`D. BIWSAS, J- The revision petitions under Rule 36A of the rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 193 7 read with Article 227 of the Constitution have been directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.10.1998 passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Judge, Shillong dismissing the Money Appeal No. 8(T) and 9(T) of 1993. 2. The respondent M/s. Meghalaya Plywoods Limited instituted Money Suit Nos. 36(T) and 27(T) of 1982 for recovery of Rs.14,32,3507- and Rs. 14,20,0007-respectively as compensation for nondelivery of 18 trucks load of plywoods despatched from Byrnihat, Meghalaya to Chandigarh through M/s. Kamal Roadways under cover of an open Marine Transit Policy issued by the petitioner Insurance Company. The aforesaid two suits were decreed on 12.2.1993 by the learned trial Judge and the decrees thereof were prepared on 18.2.1993. The decrees were put into execution and the local office of the Insurance Company at Shillong was put under lock and key. However, the said office was reopened on certain conditions as ordered by the High Court; The Insurance Company preferred Money Appeal Nos. 8 and 9 of 1993 challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. The said two appeals were also dismissed by the learned Appellate Court on 29.10.1998 on preliminary points relating to limitations and maintainability. The grievance of the insurance is that they were not given oppoitunity to tender documents and adduce evidence during the trial. On this background the Insurance Company approached this Court. 3.1 have heard Mr A.K. Phukan, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and also Mr V.K. Jindal, learned senior counsel for the respondent. 4. The questions to be answered may be classified as under:- (i) Whether the instant revision petitions are maintainable in view of the earlier Revision Petition Nos. 23(SH) of 1993 and 29(SH) of 1993 filed on 27.3.1993 against the Trial Court's judgments and decrees dated 12.2.1993 which were withdrawn on 16.8.1996 unconditionally? (ii) Whether the appeals filed before the learned appellate Court without certified copies of the judgment and decrees were maintainable in law? (iii) Whether the appeals before the learned appellate Court were maitainable under the Doctrine of Election of remedy? (iv) Whether the appeals were maintainable under provisions of Order XX11I, Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure? (ii) Whether the appeals filed before the learned appellate Court without certified copies of the judgment and decrees were maintainable in law? (iii) Whether the appeals before the learned appellate Court were maitainable under the Doctrine of Election of remedy? (iv) Whether the appeals were maintainable under provisions of Order XX11I, Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure? (v) Whether the appeals were filed beyond the period of limitations and the Insurance Company could make out a case for condonation of delay? 5. Before the aforesaid questions are addressed, it is considered necessary to mention here that the disposal of the suits filed by the respondent company more than 20 years back for compensation of loss of goods during transit have been delayed on account of negligence of the insurance. Mr Jindal, learned senior counsel for the respondents, with reference to the records of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court, pointed out that the insurance were absent on as many as 15 days fixed by the trial Court without steps and the orders passed on four occasions to proceed ex-parte were vacated to ensure just and fair trial. Slid Jindal also pointed out that the insurance took adjournments on 18 occasions in the trial Court and even did not pursue the appeals seriously. 6. The judgment delivered by the trial Judge in both the money suits reflect elaborate discussion on merit. The judgments show that the learned trial Judge had to proceed with and dispose of the suits after appreciation of plaintiff s evidence on record as the defendant did not examine any witness despite opportunities given on several occasions. 7. There is, obviously, no scope on the part of this Court sitting in revision to deliberate upon merit. But the fact remains that the respondent company did not receive any amount against the Consignment Notes Exhibit-3(l) to 3(9) dated 12.6.1980 arid 14.6.1980 and 17.6.1980 though the consignments were delivered without retiring the consignment notes from the State Bank of India. The consignor is normally entitled to recover the value of the goods either lost during transit or delivered before retiring the consignment notes. According to the insurance, it is a case of collusive delivery of goods to the intended purchaser without retiring the consignment notes and, hence, a dispute of accounts between the respondent company, the SBI, consignee and the intending purchaser. According to the insurance, it is a case of collusive delivery of goods to the intended purchaser without retiring the consignment notes and, hence, a dispute of accounts between the respondent company, the SBI, consignee and the intending purchaser. Shri Phukan, learned senior counsel submitted that the matter may be remanded for disposal afresh on merit. Mr Jindal, learned senior counsel, however, submitted that remand of the cases at this belated stage will defeat the cause of justice as, according to him, the materials on record apart from negligence of the insurance also exhibit that the Insurance Company has no case on merit. According to him, the insurance may sue the consignee or the intending purchaser but cannot stall the demand of the respondent company laid in terms of the insurance policy. 8. This revision has been preferred under Rule 36A of the Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 which empowers the High Court or the Deputy Commissioner to call for the proceedings of any case decided by any subordinate Court and pass such orders as may be necessary. It further provides that the Deputy Commissioner shall be a Court of appeal from a decision of an Assistant and the High Court shall be a Court of appeal from an original decision of the Deputy Commissioner, if the value of the suit be Rs.500/- or above or if the suit involves question of trial rights or customs, or of right to or possession of immovable property. Limitation prescribed therein is 30 days from the date of decision excluding the time required for obtaining a copy. The provisions clearly indicate that the High Court can exercise appellate powers only in appeals from the original decision of the Deputy Commissioner. The powers of this Court in revision have been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Shy'am Sunder Agarwal & Co., appellant-Vs-Union of India, respondent reported in AIR 1996 SC1321. Para 25 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below: - "25. The appellant Union of India filed a revisional application under Rule 36A before the Single Bench of the High Court, because against an appellate order of Deputy Commissioner, no appeal is provided for under the Rules. Para 25 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below: - "25. The appellant Union of India filed a revisional application under Rule 36A before the Single Bench of the High Court, because against an appellate order of Deputy Commissioner, no appeal is provided for under the Rules. Even if there was any provision for filing an appeal from such appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner under the Rules, such second appeal, being expressly barred by Section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act, would have been incompetent. In the facts and circumstances of the case, revision application under Rule 36A is to considered in conformity with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such limited application of revisional jurisdiction under Rule 36A in assailing an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act is to be read, otherwise revisional power under Rule 36A will give occasion to hostile discrimination. For example, in the State of Meghalaya where the rules were not applicable, a litigant can only move the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act but another litigant where the rules are applicable, will avail larger rights in exercise of revisional power by the High Court under Rule 36A against a similar appellate order under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act. Such a situation is not permissible. Revisional power under Rule 36A of the High Court in such case therefore, must be exercising in conformity with the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 9. It would appear from the aforesaid judgment that the revisional powers under Rule 36A have to be exercised in conformity with the revisional powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It will not make any difference though the decision was in an arbitration matter, the provisions of Rule 36A having no room for confusion. This judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court over-shadows the decision in ALR (Assam andNagaland) 92 (FB) where the Court held that the High Court in revision can go into the facts like an appellate Court. It, therefore, follows that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has to act within the parameter of revisional powers under Section 115 of C.P.C. 10. It, therefore, follows that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction has to act within the parameter of revisional powers under Section 115 of C.P.C. 10. With regard to the first question, it has been submitted by Shri Phukan, learned senior counsel, that the earlier civil revisions filed on 27.3.1993 were withdrawn on 16.8.1996. The withdrawal thereof will not bar the maintainability of the appeals. Mr Jindal, learned senior counsel, however, submitted that the withdrawal of the revision petitions without reserving the right to approach the Court will debar the petitioners from pursuing alternative remedy. In this connection the decision in Shri Medenkaba and others-vs-R. Tekatemjen Ao and another (1987 (1) GLR 156) has been brought to the notice of this Court. This Court in paragraph-15 of the judgment held as follows:- "15. The question may arise as to whether once having resorted to Rule 34 by way of appeal or revision before the Deputy Commissioner, further appeal or revision to the High Court will lie? We are of the view that if the party already appealed under Rule 34, the remedy by way of revision under the first part of the rule to the High Court will still be available. On the other hand if the party directly approached the High Court either in appeal or revision under the rule, no further remedy will be available in the High Court. In case of direct approach to the High Court learned brother Hansaria, J would like to add the following reasonable rider: "Though the High Court can be approached against any decision of any subordinate officers, it would be within the discretion of the High Court whether to entertain the same or not, if an appeal, where lies, has not been preferred. While deciding this aspect, the Court may have to consider the status of the parties, the point involved, the importance of the subject matter, the time taken in approaching, the reason for not preferring appeal, and such other relevant factors." However, the Court should bear in mind that direct approach is not inhibited by the provision in order that no injustice results." 11. It would appear from the aforesaid decision of this Court that in view of the earlier revisions preferred against the judgments of the Trial Court before this Court and for dismissal of the revisions on withdrawal without reserving the right to pursue alternative remedy, the appeal preferred from the same set of judgments are not maintainable. In my opinion, there is no alternative to this, however harsh it may be in given circumstances of a case. 12. The next question relates to maintainability of the appeals filed without certified copies of the judgments and decrees. There is no doubt that an appeal is rendered nonest in the absence of certified copy of the judgment and decree. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the certified copies of the judgments and decrees were not filed along with the appeals. Even as on today no attempt has been made to furnish the copies thereof. In M/s. M. Ramnarain Pvt. Ltd. and another-Vs-The State Trading Corporation oflndiaLtd. reported in AIR 1983 SC 786 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that filing of certified copy along with the memorandum of appeal is mandatory and in the absence thereof, the appeal becomes incompetent. Prior to that, in Jagat Dish Bhargava & Ors.-Vs-Jawaharlal Bharagava & Ors. reported in AIR 1961 SC 832 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if no certified copy is filed, the dismissal of the appeal is justified. Similar decision was also rendered in Shri Medenkaba (supra). Question was raised whether copies once used in earlier revision petitions if brought on record would suffice the requirement of law. This question can be answered in negative on the basis of the decisions reported in Shakuntala Devi Jain- Vs-Kuntala Kumari & Ors. reported in AIR 1969 SC 575 and StateofU.P.-Vs-MaharajaNarain & Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 960 . Therefore, filing of a true copy of the impugned decree cannot be said to be sufficient compliance. The word copy in Order 41 Rule 1 C.P.C. has always been held to mean the certified copy and not otherwise. 13. In the instant case the petitioners are claiming exclusion of the time taken for obtaining certified copy for the purpose of condonation of delay. The word copy in Order 41 Rule 1 C.P.C. has always been held to mean the certified copy and not otherwise. 13. In the instant case the petitioners are claiming exclusion of the time taken for obtaining certified copy for the purpose of condonation of delay. The provisions in Order 41 Rule 1 C.P.C. provides that certified copies of the judgments may be dispensed with, but this power of dispensation cannot be extended to a case where condonation of delay is sought in exclusion of the time taken in obtaining certified copy. In Sri Medenkaba and others (supra) it has been held by the Division Bench of this Court that every memorandum of appeal has to be accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed from. It was further clarified that copy of the decree mean certified copy of the decree and the Court is not to grant exemption of the filing of the copy of the decree where a decree has been prepared. It, therefore, appears that the appeals filed by the insurance before the learned appellate Court without certified copies of the judgments and decrees appealed from were incompetent. Strangely, even as on date, no attempt has been made to rectify the defect. 14. With regard to the third and fourth question, the insurance elected to pursue the remedy by way of revision and not the remedy of appeal in the Court of Deputy Commissioner. There is no provision enabling a party to pursue both the remedies. The remedy by way of revision having been availed of, the insurance is certainly not entitled to file the appeals The provisions in Order XXIII, Rule 1(4) of C.P.C. precludes a party from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter. The appeal being the continuation of a suit, the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4) would also apply in respect of appeals. In the instant case the petitioners choose to prefer the revision petitions and on dismissal thereof on withdrawal filed the appeals without rights reserved under provisions of Rule XXIII, Rule 3. Therefore, they had by the said act of withdrawal divested them of their right to prefer any appeal. The law is that when one of the two remedies available is availed of and made known to the opposite party, the other remedy cannot be availed of at a subsequent stage. Therefore, they had by the said act of withdrawal divested them of their right to prefer any appeal. The law is that when one of the two remedies available is availed of and made known to the opposite party, the other remedy cannot be availed of at a subsequent stage. In K.S. Bhoopathy and others- Vs-Kokila and others reported in AIR 2000 SC 2132 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "10. The present rule which was introduced in place of old Rule-1 by the Amendment Act of 1976 makes a distinction between absolute withdrawal which is termed as 'abandonment' and withdrawal with the permission of the Court. This clear distinction is maintained throughout in the substituted rule by making appropriate changes in the wording of various sub-rules of rule. 11. The law as to withdrawal of suits as enacted in the present rule may be generally stated in two parts: (a) a plaintiff can abandon a suit or abandon a part of his claim as a matter of right without the permission of the Court; in that case he will be precluded from suing again on the same cause of action. Neither the plaintiff can abandon a suit or a part of the suit reserving to himself a right to bring a fresh suit, nor can the defendant insist that the plaintiff must be compelled to proceed with the suit; and (b) a plaintiff may, in the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule (3) be permitted by the Court to withdraw from a suit with liberty to sue afresh on the same cause of action. Such liberty being granted by the Court enables the plaintiff to avoid the bar in Order II Rule 2 and Section 11 C.P.C." 15. The decision above read with the decisions of the Supreme Court in para-12 of the judgment in Mohanlal Jain, appellant-Vs-His Highness Maharaja Sri SawaiMan Singhji, Ex-Ruler of Jaipur and ors., respondents ( AIR 1962 SC 73 ) clearly indicate that the insurance in the instant case lost their right of appeal because of earlier revision petitions. It was argued on behalf of the insurance that Order XXIII Rule 1(4) does not apply as the appeals in questions were filed before withdrawal of the earlier revision petitions. This submission was advanced relying on the judgment reported in AIR 1982 Kerala 85 and AIR 1985 Punjab and Haryana 219. It was argued on behalf of the insurance that Order XXIII Rule 1(4) does not apply as the appeals in questions were filed before withdrawal of the earlier revision petitions. This submission was advanced relying on the judgment reported in AIR 1982 Kerala 85 and AIR 1985 Punjab and Haryana 219. But in the facts and circumstances of this case, the judgments referred to above are distinguishable as the appeals filed in those cases were competent and neither time barred nor incomplete. The ratio available in AIR 2000 SC 2132 and AIR 1962 SC 7'3 are contrary to the above view. There is no doubt that an appeal filed without certified copy and beyond time is not an appeal in the eye of law and the same is nonest. Therefore, the decisions relied upon by the insurance are of no assistance. Mr Jindal, learned senior counsel for the respondent company submitted that the principles underlying Order XXIII Rule 1 are akin to the principle of resjudicata and in support of this contention relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors.-Vs-Smti Deorajin Debt reported in AIR 1963 SC 941 (para-8) wherein it was held that the principles of resjudicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation. This submission further reinforce the view expressed above. 16. The next question relates to the prayer for condonation of delay. Rule 36A of the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Khasi and Jaintia Hills, 1937 prescribe limitation of 30 days without any provision for condonation. Mr Phukan, learned senior counsel argued that the provisions contained in Rule 41 of the Rules of 1937 which provides that the principles of Indian Limitation Act should be closely followed between a dispute not pertaining to a Scheduled Tribe or Tribes are still available despite repeal of the Indian Limitation Act of 1908. According to Mr Phukan taking aid of the provisions in sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reference of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in Rule 41 of the Rules of 1937 has to be construed as reference to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. According to Mr Phukan taking aid of the provisions in sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, reference of Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in Rule 41 of the Rules of 1937 has to be construed as reference to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Mr Jindal, learned senior counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that the provisions contained in Rule 41 of the Rules of 1937 ceased to exist on repeal of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and, therefore, even the spirit of the Limitation Act could not be followed in the instant case. 17. Before the above question is addressed, I would like to refer to a decision of this Court in the State of Meghalaya-Vs-U. William Mynsong reported in 1987(2) GLR 221. The Court held as follows:- "4. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya that the first question was not at all required to be referred by the learned revisional Court in view of the Constitutional provisions relating to the State Government. The State is not a natural person but a juristic person. In this context the learned Advocate General has referred to us a decision of this Court rendered in 'Union Territory of Mizoram-Vs-C. Lalthanpara' as reported in (1983) 2 GLR 269. In the said case it was held that the 'State' is a juristic person and it can sue and be used. The State cannot be termed as a "person belonging to a non-Scheduled or Scheduled Tribe." This point arose in the Criminal Revision No. 1(H)/80 when the State filed a revision application against the order of discharge of the opposite party in G.R. No 6/80 under Section 392/506 of I.P.C. When the question of limitation for filing the revision petition arose, this reference is made for an answer as regards the status of the State of Meghalaya and also the applicability of the Limitation Act. The State Government is one of the organs of the State and since the State is a 'juristic person' and not a 'natural person' it cannot be classified in the category of the citizen of India. As regards whether a person is a number of the Scheduled Tribe or not can be ascertained only in the case a natural person who is a citizen of India. As regards whether a person is a number of the Scheduled Tribe or not can be ascertained only in the case a natural person who is a citizen of India. In view of the above, the State of Meghalaya is a legal entity known as juristic person which cannot be put in the group of Scheduled Tribe community or in any community of India. We, therefore, need not dilate further on this point. This question is answered accordingly. 7. In the aforesaid notification dated 14.3.66, the Governor of Assam directed that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply to the Tribal areas of Assam specified in Part-A of the table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The above notification dated 14.3.66 came into force from the 1 st day of January, 1964. However, there is no dispute as to the applicability of the said notification to the State of Meghalaya. After coming into force of the North East Areas Representation Act, 1971, the notification remained in force by virtue of Section 7 read with 79 of the said Act. Therefore, our conclusion is that the notification referred to above issued which came into force on and from 1.1.64 is still in force. Therefore, in view of the notification dated 14.3.66 which came into force on and from 1.1.64 we cannot adopt the spirit of Limitation Act in the present nature of the case. We therefore, hold that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the tribal areas of the State of Meghalaya. We make it clear that our answer to the reference is relating to the applicability of Limitation Act of 1963 in the present nature of the case and on no other laws which are in force in the State of Meghalaya. The reason being that the reference was sought for relating to the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act in tribal areas." 18. It emerges from above that in the instant case the parties cannot be classified as Scheduled Tribe or Tribes. They are juristic persons and may sue and be sued. The reason being that the reference was sought for relating to the applicability of the Indian Limitation Act in tribal areas." 18. It emerges from above that in the instant case the parties cannot be classified as Scheduled Tribe or Tribes. They are juristic persons and may sue and be sued. Therefore, the provisions of the notification dated 14.3.1966, issued by the Government of Meghalaya directing that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply to the Tribal Areas of Assam specified in para-A of the Table appended to paragraph 20 of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India does riot stand as a bar in following the principle of the Indian Limitation Act. Rule 41 of the Rules of 1937 provides as follows:-I " 41. Application of Limitation Act: Although the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX of 1908), has been barred by notification No. 5868-AP, dated the 8th September, 1934, the principles of the Act should be closely followed in dispute between persons not belonging to a Schedule Tribe or Tribes in Item 1 and 2 of Part-I - Assam, of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950." 19. The rule quoted above refers to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The provisions in sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act permits reference to the provisions in the repealing Act unless contrary intention appears in the repealed Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 8 reads as follows: "8. Consideration of reference to repealed enactments:- (1) Where this Act, or any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enactment with or without modification, any provisions of a former enactment, then reference in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provisions so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provisions so re-enacted." 20. The General Clauses Act was enacted with the object of maintaining the legality of things done under the previous Act when changes are made in the law. The intention in Rule 41 was to apply the principles of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in dispute between persons not pertaining to a Schedule Tribe or Tribes. There is no change in the situation even replaced by the Act of 1963. Rule 41 has not been amended after 1963. The intention in Rule 41 was to apply the principles of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in dispute between persons not pertaining to a Schedule Tribe or Tribes. There is no change in the situation even replaced by the Act of 1963. Rule 41 has not been amended after 1963. Despite that, in view of the provisions in Section 8(1), the reference to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 in Rule 41 has to be construed as reference to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 for the purpose of maintaining continuity. 21. Shri Phukan, learned senior counsel citing a number of decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court tried to impress upon that the powers to condone delay is inherent to each Court even where there is no provision for condonation of delay. According to Shri Phukan, such delay can be condoned under the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, so that the parties do not suffer and the case is decided on merit. Here, we may refer to the decision of this Court in range of 1st Assam Rifles-Vs-Nui of Kulikawan (AIR 1959 Assam 7) wherein it was held that even if the Limitation Act is not applicable, the delay can be condoned applying the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It, therefore, follows that the principles of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 has to be followed in the State of Meghalaya in disputes between non-tribals. 22. Now let us consider whether the revision petitioner could show sufficient reason for condonation of delay in the instant case. The judgment in the instant case was delivered on 12.2.1993. Therefore, thirty days as provided in Rule 36A has to be reckoned from 13.2.1993.The Period of appeal prescribed expired on 16th March, 1993. Application for certified copy was filed on 18.2.1993. Certified copies were delivered to the petitioner on 10.3.1993. The period between 18.2.1993 and 10.3.1993 even if excluded in computing the period of limitation shows that the appeals in question were filed after the expiry of the period of limitation. Therefore, the petitioners are supposed to advance sufficient cause for condonation of delay, even if delay is of two days. The application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner contain the following reasons: "a) The delay, if any, is not wilful. Therefore, the petitioners are supposed to advance sufficient cause for condonation of delay, even if delay is of two days. The application for condonation of delay was filed by the petitioner contain the following reasons: "a) The delay, if any, is not wilful. The same has arisen while ascertaining or computing the prescribed period vis-a-vis the time required for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree; obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree; b) That no laches or negligence can be attributed on the part of the applicant/ appellant as because the appeal was filed promptly and under the bonafide belief that the same has been filed well within the period of limitation. c) That if the time for preferring the delay is computed on and from 18.2.93, that is the date on which the decree was passed, in that case the appeal was preferred well within the time as prescribed under Rule 3 6-A and Section 116(b) of the Limitation Act. d) That the law of limitation is a procedural law and not substantive law. When substantive justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, it is well settled that Courts should prefer the former, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the stakes involved, the delay, if any, in preferring the appeal requires to be condoned; e) That since the applicant/appellant is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as such, in view of the decisions of the Apex Court, the expression 'sufficient cause' should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The Court is to decide the matter on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. The Apex Court have further laid down that while deciding the matter the approach of the Court should be pragmatic but not pedantic. The Court must also see whether the adoption of strict standard of proof would lead to grave miscarriage of public justice and effect public interest." 23. This Court is not inclined to be carried by the reasons shown above. In fact nothing reason has been advanced in order to show that the petitioners were prevented from preferring the appeals within the prescribed period of limitation for reasons beyond their control. This Court is not inclined to be carried by the reasons shown above. In fact nothing reason has been advanced in order to show that the petitioners were prevented from preferring the appeals within the prescribed period of limitation for reasons beyond their control. The reasons quoted above speak of wrong calculation, bonafide belief and other superficial matters. Normally, a Court should not accept such reasons as sufficient for condonation of delay, howsoever brief the period of delay may be. Moreover, condonation was sought seeking exclusion of the time spent in obtaining the certified copies without filing the same. It is a case where, in my opinion, no legally acceptable reasons have been given to act upon. There cannot be any doubt that when sufficient cause is not shown, application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. In this connection the decision in AIR 1962 SC 361 between Ram Lal and others, appellant-Vs-Reba Coal Fiels Ltd. may be referred to. That apart, the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India & Ors.-Vs-Wood Craft Products Ltd and anr. 2001(1) GLT 34: [(2001)1 GLR 327)] held as follows:- "13. In P.K. Ramachandran's (supra) case, one of the latest decisions of the Supreme Court, the Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand and Hon'ble Justice Venkataswamy, held that the Law of Limitation may hashly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable ground. 14. Under the concept of welfare State, in order to promote social justice, it is the bounden duty of the State to protect and preserve the public interest and public fund. Since public exchequer is incurring heavy expenses on the different departments of the State and its instrumentalities, it is incumbent upon them to be fast and prompt in discharging their duties and in carrying their responsibilities with due diligence. If there is good case on merit and the application for condonation of delay, unintentional or otherwise, filed by the State is not allowed, it is certain that damage will be caused to the public interest and public fund. If there is good case on merit and the application for condonation of delay, unintentional or otherwise, filed by the State is not allowed, it is certain that damage will be caused to the public interest and public fund. Unfortunately, the officers of the State and its instrumentalities carry an impression that with each and every case, the delay caused in filing an appeal is bound to be condoned, taking it for granted on the basis of a few decisions where the delay has been condoned considering the facts of those cases where sufficient causes were shown and proved. 18. It is correct that no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what afford "sufficient cause" in a given case, where sufficient cause shown or not, depend upon the fact of the case. In the instant case, "sufficient cause" is missing." 24. The ratio available from the above decision emphatically suggest that a public institution has to be fast and prompt in discharging their duties with diligence. Obviously, in a case which is good on merit, refusal of condonation would be against public interest. But considering the circumstances of this case and for reasons discussed above, the revision petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 25. Hence, the revision petitions are dismissed.