( 1 ) THIS appeal is against the judgment dated 27/6/1988 by which the second appeal filed by the appellant has been dismissed. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: one Mathura was the owner of certain properties. He had only one son by name Sarju. Sarju had four sons and three daughters. The four sons were Tulsidas, Kabirdas, Baijnath and Ram Vishal. It is an admitted position that Tulsidas died in 1930. Tulsidas left a widow by name Manki Devi who died on 31/12/1988. Tulsidas and Manki Devi had no issue. Manki Devi by a gift deed dated 1/4/1972 gifted the suit properties to the respondent Jagan Nath. ( 2 ) AS Manki Devi had executed the gift deed dated 1/4/1972, the appellants who are the three sons of Sarju filed a suit for declaration that the gift deed was null and void and not binding on them and that the respondent Jagan Nath got no right, title and interest in any of the properties of Sarju. ( 3 ) BETWEEN the parties, there was initially a dispute as to when Sarju died. According to the appellants he had died in 1952 whereas Manki and Jagan Nath claimed that he had died in 1958. It has been held by the courts below that Sarju had died in 1952. There has been no challenge to this finding. After a full trial the suit filed by the appellants was decreed. ( 4 ) AGAINST the decree Jagan Nath and Manki Devi filed an appeal. That appeal came to be allowed by an order dated 19/2/1988. The appellate court held that Manki Devi had acquired a right to these properties under the provisions of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. It may be mentioned that this Act came into force on 14/4/1937 but it was applied to the concerned district of Rewa only with effect from 1950. ( 5 ) THE appellants filed a second appeal. That second appeal has been dismissed by the impugned judgment. It has been held that even under the Rewa law (i. e. the Rewa State Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935) Manki Devi was entitled to maintenance and that this right over property has ripened into a full-fledged right of ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Hence this appeal. It has been held that even under the Rewa law (i. e. the Rewa State Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935) Manki Devi was entitled to maintenance and that this right over property has ripened into a full-fledged right of ownership under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Hence this appeal. ( 6 ) THE question for consideration, therefore, is whether Manki Devi was possessed of and had acquired any right over the property which would fructify into a full ownership by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. ( 7 ) MANKI Devi admittedly was the widow of Tulsidas. As stated above, Tulsidas died in 1930. The property had been inherited by Sarju from Mathura. It, therefore, was joint family property. As such Manki would have had a right of maintenance. The question is whether this right of maintenance fructified into a right to property either under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 or the Rewa law. ( 8 ) AS stated above, the trial court has held that Manki had a right under the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. The relevant provisions of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 read as follows: "3. (1) When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow, all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son: provided that the widow of a predeceased son shall inherit in like manner as a son if there is no son surviving of such predeceased son, and shall inherit in like manner as a sons son if there is surviving a son or sons son of such predeceased son: provided further that the same provision shall apply mutatis mutandis to the widow of a predeceased son of a predeceased son. (2) When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. (3) Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu womans estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. (4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an estate which by a customary or other rule of succession or by the terms of the grant applicable thereto descends to a single heir or to any property to which the Indian Succession Act, 1925, applies. 4. Nothing in this Act shall apply to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of this Act. " (emphasis supplied) ( 9 ) IT is an admitted position that the parties are governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. As this is an Act of 1937 Manki could make no claim, under the Act, in the property of Tulsidas who had died in 1930. This is because S. 4 clearly lays down that the provision of this Act would not apply to the property of any Hindu dying before the commencement of this Act. Manki could only claim a right in the property of Sarju (who died in 1952) provided this Act gave her any rights. ( 10 ) IN respect of persons governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law S. 3 (1) applies only when a Hindu dies intestate leaving separate property. If a Hindu dies intestate leaving joint family property then S. 3 (2) would apply. Under S. 3 (2), it is only the widow of that person who gets the same interest as that person would have had. Manki is not the widow of Sarju and can make no claim under S. 3 (2 ). As the property was joint family property she could make no claim under S. 3 (1) also. ( 11 ) WE are unable to accept the submission that a proper reading of S. 3 (1) and the proviso thereto would show that S. 3 (1) (sic applies to joint) family property. As the property was joint family property she could make no claim under S. 3 (1) also. ( 11 ) WE are unable to accept the submission that a proper reading of S. 3 (1) and the proviso thereto would show that S. 3 (1) (sic applies to joint) family property. In our view a plain reading of S. 3 (1) makes it clear that it only applies to separate property. Therefore, the first appellate court was wrong in concluding that Manki acquired rights under this Act. ( 12 ) AS stated above, the High Court had dismissed the second appeal on the footing that even if this Act did not apply Manki got a right of maintenance under the Rewa Code. Both sides fairly point out that the Rewa Code does not confer any right of maintenance on a female in joint family property. The only relevant provision, under the Rewa Code, would be Section 48 which deals with devolution of the interest in a coparcenary property. It is fairly admitted that S. 48 would have no application to this case. Therefore the High Court was not right in concluding that Manki got a right of maintenance under the Rewa Code. ( 13 ) THE final question for consideration is whether a right of maintenance which a Hindu female has under the customary law could fructify into full ownership under S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act reads as follows: "14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.- (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.-In this sub-section, property includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property. " ( 14 ) MR S. C. Gupta submitted that mere right of maintenance, without possession and acquisition of the property in the manner as set out in the explanation to S. 14 (1) would not entitle the female to become a full owner of the property. In support of his submission he relied upon the authority of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Kusumgauri v. Umiben wherein it is held that a widows right of maintenance and residence cannot be held to be property possessed by her as a limited owner so as to attract S. 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act. He also relied upon the case of Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai wherein it has been held that a plain reading of S. 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act makes it clear that the Hindu female must have a limited ownership in the property which limited ownership would get enlarged by operation of that sub-section. It is held that limited ownership is a sine qua non for applicability of S. 14 (1 ). ( 15 ) AS against this Mr Sakesh Kumar has relied upon the authority of this Court in the case of Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh. In this case the question was whether a Will under which certain properties are vested in a Hindu female fell under the provision of S. 14 (1) or 14 (2) of the Hindu Succession Act. The question whether a widow has any pre-existing right in the property and whether after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act she becomes a full or absolute owner of that property was considered. After discussing the law on the subject, it was held that a right of maintenance of a Hindu female flowed from the social and temporal relationship between husband and wife and that the right was a pre-existing right. After discussing the law on the subject, it was held that a right of maintenance of a Hindu female flowed from the social and temporal relationship between husband and wife and that the right was a pre-existing right. It was held that where a Hindu widow was in possession of property of her husband, she had a right over it and was entitled to retain possession of that property in lieu of her right of maintenance. It was further held that the word "possessed" used by the legislature in S. 14 (1) was of the widest possible amplitute and included the state of owning property even though the owner is not actually or physically in possession. It was held that it was an equally well-settled law that the possession of the widow must, however, be under some vestige of a claim, right or title because the section does not contemplate possession of any wrong trespassers without any right or title. ( 16 ) IN our view, the authority in Raghubar Singh case can be of no assistance to the respondent. As has been held by this Court, a pre-existing right is a sine qua non for conferment of a full ownership under S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property. Such acquisition must be either by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or "in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance" or by gift or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription. In the present matter, it is nobodys case that Manki had got possession of the 1/4th share in lieu of maintenance or in arrears of maintenance. It was also not their case that there was a partition of the property and that in such partition, she had been given the property. A mere right of maintenance without actual acquisition in any manner is not sufficient to attract S. 14. ( 17 ) WE, therefore, find that Manki had no right at all which could fructify into full ownership under the Hindu Succession Act. The High Court and the first appellate court were wrong in reversing the judgment of the trial court. A mere right of maintenance without actual acquisition in any manner is not sufficient to attract S. 14. ( 17 ) WE, therefore, find that Manki had no right at all which could fructify into full ownership under the Hindu Succession Act. The High Court and the first appellate court were wrong in reversing the judgment of the trial court. We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment as well as the judgment of the first appellate court and restore that of the trial court. The suit will accordingly stand decreed. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.