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2002 DIGILAW 1657 (RAJ)

M. G. D. Girls School : Indu Bala Srivastava v. The Rajasthan Non : State of Rajasthan

2002-09-25

SHIV KUMAR SHARMA

body2002
JUDGMENT 1. - M.G.D. Girls School (for short the institution) vide order dated May 9, 1995 terminated the services of Mrs. Indu Bala Srivastava (for short the employee). The said order was assailed by the employee before the Rajasthan Non-Govt. Educational Tribunal (for short Tribunal) by filing appeal under Section 19 of the Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institution Act, 1989 (for short 1989 Act). Learned Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated May 9, 1995 vide judgment dated October 28, 1999 and directed the institution to reinstate the services of the employee with all consequential benefits. In writ petition No. 6279/99 the institution seeks to quash the said judgment of the Tribunal whereas the employee has filed writ petition No. 2062/2000 seeking implementation of the directions issued by the Tribunal. 2. The order dated May 9, 1995 whereby services of the employee were terminated reads as under "Pursuant to the unanimous decision taken by the Board of Governors in its meeting held on 5th and 6th April 1995, as conveyed by the Chairperson, after examination of the complaints of insubordination and indiscipline and the report of the enquiry proceedings given by Mr. Mahendra Surana IAS, in case of Mrs. Indubala Srivastava PGT, Hindi, and after consideration of the proceedings of the enquiry, the Board has unanimously decided that it is not in the interest of the institution to continue with her services. In view of the above unanimous decision of the Board, the services of Mrs. Indubala Srivastava PGT, Hindi stand terminated and relieved w.e.f. 9th May 1995. The Board having decided to terminate the services, the pay of six months w.e.f. 9th May 1995 in lieu of notice amounting to Rs. 32580/- (Rupees thirty two thousand five hundred eighty only) is given to Mrs. Indubala Srivastava in cash and deposited in her Account No. 58 in the Bank of Baroda, MGD School Extension Centre, Jaipur." 3. Contention of the institution before the Tribunal was that the services of the employee were terminated legally in view of clause (iii) of second proviso of section 18 of 1989 Act. Learned Tribunal did not agree with the contention and held that termination order was bad as it contained stigma and services of the employee could not have been terminated flouting the principles of natural justice under clause (iii) of second proviso of section 18 of 1989 Act. 4. Learned Tribunal did not agree with the contention and held that termination order was bad as it contained stigma and services of the employee could not have been terminated flouting the principles of natural justice under clause (iii) of second proviso of section 18 of 1989 Act. 4. These facts are not in dispute that the institution initiated departmental inquiry against the employee and charge sheet was issued on August 25, 1993. Shri Mahendra Surana IAS was appointed as Enquiry officer, who conducted the enquiry and submitted report on April 3, 1995. The institution before concluding the departmental enquiry, took decision to terminate the services of the employee and the order of termination was passed on May 9, 1995 as indicated above. 5. Mr. Abhay Kumar Bhandari learned Senior Advocate advanced three main submissions. First the institution was competent to take action to terminate the services of the employee even during the pendency of enquiry. Reliance is placed on (1) State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Das (1996) 5 SCC 331 , (2) State of U.P. v. Abhai Kishore Masta (1995) 1 SCC 336 , (3) Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. and others v. Gujrat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and others (1980) 2 SCC 593 , (4) State of Orissa and others v. Ram chandra Das ( AIR 1996 SC 2436 ) and (5) Matadeen Garg v. High Court (D.B.C.W. Petition No. 3022/99 decided on October 18, 2000) . Second, subjective satisfaction of Management Committee of the institution could not have been interfered. In support of this submission learned counsel placed reliance on (6) Baikunthnath Das v. Chief Distt. Medical Officer (1992) 2 SCC 299 , (7) State of U.P. v. Vijay Kumar Jain (2002) 3 SCC 641 , (8) Port of Telegraphs Board v. CSN Murthy (1992) 2 SCC 317 , (9) Hemlata v. State of Maharastra ( AIR 1982 SC 8 ) , (10) U.O.I. v. Harjeet Singh Sandhu (2001) 5 SCC 593 , (11) State of Gujrat v. Mohd. Ismail Jumma (1981) 4 SCC 609 and (12) First Land Acquisition Collector v. Nirodh Parakash Gangoli (2002) 4 SCC 160 . Third, as the relations of the institution and employee were strained reinstatement of the employee in the services could not have been ordered. Reliance is placed on (13) O.P. Bhandari v. India Tourism Development Corporation ( AIR 1987 SC 111 ) , (14) Nanganj Sirohi Sugar Co. Third, as the relations of the institution and employee were strained reinstatement of the employee in the services could not have been ordered. Reliance is placed on (13) O.P. Bhandari v. India Tourism Development Corporation ( AIR 1987 SC 111 ) , (14) Nanganj Sirohi Sugar Co. v. Badrinath Dixit (1991) 3 SCC 54 , (15) Integrated Rural Development Agency v. Ram Pyre Pandey 1995 (2) SLR 414 and (16) Rolston John v. CGIT 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 549. 6. Per contra Mr. Raj Deepak Rastogi, learned counsel supported the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal and placed reliance on (17) V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab JT 2000 (3) SC 1, (18) Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose (1999) 3 SCC 54 (19) Anoop Jaiswal v. Govt. of India (1994) 2 SCC 369 and (20) Bhiwani Central Coop. Bank Ltd. Haryana v. Registrar Civil Appeal No. 2757/1998 decided on Feb. 20, 2001. 7. I have pondered over the rival submissions. 8. Before proceeding further, it will be useful to have a look at Section 18 of 1989 Act. It reads thus "18. Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees- Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, no employee of a recognised institution shall be removed, dismissed or reduced in rank unless he has been given by the management a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the action proposed to be taken Provided that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has been obtained : Provided further that this section shall not apply, (i) to a person who is dismissed or removed on the ground of conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) where it is not practicable or expedient to give that employee an opportunity of showing cause, the consent of Director of Education has been obtained in writing before the action is taken, or (iii) Where the managing committee is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee can not be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, the services of such employee are terminated after giving him six months notice or salary in view thereof and the consent of the Director of Education is obtained in writing." 9. Sub clause (iii) of Second proviso is attracted where the institution has not provided reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employee and the Managing Committee of the institution is of unanimous opinion that the services of an employee can not be continued without prejudice to the interest of the institution, but where the departmental enquiry is initiated against the employees clause (iii) of proviso second of section 18 cannot be invoked. 10. I am not impressed with the submission of Mr. Bhandari, learned Senior Advocate for the institution that the institution was competent to take action in terminating services of the employee even during the pendency of the enquiry. The authorities cited by the learned counsel relates to compulsory retirement of an employee and are not applicable in the facts of the instant case. It is well settled than an employee can be retired compulsorily even during the pendency of departmental inquiry. 'Retiring an employee compulsorily' and 'terminating the services of an employee' are two different expressions. 11. I also do not find any merit in the second contention of the learned Senior Counsel that subjective satisfaction of the managing committee of the institution could not have been interfered. I am of the considered opinion that managing committee of the institution should have patience and ought to have waited till the final conclusion of the inquiry. The act of managing committee in taking decision to terminate the services of the employee can not be termed as 'based on subjective satisfaction'. The decision to terminate the services of the employee was arrived at in contravention of the protection offered under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It was an arbitrary act and could have been interfered with by the learned tribunal. 12. In so far as third submission regarding the negative consequences of reinstatement of the employee is concerned, it is also devoid of any merit. From the material on record it does not appear that the relations between the parties have been strained beyond the point of no return. I do not see any valid reason to conclude that compensation in view of reinstatement and not reinstatement, is warranted in the circumstances of the instant cases. 13. The order of termination of the employee was stigmatic in nature and once the enquiry was initiated it ought to have been concluded. I do not see any valid reason to conclude that compensation in view of reinstatement and not reinstatement, is warranted in the circumstances of the instant cases. 13. The order of termination of the employee was stigmatic in nature and once the enquiry was initiated it ought to have been concluded. During the pendency of enquiry, provisions contained in sub-clause (iii) of second proviso of section 18 could not have been invoked. 14. The question as to what is the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhiwani Central Coop. Bank Ltd. Haryana v. Registrar Coop. Societies Haryana and Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 2757 of 1998 decided on February 20, 2001) . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of the tribunal only if it comes to the conclusion that either the order of the tribunal is contrary to some provisions of law; or the order of the tribunal is based upon certain inadmissible evidence; or the tribunal does not allow certain admissible evidence to be led in; or the conclusion of the tribunal is such which no reasonable man would arrive at. 15. Judge from the above stand-point the impugned order of the learned Tribunal; I do not see any infirmity in the same which could be labelled as a patent error of law on the face of the record requiring interference by the High Court. 16. That takes me to the writ petition No. 2062/2000 filed by the employee to implement the judgment dated October 28, 1999 of the learned Tribunal. The institution ought to have honoured the said judgment of the tribunal as its implementation was never stayed by any court. In not complying with the judgment, the institution acted in utter disregard of the judgment. 17. For the reasons aforesaid writ petition of the institution bearing No. 6279/1999 stands dismissed. Writ petition of the employee bearing No. 2062/2000 is allowed and the institution is directed to implement the judgment dated October 28,1999 of the Tribunal within 15 days from today. The employee shall also be entitled to the costs which is quantified as Rs. 2000/-.Petition of Institution Dismissed With Costs/Petition of Employee Allowed. *******