Judgment Rajesh Balia and D.N. Joshi, J.-Heard learned Counsel for the parties. The petitioner filed writ petition challenging the termination of his service by order dated September 6, 1991 by his employer respondent Bhilwara Urban Co-operative Bank Limited, Bhilwara. According to the petitioner, he joined his duties on March 5, 1991 and having worked upto September 5, 1991 which he claims to be with deliberate breaks in the service, his services were terminated on September 6, 1991. 2. The petitioner’s claim to relief is rested on a resolution passed by the Bank for regularisation of the service who had been in employment for six months or more. He has also claimed relief for officer to appointment on priority basis in case any person was again appointed after September 5, 1991 as LDC. 3. The learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition by upholding the preliminary objection that the Bhilwara Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., Bhilwara is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, therefore, no writ petition issued against it. 4. Though, theaforesaid rule invoked by learned single Judge is not of absolute application when it relates to issue of any writ or direction in the case of breach of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 12, Part III of the Constitution, the question may be of relevance whether person or authority against whom writ, order or direction is sought is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In such case a person has right to seek remedy, which itself is a fundamental right under Article 32. However ambit and scope of jurisdiction of any High Court under Article 226 is not confined to breach of fundamental rights by the State or any agency or instrumentality of State. It reaches to State as well ‘as any other person’. Moreover for any other person for which writ, order or direction can be issued under Article 226 is suggestive of fact that petition under Article 226 can be made and writ, order or direction can be issued in cases other than cases involving breach of fundamental rights. It reaches to State as well ‘as any other person’. Moreover for any other person for which writ, order or direction can be issued under Article 226 is suggestive of fact that petition under Article 226 can be made and writ, order or direction can be issued in cases other than cases involving breach of fundamental rights. It is possible in a given case to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction for seeking the directions against an individual also for example in a case where a person is under any statutory obligation to do or refrain from doing anything and he commits breach of such obligation, he may be compelled to discharge his obligation by issue of a writ, order or directions. In that sense, the scope ot power to issue writ, directions or order under Article 226 is wider than the scope of issuing writ, order or directions for enforcement of fundamental rights only. 5. Therefore in each case whether the Court would exercise its jurisdiction or not against a person which is not a State or instrumentality of a State, assuming it that the respondent Bank is not a State as held by learned single Judge, enquiry must go to find what is the relief claimed by such person; whether it relates to infraction of any statutory duty cast on such person and the like considerations. 6. However, on the merits of the case, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is not otherwise entitled to any relief The petitioner has stated that he has been kept in service for six months with intermittent deliberate breaks. He has complained breach of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. We are of the opinion that on the admitted facts there cannot be any breach of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act in as much for its applicability the workmen must have been employed continuously for a period of one year or more, or must have actually worked for 240 days with (sic within) 12 months immediately proceeding date of retrenchment. Petitioner, even if taken to have worked for entire period of six months does not fulfil either of the requirements. In fact he has worked up to 93 days. Petitioner, even if taken to have worked for entire period of six months does not fulfil either of the requirements. In fact he has worked up to 93 days. So far as Section 25-G is concerned, in view of the fact that two persons appointed in July 1991 were continuing in service while petitioner’s services were terminated on September 6, 1991, it has been stated by respondents and since same was brought to the notice of the respondent their services have also been terminated before filing the reply. In that view of the matter it cannot be said to be breach of the nature for which a writ of mandamus be issued to take the petitioner in service by declaring termination of his service to be illegal particularly Rule of first come first go is also not absolute. The appropriate remedy is that even would be to seek reference to Tribunal or Labour Court by raising a dispute. Against the breach of Section 25-H there is no material before us on the basis of which we can say that any person as a LDC has been appointed since September 6, 1991 without giving an opportunity to the petitioner. In fact respondents have stated that no person has less than 2 years experience with them in their service. 7. Inthese circumstances, no relief could be granted to the petitioner otherwise. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. No orders as to costs.