was signal to him to stop the bus. Similarly, appellant had also not signalled for the said purpose. Bus was moving slowly. According to him, he was not at all at fault. In cross-examination, he admitted that on the date of accident, there were about forty passengers sitting in the bus. However, he was not aware as to on which seat the appellant was sitting. He denied that the bus was stopped at the asking of the appellant. He further denied that in addition to the appellant, 4/5 passengers had got down. He admitted that the bus was stopped at Bairi bus stand. Per him, it was incorrect to say that when the appellant was in the process of getting down, he started the bus. He claims to have lodged a report with the police. He denied that in this report, he had stated that the appellant had got down from the moving bus. He also denied that the Conductor had asked to stop the bus. He admits that the appellant was not taken to the hospital after the accident. He however denied that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving. This is the entire evidence on the basis of which claim petition was dismissed by the learned Tribunal below. 14. As already noted, great emphasis was laid by the learned Counsel for the respondents on the judgment (Ext.RW) passed by the Criminal Court in Case No. 122/2 of 1995. Whether it has any bearing so far case for grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is ^concerned, answer would be in the negative as it cannot be made the sole ,basis for dismissing the claim petition. 15. In this behalf, we may observe that so far standard of proof in criminal proceedings is concerned, that is of a much higher degree as compared to standard of proof in civil cases. This is now well known and settled proposition of law that civil cases are decided on preponderance of evidence; whereas an accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved otherwise. As such the standard of proof is much stricter in criminal cases. It is for the prosecution to cover the distance between might have" and "must have" in a criminal trial. As such the standard of proof is much stricter in criminal cases. It is for the prosecution to cover the distance between might have" and "must have" in a criminal trial. Unless the prosecution is able to show that it is the accused who has committed the crime, benefit of doubt has to go to the accused. - 16. We may further observe that the judgment of acquittal may not be of much assistance in a criminal case while examining a civil matter like a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act. Reason being, the difference of standard of proof applicable in both the cases. Judgment of Criminal Court may have some evidentiary value in civil proceedings relating to the same matter. In the present, therefore, no benefit can be derived by the respondents including the driver-respondent No. 3 from the judgment, Ext. RW. This matter had been attending the attention of different courts. We are referring to these decisions hereinbelow. 17. In Municipal Committee, Jullundur City v. Shri Romesh Saggi and others, AIR 1970 P&H 137, a Division Bench of that Court held as under:— "The principles of liability governing civil actions and criminal prosecutions based on negligence differ in two material aspects. Firstly, in a criminal case, such as one under Section 304-A or 337 IPC, the negligence which would justify a conviction must be culpable or of gross degree and not the negligence founded on a mere error of judgment or defect of intelligence. The degree of negligence which would justify a conviction must be something to the danger of which, if one drew the accuseds attention, the latter might exclaim "I dont care". It must be something more than a mere omission or neglect of duly, as for instance, the failure of a Municipal Corporation or a Trust to repair a road in consequence of which a person using the road got accidentally killed. Thus, a law distinguishes between negligence which originates a civil liability and the one on which a criminal prosecution can be founded. In some cases, the bounds which separate a culpable negligence from a civil negligence are blurred or may even disappear altogether, but in most cases this distinction is clearly discernible. In.criminal cases there must be metis rea or guilty mind, i.e. rashness or guilty mind of a degree which can be described as criminal negligence; mere carelessness is not enough. In some cases, the bounds which separate a culpable negligence from a civil negligence are blurred or may even disappear altogether, but in most cases this distinction is clearly discernible. In.criminal cases there must be metis rea or guilty mind, i.e. rashness or guilty mind of a degree which can be described as criminal negligence; mere carelessness is not enough. Secondly, the principle of avoidance of liability when there is contributory negligence by the injured person is no defence in criminal law. But contributory negligence may be a good defence to a civil action. Furthermore, the nature of the onus, the approach to and effect of the evidence, in a criminal case is materially different from that in a civil action. In criminal cases, the prosecution must pursue the guilt of the accused beyond the utmost tainty. But in cases, mere preponderance of probability may be sufficient to fasten the defendant with liability. The reason is not that the Evidence Act prescribes different standards of proof in civil and criminal cases, but because under that Act the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond all manner of doubt always rests on the prosecution and never shifts on to the accused. This is not so in civil cases." 18. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. T. Radha and others, 1993 ACJ 276, it was held as under:— . "2. I have perused the judgment and have also been taken through the evidence recorded before the tribunal. I am in agreement with the Tribunal when it observes that in the absence of any cogent direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence plays a role of great importance and the Tribunal has to rely upon the same. I do not find any force in the ground that because the Criminal Court had acquitted the driver, the Civil Court also should have acquitted him. In fact, if the criminal court convicts the driver such a suggestion could be attached considerable importance because the evidence required to convict a person of a criminal offence must be such as would go to prove the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt while same standard of proof may not be called for while examining the case for assessing the civil liability. Apart from this no other argument has been advanced to sustain the challenge to the finding that the vehicle at the time of accident was being driven rashly and negligently" 19. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Animal and others, AIR 1980 SC 1354, the Apex Court held as under:— "3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by as earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasising this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their "neighbour". Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by Tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for state relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The State must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposal so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many State are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 20. The State must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposal so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many State are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 20. In the face of the aforesaid discussion and legal position, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal below had fallen into error by relying on the judgment of acquittal ordered by the criminal court in favour of respondent No. 3. Conclusion on these basis cannot be sustained and are liable to be reversed. Ordered accordingly. So far negligence on the part of the respondent No. 3 is concerned,in the circumstances of this case the same is writ large. There is positive statement of the appellant that after the bus was stopped by the Conductor, he was in the process of getting down from it. He had stepped down on the road and the other foot was on the foot board, when the bus was set in motion by respondent No. 3. Once this evidence has come, he ought to have waited for a further signal from the Conductor to move the bus. As already noted when a witness is not cross-examined on a particular aspect of his statement. Such statement of the witness is to be taken as not disputed. Due care and caution was required of respondent No. 3 which he failed to take in the present case. 21. Now, coming to the findings recorded by the Tribunal on preponderance of evidence. At the risk of repetition, we may observe that the appellant had stated the manner in which the accident took place. No suggestion has been given to him in that behalf. He is supported by PW-5, Arjun Singh on this aspect. We may notice that Shri Rajiv Jiwan, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 as well as Shri Virender Verma, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 laid great emphasis on the statement of PW-5 Arjun Singh that he was unable to state regarding accident being the result of negligence or not. Again this is of no consequence. We may notice that Shri Rajiv Jiwan, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 as well as Shri Virender Verma, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 laid great emphasis on the statement of PW-5 Arjun Singh that he was unable to state regarding accident being the result of negligence or not. Again this is of no consequence. We feel that in the facts and circumstances which are peculiar to this case, appellants statement has remained unchallenged, as such it was sufficient to hold that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the bus, respondent No. 3. Learned Tribunal below, we are further satisfied, has not properly appreciated the evidence while recording findings on issue No. 1. We may also observe that there is evidence regarding appellant being in the process of getting down from the bus. Per him, it was started abruptly which was the direct cause of the accident. On the other hand, respondent No. 3 while appearing as RW-1 claims that the bus was in motion when in his both hands holding bags, appellant tried to get down from the bus. We feel that this aspect of the case was firstly not put to the appellant when he appeared in the witness box and secondly negligence is writ large in this case. Once this conclusion is arrived at, what follows from it is that the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving on the part of respondent No. 3. Therefore, findings on issue No. 1 need to be set aside and it is ordered accordingly. 22. We may notice here that learned Counsel for the appellant urged that the matter may be set at rest here only so that the litigation comes to an end. Ordinarily, we would have done that. However, we are purposely refraining from saying anything which might prejudice the interest of either of the parties. Accordingly, after setting aside the findings on issue No. 1, the case is remanded back to the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur directing him to restore the file to its original number and thereafter dispose of the claim petition by recording findings on issues No. 2 and 3. In this behalf, we may also observe that the evidence has already been led by the parties. In this behalf, we may also observe that the evidence has already been led by the parties. Therefore, after the parties appear before the learned Tribunal below, it shall fix a date for arguments and then decide the claim petition after hearing the parties in accordance with law and record findings under these two issues. Parties are directed to appear before Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur on 25.2.2002 where after it shall proceed to decide the case expeditiously and in no case later than 31.3 2002. It is ordered that no fresh notices will not be issued by the Tribunal below to the parties since date has been fixed by this Court. Registry will ensure that the record of the Tribunal is transmitted so as to reach well before the date fixed. No costs. Appeal disposed of.