ORDER K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. CRP. 1031/98 was preferred by the landlord in RCP. 138/91 on the file of the Rent Controller, Kozhikode-I. CRP. 396/98 was filed by the tenant. Since the issues involved in both these cases are same we are disposing of these cases by a common order. 2. We may describe the parties according to their status in RCP. 138/91. Eviction was sought for by the landlord under section 11(2)(b), 11(3), 11(4)(ii), (iii) and (v) of Act 2 of 1965. Rent Control Court allowed eviction under section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(v) of the Act. Appeal was preferred by the landlord as RCA.26/95 against the order of the Rent Control Court refusing eviction under section 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act. Appellate Authority allowed the appeal in part. Appellate Authority confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller as far as section 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act are concerned, however ordered eviction under section 11(2)(b) and 11(4)(v) of the Act. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Appellate Authority in RCA. 26/95 as we have already indicated, landlord has filed CRP. 1031/98 and tenant filed CRP. 396/98. 3. Counsel appearing for the landlord petitioner submitted that the Rent Control court as well as Appellate Authority have committed a grave error in not granting eviction under section 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii) of the Act. Counsel submitted after having found that the tenant is not entitled to get benefit of second proviso to section 11(3) the Rent Control Court as well as the Appellate Authority ought to have allowed the claim of the landlord U/s 11(3) of the Act. Counsel submitted the reasoning adopted by both the authorities for refusing landlord's prayer for own occupation are unsustainable. Counsel also submitted the courts below have committed a grave error in not granting eviction under section 11(4)(ii). Sufficient evidence have been adduced by the landlord to establish that ground as well. Counsel submitted landlord wanted the tenanted premises for doing business in hill produces. Counsel submitted mere fact that he is a partner of Neelikandy Fashion Fabrics, Kalpetta would not be a ground for rejecting his claim for bona fide need. Further, placing reliance on Ext. A15 counsel contended that partnership was dissolved on 31-3-1992. Referring to A5 partnership deed of M/s. I & H Timber Company counsel submitted that the managing Partner of that firm was not the petitioner. Further, placing reliance on Ext. A15 counsel contended that partnership was dissolved on 31-3-1992. Referring to A5 partnership deed of M/s. I & H Timber Company counsel submitted that the managing Partner of that firm was not the petitioner. Referring to A6 counsel also submitted there were several partners in that partnership firm and mere fact that he is also one of the partners does not mean that he is conducting business of his own. Reference was also made to A9 series and A10 series and contended that those documents would show that there was practically no business for the firm during 1992-93 and 1993-94. Counsel also explained away the circumstances under which RCP. 126/88 was filed and the manner in which it was disposed of. Counsel submitted court below has completely misunderstood the circumstances under CRP was filed and disposed off. Ext. B13 is the copy of plaint in O.S. 10/95 of Sub Court, Kozhikode. Counsel explained the circumstances under which the said suit was filed and the way in which his brother had misused the power of attorney executed by him. Placing reliance on Exts. A2 and A3 documents counsel contended that he became the owner of the property in the year 1990 and later he issued A12 notice dated 18-9-1991 claiming eviction of the tenant. Counsel submitted there was no delay in filing the RCP. Placing reliance on the decision of this court in Annamma Paily v. Thomas Mary, 1983 KLT 313 : counsel submitted that the dismissal of earlier petition would not be a bar in filing another petition for eviction. Reference was also made to the decision of the Apex Court in Ammal Chandra Dutt v. IInd Addl. Dist. Judge and others, AIR 1989 SC 255 . In any view counsel pointed out that the mere fact that he was a partner in another partnership firm is no reason to deny his claim for bona fide own occupation. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas, AIR 2000 SC 656 . Counsel also reiterated his contention on 11(4)(iii) as well. 4. Counsel appearing for the respondent-tenant supported the concurrent findings of the courts below under section 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii). Counsel submitted there is no justification in ordering eviction under section 11(4) (v) of the Act. Counsel also reiterated his contention on 11(4)(iii) as well. 4. Counsel appearing for the respondent-tenant supported the concurrent findings of the courts below under section 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii). Counsel submitted there is no justification in ordering eviction under section 11(4) (v) of the Act. Counsel submitted eviction petition was preferred on 12-12-1991 was notice of eviction was dated 18-9-1991. Counsel submitted absolutely there is no evidence to show that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a period of six months as on the date of the petition. Counsel submitted A13 report of the commission dated 9-11-1988 would not show that tenant was not in occupation as on 12-12-1991. Counsel submitted that Exts. X-1 to X-5 relates to the period from 1993 onwards, two years after the filing of the petition. Disconnection notice was also made only in the year 1993. On the other hand, Exts. B6 to B11 would positively show that the building was in occupation of the tenant during the relevant period. Counsel submitted burden is entirely on the landlord to prove that the tenant has ceased to occupy the building continuously for a period of six months without reasonable cause. 5. We have heard counsel on either side at length. We find that the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority have rejected the claim of the landlord under section 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii). At the outset we may point out we find no illegality or irregularity or impropriety in the findings of the authorities below on 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii). There is total lack of evidence on the side of the landlord for establishing those grounds. Consequently we find no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below on 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(iii). Counsel appearing for the landlord attacked the concurrent findings of the court below on 11(3). So also counsel for the tenant attacked the concurrent findings of the court below on 11(4)(v) of Act 2 of 1965. 6. We may examine whether we should interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below under 11(3) as well as 11(4)(v). High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 20 of the Act seldom interferes with the concurrent findings of the courts below. 6. We may examine whether we should interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below under 11(3) as well as 11(4)(v). High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under section 20 of the Act seldom interferes with the concurrent findings of the courts below. In this connection we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court in K.M. Abdul Razzak v. Damodharan, (2000) 5 SCC 369 ; Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bhai (1999)1 SCC 133 , Patel Valmik Himatlal v. Patel Mohanlal Muljibhai, (1998) 7 SCC 383 ; Mudigonda Chandra Mouli Sastry v. Bhimanepalli Bikshalu, (1999) 7 SCC 66 ; Vallampati Kalavathi v. Haji Ismail (2001) 4 SCC 26 etc. The Apex Court however in (2001) 4 SCC 26 held that the expressions "legality" "regularity" or "propriety" are undoubtedly wider than mere correction of jurisdictional error. It was held that even such revisional power cannot be exercised to upset the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the forums below merely on the ground that the High Court is inclined to take a different view. However, it should not be inferred that the concurrent findings of fact can in no case be interfered with in revision. For such interference it has to be shown that the findings recorded by the forums below suffer from any inherent defect or are based on inadmissible or irrelevant materials or are so perverse that no reasonable person will come to such conclusion on the materials. Apex Court has also in Lekh Raj v. Muni Lal , (2001) 2 SCC 762 , held that if there is impropriety and illegality in the impugned order the revisional power could be exercised. The court held in case subsequent event or fact having bearing on the issues or relief in a suit or proceedings to which any party seek to bring on record, the court should not shut its door. All laws and proceedings including functioning of court are in aid to confer justice to all who knocks its door. Apex court also in Shaw Wallace & Co. All laws and proceedings including functioning of court are in aid to confer justice to all who knocks its door. Apex court also in Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Govindas Purushothamdas, (2001) 3 SCC 445 held that the High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceeding, of the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, on examination, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such orders accordingly. 7. In the light of the above legal principles we may examine as to whether we should interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below on 11(3) as well as 11(4)(v). We find the landlord has passed only Xth Standard. He was aged 30 years at the time of filing the petition. He wanted to start a business in hill produces. He has got a specific case that he has no other building of his own to start the said business. It has come out in evidence that he has been in the gulf countries and returned in the year 1987. Facts reveal that he has some interest in an estate where cardamom and other hill produces are grown. Facts also would reveal that he has got some connection with Neelikandy Fashion Fabrics at Kalpetta. He was also a partner in I & H Timber company. There is controversy regarding the question whether partnership business still exists. We need not go into those controversies. Facts would indicate that he has no business of his own. Rent control petition was preferred by the petitioner for vacant building to do his own business. The mere fact he has got interest in other business does not mean that he cannot start his own business. We find that Rent Control Court has rejected the prayer of bona fide need on the ground that the petitioner has got interest in other business and that he was partner of two firms. Law does not prevent partners of other firms indulging in their own business. First of all evidence is lacking in this case to show that petitioner has got interest in two partnership firms by name Neelikandy Fashion Fabrics and M/s. I & H Timber Company. Law does not prevent partners of other firms indulging in their own business. First of all evidence is lacking in this case to show that petitioner has got interest in two partnership firms by name Neelikandy Fashion Fabrics and M/s. I & H Timber Company. Assuming that he has got some interest in partnership business we are of the view that petitioner could conduct his own business dehors his interest in the partnership business. Appellate Authority found that petitioner is placed in affluent circumstance. Appellate Authority also refused the prayer for eviction on the ground of bona fide need on the ground that petitioner had earlier filed RCP. 126/88 and consequently there is no bona fides in the claim. 8. We are of the view this reasoning of the Appellate Authority is completely erroneous. The circumstances under which RCP. 126/88 was dismissed was never examined by the Authorities below. Facts reveal that RCP.126/88 was filed as against a dead person and consequently it was dismissed on 25-11-1989 and no steps were taken for impleading the legal representatives. There was no finding on merits so as to apply principle of res judicata. Further, we find that petitioner had become owner to the tenanted premises only in the year 1990. Reference was made to A2 and A3 documents. Rent control petition was filed on 12-12-1991, prior to that he had issued A12 notice dated 18-9-1991. We are not prepared to say that there is delay in filing the rent control petition. Reasons stated by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority in rejecting the claim of the landlord under sec. 11(3) are perverse and are tainted with illegality and irregularity. 9. We may also in this connection point out both the authorities have concurrently found that the tenant could not establish his claim under the second proviso to section 11(3). Tenant had not produced any evidence to show that he is eking out his livelihood from the income derived from the business conducted in the tenanted premises. Availability of other buildings was proved by the landlord. There is nothing to show that tenant could discharge the burden that those buildings are not reasonably sufficient for his requirement. Both the courts have concurrently found that tenant is not entitled to protection of second proviso to section 11(3). Availability of other buildings was proved by the landlord. There is nothing to show that tenant could discharge the burden that those buildings are not reasonably sufficient for his requirement. Both the courts have concurrently found that tenant is not entitled to protection of second proviso to section 11(3). We concur with the view of the court below on the second proviso to Sec. 11(3). In view of the above mentioned circumstance we are of the view the courts below have committed a grave error in rejecting the claim of the landlord under section 11(3) of the Rent control Act. We therefore reverse the finding of the courts below and allow the claim of the petitioner under section 11(3). 10. We may now examine the question whether the courts below have committed any error in ordering eviction under section 11(4)(v). We may indicate that the rent control petition was filed on 12-12-1991. In order to claim eviction under section 11(4)(v) burden is entirely on the landlord to show that tenant ceased to occupy the building continuously for six months without reasonable cause before the date of the filing of the petition. Apart from the interested testimony of the landlord no independent evidence was adduced by the landlord to show that tenant ceased to occupy the building within the meaning of Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. Landlord did not take any steps to take out a commission to show that the tenant ceased to occupy the building. Neighbours of the tenanted premises were not examined. On the other hand, reliance was placed on A13 commission report dated 9-11-1988. Commission report at best would show that the situation prior to 1988. No reliance could be placed on A13. X-1 to X-5 and the same would not show that tenant had ceased to occupy the building prior to the filing of the petition. Mere fact that electricity was disconnected would not mean that the tenant was not conducting business in the tenanted premises. We are of the view there is total lack of evidence in this case to show that the tenant ceased to occupy the building continuously for a period of six months prior to 12-12-1991. Exts. X-1 to X-5 or Ext. A13 would not be sufficient to establish cessation of occupation. We are of the view courts below have committed to grave error in ordering eviction under Section 11(4)(v). Exts. X-1 to X-5 or Ext. A13 would not be sufficient to establish cessation of occupation. We are of the view courts below have committed to grave error in ordering eviction under Section 11(4)(v). We are therefore inclined to reverse the finding of both the authorities on section 11(4)(v). We are therefore inclined to allow C.R.P. 1031 of 1998 holding that the landlord has established the ground for eviction under section 11(3) of Act 2 of 1965. C.R.P. 396 of 1998 is also allowed reversing the finding of the courts below under section 11(4)(v). Both the revisions are disposed of as above. However, consider the facts and circumstances of the case tenant is given three months time to vacate the premises.