JUDGMENT 1. - This matter is finally heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. The only grievance expressed in this writ petition is that the petitioner could not have been suspended vide order dated July 6, 2001 by the respondents on the ground that he was arrested in a criminal case and was in judicial custody as it could not have been said that the criminal proceedings were pending against the petitioner at that time. 3. The contextual facts depict that the petitioner was placed under suspension in view of sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'The Act' of 1994). Sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994 provides that the State Government may suspend any member including a chairperson or a deputy chairperson of a Panchayati Raj Institution against whom an enquiry has been initiated under sub-section (1) or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending trial in a Court of law and such person shall stand debarred from taking part in any act or proceeding of the Panchayati Raj Institution concerned while being under such suspension. 4. A look on the aforesaid provisions demonstrates that any member against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude is pending may be suspended by the State Government. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratilal Bhanji Mithani Vs. State of Maharashtra and ors. 1979 (2) SCC 179 indicated that the trial in a criminal case supports (sic starts ?) with the framing of charge prior to it the proceedings are only an enquiry. 5. On July 6, 2001 when the petitioner was placed under suspension he was in the judicial custody in a Cr. Case No.54/2001 for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149 and 302 Indian Penal Code and undeniably charges were not framed against the petitioner on the said date. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on that date the petitioner was on bail. 6. In my considered opinion, on July 6, 2001, the petitioner could not have been placed under suspension under the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994. 7. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on that date the petitioner was on bail. 6. In my considered opinion, on July 6, 2001, the petitioner could not have been placed under suspension under the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents has urged that since the charges have been framed against the petitioner on December 5, 2001, it is not necessary to quash the impugned order dated July 6, 2001. I am not impressed by this submission. 8. In view of what I have discussed hereinabove, I allow this writ petition and set aside the impugned order dated July 6, 2001 whereby the petitioner was placed under suspension. However, I grant liberty to the respondents that if they so choose may pass a legal order in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 38 of the Act of 1994. The cost is made easy. Petition allowed. *******